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Motivation: Quiet revolutions very quick
There is a cartoon in which a father sits next to a boy of about 
twelve and says: ‘You do my website... and I’ll do your home-
work.’ It accurately depicts the imbalance in media competency 
across today’s generations, typically articulated in the vague and 
paradoxical terms: “digital natives” (for the young) and “digital 
immigrants” (for the over thirties). Historical research into read-
ing has shown that such distinctions are by no means new: 250 
years ago, when children began to be sent to school, it was not 
uncommon for twelve year olds to write the maid’s love letters – 
an example that also demonstrates that conflicts between media 
access and youth protection were already in existence in earlier 
times. Is the father in the cartoon the maid of those far off times? 
Has nothing else changed other than the medium and the year?
What has changed above all is the speed and the magni-
tude of the development of new media. Few would have imag-
ined 20 years ago how radically the Internet would one day alter 
the entirety of our daily lives, and fewer still could have pre-
dicted ten years ago how profoundly Web 2.0 would change the 
Internet itself. Since then, traditional ideas about identity, com-
munication, knowledge, privacy, friendship, copyright, advertis-
ing, democracy, and political engagement have fundamentally 
shifted. The neologisms that new media have generated already 
testify to this: They blend what were formerly opposites — pro-
sumer, slacktivism, viral marketing; turn traditional concepts 
upside-down — copyleft, crowdfunding, distant reading; and 
assert entirely new principles — citizen journalism, filter bubble, 
numerical narratives.
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Twenty years are like a century in web-time. In 1996 the 
new media’s pioneers declared the Independence of Cyberspace 
and asked, ‘on behalf of the future,’ the governments of the old 
world, these ‘weary giants of flesh and steel,’ to leave them 
alone.1 Following this declaration others bestowed the new 
medium with the power to build its own nation. The ‘citizens of 
the Digital Nation,’ says a Wired article of 1997, are ‘young, edu-
cated, affluent […] libertarian, materialistic, tolerant, rational, 
technologically adept, disconnected from conventional political 
organizations.’2 The ‘postpolitical’ position of these ‘new liber-
tarians’ has since been coined the Californian Ideology or Cyber 
Libertarianism – they don’t merely despise the government 
of the old world in the new medium, they despise government 
pure and simple.
Two decades later Internet activists and theorists are turning 
to the old nation state governments, asking them to solve prob-
lems in the online world, be it the right to be forgotten, the pro-
tection of privacy and net-neutrality, or the threatening power of 
the new mega players on the Internet.3 Meanwhile the political 
representatives of the ‘Governments of the Industrial World’ – 
which is now called the Information Society – meet regularly to 
discuss the governance of Cyberspace – which is now called the 
Internet. Governments, once at war with the Internet, are now 
mining it for data in order to better understand, serve, and con-
trol their citizens.4
Theorists have long scaled down their former enthusiasm for 
the liberating and democratizing potential of the Internet and 
have begun addressing its dark side: commercialization, sur-
veillance, filter bubble, depoliticization, quantification, waste of 
time, loss of deep attention, being alone together, Nomophobia 
and FOMO (i.e. no mobile-phobia and the fear of missing out). 
Those who still praise the Internet as an extension of the public 
sphere, as an affirmation of deliberative democracy, as a power 
for collective intelligence, or even as identity workshop seem 
to lack empirical data or the skill of dialectical thinking. Have 
tables turned only for the worse?
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It all depends on who one asks. If one looks for a more posi-
tive account, one should talk to entrepreneurs and software 
developers, to “digital natives”, or even social scientists rather 
than addressing anyone invested in the Humanities. The former 
will praise our times and produce lists of “excitements”: informa-
tion at your finger tips whenever, wherever, and about whatever; 
ubiquitous computing and frictionless sharing; new knowledge 
about medical conditions and social circumstances; the custom-
ization of everything; and a couple of ends: of the gatekeeper, the 
expert, the middleman, even of the author as we knew it. And the 
next big things are just around the corner: IOT, Industry 4.0, 3D 
printing, augmented reality, intelligent dust …
No matter what perspective one entertains, there is no doubt 
that we live in exciting times. Ours is the age of many ‘silent 
revolutions’ triggered by startups and the research labs of big 
IT companies. These are revolutions that quietly – without much 
societal awareness let alone discussion – alter the world we live 
in profoundly. Another ten or five years, and self-tracking will 
be as normal and inevitable as having a Facebook account and a 
mobile phone. Our bodies will constantly transmit data to the big 
aggregation in the cloud, facilitated by wearable devices sitting 
directly at or beneath the skin. Permanent recording and auto-
matic sharing – be it with the help of smart glasses, smart con-
tact lenses, or the Oculus Rift – will provide unabridged memory, 
shareable and analyzable precisely as represented in an episode 
of the British TV Sci-Fi series Black Mirror: “The Entire History 
of You”. The digitization of everything will allow for comprehen-
sive quantification; predictive analytics and algorithmic regula-
tion will prove themselves as effective and indispensable ways to 
govern modern mass society. Not too early to speculate, not too 
early to remember.
Methodology: Differences disclosed by 
reiteration
If a new medium has been around for a while it is good to look 
back and remember how we expected it to develop ten, twenty 
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years ago. If the medium is still in the process of finding and 
reinventing itself, it is good to discuss the current state of its 
art and its possible future(s). The book at hand engages in the 
business of looking back, discusses the status quo, and predicts 
future developments. It offers an inventory of expectations: 
expectations that academic observers and practitioners of new 
media entertained in the past and are developing for the future. 
The observations shared in this book are conversations about 
digital media and culture that engage issues in the four central 
fields of politics and government, algorithm and censorship, art 
and aesthetics, as well as media literacy and education. Among 
the keywords discussed are: data mining, algorithmic regula-
tion, the imperative to share, filter bubble, distant reading, 
power browsing, deep attention, transparent reader, interactive 
art, participatory culture.
These issues are discussed by different generations – par-
ticularly those old enough to remember and to historicize cur-
rent developments in and perspectives on digital media – with 
different national backgrounds: scholars in their forties, fifties, 
sixties and seventies mostly from the US, but also from France, 
Brazil, and Denmark. The aim was also to offer a broad range of 
different people in terms of their relationship to new media. All 
interviewees research, teach, and create digital technology and 
culture, but do so with different foci, intentions, intensities, and 
intellectual as well as practical backgrounds. As a result the book 
is hardly cohesive and highlights the multiplicity in perspectives 
that exists among scholars of digital media. A key aspect of the 
book is that the interviews have been conducted by a German 
scholar of media studies with an academic background in liter-
ary and cultural studies. This configuration ensures not only a 
discussion of many aspects of digital media culture in light of 
German critical theory but also fruitful associations and connec-
tions to less well known German texts such as Max Picard’s 1948 
radio critique The World of Silence or Hans Jonas’ 1979 Search of 
an Ethics for the Technological Age.
Another key aspect of this collection of interviews is its struc-
ture, which allows for a hypertextual reading. The interviews 
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were mostly conducted by email and for each field, some ques-
tions were directed to all interviewees. They were given com-
plete freedom to choose those relevant to their own work and 
engagements. Other questions were tailored to interviewees’ 
specific areas of interest, prompting differing requests for fur-
ther explanation. As a result, this book identifies different takes 
on the same issue, while enabling a diversity of perspectives 
when it comes to the interviewees’ special concerns. Among 
the questions offered to everybody were: What is your favored 
neologism of digital media culture? If you could go back in his-
tory of new media and digital culture in order to prevent some-
thing from happening or somebody from doing something, what 
or who would it be? If you were a minister of education, what 
would you do about media literacy? Other recurrent questions 
address the relationship between cyberspace and government, 
the Googlization, quantification and customization of every-
thing, and the culture of sharing and transparency. The section 
on art and aesthetics evaluates the former hopes for hypertext 
and hyperfiction, the political facet of digital art, the transition 
from the “passive” to “active” and from “social” to “transparent 
reading,”; the section on media literacy discusses the loss of deep 
reading, the prospect of “distant reading” and “algorithmic criti-
cism” as well as the response of the university to the upheaval 
of new media and the expectations or misgivings respectively 
towards Digital Humanities.
That conversations cover the issues at hand in a very personal 
and dialogic fashion renders this book more accessible than the 
typical scholarly treatment of the topics. In fact, if the inter-
viewer pushes back and questions assumptions or assertions, 
this may cut through to the gist of certain arguments and pro-
voke explicit statements. Sometimes, however, it is better to let 
the other talk. It can be quite revealing how a question is under-
stood or misunderstood and what paths somebody is taking in 
order to avoid giving an answer. Uncontrolled digression sheds 
light on specific ways of thinking and may provide a glimpse 
into how people come to hold a perspective rather foreign to our 
own. Sometimes, this too is part of the game, the questions or 
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comments of the interviewer clearly exceed the lengths of the 
interviewee’s response. The aim was to have the interviewer and 
the interviewee engage in a dialogue rather than a mere Q&A 
session. Hence, the responses not only trigger follow-up ques-
tions but are sometimes also followed by remarks that may be 
longer than the statement to which they react and the comment 
they elicit. The result is a combination of elaborated observa-
tions on digital media and culture, philosophical excurses into 
cultural history and human nature, as well as outspoken state-
ments about people, events and issues in the field of new media.
Media Literacy: From how things work 
to what they do to us
The overall objective of this book is media literacy, along with 
the role that Digital Humanities and Digital Media Studies can 
play in this regard. Media literacy, which in the discourse on 
digital media does not seem to attract the attention it deserves, 
is – in the US as well as in Germany – mostly conceptualized with 
respect to the individual using new media. The prevalent ques-
tion in classrooms and tutorials is: what sorts of things can I do 
with new media and how do I do this most effectively? However, 
the achievement of media competency can only ever be a part of 
media literacy: competency must be accompanied by the ability 
to reflect upon media. The other important and too rarely asked 
question is: what is new media doing to us? As Rodney Jones puts 
it in his interview: ‘The problem with most approaches to literacy 
is that they focus on “how things work” (whether they be written 
texts or websites or mobile devices) and teach literacy as some-
thing like the skill of a machine operator (encoding and decod-
ing). Real literacy is more about “how people work” — how they 
use texts and media and semiotic systems to engage in situated 
social practices and enact situated social identities.’
The shift from me to us means a move from skills and voca-
tional training towards insights and understanding with respect 
to the social, economic, political, cultural and ethical impli-
cations of digital media. Understood in this broader sense, in 
Introduction 15
terms of anthropology and cultural studies, media literacy is not 
inclined to the generation of frictionless new media usage, but 
is determined to explore which cultural values and social norms 
new media create or negate and how we, as a society, should 
understand and value this. Media literacy in this sense, is, for 
example, not only concerned with how to read a search engine’s 
ranking list but also with how the retrieval of information based 
on the use of a search engine changes the way we perceive and 
value knowledge.
The urge to develop reflective media literacy rather than 
just vocational knowhow raises the question about the appro-
priate institutional frameworks within which such literacy is 
to be offered. Is Digital Humanities – the new ‘big thing’ in the 
Humanities at large – be the best place? The qualified compound 
phrase “sounds like what one unacquainted with the whole issue 
might think it is: humanistic inquiry that in some way relates 
to the digital.”5 For people acquainted with the ongoing debate 
(and with grammar), digital humanities is first and foremost 
what the adjective-plus-noun combination suggests: ‘a project of 
employing the computer to facilitate humanistic research,’ as Jay 
David Bolter, an early representative of Digital Media Studies, 
puts it, ‘work that had been done previously by hand.’ Digital 
Humanities is, so far, computer-supported humanities rather 
than humanities discussing the cultural impact of digital media. 
Some academics even fear Digital Humanities may be a kind of 
Trojan horse, ultimately diverting our attention not only from 
critical philosophical engagement but also from engaging with 
digital media itself.6 Others consider, for similar reasons, digi-
tal humanists the ‘golden retrievers of the academy’: they never 
get into dogfights because they hardly ever develop theories that 
anyone could dispute.7
To become a breed of this kind in the academic kennel schol-
ars and commentators have to shift their interest ‘away from 
thinking big thoughts to forging new tools, methods, materi-
als, techniques …’8 In this sense, Johanna Drucker proposes 
an interesting, rigorous distinction of responsibilities: ‘Digital 
Humanities is the cook in the kitchen and [...] Digital Media 
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Studies is the restaurant critic.’9 The commotion of the kitchen 
versus the glamour of the restaurant may sound demeaning to 
digital humanists. Would it be better to consider them waiters 
connecting the cook with the critic? Would it be better to see 
them as the new rich (versus the venerable, though financially 
exhausted aristocracy) as Alan Liu does: ‘will they [the digital 
humanists] once more be merely servants at the table whose 
practice is perceived to be purely instrumental to the main work 
of the humanities’?10
The more Digital Humanities advances from its origin as a 
tool of librarians towards an approach to the digital as an object 
of study, the more Digital Humanities grows into a second type 
or a third wave11, the more it will be able to provide a home for 
Digital Media Studies or sit with it at the table. The methods 
and subjects of both may never be identical. After all Digital 
Media Studies is less interested in certain word occurrences in 
Shakespeare than in the cultural implications of social network 
sites and their drive towards quantification. However, interests 
overlap when, for example, the form and role of self-narration 
on social network sites is discussed on the grounds of statisti-
cal data, or when the relationship between obsessive sharing and 
short attention span is proven by quantitative studies. The best 
way to do Digital Media Studies is to combine philosophical con-
cerns with empirical data. The best way to do Digital Humanities 
is to trigger hermeneutic debates that live off of the combination 
of algorithmic analysis and criticism.
Summary: digital libertarianism, governmental 
regulation, phatic communication
Naturally, interviews are not the ideal exercise yard for “golden 
retrievers.” The dialogic, less formal nature of an interview 
makes it very different from the well-crafted essays shrouded in 
opaque or ambiguous formulations. A dialogue allows for provo-
cation. As it turns out, there are a few angry men and women 
of all ages out there: angry about how digital media are chang-
ing our culture, angry at the people behind this change. In an 
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article about Facebook you wouldn’t, as John Cayley does in the 
interview, accuse Mark Zuckerberg of a ‘shy, but arrogant and 
infantile misunderstanding of what it is to be a social human.’ In 
a paper on higher education you wouldn’t, as bluntly, as Mihail 
Nadin does, state that the university, once contributing ‘to a 
good understanding of the networks,’ today ‘only delivers the 
tradespeople for all those start-ups that shape the human con-
dition through their disruptive technologies way more than uni-
versities do.’
There is no shortage of critical and even pessimistic views 
in these interviews. However, there are also rather neutral or 
even optimistic perspectives. One example is the expectation 
that personalization ‘becomes interactive in the other direc-
tion as well,’ as Ulrik Ekman notes, ‘so that Internet mediation 
becomes socialized rather than just having people become “per-
sonalized” and normatively “socialized” by the web medium.’ 
However, most interviewees are more critical than enthusiastic. 
This seems to be inevitable since we are interviewing academics 
rather than software engineers, entrepreneurs or shareholders. 
To give an idea of what issues are of concern and how they are 
addressed, here are some of the findings on a few of the key-
words listed above.
1. Regarding the field of government, surveillance and control, it 
does not come as a surprise that obsessive sharing and big data 
analysis are considered in relation to privacy and surveillance. 
There is the fear that ‘our “personal” existence will become pub-
lic data to be consumed and used but not to get to understand us 
as individuals through a daring but not implausible comparison: 
‘distance reading might become an analogy for distance rela-
tionships. No need to read the primary text—no need to know 
the actual person at all.’ (Kathleen Kolmar) As absurd as it may 
sound, the problem starts with the distant relationship between 
the surveilling and the surveilled. A fictional but plausible case 
in point is the Oscar winning German movie The Lives of Others 
by Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck about a Stasi officer who, 
drawn by the alleged subversive’s personality, finally sides with 
18 Roberto Simanowski
his victim. Such a switch can’t happen with an algorithm as “offi-
cer”. Algorithms are immune to human relation and thus the 
final destination of any ‘adiaphorized’ society. Robert Kowalski’s 
famous definition ‘Algorithm = Logic + Control’ needs the adden-
dum: minus moral concerns.
While there are good reasons to fear the coming society 
of algorithmic regulation, many people – at the top and at the 
bottom and however inadvertently – are already pushing for it. 
Since – as any manager knows – quantification is the reliable 
partner of control, the best preparation for the algorithmic reign 
is the quantitative turn of/in everything: a shift from words to 
numbers, i.e. from the vague, ambiguous business of interpret-
ing somebody or something to the rigid regime of statistics. 
Today, the imperative of quantification does not only travel top 
down. There is a culture of self-tracking and a growing industry 
of supporting devices, whose objective is a reinterpretation of 
the oracular Delphic saying ‘Know Thyself,’ aptly spelled out on 
the front page of quantifiedself.com: ‘Self Knowledge Through 
Numbers.’ Even if one is part of this movement and shares the 
belief in the advantages of crowd-sourced knowledge, one can’t 
neglect the ‘danger that self-monitoring can give rise to new 
regimens of governmentality and surveillance’ and that ‘the rise 
of self-tracking allows governments and health care systems 
to devolve responsibility for health onto individuals’ (Rodney 
Jones). The original name of one of the life-logging applications, 
OptimizeMe, clearly suggests the goal to create ‘neoliberal, 
responsibilized subjectivities’12 ultimately held accountable for 
problems that may have systemic roots. It suggests it so boldly, 
that the name was soon softened to Optimized.
To link back to the beginning of this introduction: It may be 
problematic to speak of a “digital nation,” however, its “citizens” 
could eventually succeed in changing all nations according to the 
logic of the digital. David Golumbia calls it the ‘cultural logic of 
computation’ and concludes that Leibniz’ perspective, ‘the view 
that everything in the mind, or everything important in society, 
can be reduced to mathematical formulae and logical syllogisms,’ 
has finally prevailed over Voltaire’s ‘more expansive version of 
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rationalism that recognizes that there are aspects to reason out-
side of calculation.’ Nadin even speaks of a new Faustian deal 
where Faust conjures the Universal Computer: ‘I am willing to 
give up better Judgment for the Calculation that will make the 
future the present of all my wishes and desires fulfilled.’
The redefinition of self-knowledge as statistics demonstrates 
that transformation often begins with terminology. However, 
the semiological guerrilla or détournement is not conceptual-
ized as resistance against the powerful but is being used by the 
most powerful corporations.13 An example is the term “hacker” 
which is now even found as self-description for members of gov-
ernments, as Erick Felinto notes. Brazil’s ‘most progressive for-
mer minister of culture, Gilberto Gil, once said: “I’m a hacker, 
a minister-hacker”.’ Regardless how appropriate this claim was 
for Gil, Felinto seems to be correct when he holds that ‘in a time 
when big corporations are increasingly colonizing cyberspace, 
we need to imbue people with the hacker ethics of freedom, cre-
ativity and experimentation.’ However, creativity and experimen-
tation are not inherently innocent as other interviewees state. 
‘Hackers may maintain an agnostic position concerning the sig-
nificance or value of the data=capta that their algorithms bring 
into new relations with human order or, for that matter, human 
disorder,’ Cayley holds, assuming that hackers may help the vec-
toralists of “big software” discover where and how to exploit 
profitable vectors of attention and transaction. Golumbia goes 
even further in expressing a reservation with regard to hackers 
and “hacktivism” pointing out the underlying ‘right libertari-
anism,’ the implicit celebration of power at the personal level, 
and ‘its exercise without any discussion of how power functions 
in our society.’ In addition one has to remember that freedom, 
creativity and experimentation all are terms also highly appre-
ciated in any start-up and IT company. The “big corporations” 
that Felinto refers to have already hacked the term hacker: 
‘many tech business leaders today call themselves hackers; not 
only does Mark Zuckerberg call himself a hacker, but Facebook 
makes “hacking” a prime skill for its job candidates, and all its 
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technical employees are encouraged to think of themselves as 
“hackers”’ (Golumbia).
Have they hacked the very independence of cyberspace? For 
many the Internet today means Google and Facebook: billion 
dollar companies as the default interface on billions of screens 
teaching us to see the world according to their rules. The prob-
lem is now, as Nick Montfort states, ‘that corporations have 
found a way to profitably insinuate themselves into personal 
publishing, communication, and information exchange, to make 
themselves essential to the communications we used to manage 
ourselves. As individuals we used to run BBSs, websites, blogs, 
forums, archives of material for people to download, and so on. 
Now, partly for certain technical reasons and partly because 
we’ve just capitulated, most people rely on Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, Google, and so on.’
The next wave of such “counter-revolution” is already on its 
way and it also starts in the academic realm itself. It is signifi-
cant and ‘intolerable,’ as Ekman states, that projects regarding 
the internet of things and ubiquitous computing ‘are pursued 
with no or far too little misgivings, qualms, or scruples as to 
their systemic invisibility, inaccessibility, and their embed-
ded “surveillance” that will have no problems reaching right 
through your home, your mail, your phone, your clothes, your 
body posture and temperature, your face and emotional expres-
sivity, your hearing aid, and your pacemaker.’ One of the things, 
for which Ekman wishes more qualms and scruples, is ‘perva-
sive healthcare’ which, even in a small country like Denmark, a 
handful of research groups work on. Ekman’s warning invokes 
the next blockbuster dystopia of our society in 30 or 20 years: 
the ‘massive distribution and use of smart computational things 
and wirelessness might well soon alter our notion of the home, 
healthcare, and how to address the elderly in nations with a 
demography tilting in that direction.’
The driving force of progress is, apart from power and 
money, efficiency and convenience. This becomes clear in light 
of the success story of two examples of the ‘transaction econ-
omy’ which itself is the natural outcome of social media: Uber 
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and airbnb. As Nadin points out: ‘In the transaction economy 
ethics is most of the time compromised’, i.e. Uber disrupts the 
taxi services and all labor agreements, benefits and job security 
that may exist in this field. However, it is useless to blame the 
Uber driver for killing safe and well-paid jobs: What shall she do 
after she lost her safe and well-paid job in the hotel business? It 
is the tyranny of the market that we are dealing with and there 
is little one can do if one tends more toward Hayek’s economic 
philosophy than to Keynes’. The situation is comparable to that 
of East-Germany in the early 1990s immediately after the fall of 
the Berlin wall: people bought the better products from West-
Germany undermining their own jobs in archaic, inefficient com-
panies that were not able to compete and survive without the 
help of protectionism or consumer patriotism. Maybe new media 
demand in a similar way a discussion of the extent to which we 
want to give up the old system. If we don’t want the market alone 
to determine society’s future we need discussions, decisions, and 
regulations. We may want ‘to put politics and social good above 
other values, and then to test via democratic means whether 
technological systems themselves conform to those values,’ as 
Golumbia suggests.
The result could be a state-powered Luddism to fight reck-
less technical innovations on the ground of ethical concerns and 
political decisions. The response to the “hacking” of cyberspace 
by corporations is the “embrace” of the government as the shield 
against the ‘neoliberal entrepreneurialism, with its pseudo-
individualism and pro-corporate ideology, and the inequities 
that intensify with disbalances of economic power’ (Johanna 
Drucker). While in preparation for Industry 4.0 the “homo 
fabers” involved expect the government to pave the way for 
economic development, the observing “Hamlets” at humanities 
departments call for interventions and debate. But it is true, ‘the 
fact that many Google employees honestly think they know what 
is good for the rest of society better than society itself does is 
very troubling’ (Golumbia). The soft version of Neo-Luddites are 
Federal Commissions that do not blindly impede but consciously 
control innovations. Given the fact that computer technologies 
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‘are now openly advertised as having life-altering effects as 
extreme as, or even more extreme than, some drugs’ it is only 
logical to request a FDA for computers, as Golumbia suggests, or 
to wish the ‘FCC to protect us against the domination by private 
enterprise and corporate interests,’ as Drucker does.
While it appears that the issue of corporations and regula-
tions could be fixed with the right political will and power, other 
problems seem to be grounded in the nature of the Internet itself 
– such as the issue of political will and power. The political role of 
the Internet has been debated at least since newspapers enthu-
siastically and prematurely ran the headlines: ‘In Egypt, Twitter 
trumps torture’ and ‘Facebook Revolution’. The neologisms 
“slacktivism” and “dataveillance” counter euphemisms such as 
“citizen journalism” or “digital agora”. Jürgen Habermas – whose 
concept of the public sphere has been referred to many times and 
not only by German Internet theorists – is rather skeptical about 
the contribution digital media can make to democratic discourse. 
In his 2008 essay Political Communication in Media Society: Does 
Democracy still have an Epistemic Dimension?, Habermas holds 
that the asymmetric system of traditional mass media offers a 
better foundation for deliberative, participatory democracy than 
the bidirectional Internet, since the fragmented public sphere 
online and the operational modus of laypeople obstruct an inclu-
sive and rigorous debate of the pros and cons of specific issues. 
The much objurgated or at least ignored experts once forced us 
to avoid the easier way and cope with complex analysis of a polit-
ical issue. Today, after the liberation from such “expertocracy,” 
we register a dwindling willingness to engage with anything 
that is difficult and demanding such as counter arguments or 
just complex (“complicated” and “boring”) meditations. Not only 
is the democratic potential of the Internet questionable because 
now ISIS is using social media to recruit supporters, but also 
because the Internet ‘does not “force” individuals to engage with 
a wider array of political opinions and in many cases makes it 
very easy for individuals to do the opposite’ – whereas before, in 
the age of centralized mass media, there was ‘a very robust and 
very interactive political dialogue in the US’ (Golumbia).
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The Internet not only decentralizes political discussion, 
it also distracts from it by burying the political under the per-
sonal and commercial. Yes, there are political weblogs and yes, 
the Internet makes it easy to attain, compare, check information 
free from traditional gatekeepers. However, the applied linguist 
also underlines the ongoing shift from Foucaultian ‘orders of 
discourse’ to Deleuzian ‘societies of control’: ‘Opportunities to 
“express oneself” are just as constrained as before, only now by 
the discursive economies of sites like Facebook and YouTube.’ 
(Jones) But how much of the information processed online each 
day is political anyway? How much of it is meaningless distrac-
tion? What Felinto affirms most likely echoes the belief of many 
cultural critics: ‘Instead of focusing on the production of infor-
mation and meaning, we’re moving towards a culture of enter-
tainment. We want to experience sensations, to have fun, to be 
excited. If silence is becoming impossible, meaning also seems to 
be in short supply theses days.’
2. Fun, sensation, entertainment are effective ways to occupy, 
or numb, brain time. As Adorno once famously said: Amusement 
is the liberation from thought and negation. Adorno’s equation 
and Felinto’s observation link the political to the psychologi-
cal and shift the focus to issues of deep reading and attention 
span. Another very effective form of depolitisization is the sub-
version of the attention span and the skill of complex thinking, 
both needed in order to engage thoroughly with political issues. 
The obvious terms to describe the threat are “power browsing”, 
“multi tasking”, “ambient attention”. The less obvious, most par-
adoxical and now quite robust term is “hypertext”. It is robust 
because it doesn’t depend on the user’s approach to digital media 
but is embedded in the technical apparatus of these media. The 
multi-linear structure of the Internet is one of its essential fea-
tures – and possibly one of the most reliable threats to com-
plex thinking.
This is ironic, since it was precisely hypertext technol-
ogy which, in the 1990s, was celebrated not only as liberation 
from the “tyranny of the author” but also as destabilization of 
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the signifier and as highlighting the ambivalence and relativity 
of propositions. Hypertext was seen as an ally in the effort to 
promote and practice reflection and critical thinking; some even 
saw it as a revolution of irony and skepticism14. Today hyper-
text technology – and its cultural equivalent hyper-reading – 
appears, by contrast, as the practice of nervous, inpatient read-
ing, discouraging a sustained engagement with the text at hand 
and thus eventually and inevitably hindering deep thinking; an 
updated version of ‘amusement’ in Adorno’s theory of the culture 
industry. Jay David Bolter – who agrees that the literary hyper-
text culture some academics were envisioning at the end of the 
20th century never came to be – considers the popularization of 
hypertext in the form of the WWW ‘a triumph of hypertext not 
limited to or even addressed by the academic community.’ How 
welcome is this unexpected triumph given that it contributes 
to the trend, noted by Felinto, of ubiqutious ‘stupidification’ in 
Bernard Stiegler’s characterization?
When it comes to issues such as attention span and deep 
reading, academics respond as teachers having their specific, 
anecdotal classroom experiences. While the extent to which 
Google, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia and other digital tools of 
information or distraction make us stupid is debatable, there 
is the assertion – for example by neuroscientist Maryanne Wolf 
as popularized in Nicholas Carr’s book The Shallows: What the 
Internet is Doing to Our Brains – that multitasking and power 
browsing make people unlearn deep reading and consequently 
curtail their capacity for deep thinking. Such a judgment has 
been countered by other neuroscientists and popular writers, 
who hold that new media increase brain activity and equip digital 
natives to process information much faster. The debate of course 
reminds us of earlier discussions in history concerning the cog-
nitive consequences of media use. The German keywords are 
Lesesucht (reading addiction) which was deplored in the late 18th 
century and Kinoseuche (cinema plague) which broke out in the 
early 20th century. Famous is the defense of the cinema as prepa-
ration for life in the modern world and put forward by Walter 
Benjamin in his essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
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Reproduction. While others complain that the moving image 
impedes thought, Benjamin applauded the shock experience of 
the montage as a ‘heightened presence of mind’ required for the 
age of acceleration.
Those who have not read other texts by Benjamin may be 
tempted to refer to his contrary praise of cinema (contrary, rela-
tive to all the condemnations of the new medium by conserva-
tives) when insisting on the beneficial effects of new media 
for cognition. Others may point to the difference between 
Geistesgegenwart (presence of mind), that Benjamin sees 
increased by cinema, and Geistestiefe (deep thinking). The 
shift from deep to hyper reading resembles the shift from deep 
Erfahrung (interpreted experience) to shallow Erlebnis (lived 
experience) that Benjamin detected and criticized in other 
essays. Processing more information faster in order to safely get 
to the other side of a busy street is very different from digesting 
information so that it still means something to us the next day. 
This meaning-to-us is at stake in a medial ecosystem that favors 
speed and mass over depth.
If the ‘templates of social networking sites such as Facebook 
constitute a messy compromise between information and spec-
tacle,’ as Bolter notes, one may, with Bolter, place his hope on 
text-based media such as WhatsApp and Twitter: ‘The baroque 
impulse toward spectacle and sensory experience today seems 
to be in a state of permanent but productive tension with the 
impulse for structured representation and communication.’ On 
the other hand, the templates of these media (140 signs or less) 
do not encourage the transmission of complex information nor 
the engagement in deep discussion. These are “phatic technolo-
gies“15 good for building and maintaining relationships, good 
for fun, sensation, and entertainment. Whether this is reason 
enough to be alarmed, Bolter will discuss in his next book, The 
Digital Plenitude, arguing that we experience different forms 
of cultural expressions which are not reconcilable and holding 
that ‘we have to understand that outside our community this dis-
course [about what kind of cultural standards we have to pursue] 
isn’t necessarily going to make much sense.’ Bolter’s conclusion 
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is radical beyond postmodernism and contrary to any culture 
pessimism: ‘That’s exactly what people like Nicholas Carr on the 
popular level or some conservative academics on the scholarly 
level are concerned about when they complain about the loss of 
reflective reading or the ability to think and make arguments.’
For many addressed by Bolter, Wikipedia is one of the red 
flags concerning the cultural implications of digital media. The 
concern is mostly directed towards the accuracy of a crowd-
sourced encyclopedia vs. one written by experts. However, sev-
eral studies suggest that Wikipedia’s score compared to “offi-
cial” encyclopedia is not as bad as usually assumed. There are 
other worries: What does it mean when Wikipedia “intends to be 
and has partly succeeded at being the single site for the totality 
of human knowledge” (Golumbia)? What does it mean when an 
encyclopedia rather than monographs or essays becomes the only 
source students consult today? How will it change the culture of 
knowledge when one encyclopedia plus search engines become 
the prevalent form for presenting and perceiving knowledge?
One result of the new approach to knowledge is known to 
many teachers who discover that students today have a ‚shorter 
concentration span’ and favor audio-visual information over 
reading (Willeke Wendrich); that they ‘want instant and brief 
responses to very complex questions’ (Kolmar); and that their 
‘moan-threshold’ for reading-assignments has fallen from 20 to 
10 pages: ‘Deep reading is increasingly viewed as an educational 
necessity, not something done outside the classroom, for plea-
sure or personal learning’ (Diane Favro). Katherine N. Hayles, 
in her article in Profession “Hyper and Deep Attention: The 
Generational Divide in Cognitive Modes”, shares a similar sense 
of these questions already in 2007. Others may have better expe-
riences or see the reason less in digital media than in the move 
of higher education towards the type of instrumentalism found in 
vocational training. They may be convinced that ‘the era of deep 
attention is largely a fantasy that has been projected backwards 
to romanticize a world that never existed’ and point to teenag-
ers playing videogames: ‘their rapt attention, complex strategy 
making, and formidable attention to detail’ (Todd Presner). Or 
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they may remind us that the “deep critical attention” of print lit-
eracy did not prevent centuries of war, genocide, and environ-
mental devastation and imagine their students ‘rolling their eyes 
at being called stupid by a generation that has created the eco-
nomic, political, social and environmental catastrophe we now 
find ourselves in’ (Jones).
Stiegler, who translates Carr’s concerns into political lan-
guage and detects a threat to society if the capability of criti-
cal attention is compromised, speaks of the digital as opium for 
the masses, an expanding addiction to constant sensual stimu-
lation. Stiegler considers the digital a pharmakon – which can 
be either medicine or poison depending on its use – ‚prescribed 
by sellers of services, the dealers of digital technology.’ He does 
not accuse Google or other big Internet-companies of bad inten-
tions but blames us, the academics, who did not ‚make it our job 
to produce a digital pharmacology and organology.’ While the 
theoretical implications of this task are ‚new forms of high-level 
research’ of rather than with digital instruments, one pragmatic 
facet of such digital pharmacology is a certain form of media 
abstinence in order to develop real media literacy: ‘Children 
should first be absolutely versed in grammar and orthography 
before they deal with computation. Education in school should 
follow the historical order of alteration of media, i.e. you begin 
with drawing, continue with writing, you go on to photography, 
for example, and then you use the computer which would not be 
before students are 15 or 16.’
Other interviewees, however, suggest that all elementary 
school kids should learn to program and to ‘create and critique 
data sets’ (Drucker) or object: ‚Stiegler’s approach of “adoption—
no!” may be feasible for very young pre-schoolers, it becomes 
ineffective, and probably impossible, for children older than five 
as they become exposed to school, classmates, and other influ-
ences outside of the home.’ (Hayles) The notion of peer pres-
sure is certainly operative and it is also true that the tradition 
of deep attention always ‚required the support and nurturing of 
institutions—intellectual discourse and an educated elite’ and 
that therefore today the role of ‚educators at every level, from 
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kindergarten through graduate school, should be to make con-
nections between contemporary practices, for example browsing 
and surfing the web, and the disciplined acquisition of knowl-
edge’ (Hayles). However, one does wonder whether children have 
to be exposed to computers as early as advocates of classrooms 
decked with technology maintain, if it is so easy to pick up the 
skills to use computers and so difficult to learn the skill of “deep 
reading.” It is also worth noticing in this context that those who 
invent, sell and advertise – ‘prescribe’ as Stiegler puts is – the 
new technology partly keep their own children away from it or 
take measures to ensure it does not turn into a poisoning drug: 
Executives at companies like Google and eBay send their chil-
dren to a Waldorf school where electronic gadgets are banned 
until the eighth grade, and Steve Jobs denied his kids the iPad.16
What shall we think of people preaching wine but drinking 
water? At best, these parents are selling toys they consider too 
dangerous for their own kids. At worst, they want to ensure their 
own breed’s advantage over people addicted to sensory stimula-
tion and unprepared for tasks that demand concentration, endur-
ance and critical thinking. In a way, what these parents do in 
their family context is what Golumbia wants society to do on a 
bigger scale: to check whether new technological tools conform 
to the values of this society – or family.
No matter what one considers the best age to be introduced 
to the computer or how one sees the issue of deep reading and 
deep attention, there is no doubt that today younger generations 
are immersed in constant communication. They are online before 
they see the bathroom in the morning and after they have turned 
off the light in the evening: ‘They live entirely social existences, 
always connected and in an exchange, no matter how banal, 
about the ongoing events of daily life.’ (Drucker) But Drucker is 
less concerned about the prevalence of phatic communication 
than the ‘single most shocking feature’ of the way young people 
are living their lives nowadays: ‘that they have no interior life 
and no apparent need or use for it.’ For Drucker the disregard 
and discard of reflection, meditation, imaginative musing jeopar-
dizes innovation, change, and invention which ‘have always come 
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from individuals who broke the mold, thought differently, pulled 
ideas into being in form and expression. Too much sociality leads 
to dull normativity.’ The birth of conventionalism out of the 
spirit of participation; this implicit thesis in Drucker’s account is 
spelled out in Nadin’s assessment: ‘social media has become not 
an opportunity for diversity and resistance, but rather a back-
ground for conformity.’
One could go even further and say: too much sociality 
through mobile media and social network sites spoils the cul-
tural technique of sustained, immersed reading. The reason for 
this is associated with another essential feature of the Internet: 
its interactivity, its bias to bidirectional communication, its offer 
to be a sender rather than “just” a reader. ‘Feed, don’t read the 
Internet,’ this slogan was around before the turn of the century. 
Today people read as much as they can. They must do so, if they 
want to keep up the conversation and avoid trouble with their 
friends. What they mustn‘t do is: wait too long for their turn. 
Nobody expects them to listen for long before they are allowed 
to answer; nobody except their teachers. In his 1932 essay The 
Radio as an Apparatus of Communication, Bertolt Brecht demands 
a microphone for every listener. It was the Marxist response 
to the advent of a new medium; a response that exploited the 
unrealized potential of the medium (‘undurchführbar in dieser 
Gesellschaftsordnung, durchführbar in einer anderen’) as an 
argument to fight for a new social order. The notion of turning 
the listener into a speaker reappears with the concept of the 
open artwork and the advent of hypertext. The readers’ freedom 
to chose their own navigation through the text was celebrated as 
‘reallocation of power from author to reader.’17 This perspective 
was later dismissed on the ground that it was still the author 
who composed the links and that, on the other hand, the feel-
ing of being ‘lost in hyperspace’18 hardly constitutes liberation or 
power. Who – of all the scholars of literature celebrating the end 
of linear reading back in the 1990s – would have thought that it 
actually was the hope for the empowerment of the reader itself 
that had to be dismissed?
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The natural development, following from the demise of 
patient, obedient readers is their replacement by a machine; the 
sequel to “hyper-reading” is “distant reading”. Nonetheless, the 
relationship of the reader to the author is similar: one no longer 
engages in a careful following – or ‘listening’ to – the author’s 
expression but rather navigates the text according to one‘s own 
impulses and interests. The new pleasure of the text is its algo-
rithmic mining. However, for the time being there is still a sig-
nificant difference between these two alternatives to good old 
“deep reading”: distant or algorithmic reading is not meant as 
a substitution for deep reading. Rather it ‘allows us to ask ques-
tions impossible before, especially queries concerning large 
corpora of texts,’ which is why ‘we should not interpret algo-
rithmic reading as the death of interpretation’ as Hayles states: 
‘How one designs the software, and even more, how one inter-
prets and understands the patterns that are revealed, remain 
very much interpretive activities.’ The exciting goal is to carry 
out algorithmic reading in tandem with hermeneutic interpreta-
tion in the traditional sense, as Hayles with Allen Riddell does of 
Mark Danielewski’s Only Revolutions in her book How We Think. 
Hayles’ perspective and praxis counters any cultural pessimism 
opting for a use of new technologies in a way that does not com-
promise the old values: ‘Instead of “adoption, not adaption” my 
slogan would be “opening the depths, not sliding on surfaces”.’
3. Digital Humanities and higher education is a link that, unsur-
prisingly, creates certain scepticism among the interviewees. 
If the Humanities are seen as ‘expressions of resistance’ that 
‘probe the science and technology instead of automatically 
accepting them,’ as Nadin does, then the ‘rushing into a terri-
tory of methods and perspectives defined for purposes different 
from those of the humanities’ does not seem to be a good trade-
off. Nadin’s anger goes further. He addresses the university 
as an institution giving in to the mighty IT companies and the 
deterministic model of computation: ‘If you want to control indi-
viduals, determinism is what you want to instill in everything: 
machines, people, groups. Once upon a time, the university 
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contributed to a good understanding of the networks. Today, it 
only delivers the trades-people for all those start-ups that shape 
the human condition through their disruptive technologies way 
more than universities do.’
The criticism of the ‘intrusion of capital’ into the sphere of 
higher education (Golumbia) is shared by others who fear that 
‘differently motivated services outside the institutions of higher 
education will first offer themselves to universities and then, 
quite simply, fold their academic missions and identities into 
vectoralist network services’ (Cayley). The assumption is that 
the digital infrastructure of the university will affect its aca-
demic mission: ‘“cost-effective’ and more innovative services 
provided from outside the institution’ Cayley holds ‘may then go 
on to reconstitute the institution itself. “Google” swallows com-
puting services at precisely the historical moment when digital 
practices swallow knowledge creation and dissemination. Hence 
“Google” swallows the university, the library, the publisher.’ Was 
this inevitable? Is it still stoppable? Golumbia is not surprised 
‘that academics, who often rightly remain focused on their nar-
row areas of study, were neither prepared nor really even in a 
position to mitigate these changes.’ Montfort is less reproach-
ful and displays more hope for resistance within academia: The 
research Google is conducting is, ‘by the very nature of their 
organization as a corporation, for the purpose of enriching their 
shareholders. That by itself doesn’t make Google ‘evil,’ but the 
company is not going to solve the scholarly community’s prob-
lems, or anyone else’s problems, unless it results in profit for 
them. A regulation won’t fix this; we, as scholars, should take 
responsibility and address the issue.’
While Nadin implies that the humanities and the univer-
sity in general are being rebuilt according to the paradigms of 
computer science and big business, in Hayles’ view ‘these fears 
either reflect a misunderstanding of algorithmic methods […] 
or envy about the relatively abundant funding streams that the 
Digital Humanities enjoy.’ She does not exclude the possibility 
that Digital Humanities is ‘being coopted by corporate funding 
to the extent that pedagogical and educational priorities are 
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undercut’ nor does she neglect the need for ‘defining significant 
problems rather than ones tailored to chasing grants.’ However, 
one should, with Hayles, see the exciting prospects of combin-
ing algorithmic data analysis with traditional criticism rather 
than always looking for the dark side of the digital humanities. 
In the same spirit Montfort underlines the valuable insights that 
already have been reached from computational humanistic study 
and points out: ‘Fear of quantitative study by a computer is about 
as silly as fearing writing as a humanistic method – because writ-
ing turns the humanities into a branch of rhetoric, or because 
writing is about stabilizing meaning, or whatever.’
After all, rather than being colonized by technical science, 
digital humanities can also be seen as the opposite if it brings 
the ‘insights from the humanities that are seldom considered, 
let alone valued in the sciences, including computer science’ to 
computational approaches: ‘that data are not objective, often 
ambiguous, and context dependent’ (Wendrich). The same hope – 
that ‘it will be the humanistic dimensions that gain more traction 
in the field—not just as content, but as methods of knowledge, 
analysis, and argument’ – is uttered by Drucker who rightly calls 
on Digital Humanities to overcome its obsession with defini-
tions and start to deliver: ‘until a project in Digital Humanities 
has produced work that has to be cited by its home discipline—
American History, Classics, Romantic Poetry, etc.—for its argu-
ment (not just as a resource)—we cannot claim that DH has really 
contributed anything to scholarship.’
Conclusion and Speculation: Media ethics  
from a German perspective
If we don’t limit the discussion of media ecology to either the 
contemporary reinvention of the term in the work of Matthew 
Fuller or the conservative environmentalism of post-McLuhan 
writers such as Neil Postman, we may refer to the magnum opus 
of a German philosopher who discussed the cultural implica-
tions of technological advancement and its threat to humanity 
in the light of the first Club of Rome report. In his 1979 book 
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The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the 
Technological Age Hans Jonas demanded an ‘ethics of responsi-
bility for distant contingencies.’19 We have to consider the con-
sequences of our actions even though they do not affect us or 
our immediate environment directly. It is remarkable that Jonas 
saw the fatality of man lying in the ‘triumph of homo faber’ that 
turns him into ‘the compulsive executer of his capacity’: ‘If noth-
ing succeeds like success, nothing also entraps like success.’20 
Almost 40 years later it is clear that we have more than ever 
given in to this imperative of technological success and compul-
sively create hardware and software whose consequences we 
barely understand.
Jonas’ warning and demand are part of the environmental-
ism that developed rapidly in the 1970s. The discussion today 
about big data, privacy and the quantitative turn through digital 
media, social networks and tracking applications has been linked 
to the environmental catastrophe in order to broaden the discus-
sion of relations and responsibilities.21 Just as, at a certain point, 
one’s energy bill was no longer simply a private matter – after all 
the ecological consequences of our energy consumption affects 
all of us – the argument is now that our dealings with personal 
data have an ethical dimension. The supply of personal data 
about driving styles, consumption habits, physical movement, 
etc. contributes to the establishing of statistical parameters and 
expectations against which all customers, clients and employees, 
regardless of their willingness to disclose private data, will be 
measured. Generosity with private data is no private issue. In 
other words: obsessive sharing and committed self-tracking are 
social actions whose ramifications ultimately exceed the realm 
of the individuals directly involved.
There is no question that society needs to engage in a thor-
ough reflection on its technological development and a broad 
discussion about its cultural implications. There is no doubt that 
universities and especially the Humanities should play an impor-
tant role in this debate. However, it is also quite clear that the 
search for an ethics in the age of Web 3.0 and Industry 4.0 is 
much harder than it was in Jonas’ time. While nobody questions 
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the objective of environmentalists to secure the ground and 
future of all living beings (the point of contention is only the 
actual degree of the danger), digital media don’t threaten human 
life but “only” its current culture. Data pollution, the erosion of 
privacy and the subversion of deep attention are not comparable 
to air pollution, global warming and resource depletion.22 The 
ethics of preservation is on less sound ground if this project aims 
to preserve cultural standards and norms. Even if people agree 
on the existence of the threat they will not agree on how to judge 
the threat. After all, this is a central lesson that the Humanities 
teach: radical upheavals in culture are inherent to society.
Nonetheless, the ongoing and upcoming upheavals and revo-
lutions need to be discussed with scholarly knowledge and aca-
demic rigor. According to many interviewees in this book such 
discussion is not taking place as it should. The reasons are not 
only political, but also epistemological and methodological. ‚We 
were given the keys to the car with very little driver’s educa-
tion’ and hence incur a high risk of ‘derailment’ on the digital 
highway, as Favro puts is. To stay with the metaphor: We also 
lack the time to look beneath the hood. Rather than pulling all 
the new toys apart in order to understand how they work we just 
learn how to operate them. There are too many toys coming out 
too fast. The frenetic pace of innovation has a reason, as Nadin 
makes clear: ‘what is at stake is not a circuit board, a commu-
nication protocol, or a new piece of software, but the human 
condition. The spectacular success of those whom we associate 
with the beginnings lies in monetizing opportunities. They found 
gold!’ When Nadin speaks of the ‘victory of “We can” over “What 
do we want?” or “Why?”’ it is reminiscent of Jonas’ comment on 
homo faber. And like Jonas, Nadin addresses our complicity in 
this affair: ‘The spectacular failure lies in the emergence of indi-
viduals who accept a level of dependence on technology that is 
pitiful. This dependence explains why, instead of liberating the 
human being, digital technology has enslaved everyone—includ-
ing those who might never touch a keyboard or look at a moni-
tor.’ We need a ‘reorganization of the digital,’ Stiegler accord-
ingly says, because the Web, ‚completely subject to computation 
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and automation,’ is producing entropy, while the ‚question for the 
future, not only for the Web, but for human kind is to produce 
negentropy.’
Of course, such negative assessment of the ongoing techno-
logical revolution is debatable. It is not only Mark Zuckerberg 
who, along with his wife in a letter to their newly born daugh-
ter, considers the world a better place thanks to digital technol-
ogy, including of course the opportunity for people to connect 
and share.23 Many others too expect advances in health care, 
social organization, and individual life from computation and 
automation. Nonetheless, if experts demand the prohibition of 
certain technological advancement citing predictable devastat-
ing consequences – take the Open Letter from AI and Robotics 
Researchers from July 28 in 2015 to ban autonomous weapons 
– one feels reassured that there is indeed an essential risk that 
many researchers and entrepreneurs are taking at our expense. 
This risk is not reduced to weapons and the scenarios of cyber-
war (or worse: cyber terrorism) in a world after Industry 4.0 and 
the Internet of Things. It includes genetically-engineered viruses 
and self-learning artificial intelligence whose decisions exceed 
human capacity for comprehension. The questions such consid-
eration raises are pressing: Where does the marriage of intel-
ligence and technology lead us? Who or what are the driving 
forces? How did they get their mandate? And most importantly: 
Is it possible to stop them/it?
If we hear scientists who do research on invisible (killer) 
drones or genetic design we don’t hear them refer to Friedrich 
Dürrenmatt’s 1961 tragicomedy The Physicians where a genius 
physicist feigns madness so he is committed to a sanatorium 
and can prevent his probable deadly invention from ever being 
used. What we see instead is the excitement to overcome scien-
tific problems with little qualms concerning humanity’s ability 
to handle the outcomes. Technical discoveries, technological 
advancement will be made, where and when possible, regardless 
of the benefit to humanity. Some scientists defend their ambi-
tion with the notion that not scientists, but society must decide 
what use it wants to make of the technology made available. 
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Others, referring to economic and military competition, argue 
that there is no universal authority that has the power for bind-
ing decisions: If we don’t do it, the enemy will. It is difficult to 
ignore this argument, even though dangerous inventions have 
been successfully banned worldwide, such as blinding lasers, by 
the UN in 1998. This said, it is also difficult not to consider those 
scientists opportunists who talk about excitement and competi-
tion rather than responsibility, while secretly being in contact 
with companies interested in producing the perfect embryo or 
an invisible drone.
Perhaps we mistake the actual problem if we only focus on the 
“black sheep” among scientists and engineers. Maybe it is really 
the human condition that is at stake here, though in a different 
way than addressed by Nadin. To turn to another, much older 
German philosopher: In the third proposition of his 1784 Idea 
for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose Immanuel 
Kant considers the ‘purpose in nature’ that man go ‘beyond the 
mechanical ordering of his animal existence’ and gain happiness 
from the perfection of skills. The means to do so is to constantly 
develop the utmost human capacity of reason, from generation 
to generation, bestowing each with ever more refined technol-
ogy: hammer, steam-engine, electric motor, computer, artificial 
intelligence. To Kant, this teleological concept of (reason in) his-
tory is entelechic; he presumes (as many of his contemporaries 
did) a development for the better. To later thinkers, however, 
such as Hannah Arendt in her 1968 Men in Dark Times, the ide-
alism of the enlightenment looks like ‘reckless optimism in the 
light of present realities’, i.e. the achieved capacity of mankind to 
destroy itself with nuclear weapons.24 As mentioned, since then 
the advances in human intelligence have brought many more 
powerful means to life that can end or suppress human life.
Maybe Kant’s optimism is the result of a premature conclu-
sion from the third proposition in his Idea (to gain happiness 
from the perfection of skills, i.e. unlimited research) to the eighth 
proposition (the philosophical chiliasm, i.e. perfection of human-
kind). There is a tension between theoretical reason (that drives 
us to explore and invent as much as we can) and practical reason 
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(that should forbid certain inventions). It is a tension between the 
homo faber as ‘compulsive executer of his capacity’ and man’s 
‚responsibility for distant contingencies’ to use Jonas’ words. It 
is a tension between the enthusiastic “We can!” and the cautious 
“Why?” and “To what end?” to refer to Nadin again. In the new 
Faustian deal, that Nadin speaks of, the devil is the computer or 
rather: artificial intelligence, with which we trade better judg-
ment for fulfilled desires. The obvious risk of such a deal is the 
extinction of men or their being locked in or out by post-human 
intelligence as addressed in 2015 by Alex Garland’s Ex Machina 
and as early as 1968 in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey 
which renders Kant’s generational relay race of ever better tools 
as result of ever better use of the human capacity of reason in a 
famous and alarming short cut.
However, the metaphor of Faust leaves room for hope. If we 
perceive the new Faustian deal in the spirit of Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe, it is open ended. For in Goethe’s play the bargain 
between Faust and Mephisto is not a “service for soul”-trade 
but a bet. It is Faust who self-confidently dictates the rules of 
the bargain:25
If the swift moment I entreat:
Tarry a while! You are so fair!
Then forge the shackles to my feet,
Then I will gladly perish there!
Then let them toll the passing-bell,
Then of your servitude be free,
The clock may stop, its hands fall still,
And time be over then for me!
Since Faust, who finally turns into a restless and somewhat reck-
less entrepreneur, wins the bet and is saved, we may look calmly 
on the new deal. Even more so in light of another important detail 
in Goethe’s Faust, Mephisto’s ambivalent nature announced 
when he introduces himself to Faust:
[I am] Part of that force which would
Do ever evil, and does ever good.
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Such ambiguity and contradiction has long attracted German 
thinkers, as for example  the Christian mystic Jacob Böhme who, 
in the early 17th century, understood the Fall of Man, i.e. the use 
of reason, as an act of disobedience necessary for the evolution 
of the universe. Two centuries later the negative as precondition 
of the good, the clash of antithesis and thesis was called dialec-
tic. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who was influenced by both 
Goethe and Böhme, considered contradictions and negations 
necessary elements for the advancement of humanity. Before 
him, Kant employed contradictions as the dynamic means of 
progress when, in the fourth proposition of his Idea for example, 
he discusses the ‘unsocial sociability’ of man that finally turns 
‘desire for honour, power or property’ into ‘a moral whole’. The 
negative is the vehicle for the implicit purpose of nature with 
which Kant substitutes God and which, in the ninth proposition, 
he also calls providence. In light of this concept of dialectic prog-
ress Mephisto’s further self-description sounds harmless:
The spirit which eternally denies!
And justly so; for all that which is wrought
Deserves that it should come to naught
However, the confidence that everything bad is finally good 
for us may be nothing more than the “reckless optimism” that 
Arendt detects in the Enlightenment’s spirit of history and 
humanity’s role in it. What if we can’t count on that dialec-
tic appeasement any longer after the advancement of a certain 
capacity for destruction? What if providence turns out to be 
exactly what Mephisto says: simply negation (rather than Hegel’s 
double negation) with negative results for all of us? What if we 
really ‚should get rid of the last anthropic principle, which is life 
itself’ – as Felinto paraphrases the Argentine philosopher Fabián 
Ludueña – and accept a ‚universe without a human observer’ 
rather than assume ‚man is the final step in the development of 
life’? What if technology turns out to be less an act of libera-
tion from the determinations of nature than an obsession, enter-
tained by the ‘purpose of nature,’ humans can’t help even if it 
finally kills them? What if the ride we undertake in that “car” 
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on the digital highway does not have, as a kind of “divine algo-
rithm,” a built-in emergency brake in case human reason turns 
out to be devastating?
Despite learning from the past and despite predictive ana-
lytics: with regard to the future we are blind. We may, hear-
ing the diligent workers around us, celebrate the arrival of a 
better world, while in fact people are digging our grave, as it 
happens to Goethe’s Faust. After a symbolic dialogue with the 
Sorge (which means worry but also care in German) whom he 
dismisses and who punishes him with blindness, Faust mistakes 
the Lemuren digging his grave on Mephisto’s order for his work-
ers building a dam to defy nature.26 Is this our situation? Are 
we, without worries and care, blind about the implications of our 
actions? Are we facing an inhuman, adiaphorized society while 
hoping big data and algorithmic regulation will make the world 
a better place? Are we turning ourselves into objects of “panop-
tic” control by pursuing datafication and the ubiquity of smart 
objects? Is the rise of the machine the end of men? To come back 
to our philosophical references: Does  Hegel’s Absoluter Geist 
(the single mind of all humanity that becomes self-aware and 
free through the march of reason) reach its destiny in the form 
of artificial intelligence? Is the Kantian capacity for reason ful-
filled once human consciousness is passed on to machines? Or is 
it rather overdone?
There are many questions to be raised in light of ongoing 
technological development. Media literacy, without a doubt, is 
important and has to move on from vocational “How”-questions 
to critical “What for?”-questions, from “How can I use these 
media?” to “What do they do to us?” It is important to under-
stand media in their historical context and from an anthropo-
logical perspective. As the following interviews demonstrate, 
in such endeavor not only contemporaries such as Nicolas Carr 
and Sherry Turkle can be helpful and inspiring but even pre-dig-
ital ancestors such as the French Blaise Pascal and the Swiss 
Max Picard. If the discussion aims at a philosophical treatment 
rather than a phenomenological approach people tend to turn to 
Gilbert Simondon, Manuel DeLanda and Vilém Flusser. As these 
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interviews show there are more techno-philosophers to be (re)
discovered for the discussion needed – and as this introduction 
suggests, Goethe’s Faust  and Böhme’s mysticism could, should, 
be part of it.
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InteRvIew 1
At the intersection of computational 
methods and the traditional humanities
Johanna Drucker
Johanna Drucker has a reputation as both a book art-
ist as well as a pioneer of what has become known as 
Digital Humanities. She is well known for her stud-
ies on visual poetics and experimental typography 
(The Visible Word 1994, Figuring the Word 1998) but 
also for her investigations of visual forms of knowl-
edge production (Graphesis 2014), digital aesthet-
ics and speculative computing (SpecLab 2008) and 
Digital_Humanities (2012, co-authored). She has 
worked as a Professor in Art History (Columbia, Yale, 
& SUNY) and Media Studies (University of Virginia) 
and since 2008 is the inaugural Breslauer Professor 
of Bibliographical Studies in the Department of 
Information Studies at UCLA.
Johanna welcomes governmental regulation on the internet 
against ‘neoliberal entrepreneurialism,’ rejects new grand nar-
ratives ‘reconfigured by the pseudo-authority of computation’ 
and considers the sociality of contemporary existence an obsta-
cle for ‘interior life,’ innovation, and zoophilia. She compares 
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Digital Humanities with the ‘cook in the kitchen’ and Digital 
Media Studies with the ‘restaurant critic,’ sees the platform 
and tool development in the Humanities as a professional, not 
academic track, she calls for a visual epistemology in times of 
Screen culture and diagrammatic knowledge production and she 
explains how to contaminate the world of quantitative and dis-
ambiguating underpinnings with the virtues of relativism and 
multi-perspectivism.
Prelude
Roberto Simanowski: What is your favored neologism of digital 
media culture and why?
Johanna Drucker: I’m drawn to neologisms that serve as both 
nouns and verbs–tweet, google, email–because they indicate a 
blurring of action and object in a way that embodies the fluidly 
unstable transience of digital media. But I also like geek, geekify, 
geek-out, and digerati (along with their offspring, the digeratini) 
used as self-identification.
RS: If you could go back in history of new media and digital cul-
ture in order to prevent something from happening or somebody 
from doing something, what or who would it be?
JD: I’d legislate against the violence being done to net neutrality 
and get the FCC to protect us against the domination by private 
enterprise and corporate interests. This will be the end of access 
to academic, scholarly, and independent thought online.
RS: What comes to mind if you hear “Digital Media Studies”?
JD: Digital Media Studies uses tools such as critical theory, 
cultural studies, media archaeology, bibliographical, textual, 
and visual studies, and a host of highly focused approaches to 
software, platforms, interface, networks and other technical 
aspects of networked environments to expose their workings. 
It is almost entirely a critical practice except when explicitly 
linked to making.
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RS: If you were a minister of education, what would you do about 
media literacy?
JD: I’d insist that all elementary school kids learn to create and 
critique data sets, know some basic statistics, learn database 
structure, interface design, and know how to analyze search 
engines, be able to do some scripting/programming, and be 
taught how to do data wrangling and introductory digital media 
studies. Skill in reading texts and images for their arguments as 
well as their content remains essential, but across the full spec-
trum of media formats.
Politics and Government
RS: Web 2.0 culture seems to have tamed and commodified the 
wild, anarchistic Internet of the 1990s when people played with 
identity in IRCs and MUDs and built their own websites in idio-
syncratic ways. Today, clarity and transparency are the dominat-
ing values, and for obvious reasons, since only true and honest 
information are valid data in the context of commerce. This shift 
has also changed the role of the government. While in the 1990s 
Internet pioneers such as John Perry Barlow declared the inde-
pendence of Cyberspace from the governments of the old world, 
now it seems people hope for governments to intervene in the 
taking-over and commercialization of the Internet by huge cor-
porations such as Google and Facebook. Thus, web activists call-
ing for the government to pass laws to protect privacy online, 
and politicians suggesting expiration dates for data on social net-
works appear to be activist in a battle for the rights of the indi-
vidual. Have tables turned to that extent? Are we, once rejecting 
old government, now appealing to it for help?
JD: The Internet began as a government research project, 
through linked cables connecting major research universities 
and facilities that had defense contracts. So the Net and the Web 
began under government jurisdiction. Concerns about regulation 
cut across a range of issues –protections and violations of privacy 
are only part of the larger landscape. The overarching disaster 
of our lifetime is deregulation of all aspects of social life, the 
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demonization of taxation, extreme income inequity, and under-
mining of the social contract as conceived by the 18th century 
polymaths who designed the Constitution of the United States.
The non-standard approaches to interface that were part of 
CD-Rom era electronic literature, arts, and design, like those 
of first generation web sites, were less constrained by conven-
tion than today’s menu-drive and side-bar organized ones, and 
innovation does seem to have stymied in the rush to fixity, to 
the conventional screen display. But the design issue is sepa-
rate from the ideology of individualism (mythic, in my opinion) 
and the kind of libertarianism that lurks under the rhetoric of 
certain activist movements. I’m not an anarchist. Quite the con-
trary, I think cultures are about negotiation of and through lim-
its on what can and can’t be tolerated, allowed, condemned. I’m 
far more afraid of deregulation, the end of internet neutrality, 
and the intersection of rhetorical assertions that combine neolib-
eral entrepreneurialism, with its pseudo-individualism and pro-
corporate ideology, and the inequities that intensify with disbal-
ances of economic power. I’ll take government regulation over 
that any time, and that does not have to mean compromises to 
protected rights and liberties such as free speech and privacy.
Do most Internet users actually know what their rights and 
responsibilities are as citizens, let alone how the laws of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications 
Commission, Department of Justice, and other agencies actually 
regulate the Web? I doubt it. Like many people, they want the 
government out of their lives when it comes to taxes, account-
ability and responsibility but they want it in their lives to fix 
roads, maintain services like police and fire, and come to their 
aid in a major disaster—or keep the internet “there” for them. 
Children and adolescents have the same relationship to their 
parents. We have to get beyond models of government as dys-
functional family relationships and see that we are the regulat-
ing and responsible parties. No other grownups are going to 
appear. The internet may have begun as a government research 
project, but service providers are for-profit businesses and we 
depend on their cables, routers, servers, and infrastructure.
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RS: I like very much your analogy about kids and parents. A com-
panion and counterpart to responsibility is the entrepreneurial-
ism you mention which makes me think of the young, energetic, 
and very excited startups as portrayed in the Silicon Valley TV 
series. It’s a specific mixture of technophile, profit seeking and 
changing-the-world intent; and it is problematic in all three 
regards. The German philosopher Hans Jonas, in his 1979 book 
The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the 
Technological Age, notes that the fatality of man lies in the ‘tri-
umph of homo faber’ that makes him into ‘the compulsive exe-
cuter of his capacity.’ The blithe excitement about social media, 
cloud computing and data mining we are encountering today 
seems to illustrate Jonas’ apprehension: ‘If nothing succeeds like 
success, nothing also entraps like success.’ The inventive entre-
preneurs in Silicon Valley and elsewhere may see data mining 
as the great adventure of our times in which they involve them-
selves as in former times courageous businessmen did as they 
embarked in dangerous voyages. The difference: today’s explor-
ers take the entire mankind on board in their search for assets 
– not to make them all millionaires but to become millionaires 
at their expense. Petty concerns for privacy or cultural sustain-
ability are only in the way of such spirit of discovery, just as the 
aged couple Philemon and Baucis in Goethe’s play Faust stood 
in the way of modern business practices when they refused to 
give up their land for industrialization. To justify the “death” of 
those who stand in the way of “progress,” an important part of 
the IT-industry business is the management of moods. The pub-
lic has to be convinced of the entrepreneurs’ good intentions: 
namely that their goal is to develop better products and to offer 
improved customer care. My analogies exaggerate, I admit. 
However, I really wonder whether we not only need more regula-
tions of social life, as you indicate, but also against the spirit of 
homo faber that mercilessly changes the world regardless of any 
negotiations of and through limits.
JD: OMG, I have friends in SF who report with horror the over-
heard conversations of the opportunistic “entrepreneurs” who 
48 Interview 1
are seeking any way to create a new niche in the data stream (an 
app, a service, a new social media mode, a filter, anything). This 
is similar to the way advertisers dissected bodies into “zones” to 
which they targeted hygiene products, and of course in the data 
world, the zones can be sliced infinitely, to any granularity. Data 
derivatives replicate endlessly, without limit. Ethics? Can they 
be monetized?
RS: I absolutely agree, while for some time and to some people 
its gift economy imperative let the Internet appear as the last 
resort of communism, it in fact has become a playground of cov-
eting and ruthless neo-liberalism. In this process even an impor-
tant public good such as knowledge has been centralized in the 
hands of a private company such as Google. On the other hand, 
would the US government or the European Union ever have been 
able to carry out something like Google’s book project? Should 
–and could– they run a search engine free of advertisement and 
with an algorithm visible to all who care?
JD: The Digital Public Library initiative, started as a visionary 
project by Robert Darnton, and now headed by Dan Cohen, is a 
perfect antidote to the problems posed by having Google control 
so much intellectual content as well as create so many data deriv-
atives. Though DPLA will not deal its information, and seems to 
have no plans to monetize user profiles and patterns, it does 
offer a first and hopefully successful move towards a networked 
cultural heritage and access. Scientific and social-science data 
should also be part of this kind of repository. Private enter-
prise should be subject to regulation, scrutiny, and control, of 
course. But anyone who thought the internet was a gift economy 
is blind to the ways ease of consumption conceals the complexi-
ties (labor, costs, infrastructure) of production. To support digi-
tally networked cultural heritage in any way that will carry for-
ward more than a generation is going to require a public-private 
partnership at the scale of Carnegie Libraries in the early part 
of the 20th century. That was a hugely transformative under-
taking, endowed by industrialist-turned-philanthropist Andrew 
Carnegie, but it coincided with tax funded support for public 
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education, universal literacy, a public library system, and other 
initiatives. A few nationally funded projects show how transfor-
mative the commitment to infrastructure can be. Australia intro-
duced a national broadband initiative, has a vital national library 
and cultural heritage/preservation programs, and its archivists 
have been at the forefront of international discussions about the 
rights of diverse communities. This is all far from Google and 
private interests. I think we need to reconcile various mytholo-
gies that have no real bearing on contemporary issues with the 
reality of actual possible futures—I know it sounds shockingly 
un-fun, but regulation, governance, shared responsibility and 
accountability, taxation, distribution of wealth, caps on income 
and profits, all these things are essential if education, informa-
tion, power distribution, and sustainable futures are going to be 
made possible in any realm, including digital and traditional lit-
eracy. I’m a realist, not an idealist, and escalating inequities in 
every area of the culture need to be recalibrated.
Algorithm and Censorship
RS: The numbers of views, likes, comments and the Klout Score –
as measure of one’s influence in social media– indicate the social 
extension of the technical paradigm of digital media: counting. 
The quantification of evaluation only seems to fulfill the cultural 
logic of computation, the dichotomy of like/dislike even to mir-
ror the binary of its operational system. The desired effect of 
counting is comparison and ranking, i.e. the end of postmodern 
ambiguity and relativism. Does the trust in numbers in digital 
media bring about the technological solution to a philosophical 
problem? A Hollywood-like shift from the melancholia of the end 
of grand narratives and truth to the excitement of who or what 
wins the competition?
JD: Pretty pathetic as an image of our times, this return to the 
Roman Forum, thumbs up, thumbs down, court of public opinion 
and gladiatorial combat. Nishant Shah is eloquent on this topic, 
and has mustered vivid examples of the ways web-driven vigilan-
tism and swarm-mob behavior can mete out injustice without any 
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control transferring socially mediated behavior into real world 
violence. As for counting as a metric, a measure of all things, it 
has to be balanced with statistical understanding, analytic tools 
from the quantitative domain, as well as with the tools of critical 
theory. A number is always relative, and even the first lesson in 
statistics—of median, mean, and mode—immediately calls atten-
tion to the relative value of a quantity. Combine this basic work 
in statistics with fundamentals in critical theory – a number is 
meaningful only in a scale, all scales are human-derived, based 
on some perceptual framework within a domain of knowledge or 
experience (body temperature, cycles of a day, a human lifespan, 
the speed of light, absolute or not, has value because it signifies 
a certain limit of what we imagine to be possible).
The grand narratives are all there, still, but being reconfig-
ured by the pseudo-authority of computation, that set of mechan-
ical exercises that passes itself off as irrefutable logic, as if it 
were not subject, like all logics, to a higher order of rhetoric. 
All statements of supposed fact are arguments about the belief 
system within which they gain their authority. That is simply 
Ideology 101, along with the other basic tenets of ideology: the 
more something appears to be natural, the more it is cultural; 
one has only to ask in whose interests it is for this “naturalness” 
to appear to be so to begin to unpack the power structures by 
which it is operating. Go back to the formulation about compu-
tational method and number and apply these basic tenets and 
suddenly the machinations of bureaucratic and managed culture 
appear unmasked, their grounds of authority revealed.
RS: No doubt that numbers too are not innocent. As book titles 
teach us: “Raw Data” is an Oxymoron (ed. Gitelman, MIT Press 
2013). However, somehow the new technology (and its statistical 
mode) seems to promise the solution to an old political problem: 
to know and count the opinion of people. In fact, statistics may be 
considered the ideal advocate of democracy insofar as numbers 
avert the distortion of communication. Any utterance beyond a 
vote, any comment beyond a like or dislike, is a form of manipula-
tion of the opinion, belief, feeling of others. Habermas celebrates 
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this communicative action as discourse ethics, Rousseau, in his 
Contrat Social, considers debates and discussion as counter intu-
itive to democracy, since it aims at overcoming differences by 
rhetoric power if not political and economic power over media. 
We may not be able to say whether the numerical rationality is 
superior to the communicative. But we may agree that statistics 
allows for a shift from a kind of synthetic-discursive exclusion to 
syndetic-additive inclusion.
JD: Indeed, the relative virtue of quantitative reasoning is, 
well, just that--relative. I’m contrarian enough to suggest that 
statistical processes are discursive. Numbers seem discrete, 
referential, and delimiting, but that does not make their author-
ity absolute. Their value is subject to cultural conditions even 
if they pretend otherwise. I’m reminded of the peculiar delu-
sion that F.T. Marinetti entertained in thinking that mathemati-
cal symbols–the plus and minus sign–should replace syntac-
tic terms because they were more precise. But of course, they 
are not, they are reductive, but thus, often, ambiguous, hence 
the paradox. Language need not be referential, but numbers, 
because they represent quantities, always are—even if the value 
of the referent may be ambiguous. For instance, what does “one” 
mean—it depends on the system of metrics within which it is 
operating, right? Modernism’s struggles with syntax of all kinds 
(literary, musical, visual) was an attempt to open the possibility 
spaces of non-representational aesthetics, or at least, open forms 
of discourse.
RS: The personal and cultural cost of personalization in digital 
media is the loss of chance encounters, the preclusion of the unfa-
miliar, the removal of diversity and of what we are not (yet). The 
algorithm is the censor people more or less approve of and even 
desire. This becomes problematic once people are addressed 
not as consumers but as citizens expected to be open to others 
instead of cocooning in their bubble. Hence, personalization, 
driven by economic force, is political. Are the actual policy mak-
ers in the digital media age those who program ego-loops, inad-
vertently undermining the foundation of a democratic society?
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JD: These questions hark back to earlier eras, degrees of col-
lusion between desire-producing apparatuses and the subjects 
interpellated into their workings. What difference does it make 
whether we are discussing theater, flickering shadows in the 
cave, or the current screens? Human beings are addicted to the 
Symbolic, and the illusion it gives them of being somehow con-
nected to the Other. The screens are just that, and I think we 
are in the era of the Grand Object A, rather than the Petit. The 
transactional object, the mechanism of illusion, the point of ref-
erence to which we are cathected in our Imaginary relations to 
the Real, has assumed gigantic proportions. Most people would 
give up food before they would give up their cell phones or inter-
net connections, even though they are really only connected to a 
device. No self, only its fictive illusion within constructs of sub-
jectivity, can be confirmed in such transactions. “Self” in this 
construction (now or in antiquity, from paleo-consciousness to 
the present) is a kind of specificity, a location, a unique address 
and identifier—not completely fictional, but rarely as “different” 
as imagined. Cocooning? Citizenship? Some incentive for partici-
pation will have to appear if the broad mass of people are going 
to see themselves as stakeholders. In our generation, the slogan 
“the personal is political” was used as a rallying cry, but now the 
difficulty is in convincing most younger voters that the “political 
can be personal” in any sense. And given recent Supreme Court 
decisions in the US that allow private interests to determine pol-
icy to an unprecedented degree, this is understandable. When 
money is speech, government works in the private interest and 
individuals as well as communities are disenfranchised. The con-
nections between individual illusions/delusions, the pursuit of 
lifestyle over knowledge or experience, and the political sphere 
are complicated, and also have to meet the realities of motiva-
tion and activism.
RS: Facebook portrays the sharing of as much personal informa-
tion as possible as the precondition for a better world. While the 
economic interests behind this data worship are undoubted and 
certainly need to be addressed, the question remains as to why 
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younger generations don’t seem to care about privacy but estab-
lish, using Facebook millionfold day-to-day, radical transparency 
as the new foundation of our culture. Is the data-exhibitionism 
of digital natives the contemporary version to the  sexual revolu-
tion of the 1960s?
JD: I love the phrase “data worship” but I don’t see the paral-
lel with 1960s sexual revolutionary activity. We were given per-
mission and we took it. We lived uninhibited lives without fear—
remember this was pre-AIDS, and in the most permissive use of 
contraception. I don’t use Facebook, though I have an account, it 
lies dormant. I like interior life, and private life, though I advise 
all my students to live their lives as if they are public, that way 
they will never have a problem. If I were to run for public office, 
my private life would be a field day for the news media—I/we did 
everything, with whomever and whatever we wanted. I once lived 
with a cat who wanted to have sexual relations with me. At a cer-
tain point in my conditioned resistance to his advances, I had to 
ask myself what my problem was with his desires? I did not give 
in, in the end, but it did make me think about the proscriptions 
in place. I was raised by a Calvinist in a Jewish household, so 
showing anything to anyone or being the least bit conspicuous 
or desirous of attention was simply not permitted. American cul-
ture is built on these kinds of deep prohibitions. I don’t believe 
in mortifying the flesh. In a full life, one lives erotically in all 
dimensions of the daily encounter with the world—not screwing 
everything that comes along (though that’s just fine by me too, 
if that’s what someone wants to do), but living a sensually aware 
and fully ecstatic state of being. If only we could sustain that 
kind of intensity in our relation to the world. But would you want 
to live that way in public? What difference does it make? Notions 
of privacy, propriety, decorum, are all historically and culturally 
set. Eros is a state of body-mind. So much is shut down, put away, 
prohibited and circumscribed within human experience. Why?
RS: Your words first of all remind of what two older Germans 
said about the value of privacy. The sociologist Georg Simmel 
declared a century ago: ‘The secret is one of man’s greatest 
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achievements’; the writer Peter Handke admitted three decades 
ago: ‘I live off of what the others don’t know about me’. Secondly, 
one wonders what will be the consequences if we all live our 
lives in the public eye. There is the hope that if all the skeletons 
in the closet (and the cats under the blanket) are known, nobody 
will cast the first stone and what had been considered sinful 
will finally turn out to be a social habit. However, there is also 
the fear that life in the age of transparency and search engines 
will rather be as two younger Americans suggest: think of Marc 
Zuckerberg’s nothing-to-hide-nothing-to-fear declaration and 
Eric Schmidt’s warning ‘If you have something that you don’t 
want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first 
place.’ What is your bet?
JD: I guess I think there is a difference between what can be 
known and what should be shown. The problem with too much 
exposure is aesthetic as much as moral—the banality of it makes 
so much information uninteresting, generic. Ask students to do 
a drawing of a chair and a coat and they all do something inter-
esting, highly revealing, very personal. Ask them to show you 
their diaries/sketchbooks—they are shockingly similar. If every 
frog around the pond is speaking at night, who will listen? Time 
and attention, as we know, are the valuable commodities of our 
times. Competition for these will only grow. How many Karl Ove 
Knausgaard accounts do we need? How many Jenny Cams?
Art and Aesthetics
RS: Nobody today speaks of digital art. Does this mean that digi-
tal art has ceased to exist or does it mean all art is digital?
JD: Gosh, no, not all art is digital! Lots of fine works of sculpture, 
painting, installation work, performance, drawing, and musical 
arts exist that have nothing to do with digital production. Just 
that the stigma of the “digital” went away so we can just think 
about the works as art—are they interesting, engaging, success-
ful. We don’t talk about oil paint art or instrumental art, so why 
emphasize a medium or technique?
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RS: Well, if a medium has a message this message may also 
affect how we produce and perceive art. I would hold that com-
putation, transformation, participation, and craftsmanship are 
some central aspects specific for the aesthetic of art born in 
digital media.
JD: Oh yes, I completely agree that there is a specificity to the 
ways digital production engages with conceptual, material, and 
aesthetic dimensions of production. But only some digital work 
is reflecting specifically on those aspects of process. I don’t 
analyze every poem in terms of its use of typography, because 
many are so conventionally composed and laid out that the poet 
was clearly working within an already absorbed set of instruc-
tions for composition, not working with composition as a mate-
rial aspect of their work. I think aesthetic is always about how 
something is made and thought, so in that sense, again, I agree. 
I just don’t think every artist is reflecting on these issues in and 
as their production.
RS: People have said that art in or of digital media must be polit-
ical even if its intentions are to be utterly formalistic. If art is 
based on technology the focus on form draws attention to how 
technology works and this is already an act of reflection or edu-
cation. From this perspective, one would assume that digital lit-
erature is literature that addresses the politics of digital technol-
ogy. What is your experience in this regard?
JD: All art is ideological, but that is different from saying it is 
political. All works engage with value systems and their opera-
tion, all artistic expressions are arguments for their forms (every 
novel is an argument about what a novel should/could be). Claims 
for the “political” are usually made for the most dull and didactic 
art, not work that actually makes for change or effects any struc-
tural transformation of power or process. The ideas that expos-
ing the medium, calling attention to its machinations, showing 
how something makes meaning or effect—these are all features 
of modernist belief in epistemological defamiliarization. All fine 
and good, but the tediousness of didactic work plays into the 
worst neo-Liberalist affirmations, as the work of Claire Bishop, 
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among others, makes very strikingly clear. Who are we kidding? 
The tasks of reworking the ideologies that have come to prevail 
since the Reagan-Thatcher era are daunting. Technology is nei-
ther a cause nor an effect, but a historically coincident forma-
tion that works on certain faultlines, exaggerating tendencies 
and taking advantage of affordances. But technologies have to 
be adopted by receptive cultural conditions and ecologies. As 
to the politics of digital technology, that goes right back to the 
points I made above, about the way ideology works to conceal 
its workings.
RS: I agree with your favoring of the epistemological defamiliar-
ization over didactic ambitions; as Adorno states in his essay on 
commitment and art: “If art is to live on, it must elevate social 
criticisms to the level of form, de-emphasizing social content 
accordingly”. I would add, with Claire Bishop, that, on the other 
hand, even self-reflective art – such as the ‘cozy situation’ of a 
cooking-performance by Rirkrit Tiravanija – may actually pave 
the way for (neo-liberalist) affirmation. As for literature based 
on digital technology, academics have considered the option and 
need to navigate through a multi-linear hypertext as the replace-
ment of the passive by the “active reader” thus implicitly prais-
ing mechanical activity over cerebral. Today electronic books 
and appropriate apps allow for “social reading”: bookmarks and 
notes can be shared with other readers of the same text and con-
versation can start immediately. The words used to distinguish 
the new reading habits from the old claim a positive connotation. 
What could be wrong with being interactive and social? Why, 
our grandchildren may wonder once, would anybody want to 
withdraw a book from the others instead of sharing the reading 
experience, as it was common until the 18th Century? There are 
different ways of looking at the end of the cultural technique of 
immersive reading. What is your perspective?
JD: The distinction between active and passive reading modes 
does not depend on technology any more than ‘chose your own 
adventure’ type fiction depended on digital media. Torah read-
ing is always active, situated within conversation and discussion. 
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What is passive about that? The entire experience of the text is 
based on interpretation in a community. Some reading you want 
to do on your own. Social reading is useful for some things, but 
do we have to share everything? Technology that allows mul-
tiple readers to access a text simultaneously does not require 
shared commentary or conversation. As for combinatoric work 
or stories with variable endings, they were structured into the 
children’s amusements known as harlequinades in the 19th 
century, and written into print based works, such as the exem-
plary Julio Cortázar work, Hopscotch, first published in 1963, 
twenty years before the wonderful The Policeman’s Beard is Half 
Constructured (1984) was written by Racter, a program.
But the question of access is of course different from either 
interactive reception or combinatoric or hyperlinked composi-
tion. The reality that multiple copies of a work can be accessed 
simultaneously is great, but along with this privilege, we have 
to be vigilant about not losing the privileges that went with buy-
ing books—such as the right to circulate an individual copy after 
first sale and so on. Uniqueness doesn’t always cancel circula-
tion—the Mona Lisa exists in a single, unique canvas, but the 
original has been seen by many more people than most works 
created as artists’ books in the spirit of the so-called “demo-
cratic multiple.” Of course the whole mechanical reproduction 
and aura argument is relevant here too. DaVinci’s portrait is a 
mass culture icon through its reproduction.
My point is simply that many claims for works, values, innova-
tion, or advantages turn out to be more complicated—even con-
tradictory—than at first glance. As for immersive reading, it is 
only one among many modes, but what computational techniques 
allow are certain processing skills that aggregate and synthe-
size results from corpora that are too large to go through using 
traditional reading modes. They point toward the places to do 
the close reading, as needed. The range of reading experiences 
may broaden, but reading as an experience remains, for now. 
Whether the alphabetic code will disappear as the central mode 
of linguistic transmission (it undergirds the internet) is another 
question altogether.
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Media Literacy
RS: Many observers of digital culture announce the shift from 
deep attention to hyper attention. The French philosopher 
Bernard Stiegler even speaks of a threat to social and cultural 
development caused by the destruction of young people’s ability 
to develop deep and critical attention to the world around them. 
Is this academic nightmare justified? Or is this just another reit-
eration of a well-known lamentation about the terrifying ramifi-
cations of all new media?
JD: I tend to agree with Bernard Stiegler, though I would add 
that the single most shocking feature of the way people, young 
ones in particular, are living their lives is that they have no inte-
rior life and no apparent need or use for it. They live entirely 
social existences, always connected and in an exchange, no mat-
ter how banal, about the ongoing events of daily life. Reflection, 
meditation, imaginative musing, these are all missing, jettisoned, 
discarded and disregarded. Innovation, change, invention–these 
have always come from individuals who broke the mold, thought 
differently, pulled ideas into being in form and expression. Too 
much sociality leads to dull normativity.
RS: The birth of conventionalism out of the spirit of participa-
tion; this is a strong statement that many of the young will not be 
happy to hear. But lets drive your point even further. My thesis 
would be: People live entirely social lives for in the age of indi-
vidualism life is too big to be absorbed alone. In (post)modern 
society where past and future have become unreliable concepts 
every moment takes on an intensity that is hard to bear. One 
lives in the here and now and permanently feels unequipped for 
an appropriate reaction. Without a rich interior life, without a 
reflection, meditation, and imaginative musing experiences – be 
it Venice, Grand Canyon, Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa or the sudden rain-
bow – become indigestible bits we don’t know what to do with: 
except posting them. The unquestioned imperative of sharing is 
the new way to live up to important and trivial moments alike. 
It forwards the moment experienced to others who will “solve 
it” with a number of likes. Sharing is a way to mask the horror 
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vacui. If Blaise Pascal once, in the 17th century, stated: “all the 
unhappiness of men arises from one single fact, that they can-
not stay quietly in their own chamber” we may add today: people 
cannot only not be alone in an empty room they are also unable 
to cope by themselves with the events they encounter.
JD: Yes, well, there it is. I spend so much of my life alone and soli-
tude is as important to me as water and air, it is the medium in 
which I breathe, that I am an anomaly. I have a horror of constant 
contact, of being used up, absorbed, taken out of the being-ness 
in life as lived. I so prefer to watch times of day shift to watching 
any programmed entertainment. I’m not much of a sharer, though 
I like real conversation, dialogue, and enjoy consuming the end-
less spectacle of daily life in its direct and mediated range of 
poignancies and follies. The horror of the real is the cruelty of 
the world, of human beings to each other, which is unspeakable. 
Mediation is the assurance that we are not the suffering ones, 
because they are the enunciated subjects. Hideous indeed. What 
glass do we think we are on the other side of? I wonder.
RS: Digital Humanities are a keyword in the current discussion 
about the present and future of the Humanities. It has many fac-
ets and, as the discussion suggests, at least a dark and a bright 
side. However, there seems to be very different notions of what 
digital humanities actually are. Some reduce it to digitized cor-
pora or to the use of networks for communication, others include 
digital media studies. What is your perspective?
JD: I characterize Digital Humanities as work at the intersec-
tion of computational methods and the traditional humanities. 
The production of digitized corpora was and is one of the out-
comes of this intersection. My standard line is to say that Digital 
Humanities is the cook in the kitchen and that Digital Media 
Studies is the restaurant critic. As far as I am concerned, you 
have to know how to do things and make things in order to be 
able to think arguments into being as works in any medium, 
analogue or digital. I would extend this by noting that much 
of my work in the last ten years has been part of an overarch-
ing argument that humanities methods as well as humanities 
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content—that the humanistic approach to knowledge is funda-
mentally interpretative, observer-dependent, situated cultur-
ally and historically, necessarily partial, constrained by circum-
stances, tolerant of ambiguity.
This puts my approach at odds with computational tech-
niques and approaches to knowledge that imagine user inde-
pendent approaches, repeatable results, universal and absolute 
objects produced by empirical inquiry. I don’t include classroom 
technology, online learning, or critical media studies in Digital 
Humanities, though these are closely related fields and each is of 
value. Digital Humanities has become too obsessed with defini-
tion, and is at risk of becoming a service field without intellectual 
content or problems. I think Andrew Prescott has pointed this 
out as well, asking where are the intellectual contributions of 
Digital Humanities now that we are almost two decades into the 
field? I keep insisting that until a project in Digital Humanities 
has produced work that has to be cited by its home discipline—
American History, Classics, Romantic Poetry, etc.—for its argu-
ment (not just as a resource)—we cannot claim that DH has really 
contributed anything to scholarship.
RS: If you don’t include critical media studies in Digital 
Humanities, I as a media theorist who considers the critical 
discussion of the cultural implications of new technologies as a 
central part of media literacy hope there will be room and fund-
ing for such digital media studies besides the trendy Digital 
Humanities. I am afraid the focus on the making and managing 
of information could eventually override the traditional charac-
teristic of humanities to question knowledge. For many gradu-
ates in the humanities the promised land meanwhile seems to 
be what has been discussed as Alternative Academic Careers 
for Humanities Scholars. I have the feeling this direction fur-
ther promotes the shift from critical media studies to affirmative 
media management.
JD: The #AltAc discussion has indeed introduced confusions as 
well. In some ways, #AltAc is a sideways step into the work that 
librarians and information professionals have done for years. But 
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it brings the design and development of platforms and project 
technology in the humanities into the equation. How else would 
we have tools like Zotero, or Neatline, or Omeka if we didn’t have 
humanist-technologists committed to their development? But 
suggesting it is an alternative academic track sends the wrong 
message to the public and to administrators—it is a professional 
one, I think. The research done in an #AltAc mode is not disci-
pline specific. The distinction is important because substantive, 
discipline-specific humanities research needs support. If you are 
working all year in an admin position, especially if you are also 
teaching, the research you do may be in platform and tool devel-
opment but you don’t have the time, hours in the day, to become 
an expert in the Romantic fragment and poetics, or the interpre-
tation of the eco-political impact of the Norman conquest, or the 
construction of celebrity in 18th century French culture.
They are different kinds of work. I’m happy to work with my 
colleagues in the Library. They are dedicated professionals, 
but they are not “alt” anything, they are people whose work is 
premised on a subject specialization and on expertise in profes-
sional areas. These are essential skills. Most #AltAc advocates 
are not trained information professionals, they are in adminis-
trative positions trying to catch up with what MLIS programs 
teach, while trying to develop humanities-oriented services and 
platforms. That is a specific kind of research in the professional 
arena. Either path is consuming. Domain-specific research takes 
a lifetime of accumulated knowledge and dedication, continued 
attention to developments in the field, among peers, and it pro-
duces new knowledge. It cannot be done around the edges of full-
time administrative work. Research into platforms, protocols, 
data management, design—these are also legitimate, but they 
belong to the information domain, not the humanities. Creating 
the impression that humanities research can be done on “one’s 
own time” around the edges of full-time work plays right into 
the current diminishment of respect for the humanities. This is 
not in the interest of Digital Humanities or anyone else. We need 
Digital Humanities professionals, not diminished academics.
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RS: Against the ‘default position that the humanities are in “cri-
sis”,’ in the 2012 book Digital_Humanities you and your coauthors 
Anne Burdick, Peter Lunefeld, Todd Presner, and Jeffrey Schnapp 
portray the computational turn in Humanities as an opportunity 
of bringing the ‘values, representational and interpretative prac-
tices, meaning-making strategies, complexities, and ambiguities 
of being human into every realm of experience and knowledge of 
the world.’ As one of those values, you suggest ‘thinking beyond 
received positions and claims to absolute authority’ supporting 
‘a genuine multiverse in which no single point of view can claim 
the center.’ How do you bring relativism and multi-perspectivism 
into a world of quantifying methods and algorithmic analysis? 
What obstacles do you see?
JD: A simple demonstration to show the multiverse is to imagine 
a faceted interface that allows us to see a collection of artifacts 
from a variety of perspectives. Consider an online museum dis-
played through a set of filters that organize and select objects 
according to different criteria: the knowledge of an original col-
lector, a scheme of standard metadata from a western perspec-
tive, in accord with a classification scheme from an indigenous 
community, and so on. Each structuring organization offers a 
different argument, different set of hierarchies and values in 
its presentation. The quantitative or disambiguating underpin-
nings don’t have to determine what happens at the level of dis-
play, and the parallax of comparative views into data or organi-
zations structured into data take apart the singularity that is the 
usual perspective of a monograph. Imagine a view into a spatial 
representation of Rome—show it to me as Augustus saw it, as 
Michaelangelo saw it, as Mussolini saw it—think about the spa-
tialization of power and its connection to point of view, daily rou-
tines, routes, events. The city stops being a given. It stops being 
a singularity, and turns into a multiplicity of perspectives, each 
of which is experiential.
For more than a decade, I’ve been working on using digital 
techniques for modelling temporalities, and that work has inves-
tigated highly subjective models of experiential time, referential 
Johanna Drucker 63
time (from documents), relative time, and other modes that can’t 
be expressed in timelines borrowed from the empirical sciences. 
Most recently I’ve been working on the graphical expression 
of irreconcilable chronologies in the history of writing and the 
alphabet, particularly in the late 18th century, just on the cusp 
of geological reckoning with the ages of the world, its forma-
tion, and evolution. This is a time when biblical chronologies 
and Olympiads were the two stable reference systems for any 
historical event, but historical records and actual chronologies 
also existed. Prehistory was a mystery, unfathomable, though 
controversies reigned about whether people existed before 
Adam. This is half a century before geological discoveries and 
evolution upset the entire belief system. When you think that 
within a hundred years, theories of the birth of the universe, big 
bang, galaxy formation, and the understanding of the millions 
of years through which the earth and its species formed would 
all be articulated, it is mind-boggling. So how do we model these 
knowledge systems, show their distinctions and differences, not 
as errors, but as rhetorics, as argument structures?
These are tasks well-suited to the mutable conditions of dis-
play within a digital environment, I think, though we will have 
to let go of the attachment to easy, reductive eye-candy that has 
been the stuff of information visualizations as they have been 
inherited from the natural sciences and brought into the digi-
tal humanities. The intellectual and epistemological problems 
in using visualizations are many, beginning with a fundamental 
fallacy about representation—that an image can “be” in a rela-
tion of equivalence or identity with that which it claims to repre-
sent. Many other fallacies follow from this, but we went through 
decades of deconstruction and post-structuralism and seem to 
have forgotten all of the lessons we learned as we (humanists) 
rush to uncritical engagement with methods from other fields. 
When you realize that language has many modalities—interroga-
tive and conditional, for instance—but that images are almost 
always declarative, you begin to see the problems of represen-
tation inherent in information visualizations. They are state-
ments, representations (i.e. highly complex constructions and 
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mediations) that offer themselves as presentation (self-evident 
statements). This is an error of epistemology, not an error of 
judgment or method.
RS: The unlearning of deconstruction and post-modernism, 
this is what I meant above when portraying the quantitative turn 
as the epistemological happy end that overcomes the relativism 
and ambiguity of postmodernism. As for the difference between 
language and images you point out, the book also states that 
Digital Humanities ‘necessarily partakes and contributes to the 
“screen culture” of the 21ST century’ – which you already stated 
in your project Wittgenstein’s Gallery in which you take quali-
ties specific to images and see how they could work in texts, and 
vice versa. Digital_Humanities admits to the tension between the 
visual and the textual, but doesn’t accept an either/or approach 
nor the subordination of the one to the other. However, as you 
just stated it, the visual and the textual are two very different 
systems of signification and communication. To quote yourself 
at a symposium on Digital Humanities in Hong Kong in 2014: a 
word doesn’t cast a shadow and an image can’t be conjugated. 
You have extensively worked on the visual of the textual, as it 
were. How do you see the collaboration of both in this context? 
What role should visual studies or rather the study of visual com-
munication play in Digital Humanities?
JD: I was at a dinner party this year with a very senior and right-
fully esteemed scholar of visuality, an equally senior literary 
critic, and a younger poet who suggested that images and texts 
are ‘now the same’, because they both appeared on the screen 
display as pixels. I was appalled by the stupidity of this remark. 
Might as well say that images and texts printed in ink on news-
print are the same order of thing because they are produced in 
the same medium. Text and image are processed in different 
parts of our brains and by different means. More than 50% of 
primate cerebral cortex activity is given to visual experience, 
and this is dramatic by contrast to that of other animals. What is 
striking to me is that we do not have a field called visual episte-
mology, no dedicated discipline.
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Visual studies was its own thing, a rejection of art history’s 
hegemonic attachment to high art, an attempt to expand the 
social and cultural parameters of what was allowed to be looked 
at and how. But visual studies, perversely, was little concerned 
with visuality, and very concerned with politics, social practices, 
economics, ideology and so on. This left visual epistemology 
undeveloped. We do not have a good language for critical discus-
sion of graphics, or of graphical principles of organization and 
argument. What, for instance, is the difference between hierar-
chy and proximity in terms of the creation of meaningful spa-
tialized relationships in graphic design? Huge. But do we teach 
these principles? Communicate them? And yet, now, in the world 
of screen-based communication exchange and continual trans-
actions, the need for critical engagement with the workings of 
graphical form could not be greater. My new book, Graphesis: 
Visual Forms of Knowledge Production, which was just published 
by Harvard University Press, is an attempt to outline the foun-
dations of a broad-based approach grounded in the history of 
graphical knowledge and its practice. Sadly (perversely), for a 
book about visual forms of knowledge, it is badly designed, on 
poor paper, and dismally printed, with images that are way too 
small and a layout that has none of the exquisite elegance that 
Emily McVarish brought to our Graphic Design History: A Critical 
Guide. But so be it. The content of the book, will, I hope still be of 
some use in the larger conversation.
RS: The poet you meet over dinner should have known better 
since poetry, though it works with images, does so in language. 
What he or she should have brought up is that the word in digital 
culture is in decay, since new technologies more and more shift 
communication from the linguistic to the visual mode. Take an 
app such as Snapchat which, through the promised ephemeral 
character of its images, invites users to document rather than 
describe. No need to voice how one is doing if one can send a 
snapshot of sitting in front of the TV legs on the table beer in 
hand. It is faster and it requires less cognitive effort. The excit-
ing aspect of such form of communication is its increased ambi-
guity and semantic surplus: It is up to the perceiver what specific 
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aspect of the photograph she responds to with an image that 
again says more than thousand words and hence leaves it to the 
perceiver to what of those ‘words’ she wants to respond. So, if 
Digital Humanities moves to visual forms of knowledge produc-
tion this may be the academic equivalent to the development in 
digital culture.
JD: Absolutely! Hence my call for visual epistemology as an 
essential and emerging field. In what does knowledge consist 
when it is encoded in visual, graphical, diagrammatic, schematic, 
and other forms we process through vision? I do not believe, 
along with the rest of my other poet friends, that we remediate 
all visual experience into language. Visuality is a primary mode 
of perception, representation, mediation, processing, and cogni-
tion. For years, every time I went to an art history theory confer-
ence, the conversation turned to the question of how to develop a 
visual mode of criticality—enacted in and through visual means. 
Look at Robert Frank and the sequencing of the The Americans. 
Juxtaposition is a critical move, one that operates across a divide 
that prevents closure into singularity. This can happen within 
an image. Winslow Homer’s amazing painting of confederate sol-
diers as prisoners is a masterwork of juxtaposition and difference 
operating within visual codes. You never exhaust the looking and 
comparing and the way the differentiation and specificity of each 
individual is produced by and across these rifts.
RS: UCLA is one of the rather few universities that has a Digital 
Humanities center. What is your experience in this center 
regarding student expectations and faculty collaboration?
JD: Just to be clear, the Center for Digital Humanities does not 
offer any degrees, graduate or undergraduate, it is a research 
and teaching support unit, and actually does more of the latter 
than the former. Our research infrastructure is as fragile as any-
one else’s, I think. But we did mount an undergraduate minor 
and a graduate certificate as an interdisciplinary effort across 
schools and departments. We are thinking about a Master’s 
Degree that would be a stand-alone two-year degree with a sub-
ject specialization or a three-year combination with MLIS. This 
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is all fluid, and we may look at other options as well, but we are 
trying to think about how to best prepare our students for jobs in 
private and public enterprises, cultural institutions, media and 
business, academic and non-academic positions.
The needs for data wrangling and production, critical under-
standing of databases, analysis, visualization, data mining in 
text and image, mapping, network analysis, and the techniques 
of digital publishing are all pressing. My goal is to provide stu-
dents with the skills they need to work in digital, networked 
environments while also having an understanding of history, 
theory, culture, and some humanistic discipline in which they 
have a passion and feel like a stakeholder. If you love something 
and want it to be valued, understood, passed on to a broad pub-
lic now and for generations to come, that makes your motivation 
very different than if you are only trying to perform a task effi-
ciently. The students have been terrific, and they are living evi-
dence of the viability of our approach. In our first group of grad-
uating minors, the reports on how their classes got them jobs, 
next steps, an edge for graduate school or for work in some gov-
ernmental, non-governmental, or other sector have been legion. 
It’s been gratifying. We’ll have to see how the graduates do, but 
they are an enthusiastic bunch.
Getting an in-depth specialization in Digital Humanities 
while learning the general landscape of tools and possibilities is 
important as well. We need someone who can teach coding. You 
can do a lot without knowing any Java Script, for instance, but 
being able to write code is a crucial skill for digital work. I would 
argue that structured data is the primary feature of digital plat-
forms, and manipulating data comes after that, but knowing how 
to read code, understand how it works, how its syntax and spe-
cialized vocabulary function, provides real insight. I won’t swap 
it for literature, for poetry, or for art, but I will allow that it is its 
own form of writing, an expression whose rules and features are 
integral to our culture’s operations. But like so many things, I 
distinguish between having a reading knowledge and a working 
skills—even if I can read code and understand how it works, I’m 
not going to get good enough to make it make sense for me to be 
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my own programmer. Life is too short. I drive a car without hav-
ing built one, use paints without creating my own pigments, print 
with lead type without have designed a set of punches or cast my 
own fonts. I think it is important to distinguish between what 
you need to know and what you need to do individualy, what your 
skills and strengths are, and where you are in the ecosystem. I’m 
a better coach and mentor than practitioner in many arts, and 
that seems appropriate. I can think things that I don’t believe 
others do, and that is my contribution. Contrarian thought. 
It’s my niche.
Reading back through my answers, I realize I sound cranky, 
critical, and a bit despairing about the state of world and the fate 
of the humanities. But I actually believe that the only way we 
can change the course on which we are currently is to engage 
with those values and methods that are central to humanistic 
thought and to incorporate the interpretative rhetorics of the 
humanities into the work we do, not just the analysis of work 
done. Humanistic methods, with their emphasis on situated-
ness of knowledge, of the partial and incomplete understanding 
of the world and its workings, and a commitment to imaginative 
and speculative thought, may open possibility spaces as yet not 
manifest within our current sphere of understanding. These are 
very early days for Digital Humanities, but my hope is that as 
the future unfolds, it will be the humanistic dimensions that gain 
more traction in the field—not just as content, but as methods of 
knowledge, analysis, and argument.
InteRvIew 2
Of Capta, vectoralists, reading and the 
Googlization of the university
John Cayley
John Cayley is a pioneering practitioner and theo-
rist of digital language arts, a poet and a transla-
tor specializing in Chinese poetics. He won the 
Electronic Literature Organization’s 2001 Award for 
Poetry while still in the UK, and is now a Professor 
of Literary Arts at Brown University, directing its 
MFA program in Digital Language Arts. His work 
has explored ambient poetics, writing in immersive 
audiovisuality, and aestheticized vectors of reading 
(thereadersproject.org), with theoretical essays on 
code and temporality in textual practice, and ‘writ-
ing to be found’ with/against proprietary statistical 
models of language. The Listeners (2015) is a critical 
aesthetic engagement with transactive synthetic lan-
guage, representing a shift in his work toward lan-
guage art for an aural as much as a visual readership. 
For John Cayley’s writing in networked and program-
mable media see programmatology.shadoof.net.
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John Cayley positions ‘capta’ against ‘data’, reveals vectoral-
ization as algorithmic determination within a new socioeco-
nomic architecture, bemoans the blackmail of ‘terms of service’ 
as well as the infantile misunderstanding of what it is to be a 
social human by Mark Zuckerberg and the serfdom of narcis-
sistic selves to the data-greedy service providers. He under-
lines the dumbness and deception of statistics and algorithmic 
agency, wonders when the vectoralist class of big software will, 
eventually, be ‘too big to fail,’ speculates about unrealized art-
works with Google Translate, rejects “social reading” and fears 
Digital Humanities.
Prelude
Roberto Simanowski: What is your favored neologism of digital 
media culture and why?
John Cayley: I don’t seem to have a favorite that comes to mind 
although ‘codework’ and ‘codebending’ surfaced as I mused. 
These are terms for new and hybrid practices that require lexi-
cal focus as we strive to understand or reimagine them. Years 
ago I suggested that ‘programmaton’ should replace ‘computer’ 
in English. This did not catch on. New words must become good 
words, otherwise they will not survive.
RS: If you could go back in history of new media and digital cul-
ture in order to prevent something from happening or somebody 
from doing something, what or who would it be?
JC: I would certainly have done what I could to prevent the rise 
of proprietary, (so-called) social media. I would try to isolate and 
prevent certain mechanisms that log and accumulate and pro-
cess the transactions of human beings such that their social and 
transactional identities are constrained by capta-driven compu-
tational processes in the service, primarily, of commerce.
RS: Capta-Driven? You refer to Johanna Drucker’s differentiation 
between given and taken data?
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JC: My use of capta does come, in the first instance, from 
Drucker’s reintroduction of the term. I’ve commented on my use 
of it in an essay.1 ‘Data’ has become a very common term.  It’s 
been prevalent for decades, especially since the advent of the 
database, as indicating, I suppose, the raw material of research. 
I think that there should be more of a debate about what is and 
is not data. Etymologically, data means ‘that which is given‘ as 
evidence of the world. However, the tools we use to take what 
the world gives may overdetermine the material evidence that 
we are able to gather. Arguably, the computational regime is 
overdetermined in a number of respects. It can only accept and 
process—as putative data—those things that can be represented 
in terms of discrete symbolic elements. It will tend to favor the 
quantitive accumulation and analysis of these things, this so-
called ‘data.‘ Drucker makes the same sort of argument and 
following her, I prefer to use capta, for what has been ‘taken,’ 
when referring to the raw material collected and processed by 
networked services or indeed by the regime of computation in 
general. In her article, Drucker suggests that the conventional 
and uncritical use of ‘data’ implies a “fundamental prejudice” 
subjecting humanistic interpretation to relatively naive statisti-
cal applications, and skewing the game “in favor of a belief that 
data is intrinsically quantitative—self-evident, value neutral, and 
observer-independent.”2 If we call what we collect and analyze 
‘capta’ rather than ‘data’ then at least we signal our awareness of 
the likely prejudice and open a door that allows critical interpre-
tation to reinvigorate our debates and concerns. The distinction 
is fundamentally important and it is remarkable to consider that 
this seems to be the first time that it has been clarified for the 
era of Digital Humanities.
RS: So the term ‘capta’ indicates that digital data or rather all 
data is not just given, raw, unprocessed material, but material 
taken from somewhere within a specific method and frame-
work. Surprising and alarming if the Humanities should not be 
aware of this issue after all the debates in their disciplines about 
whether or not there are facts before interpretation. We will 
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return to Digital Humanities. First let me ask this: If you were a 
minister of education, what would you do about media literacy?
JC: I would ensure that the media infrastructure of educa-
tional institutions was commensurate with the most advanced, 
proven media infrastructures deployed by major corporations 
in the technology sector. I would seek to introduce legislation 
that required corporations to supply digital media infrastruc-
ture to educational institutions as a condition of their contin-
ued operation.
Politics and Government
RS: While in the 1990s Internet pioneers such as John Perry 
Barlow declared the independence of Cyberspace from the gov-
ernments of the old world, now it seems people hope for govern-
ments to intervene in the taking-over and commercialization of 
the Internet by huge corporations such as Google and Facebook. 
Thus, web activists calling for the government to pass laws to 
protect privacy online, and politicians suggesting expiration 
dates for data on social networks appear to be activist in a bat-
tle for the rights of the individual. Have tables turned to that 
extent? Are we, once rejecting old government, now appealing to 
it for help?
JC: When exactly did we, collectively, reject old government? I 
do not think it is a matter of turning back. Governments have 
continued to exist as complex conglomerations of institutions to 
which we consent—more or less, and pace all manner of negotia-
tion and struggle—in the matter of the administration and regu-
lation of our sociopolitical lives. The world of the network has 
seen the rise of new and alternative institutions. These emerged 
and are now powerful in, as you say, an environment that was 
surprisingly unregulated. New institutions now affect and corral 
and enclose (vectoralize, in Mackenzie Wark’s terms) significant 
aspects of our lives as humans, for huge marginal profit. They 
have done this unwittingly and irresponsibly with our unwitting 
and irresponsible consent—default consent to their ‘terms of ser-
vice.’ Our past institutions of value-preservation and governance 
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were equally unwitting and irresponsible in this process. What 
happens now is that we pause, take stock, and try to see more 
clearly how the institutions of the past and those of the future 
might interrelate more responsibly and help to redefine, as indi-
viduals and societies, what we believe that we want to be and 
do and own. Otherwise, we will simply become, by unregulated, 
data-driven, statistical force majeure, what the algorithms of the 
new institutions determine that we want.
RS: You refer to Mackenzie Wark’s notion of vectoralists in his 
A Hacker Manifesto. Can you say more concerning your per-
spective on the relationship between vectoralization, algo-
rithm and capta?
JC: Mackenzie Wark proposes that, historically, there is a new 
productive and at least potentially progressive class of hackers, 
and a new corresponding exploitative class: the vectoralists. I 
find his proposals useful. Briefly, and with apologies to Wark, 
the hackers compose/produce algorithms that reveal vectors: 
vectoral potentials in the swelling currents of informational, 
data=capta transactions. Hackers may maintain an agnostic 
position concerning the significance or value of the data=capta 
that their algorithms bring into new relations with human order 
or, for that matter, human disorder. However the vectoralists of 
‘big software’ discover where and how to exploit certain, profit-
able vectors of attention and transaction, and then acquire con-
trol over both these vectors themselves and the productive labor 
of those hackers that create them. They build these algorithms 
into a new socioeconomic architecture, which I now call big soft-
ware. They own this architecture and profit from the use of the 
services it provides. They seek to enclose the commons of digital 
transactions within their architectures and systems, the vectors 
of which they carefully control.
As I say, the hackers are, in principle, agnostic about 
data=capta. If data=capta better represented what is given by 
the world, they would continue to hack with this better material. 
Vectoralists care even less about whether they are dealing with 
data or capta because their motivation is simply to seek profit 
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from whatever transactions have been vectoralized. As a func-
tion of recent historical and technological developments, there 
is simply so much capta now and for the time being, that we are 
likely to be held within its artificial, computational biases for 
many years, perhaps until it is too late for us either to reject the 
representation of our transactional lives by capta, or to insist 
that computation comes to grip with some of the true data that 
we should be able to give, or to withhold.
RS: It is interesting that vectorialists such as Google side with 
web activists opposing the government’s attempts to constrain 
the free use of data online on behalf of intellectual property 
rights as seen from SOPA, PIPA, and ACTA. It appears to be 
the case that never before has a new medium generated such 
ambivalent responses to central issues of law and rights—their 
enforcement and preservation, the potential for freedom and 
radical change.
JC: It is not necessarily ambivalence or contradiction that char-
acterizes the responses of activists and critics. For example, 
since it is raised here, existing custom and law associated with 
intellectual property is irremediably flawed and quite unable 
to comprehend or regulate a significant proportion of digitally 
mediated transactional and cultural practices. More and more 
of these practices—the writing and reading that is convention-
ally regulated by copyright law—are so much altered by digital 
mediation and digital affordances that our fundamental expec-
tations and potentialities are changed beyond easy recognition 
and beyond assimilation by existing custom and law. Moreover, 
our creative and discursive practices are now inextricably inter-
twined with their network mediation—the internet and its ser-
vices—and so the questions and conflicts—those of adversarial 
law—surrounding institutions of copyright and intellectual 
property have shifted from who creates and owns what, to who 
controls the most privileged and profitable tools for creation 
and who controls the most privileged and profitable means of 
dissemination.
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RS: This shift is, I think, very well illustrated by Google when 
it advocates the liberty of information against newspapers that 
demand some payment for using their lead paragraph in news.
google. The newspapers have a point—since here the profit goes 
to whoever disseminates the content that others provide—but 
they have no chance if they want to be listed by Google. Which 
brings me to the next question. In his book The Googlization of 
Everything (And Why We Should Worry), Siva Vaidhyanathan 
speaks of Google’s ‘infrastructural imperialism’ and calls for the 
public initiative of a ‘Human Knowledge Project’ as ‘global infor-
mation ecosystem.’ Aware of the utopian nature of his vision, 
Vaidhyanathan adds that Google has been crowding out imagina-
tion of alternatives, not the least of which by its reputation for 
building systems that are open and customizable – so far. Should 
we mistrust the positive record and worry? Would the U.S. gov-
ernment or the European Union ever have been able to carry out 
something like Google’s book project? Should –and could– they 
run a search engine free of advertisement and with an algorithm 
visible to all who care?
JC: Given the variety and scope and general applicability of 
network services such as Google’s, Amazon’s, Facebook’s, it is, 
frankly shocking that existing national and international insti-
tutions—those traditionally engaged with all the activities that 
we consider most valuable and essential to human life, such as 
research, knowledge production, education, governance, social 
interaction, the planning and organization of everyday life, read-
ing and writing, retail logistics—have not been able to effectively 
resist or, perhaps, co-opt or even, effectively, tax in kind (for a 
more equitable redistribution of cultural benefits) the activities 
of the new vectoralist institutions. Why shouldn’t governments 
get themselves involved on our behalf? Probably for the same 
reason that governments can no longer control their banks and 
can no longer make their banks work for their citizens. Perhaps 
the vectoralist corporations are now also—culturally—’too 
big to fail?’
76 Interview 2
What is clear is that inequalities in the distribution of power 
over the vectors of transaction and attention—commercial 
but especially cultural—are simply too great. This power was 
acquired far too quickly by naive and untried corporate entities 
that still appear sometimes to be naive and untried, although 
they are perhaps now simply brazen and unregulated. This 
power is consolidated by agreements—literal, habitual, and all-
but-unconsidered by the network ‘users,’ ourselves, who enter 
into them—to ‘terms of service’ that are not mutual and which 
will only reinforce and increase the disparities between ‘server’ 
and ‘client.’ And this power is consolidated by the inadequa-
cies of existing custom and law since huge marginal profit has 
allowed the new corporations to acquire, on a grand scale, con-
ventionally licensed intellectual property along, inevitably, with 
the interest and means to conserve this property through exist-
ing—and in my opinion, inappropriate—legal mechanisms, mech-
anisms that are incommensurate with the culture and commerce 
of networks, clouds, big data, big software.
RS: As for another vectoralist corporation: What comes to mind 
when you hear the name Mark Zuckerberg?
JC: A shy, but arrogant and infantile misunderstanding of what 
it is to be a social human. A consent to mechanistic services 
that are dedicated to simplistic conceptions of humanity while 
arrogantly extending these conceptions to every possible human 
engagement with privacy, self-expression, desire, and so forth. 
Complete denial of the fact that proprietary social media is fun-
damentally the theft and enclosure of transactional personal 
information. Complete denial of lived experience, even in terms 
of empirical data, and instead the substitution of an implicit 
claim that what social media collects as so-called ‘data’ reveals 
the world as it is or should be; whereas social media conceals, 
more effectively than ever and from more people than ever, how 
the world—as power and profit and violence—actually is. Shock, 
that such a sad individual has been recast as a commercial and 
sometime (im)moral exemplar.
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Algorithm and Censorship
RS: To move from the person to the platform: The focus on num-
bers of views, likes, comments in social media and many other 
websites indicates the quantitative turn that our society takes. 
The desired effect of counting is comparison and ranking, i.e. the 
end of postmodern ambiguity and relativism. Does the trust in 
numbers in digital media bring about the technological solution 
to a philosophical problem? A Hollywood-like shift from the mel-
ancholia of the end of grand narratives and truth to the excite-
ment of who or what wins the competition?
JC: Remember those postwar decades—a period taking us up 
into at least the mid 1990s—when there was a widely prevalent 
popular suspicion of statistics? Especially of both government-
gathered and marketing statistics? How could (dumb) statistics 
ever reflect the richness and nuance of human life? But now we 
have big data, and analytics, and these will allow self-professed 
‘IBM’ers’ (apparently personable, active individuals of a certain 
vision) to ‘build a smarter planet.’ In fact, all we really have is 
more statistics: several orders of magnitude more statistics. 
‘Data’ is a misnomer. Philosophically and also in terms of empiri-
cal science per se, ‘data’ should be understood as what is given 
to us by our (full, phenomenological or empirical) experience of 
the world. However the records of big data are simply records of 
(see above) capta, the captured and abducted records of trans-
actions with—merely—that portion of human life that is capable 
of being assimilated by the current regime of computation: no 
more, no less, and certainly not enough to express the fullness of 
what we are.
In what follows, I’m sort of adapting and paraphrasing from 
the essay I’ve cited above. The ability to store, digitally, and ana-
lyze, algorithmically, overwhelming quantities of data has ren-
dered it ‘big’ in combination with the near ubiquity of portable 
and mobile devices, fully networked and capable of collecting, 
transmitting, and so allowing the aggregation of both data and 
meta-data gathered from an ever-increasing proportion of human 
movements and actions: from transactional, communicative 
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exchanges of all kinds. These may be representations of any-
thing—from the highly significant and valuable (finance, trade, 
marketing, politics, ...) to the everyday and commonplace (social-
izing, shopping, fooling around ...). Personal analysis of all but 
a minuscule part of this data would be humanly impossible and 
so, at the cost of commensurate, individual human attention, 
algorithmic agencies promise to predict trends and visualize 
patterns from what has been collected with unprecedented sta-
tistical accuracy and previously inconceivable power. The ques-
tion of what this data represents—what exactly it gives us of the 
world—remains little-examined. Because the cost of collection is 
so low and because the methods of collection are now inciden-
tal and habitual, the tangentially-related profits—derived chiefly 
from the reconfiguration of advertising—are massive, and far 
from exhausted.
It is not only that we seem to have given ourselves and our 
(self-)evaluation over to ‘counting’ but we are refusing, any lon-
ger (as we once, arguably, did) to acknowledge that the motiva-
tion for this is not our common or collective benefit, whatever 
the service providers may claim.
RS: Your answer clearly indicates your skepticism and even 
anger at the role statistics and big data play in current society. 
Such is the appeal of numbers that the expression “data love” 
has been coined to describe society’s immature infatuation with 
digitization and datafication. In the end, this love is narcissistic. 
Given the fact that Internet companies use data and algorithms 
to customize the website they show us, the ads they send us, and 
the information they give us, one metaphor to describe the digi-
tal media age may be narcissism. In digital media studies such 
customization is translated to “daily me” (in Cass Sunstein’s book 
Republic.com) or “you-loop” (in Eli Pariser’s Filter Bubble). The 
fate of Narcissus is well known. The personal and cultural cost 
of personalization in digital media is the loss of chance encoun-
ters, the preclusion of the unfamiliar, the removal of diversity 
and of what we are not (yet). The algorithm is, you just pointed it 
out, the censor people more or less approve of and even desire. 
John Cayley 79
This becomes problematic once people are addressed not as con-
sumers but as citizens expected to be open to others instead 
of cocooning in their bubble. Hence, personalization, driven by 
economic force, is political. Are, hence, the actual policy makers 
in the digital media age those who program ego-loops, inadver-
tently undermining the foundation of a democratic society? Or 
is the alert regarding personalization hyperbolic and rather the 
clandestine update and comeback of the claim of critical theory 
that cultural industry impedes citizens’ release from their self-
incurred tutelage?
JC: The apparatus into which we stare is something far worse – 
in terms of psycho(social)analytic structures shall we say – than 
the pools or mirrors of Narcissus. We are in the grips of what 
Talan Memmott calls the narcissystem, a syndrome he creatively 
delineated long before a billion of us began to do so much more 
than simply gaze longingly at our reflections. The pool and the 
mirror have the benefit of a certain objectivity: they reflect only 
what they see. The waves of reflective feedback into which we 
gaze now are waves of images that we construct ourselves.
In the early history of the internet the fashion was to proj-
ect ourselves as the kind of hopeful, fictive, ‘transitional’ mon-
sters that theorists such as Sherry Turkle once tried to con-
vince us were pyschosocially or even politically progressive. 
Cyberutopianism reckoned without the unconscious, and more 
specifically without the blind and venal desire that drive majori-
ties, as many as a billion willing persons. In our current situation, 
questionably progressive experimentation – for which read mon-
strous, hopeful self-delusion – has given way to a mass acquies-
cence: a cyber(pseudo)activism that ‘logs in’ – agreeing to terms 
– as its no longer over-hopeful, transactionally authenticated self 
and then strains to construct a plausible, attractive, *like*able 
image which it can gaze upon and consider together with all its 
other equally – if marginally distinctive – *like*able (friendly) 
selves. The newness of this situation is merely the *accessibil-
ity* of the (big) ‘data’ of self-(re)presentation. This appears to 
be accessible to all, and so it is – so long as ‘access’ means the 
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reflective feedback of narcissistically lovable, *like*able self-
image(s), as naively shared imaginaries.
However the fact that *effective* access to the data – its 
aggregation for the manipulation and delivery of attention (to 
advertisement) and (instant commercial) transaction – is in the 
hands of a small number of private corporations, demonstrates 
that a familiar systemic mass neurosis – the narcissism here and 
now stimulating this response – is in thrall, in service, in serfdom 
to the service providers: the vectoralist class of big software. If 
the ‘culture industry’ was a set of negotiable institutions, some-
times subject to the critique of critical theory, then the more 
pressing threat - for us currently - is the media-driven, default 
predominance of network systems, pandering to mass psychol-
ogy in a post-natural, unholy alliance.
RS: From this speech and from your more academic writings 
such as ‘Terms of Reference & Vectoralist Transgressions” I take 
it that you consider search engines, for example, to be an aspect 
of social media.
JC: Any reply hinges on an understanding of ‘social media.’ This 
term is currently applied to network services that allow digitized 
(and thus prejudicially grammatized) transactions that are, with-
out question, nonetheless within the purview of social human 
interactions. But to claim that these media are in any way defini-
tive or constitutive of (all) human social experience is, clearly, a 
profound misdirection, one that the popularity of the term tends 
to encourage. Networked media are used for social transac-
tions but they co-opt social activity and engagement selectively, 
according to the development of technological affordances and, 
now also according to the (specific moral and explicitly com-
mercial) motivations of the service providers (their leaders and 
executives).
If our understanding of ‘social media’ includes network ser-
vices that seek to capture the data of social interaction and 
reflect it back to human users, then, yes: Google has always 
been ‘social media.’ From the moment Google collected the 
data implicit in search terms that had been entered over time 
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and adjusted its services accordingly, it was ‘social media.’ If we 
reserve ‘social media’ for those services that seek to identify and 
normalize human social agents and then capture the data from 
those transactions that they subsequently choose to mediate via 
the services in question, then Google still qualifies, but does so 
from the moment that it required or suggested or presupposed 
(note that it does now often presuppose coherent human identity 
without any need for explicit login) its services as subsequent 
to the login or identification of a human agent engaged with its 
services. This I date, loosely, from the introduction of Gmail in 
2004 and, at least since the advent of Google+, a constrained, 
digitized and computationally implicated enclosure of the ‘social’ 
– as in the generally understood sense of ‘social media’ – is quite 
clearly inalienable to Google and all of its networked services, 
including and perhaps especially search, since search is such a 
vitally important aspect of network interaction.
RS: To go even further in evaluating Google’s net-service, 
Google—and other search engines, although Google is the pre-
dominant exemplar—is accused of manipulating the way that the 
Internet is presented to us by way of its PageRank. The objec-
tion is twofold: on the one hand, one may question the ranking’s 
statistical and algorithmic foundations, i.e the popularity and 
accessibility of a searched phrase is likely to be ranked above 
its complexity or intellectual challenge. This objection, one may 
say, does not so much address any pitfalls of Google’s process 
as those of democracy itself where everybody has an equal say 
regardless of her intellectual or political resources. On the other 
hand, one wonders to what extent Google really does follow a 
questionable paradigm of “datocracy”. Although, the actual cri-
teria of Google’s ranking are unknown, we do know from Google 
Instant Search results that a pure law of numbers is being sub-
mitted to some degree of censorship. To give an example: While 
it is certainly believable that ‘amazon’ pops up if we type an ‘a,’ 
we might be surprise to be offered ‘porsche’ and ‘portugal’ for 
‘por.’ Does Google modify the way the Internet looks to give us a 
more moral view of how it represents us to ourselves?
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JC: The simple answer to this question is: yes. You state the posi-
tion quite clearly and the evidence is available to all of us. Our 
problem is the characterization of the new institutions – and of 
Google as exemplary of vectoralist big software. These institu-
tions do what others preceding them have always done. They 
respond to human needs and desires and propose how best (and 
most profitably) these might be accommodated in terms of per-
sistent sociopolitical and socioeconomic practices – precisely: 
institutions. The problem is the unprecedented accumulation 
of cultural as well as economic power in institutions that are: 
young, and proprietary, and, as a function of the latter condition, 
enclosed – black boxes to the vast majority of their ‘users.’ Our 
problem is the relatively unexamined properties and methods of 
these institutions. They are new and they are doing much that is 
new and much that is, apparently: beneficial, interesting, excit-
ing. But this is no excuse, no reason for us not to give these new 
policy makers serious (re)consideration, before, that is ... they 
are ‘too big to fail.’
RS:  More on Google: What about its “shared endorsement” pro-
posal to deploy user ratings and photos in ads to make advertise-
ment more social.
JC: Again, in my ‘Terms of Reference’, I discuss, as highly prob-
lematic, what I see as the appropriation of material that is proper 
to human users and its automatic, algorithmic incorporation 
into advertisement. Habitual and unthinking agreement as to 
‘terms of use’ or ‘terms of service’ are what make this possible. 
However, I do not believe that human users, yet, have any real 
understanding of what they are handing over and giving up. 
“Shared endorsement” is simply a euphemistic gloss for what is 
going on, for what has been going on ever since search results 
and webmail pages began to show us advertisements that are 
composed, in real time, from the actual words – material that 
belongs to us, in a real sense – that we have used to form a 
search or to write an email. The way that language is inscribed 
in computation – such that is it is immediately assimilable in 
terms of discrete lexical symbols and thus immediately subject 
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to algorithm – also makes this easily possible for big software. 
But I see this, literally, as the theft of something that is proper 
to myself, and its appropriation, by regular processes (not even 
by other humans, directly) into advertising of which I am very 
likely to disapprove and which may actually offend me. “... This 
is material / Appropriation of cultural interiority to venal desire, 
/ Wrongly subjecting and reforming you-and-I / Within a false 
enclosure of precisely that which / Should never be enclosed: 
the openness of all / That we inscribe.”3 As Google and the other 
social network services move on to algorithmically appropriate 
our images and our opinions for their revenue-generating adver-
tisers, I hope that there may be a greater outcry and a better 
awareness of what is happening. Oddly, ordinary humans seem 
to be far more sensitive to the robot-theft of their “image” as 
compared to any robot-theft of their words.
RS: To come back to the other vectoralist corporation that por-
traits itself as a neo-moralist institution, Facebook declares the 
sharing of as much personal information as possible as the pre-
condition for a better world. In October 2013 Facebook made 
headlines by allowing teenagers to share content not only with 
friends and friends of their friends but everybody on Facebook. 
While Facebook Inc. explains this move as giving teenagers –
and especially the socially active among them such as musicians 
and humanitarian activists– the same access to the broader 
audience that they have on blogs and Twitter, we all know that 
it first and foremost allows the aggregators and advertisers 
access to impressionable young consumers. The economic inter-
ests behind this data worship are undoubted and certainly need 
to be addressed – as you do, pointing to the collection of com-
mercial transactions and data aggregation. However, the ques-
tion remains as to why younger generations don’t seem to care 
about privacy but establish, using Facebook millionfold day-to-
day, radical transparency as the new foundation of our culture. 
Siva Vaidhyanathans, in a talk at Stanford University (on May 16, 
2011) about his book The Googlization of Everything (And Why 
We Should Worry), calls for a “dignity movement” that needs to 
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address that having a certain level of anonymity and “breathing 
room” is part of both being human and being social. Would such 
movement be more than the helpless response of digital immi-
grants to their kids and grandchildren whose data-exhibitionism 
only carries their own public display of affection since the sexual 
revolution of the 1960s in a paradoxical way to the extreme?
JC: As already indicated above, when we debate these issues—
privacy, personal secrecy, the contrary socialized ‘openness’ 
that networked media provide for activities that we previously 
considered to be difficult or dangerous or undesirable to commu-
nicate—we are not doing so in the abstract, or in a true public, 
or in a genuine agora, where access to the events and effects (the 
capta or data) is equally distributed or is distributed according 
to locality and local custom as defined by the affordances of the 
human body, prosthetically enhanced or otherwise. The events 
and effects of the so-called sexual revolution were accessible to 
its participants and to those reporting on behalf of broadcast, 
one-to-many media. Behaviors altered; times changed; opinions 
changed; markets, politics, and culture evolved in response. 
The behaviors and opinions, events and effects, as generated by 
authenticated individuals within Facebook’s network make all 
of these events and effects—in their digitally inscribed form as 
big data—immediately accessible to a system of aggregation and 
analysis that is now explicitly geared to the service of a commer-
cially implicated mission. If I am open about a behavior, or desire, 
or opinion, that is one problem for me; if this data is immediately 
and automatically appropriated, that is another problem, but it 
is more of a problem for society than it is for me. I have already 
made the moral effort to be open. Perhaps I feel I have done 
something good or at least true. Why should I go on to worry 
that what I have done might be bad for others. It is surely bad for 
all of us that only Facebook and one or two other huge corpora-
tions ‘know’ statistically and immediately what appears—com-
mercially? politically? psychosexually?—to be ‘best’ for all of us.
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Art and Aesthetics
RS: Nobody today speaks of digital art. Does this mean that digi-
tal art has ceased to exist or does it mean all art is digital?
JC: Except in the special case of what might be called computa-
tional art or computational aesthetics, the digital is not media 
specific. In other words, digitization and digitally enhanced—
programmable, networked—media can be and are applied to any 
traditional or new medium; and broadly across all artistic prac-
tices. The tendency, over time, has been to discover that a huge 
proportion of contemporary practices rely on digital media. So 
yes: it’s effectively all digital. Then let’s just call it art. I recently 
redesignated the rubric under which I work within a university 
Department of Literary Arts (Creative Writing). I now work in 
Digital Language Arts. ‘Digital’ conveys a strategic emphasis: 
the academy still needs to promote an engagement with digital 
media. However the arts that we practice are arts of language, 
basta. Some of us, but not all, do also practice electronic liter-
ature proper which, following the analogy of electronic music, 
entangles literature with computation and with a large measure 
of technicity.
RS: People have said that art in or of digital media must be polit-
ical even if its intentions are to be utterly formalistic. If art is 
based on technology the focus on form draws attention to how 
technology works and this is already an act of reflection or edu-
cation. From this perspective, one would assume that digital or 
electronic literature is literature that addresses the politics of 
digital technology. In your work, you are making use of digital 
technology in various ways. How political is your aesthetic use 
of technology?
JC: At an earlier point in my life and career as a digital language 
artist I often characterized myself, unapologetically, as a poetic 
formalist. In poetic practice, at this time (before the turn of the 
millennium), there did not seem to me to be sufficient formalist 
engagement and so I was content to pursue this variety of aes-
thetic practice because I preferred it and, in a sense—somewhat 
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pretentiously—as a corrective. Is this political? I am still con-
cerned that artists engaged with language as their medium 
should have a better understanding of this medium as such, and I 
do not think that this is an easy study when language is at issue. 
Does this incline me to formalism?
The rise of digital media is historical, unprecedented. But 
it is difficult to say exactly what about the digital is specific 
and unalloyed with other historical developments. Recently, 
I have begun to think that, in the era since the war, following 
on the development and proliferation of stored-program Turing 
machines, humanity has been, historically, presented with a 
whole new domain of symbolic practice, precisely that of pro-
grammable and networked media (my own long-standing phrase 
for what others have called ‘new’ or ‘digital media’). Events and 
effects in this new domain are changing, fundamentally, what we 
are and how we act. Those of us who began, early on, histori-
cally, to work in this domain did have the opportunity to produce 
work that may already have had important sociopolitical and 
socioeconomic consequences. To have been a digital practitioner 
is, at the least, to have been politically active, but we do not yet 
understand the consequences of, especially, our earlier actions, 
or, for that matter, our present engagements. I would hope that 
my other answers, above, to your earlier questions demonstrate 
that I have—quite recently—discovered a number of ways in 
which my present work is highly political.
RS: They certainly do; and your work together with Daniel Howe 
How It Is in Common Tongues4 is an exciting example of a for-
malistic and political approach: It assembles Beckett’s How It 
Is by searching online for the longest possible phrases from the 
Beckett text in contexts that are not associated with Beckett. 
Using the mechanisms of search engines in order to find the 
words of an authorized text where they are still, if only momen-
tarily, associating freely the work addresses questions of own-
ership and copyright. An example also of how Google changes 
writing and turns, as a means of art, into a subject of politi-
cal consideration. How It Is in Common Tongues is a work that 
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obviously addresses some of the issues you raised above such as 
vectoralization and capta. Apart from the work you have done, 
what art project would you like to have initiated, if you could go 
back in time?
JC: I would have chosen or composed, carefully, a short literary 
text in English and a somehow corresponding short literary text 
in French. I would then have offered these texts, every week or 
fortnight or month to Google Translate, from its inception, and 
faithfully recorded and time-stamped the results. I am undertak-
ing a similar exercise with Apple’s Siri. When I remember, I dic-
tate, alternately, one of two idiomatic English text messages to 
Siri every week. The results are interesting and I may publish 
them one day. Are either of these aesthetic projects? I believe 
that my lost opportunity (as opposed to the texts for Siri) would 
be far more amenable to aestheticization.
RS: The marriage of literature and digital media goes back to 
offline hyperfiction written in Storyspace and sold on floppy 
disc allowing the reader to navigate on her own behalf within 
the links offered. Some academics considered this trace of inter-
action as the replacement of the passive by the “active reader” 
thus implicitly praising mechanical activity over cerebral. Today 
electronic books and appropriate apps allow for “social reading”: 
bookmarks and notes can be shared with other readers of the 
same text and conversation can start immediately. The words 
used to distinguish the new reading habits from the old claim a 
positive connotation. What could be wrong with being interac-
tive and social? Why, our grandchildren may wonder once, would 
anybody want to withdraw with a book from the others instead 
of sharing the reading experience, as it was common until the 
18th Century? There are different ways of looking at the end 
of the cultural technique of immersive reading. What is your 
perspective?
JC: I now read a great many ebooks (traditional texts tran-
scribed for tablets). As soon as I can, I turn off their few and 
feeble ‘media-progressive’ affordances. I do not want to know 
how many of you underlined what. I do not want you to know 
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what I underline. I do not want to ‘interact’ (i.e. transact) with 
any of you. I would not, in any case, be interacting with you. We 
would all, chiefly, collectively, if we agreed to do so, be offering 
some data=capta concerning our thoughts and opinions to the 
aggregators and vectoralists. Something inside me knows this. 
I turn off all the ‘interactive’ and ‘social’ functionalities. I read 
and drink my wine and muse. When I am courageous enough, I 
interact with people whom I know, and I imagine making things, 
even things in programmable media, that are beautiful, includ-
ing in terms of the new ways that they interrelate—symbolically, 
linguistically.
Media Literacy
RS: Many observers of digital culture announce and bemoan the 
shift from deep attention to hyper attention. Is the concern justi-
fied? Or does it just reiterate a well-known lamentation for the 
terrifying ramifications of all new media?
JC: There is no longer any doubt in my mind that the rise and 
proliferation of networked and programmable media has driven 
unprecedented and historical changes in the properties and 
methods of knowledge, knowledge production, and the archive. 
Access to books and works of reference will never be the same. 
The Library is becoming a collection of Data- or Knowledge 
Bases. Libraries and Archives are increasingly interlinked and 
open—even if the new institutions that provide this linking and 
openness are untried, unregulated and, themselves, closed. If 
reading can be understood as the set of widely various cultural 
practices that allow human beings to process symbolic—espe-
cially natural-language—inscriptions and performances, then 
reading must now be a very different set of such culture prac-
tices. Reading has changed. If reading has changed then the 
human subject has changed.
RS: Changed for the better or for the worse?
JC: It is a more difficult proposition to ascribe a value judg-
ment to these changes. However, in so far as they are driven, 
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predominantly, by forces whose motivation is not directly and 
intimately associated with the human experience of and engage-
ment with knowledge production—with art and learning—then 
there is the possibility that the momentum of human culture 
as a whole is in the process of shifting, significantly if not radi-
cally, away from an inclination that more was aligned with, for 
example, “deep and critical attention to the world.” My answers 
above contribute to this commentary, honing its dystopian mel-
ancholy. I do not believe, by the way, that a mission “to organize 
the world’s information and make it universally accessible and 
useful” is in any way necessarily allied with a project of knowl-
edge production and learning or artistic practice and endeavor.
RS: Part of this dystopian melancholy is probably the lack of 
the right decisions at the right time during the career of digital 
media. Before the Internet became available for private and com-
mercial use it was administered by the university. Today one has 
the impression the university is no longer on top of development 
in this domain. How should academic institutions have responded 
to the upheaval of new media? How should they become more 
involved today?
JC: Universities must integrate digital infrastructure—includ-
ing all the latest affordances of networked and programmable 
media—with academic infrastructure. They must build this 
infrastructure into their own institutions and ensure that it is 
governed by their academic mission and also that their aca-
demic missions are responsive to the integral digital infrastruc-
ture that they will have created. In concrete terms: universities 
should cease to have staff-only ‘computing’ or ‘information tech-
nology‘ departments that are in any way considered to be (ancil-
lary) ‘services.’ Instead they should recast these services as aca-
demic infrastructure and fold their governance into the same 
organizational structures that manage their faculties’ teaching 
and research. Otherwise—and we already see this happening 
everywhere, not only in the terrible rise of the MOOC—differ-
ently motivated services outside the institutions of higher edu-
cation will first offer themselves to universities and then, quite 
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simply, fold their academic missions and identities into vectoral-
ist network services.
Digital mediation is historically unprecedented in this 
respect at least: it presents itself as service or facility but it 
quickly goes on to establish itself as essential infrastructure. 
Because of this, it becomes remarkably determinative of practice 
and ideology while continuing to be managed and developed as 
if it was still a service. As a matter of fact, digital services are 
provided as free or low-cost commercial services. As such, they 
appear to be optional or elective although by now, surely, they 
have the same status as utilities in the developed world. Cutting 
off internet provision is like cutting off electricity or gas. The 
same syndrome plays out in the relationship between a univer-
sity’s management of its ‘computing services’ on the one hand 
and its academic and intellectual mission on the other. Before 
an institution like a university fully realizes and internalizes the 
fact that practices demanding of digital infrastructure will be 
constitutive of its academic mission, its computing services are 
willingly swallowed up by more ‘cost-effective’ and more inno-
vative services provided from outside the institution. These, as 
infrastructure, may then go on to reconstitute the institution 
itself. ‘Google’ swallows computing services at precisely the his-
torical moment when digital practices swallow knowledge cre-
ation and dissemination. Hence ‘Google’ swallows the university, 
the library, the publisher.
RS: This prospect is darker than dystopian melancholia. And it 
may not yet be the end of these processes of ingestion. Think of 
the Googlization – not only regarding who controls the data but 
also how they are accessed and processed – of the Humanities, 
i.e. think of Digital Humanities. Some of us fear the same quan-
titative turn in the Digital Humanities reinforcing what is tak-
ing place in contemporary society, and finally infecting even 
those disciplines that are supposed to reflect and interpret 
society’s development, turning Humanities into a sub-branch of 
Science. Others hold that “algorithmic criticism” doesn’t aim at 
verifying and stabilizing meaning through the replacement of 
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interpretation by counting. On the contrary, “algorithmic criti-
cism” and “distant reading” may offer new insights in the way 
knowledge or data respectively is organized and open up new 
opportunities for close reading and interpretation. What do you 
fear or hope from Digital Humanities and how do you see their 
relationship to Digital Media Studies?
JC: See our discussion of art above. Drop the ‘digital’ from 
‘Digital Humanities.’ But, by all means, do use every digital and 
networked instrument and affordance to further any kind of 
research that could be seen as a contribution to the project of 
the Humanities as such. If insights and statements can be made 
on the back of algorithmic criticism or distant reading, they are 
no less insights and statements for all that—provided the meth-
odologies are sound.
When the cart drags the horse, when digital instruments 
are valued for ‘seeing’ only what and whatever they happen to 
‘see,’ then we do have a problem, the problem of capta. I recall 
attending a fascinating conference presentation of ‘distant read-
ing,’ in the course of which we were offered visualizations based 
on ‘data’ from Amazon’s recommendation engine as if this was 
untainted, empirical evidence for some aspect of the sociology 
of literature. Amazon’s engine is a complex system of software 
processes, transacting in a limited and continually changing 
manner with human readers of literature. Not only is it com-
plex, the details of its operations are secret, proprietary, and, 
clearly, commercially directed. To suggest that we should con-
sider data records generated by this complex system as unquali-
fied evidence of the human culture of reading: this is fundamen-
tally flawed scholarship. The strange circumstance is that we do 
not—yet—seem to perceive it as such: as flawed and requiring 
qualification. The conference paper was very well received. We 
seem to believe that systems like Amazon’s are already a part of 
the given, empirical world. On the contrary, software may have 
become ‘big’ but the whole point of software is surely that we 
can change it to an extent that we cannot change many other 
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material conditions of our world. None of us should treat it as 
given; most especially and emphatically not Digital Humanists.
RS: At the end of his 2011 book Reading Machines. Toward an 
alorithmic criticism, Stephen Ramsay states: ‘algorithmic criti-
cism looks forward not to the widespread acknowledgement of 
its utility but to the day when „algorithmic criticism“ seems as 
odd term as „library based criticism.“ For by then we will have 
understood computer based criticism to be what it has always 
been: human-based criticism with computers’. It is telling and 
frightening that even a critic of the quantitative turn in the 
Humanities fails to see the difference between a library and an 
algorithm, the first being a location presenting books as such; 
the second being a method that presents a statistical reading of 
books. If even critical observers are blind to the medium and its 
message, how optimistic shall we be?
JC: I agree with you and I have the fear. The library is an insti-
tution that we have built and worked both within and against 
over time. Algorithms are also, at least initially, composed and 
created by human beings, but they proliferate and change very 
quickly in response to many kinds of human and, perhaps, their 
own, ‘needs’ and ‘desires,‘ without anything like the same incul-
turated understanding of history—of the library, for example. 
Moreover, algorithms can be owned and controlled by, essen-
tially, corporations that are privately, commercially motivated, 
driven by vectors and vectoralists who may not share our values, 
whoever we may be or may desire to become.
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Mediascape, antropotechnics, culture 
of presence, and the flight from God
Erick Felinto
Erick Felinto is a professor for media theory at the 
State University of Rio de Janeiro and author of 
several books and articles on cyberculture, media 
theory and cinema. He was actively involved in the 
production of the Flusseriana (a dictionary of Vilém 
Flusser’s concepts, edited and published by the 
ZKM and the University of the Arts, Berlin), as a col-
laborator and translator and is currently working 
on a book on the notion of ‘Philosophical Fiction’ in 
Vilém Flusser. He is the organizer of the conference 
series The Secret Life of Objects which explores the 
transformation within the Humanities and the ecol-
ogy of media.
Erick Felinto addresses the growing digital illiteracy compared 
to times before graphical user interface and calls, with Vilém 
Flusser, the hacker the actual educational ideal of our time. He 
discusses the enthusiasm and misconceptions in early net culture 
discourse, sees ‘speculative futurism’ and ‘theoretical fictions’ 
as the discursive strategy of tomorrow, considers technology as 
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an ‘uncanny form of life’ and inevitable correction to the dictate 
of nature, explains the different concepts of posthumanism, and 
questions that (human) life is necessarily the ultimate goal of the 
cosmos. He explores the dialectic of silence and phatic commu-
nication in new media in the context of a general shift from the 
‘culture of meaning’ to a ‘culture of presence’ and the exhaustion 
of the interpretative paradigm in the Humanities.
Prelude
Roberto Simanowski: What is your favored neologism of digital 
media culture and why?
Erick Felinto: I’m not a big fan of neologisms, but if I had to 
choose one it would probably be “mediascape”. I like the term 
for two reasons. First, it translates our complex and intricate 
media scenario as just one large structure of interconnected 
technologies, notwithstanding the specific differences between 
each medium and its audiences. And if there’s some truth to 
Friedrich Kittler’s dictum that ‘the general digitization of chan-
nels and information erases the differences among individual 
media,’ then this neologism is more relevant and useful now than 
ever before. Second, I find the convergence between the notions 
of media and landscape very interesting, because it character-
izes our current situation in terms of a specific “mood” or “ambi-
ence”. It’s impossible to live “outside” of media, because media is 
everywhere and endows every event of our daily lives with a spe-
cific mediatic quality. For me, the metaphor of an electronic or 
digital landscape conveys the singular feeling of living in a time 
where social relations and even the culture are constantly being 
filtered through the lenses of several media devices. A Brazilian 
theoretician, Muniz Sodré, talks about a fourth “bios”, or mode 
of existence, following the previous three coined by Aristotle. 
Now we experience the “mediatic bios” as a new form of life com-
plementing (and overpowering) the other ones: bios theotikos 
(contemplative life), bios politikos (political life) and bios apolaus-
tikos (sensual life). I think this kind of approach is also interest-
ing because it collapses the radical separation between nature 
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and culture or nature and technology that modernity strived 
to establish.
RS: What comes to mind if you hear “Digital Media Studies”?
EF: I don’t like the expression very much, because it suggests that 
we should study digital media apart from other kinds of media. 
The field of digital studies suffers from memory loss, treating 
the past as if it were only a preamble to the marvels of the digi-
tal world. Yes, there are several particularities to digital media 
that need to be taken into account, however, I believe we can 
better understand these particularities by comparing them with 
previous technological paradigms. That’s why I prefer the term 
“media studies” as a more inclusive label, which also doesn’t 
imply a radical break with the past or any kind of special sta-
tus granted to the present situation. That’s also the reason why 
I believe the rise of media archaeology (the works of Wolfgang 
Ernst, Knut Ebeling and Jussi Parikka, for instance, come to 
mind) represents one of the most exciting events in the recent 
history of media theory. According to Parikka, media archaeol-
ogy ‘sees media culture as sedimented and layered, a fold of time 
and materiality where the past might be suddenly discovered 
anew, and the new technologies grow obsolete increasingly fast.’ 
In that sense, I specially like Siegfried Zielinski’s idea of seek-
ing the new in the old instead of the other way around. A critical 
appraisal of our current mediascape demands an examination of 
the past in order to ascertain which interesting paths and poten-
tialities have been left underdeveloped or abandoned.
RS: If you were a minister of education, what would you do about 
media literacy?
EF: I’d certainly do everything in my power to make media lit-
eracy mandatory at the level of high school education, with a spe-
cial focus on programming languages. Two of my favorite media 
theorists, Friedrich Kittler and Vilém Flusser, strongly believed 
in the importance of computer literacy for future generations.
96 Interview 3
Politics and Government
RS: Today, web activists are calling for the government and 
governmental institutions such as the European Union to pass 
laws to protect privacy and net neutrality, while in earlier times 
Internet pioneers such as John Perry Barlow declared the inde-
pendence of Cyberspace from the governments of the old world. 
Do those governments that ‘do not know our culture, our eth-
ics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society 
more order than could be obtained by any of your impositions’ 
as Barlow stated turn out to be our last hope in the battle for the 
rights of the individual and the freedom of the Internet?
EF: Yes, there seems to be a significant shift regarding the role 
of government within digital culture. It’s not so much that activ-
ists now see governments as allies in their fight for Internet free-
dom, but rather the idea that it’s preferable to side with (some) 
governments rather than with large private corporations such 
as Google. However, the situation might be slightly different for 
every country. The Brazilian case is very interesting, since our 
Congress is now working precisely on a special draft bill (Marco 
Civil da Internet) intended to guarantee civil rights in the use 
of the Internet and regulate the behavior of service providers. 
The bill states that Internet access is a prerequisite for the exer-
cise of civic rights. It was developed collaboratively by means 
of public consultation and its main goal is to assure the prin-
ciple of net neutrality. Some people even say that the bill rep-
resents a chance for Brazil to take international leadership in 
the fight for a freer net, by adopting a political position that is 
directly oppositional to conservative initiatives such as ACTA 
(the Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement, which was rejected by 
the European Parliament in 2012).
RS: This sounds as if the Brazilian parliament is much more pre-
pared to discuss the political and cultural implications of digi-
tal media than politicians in other countries who mostly have no 
clear concept about the matter of new media and leave it to jour-
nalists, academics and net-activists. Who is behind the discus-
sion in Brazil?
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EF: Well, not really. Several specialists in digital technology and 
Internet culture participated in the process. Debates and pub-
lic hearings around specific issues (for instance, on the privacy 
rights of internet users) were organized and people from differ-
ent sectors and walks of live had the opportunity to voice their 
concerns and offer suggestions. However, as democratic and 
comprehensive as this process may sound, the results so far have 
been somewhat disappointing. Some of the main problems have 
to do with the definitions of intellectual property and fair use, 
which are still fairly conservative. Sérgio Amadeu Silveira, a pro-
fessor and Internet researcher who participated in the elabora-
tion of the bill, believes that the most conservative aspects of 
the draft are a result of the powerful lobby exerted by the tele-
communication and copyright industries. The bill was passed in 
April, 2014, but many people believe it still needs some improve-
ments . There’s a very heated and fruitful debate going on in 
Brazil regarding topics such as open software and copyright. 
Some academics are still working together with the government 
(or at least some of its more progressive sectors) in order to pass 
new legislation that proves to be adequate and relevant for the 
context of digital culture.
It’s interesting to note that Brazilian President Dilma Roussef 
had requested the Congress to prioritize the bill’s vote right 
after the allegations of espionage by the NSA came to light. The 
government believes that the creation of data centers for compa-
nies like Google or Facebook in Brazil can prevent the transmis-
sion of private information to foreign agencies, so they tried to 
include this provision in the bill, I’m not sure if they succeeded, 
since I still didn’t have the time to read its whole text  In any 
case, I don’t think this is realistic and I doubt it would be enough 
to stop the NSA (or any other foreign agency, for that matter) 
from spying on us. The situation is highly complex today because 
there seems to be a mixed perception about the role of govern-
ment in digital culture. On the one hand, it can embody the “dark 
side of the digital” (to evoke the title of a symposium organized 
by Richard Grusin at the UWM in May 2013) when it monitors 
social networks in order to prevent the organization of protests 
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– as has been recently happening in Brazil – and control people’s 
access to information. On the other hand, it can be an ally in 
the fight for a better Internet when it regulates the obligations 
of service providers to its customers and tries to guarantee net 
neutrality, which is supposedly one of the main principles of the 
above mentioned “Marco Civil”.
But there might also be another factor at work in this shift in 
the perception of the government. More and more people have 
access to the Internet, but are digitally illiterate. In fact, most 
people don’t want to go through the trouble of learning code or 
software languages and we don’t have special programs to teach 
them that. Back in the heroic times of the Internet, when we 
still didn’t have perfected GUIs (graphical user interface), one 
needed to have at least some minimal training in digital literacy. 
Hackers were the main “dwellers” of the digital territories. As 
Gabriela Coleman states in her 2013 book Coding Freedom, while 
the Internet’s architecture in the 1980’s was open, practically 
speaking it ‘operated under a lock’ with the keys available only 
to a select number of hackers and engineers. Today the situation 
is quite different and the development of effective GUIs is partly 
to blame for this. People just want to punch keys and see things 
happening. Perhaps we should pay more heed to Kittler’s argu-
ments in essays such as There is no Software. Interfaces can be 
a way of shielding us from the complexity of the hardware and 
the creative unpredictability of noise. Trial and noise have been 
all but abolished in the extremely closed and copyrighted soft-
ware systems that we use in our machines. Hackers still experi-
ment, code and break things, but regular people ask for guid-
ance. As the big companies become increasingly untrustworthy, 
there is no alternative but to turn to the government (the lesser 
of two evils).
RS: What you describe – punching keys with no idea about code 
– points to a central aspect of nowadays cultural habits: people 
want immediate gratification and they want it with as little effort 
as possible. This is true not only for our interaction with tech-
nology but also for our relationship to knowledge given that we 
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hardly read through books or essays any longer until we under-
stand but rather ask the search machine to give us the answer 
right away. We will come back to the issue of complexity and 
thinking later. For here we may note the rule of thumb that effort 
and understanding relate to each other in inverse proportion. 
In this perspective and in regard to understanding new media 
the hacker – in the broader sense of the term – seems to be the 
actual educational ideal of our time.
EF: I believe so. Hackers display some traits that are funda-
mental for a creative and active participation in digital culture. 
They’re often self-taught and always question the stability of 
systems or the arbitrariness of protocols. Of course, most gov-
ernments have gone to great lengths to make sure that hackers 
appear as irresponsible and dangerous in the eyes of the general 
public. However, there are some situations where activists and 
governments can be allies. Our most progressive former minis-
ter of culture, Gilberto Gil, once said: ‘I’m a hacker, a minister-
hacker’ (something that would be unthinkable, say, in the United 
States). In a time when big corporations are increasingly coloniz-
ing cyberspace, we need to imbue people with the hacker eth-
ics of freedom, creativity and experimentation. In a short article 
published in Switzerland in 1990, Vilém Flusser drew an inter-
esting argument concerning the reunification of Germany. For 
him, more interesting than the process of Wiedervereinigung 
(reunification), which would ultimately serve the purpose of 
establishing other frontiers (Germans and non-Germans), was 
the digital revolution being set in motion at the time by hack-
ers all over the world. According to him, hackers were the liv-
ing proof of the foolishness of setting borders and the creative 
power of the gray zones. Flusser was a very radical critic of fixed 
identities, of rigid frontiers, of authorship and ownership. Yes, 
this may sound romantic and unrealistic, but I think it’s precisely 
this kind of romanticism that we need in an age when the market 
seems to be invading every living space.
RS: Let me pick up Flusser’s romanticism and his critic of fixed 
identity in the context of digital media. In contrast to more 
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pessimistic media theorists such as Jean Baudrillard and Paul 
Virilio, Flusser predicted a telematic utopia of unrestricted and 
democratic global communication. And indeed, the early Internet 
seemed to meet Flusser’s advocacy of noise and fluid identity 
developed in his autobiography Bodenlos (Groundless, 1992) and 
his book Von der Freiheit des Migranten (The Freedom of the 
Migrant, 1994; English 2003). However, with the critical turn 
in Digital Media Studies in the last 10 years, the notion of the 
Internet as an “identity workshop”, as Sherry Turkle described 
it, or the new public sphere for free political discourse has been 
widely abandoned (cf. Morosov’s Net Dellusion, Turkle’s Alone 
Together, Lovink’s Networks Without a Cause, Pariser’s Filter 
Bubble). Do you see a place for Flusser’s optimism today?
EF: It is true that Flusser was at times excessively optimistic 
about the potentialities of the “telematic society” (the term with 
which he named the socio-cultural formation we used to define 
as “cyberculture” until recently). However, this enthusiasm was 
not uncommon in the theoretical discourses on net culture in the 
early 1980s and 1990s. He was also somewhat simplistic when 
he confronted mass culture with digital culture, although always 
in a very poetic manner. He liked animal metaphors and com-
pared the public in the mass media environment to a worm (ein 
riesiger Wurm), which kept digesting, excreting and consuming 
the same content again and again while believing it was receiv-
ing new information. For him, the opposition between mass 
media and digital media was very clear. The first represented 
a societal model composed of apathetic, passive people, incapa-
ble of creating anything new, while the second stood for inter-
activity and a playful engagement with the culture. For Flusser, 
freedom was synonym with the capacity to play with our tech-
nological apparatuses and try to find ways to circumvent their 
inscribed programs.
RS: Playing with the technological apparatuses reinforces the 
idea of the hacker. The passive/active opposition, however, that 
was also used and mis-conceptualized in the hypertext discourse 
of the 1990s, certainly needs to be revisited in light of more and 
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more hyperactive readers less and less able to absorb complex 
information.
EF: Nowadays we understand that mass media and digital media 
can’t be so neatly separated and the theological-utopic faith in 
the liberating powers of the digital sounds a bit naïve (except 
maybe for a handful of authors such as Pierre Lévy). However, 
none of these traits disqualifies Flusser as an extraordinary 
thinker and a precursor to contemporary media theory. I strongly 
believe that Flusser can be aligned, at least partially, with the 
research program that has been termed recently as “German 
media theory”. His cybernetic vision of the culture, the centrality 
of media (and, most importantly, of the materiality of media) in 
his worldview and his archaeological approach to the pair soci-
ety/technology situate him in an epistemological space that is 
not very distant from the speculations of a Friedrich Kittler or a 
Siegfried Zielinski. In fact, Kittler was an admirer of Flusser and 
invited him for a professorship in Bochum a few months before 
his death in 1991. In the preface to Kommunikologie weiter den-
ken, the book that transcribes Flusser’s lectures in Bochum, 
Kittler dubs him a “prophet” and a “founder hero” of contempo-
rary media theory.
RS: A “prophet” and “founder hero” of media theory similar to 
Marshal McLuhan? And similar “non-academic”, “metaphoric” 
and “sloppy” as McLuhan has been criticized in German intro-
ductions to media theory?
EF: The trope of the prophet, also ascribed to thinkers such as 
McLuhan (a major influence on Flusser’s thought), lead to the 
very peculiar situation of a scholar who was frequently men-
tioned, often described as a pioneer, but very scarcely studied in 
depth. For many people, Flusser was someone who wrote about 
important topics and stated some interesting things, but was 
ultimately a dilettante, lacking the seriousness of a full-fledged 
university professor. In Germany, he was often compared to 
McLuhan, although not always in a good way. I also believe he 
tackled with several aspects of the contemporary discussion on 
posthumanism (another trademark of “German media theory”), 
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notwithstanding the fact that he was, in many ways, a tradi-
tional humanist at heart – but this kind of contradiction may 
likewise be found in Nortbert Wiener, the father of Cybernetics. 
His obsession with animal metaphors and tropes is evocative of 
the contemporary wave of media studies that dissolve the bor-
ders between biology and technology or nature and culture, such 
as Jussi Parikka’s Insect Media (2010) or Sebastian Vehlken’s 
Zootechnologien (2012).
For instance, Flusser’s Vampyroteuthis Infernalis (2011), 
recently translated into English (there’s actually translations 
of the versions Flusser wrote in Portuguese and German), is an 
extraordinary philosophical essay on our technological condition. 
But what strikes me as extremely original is how he approaches 
the problem by means of a very peculiar allegory. He defines his 
essay as a “philosophical fiction”, where the main character is 
the strange marine creature (an octopus) named in the book’s 
title. The character works as a sort of twisted mirror-image of 
man, while at the same time offering Flusser the opportunity to 
relativize categories that are traditionally referred exclusively to 
man, such as “art” and “culture”. Vampyroteuthis Infernalis is a 
speculation on the possible future outcomes of the technologi-
cal revolution, and, albeit essentially optimistic, Flusser does not 
exclude the possibility that these news technologies end up pro-
moting new forms of totalitarianism and control.
RS: What form of totalitarianism?
EF: Well, if the Vampyroteuthis indeed works as an allegory of 
technology and the foundational relationship between man and 
technics, then it should always be structured between the poles of 
reason and emotion, calculation and imagination. When Flusser 
discusses the emergence of this strange octopus, he claims that 
we can only have a meaningful encounter with it by balancing 
the cold gaze of science and technology with poetry and intu-
ition (this refers to the Portuguese manuscript, the German 
version is a bit different, which makes things more interesting 
and complex). Vampyroteuthis is a scientific entity – in fact, an 
actually existing being, assigned by Biology to the class of the 
Erick Felinto 103
cephalopoda –, but also the stuff of legend and imagination. This 
kind of dualism lies at the core of Flusser’s thinking and is never 
solved. It can be translated into more philosophical terms in the 
central conflicting forces of Cybernetics and Heideggerian phe-
nomenology, both powerful sources of Flusser’s reasoning. As 
Flusser himself puts it, in order to be effective, his fable of the 
wondrous marine creature has to be ‘”fictitious science”, that is, 
the overcoming of scientific objectivity in the service of a con-
cretely human knowledge’.
RS: This reminds me of Hans Jonas who in his 1979 book Das 
Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technolo-
gische Zivilisation (The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search 
of an Ethics for the Technological Age) demands an ‘imaginative 
casuistic’ about the possible consequences of current develop-
ments. In 2012, Geert Lovink in his book Networks Without A 
Cause: A Critique of Social Media proposed a similar method for 
Internet Studies coining it ‘speculative futurism’.
EF: I think Lovink’s proposition is indeed very close to the heart 
of Flusser’s project. When Lovink writes that ‘Humanities should 
do more than describe the times we’re living in’ and defends 
the need ‘to celebrate singular modes of expression,’ he is sum-
moning cultural theorists to speculate about the present and 
the future with the full extent of their imagination. This move 
requires expressive strategies that appropriate the possibilities 
of non-academic modes of discourse, such as fiction and poetry. 
To be sure, Flusser was not the first advocate of this intellec-
tual strategy, which has some respectable historical anteced-
ents, neither the last thinker who resorted to it. In fact, I believe 
theoretical fictions of this kind will become increasingly popu-
lar as a discursive device in the years to come. Let’s compare, 
for instance, the flusserian technique of the “philosophical fic-
tion” with the strategy adopted by Manuel de Landa in his War in 
the Age of Intelligent Machines (1991), published only four years 
after the Vampyroteuthis (1987). De Landa performs an extraor-
dinary de-centering of the human gaze by placing an intelligent 
war-machine as the narrator of his book. What would a work of 
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history look like if a robot instead of a human being had written 
it? In such a work, human beings would be nothing more than 
‘pieces of a larger military-industrial machine: a war machine’, 
in other words, only part of a larger (organic-mechanic) assem-
blage. De Landa’s book is equivalent to a philosophical fiction 
– or an exercise in “speculative futurism”, if you will – that nar-
rates the past from the point of view of a future sentient, non-
human being. His robot historian is a machinic version of the 
organic Vampyroteuthis: they represent the position of an imag-
ined “other” through which we can acquire an innovative per-
spective on ourselves. In Kant in the Land of Extraterrestrials, 
without ever mentioning Flusser, Peter Szendy terms the use of 
radical imagination in philosophical discourses as “philosofic-
tion” and quotes Derrida’s statement that ‘all philosopher’s have 
made fiction a keystone of their discourse’. For Szendy (and also 
for Flusser), philosofiction is a discursive strategy that works 
‘as both an opening and a limit – as an imaginary access to the 
other, but without experience of the other’.
We’re now simply taking this idea to its farthest conse-
quences. It’s interesting that Lovink talks so much about “specu-
lation” in his book, because I’d go so far as to suggest that we’ve 
been experiencing a “speculative renaissance” in the last twenty 
years or so, not only in philosophy (the young philosophical 
movement called “speculative realism” comes to mind), but in all 
fields of the Humanities. Steven Shaviro, in his book Connected, 
or what it means to live in the network society (2003), has stated 
that it is only by writing cultural theory as science fiction that 
one can hope to be ‘as radical as reality itself’. In Flusser, how-
ever, imaginative speculation is to be a trademark not only of 
theoretical writing, but also of all our dealings with technology. 
Science and technology that are not associated with imagination 
and intuition can easily turn into the complete rationalization 
of life. Therefore, the apocalyptical vision of an administered 
society is a very real possibility for Flusser, with technologies 
being used for the control of populations and the suppression of 
all attempts to disrupt the status quo (and nothing can be more 
disruptive than imagination).
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There’s a beautiful passage in Kommunikologie weiter denken 
where Flusser frames the dilemma between order and freedom 
in theological terms. Like Walter Benjamin, Flusser appropri-
ates and secularizes theological notions in order to discuss pro-
fane topics, such as art and technology. Freedom is only possible 
because the world has holes (Löcher) in it. The fact that God is 
an imperfect designer (or “programmer”, as Flusser puts it), like 
the demiurge of the gnostics, allows for the existence of extraor-
dinary events. Flusser plays here with the double meaning of 
the German word Wunder: “wonder” and “miracle” at the same 
time. Freedom is connected to wonder, our capacity to marvel 
and engage in an imaginative relationship with the world. This 
engagement is itself a source of wonder and miracles. There are 
holes we can exploit, and the decision to exploit them is tanta-
mount to committing a “sin” (Sünde). Then comes the most strik-
ing statement, when Flusser explicitly affirms that freedom is 
technology, in fact, the “real freedom” (die eigentliche Freiheit), 
and he criticizes the disdain of most French and German intel-
lectuals for technology (especially Heidegger). What technology 
offers us, when dully combined with imagination and art, is a 
way of predicting and preempting the future. Technics is thus 
the possibility of driving the outcome of a situation into a direc-
tion other than that dictated by nature. Therefore, the real dan-
ger lies not in technology itself, but rather in its isolation from 
the realms of art and creativity.
RS: To me, the opposite seems to be the case once we look closer 
and in a more specific manner at the issue: Freedom is not 
enhanced but reduced by information technology for it fills all 
the holes that allow extraordinary or uncontrolled events. For 
example, if Big Data mining produces reliable information about 
all kinds of if-then-correlations, it doesn’t require much imagi-
nation to see the government, the health department, insurance 
companies and credit institutes asking people to refrain from 
behavior with unwanted then-consequences. Such demand is 
unlikely as long as the consequences of certain ifs are not dis-
covered or certain. However, knowledge obliges. The flipside of 
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conducting measuring is taking measures – its looming concepts 
are predictive analytics and algorithmic regulation. Hence, don’t 
we, in the context of the information and control society, face the 
paradoxical equation that knowledge and freedom relate to each 
other in inverse proportion?
EF: Well, Flusser understands the technological gesture as an 
act of freedom against the determinations of nature. When man 
starts altering his natural habitat – for instance, by transform-
ing a branch into a stick –, he is already engaged in the techno-
logical enterprise. Flusser was well aware of Heidegger’s criti-
cism of (modern) technology as a form of “enframing” (Gestell) 
and calculation of the world. He certainly sees the danger in a 
use of technology that seeks only to control and predict. And I 
know this sounds paradoxical, since I used precisely words like 
“predict” and “preempt” in my previous answer, but I think that 
Flusser had a very particular idea regarding these “preemptive” 
powers of technology. For him, it is not so much about controlling 
our fate or becoming, as it is about the opening up of new possi-
bilities not already programmed in our natural state. Although 
he used words like “preempt” (vorwegnehmen), his expression of 
choice was “suppose” (annehmen). In fact, in a book that bears 
precisely this verb as its title, Angenommen (2000) (“suppose 
that…”) he contrasts his way of thinking with that of the futur-
ologist, since he is interested in improbabilities rather than in 
probabilities, the latter being the subject matter of the futurol-
ogist – and this is precisely why his imaginative scenarios and 
suppositions never cease to acknowledge the fundamental role of 
otherness. This relationship to the “other” – understood both as 
our fellow human being and as the emblem of an ever-open field 
of possibilities – is central to Flusser’s thought.
I see some interesting connections between Flusser’s propos-
als and R.L. Rutsky’s notion of high techné (coined through a very 
interesting dialogue with Heidegger) as a form of relationship to 
technology that is not external to man, but rather constitutive of 
the human being in his entwinement with art, technique and oth-
erness. As Rutsky himself puts it, the change we need to effect in 
Erick Felinto 107
our dealings with technology must be a ‘mutational process that 
cannot be rationally predicted or controlled; it can only be imag-
ined, figured, through a techno-cultural process that is at once 
science-fictional and aesthetic’. Technology is thus characterized 
as endowed with agency, as if it were an uncanny form of life 
that continually unsettles and challenges (in an “aesthetic” man-
ner) the position of the human subject. The future envisioned by 
this change is, again, essentially posthuman, not of course in the 
sense of securing the boundaries of the subject through the use 
of prostheses or a cyborg body, but rather of destabilizing it, of 
acknowledging the ‘otherness that is part of us’, as Rutsky put it. 
This sounds very Flusserian to me.
RS: If, with Flusser, we understand technology as an act of free-
dom against the determinations of nature and if, with Rutsky 
and many others, we look at human relationship to technology 
as constitutive of their beings, allowing them, as you say, to go 
in a direction other than that dictated by nature, we may also 
remember Immanuel Kant’s notion about the ‘purpose in nature’ 
as discusses in his 1784 essay Idea for a Universal History with 
a Cosmopolitan Purpose. Kant considers the ‘purpose in nature’ 
that man go ‘beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal 
existence’ and gain happiness from the perfection of skills. The 
means to do so is to constantly develop the utmost human capac-
ity of reason, from generation to generation, bestowing each with 
ever more refined technology: hammer, steam-engine, electric 
motor, computer, artificial intelligence. To Kant this endeavor 
will be a walk ‘from barbarism to culture’ and finally, despite all 
conflicts and contradictions on the way, make the world a bet-
ter place, as the slogan reads today. Needless to say, that Kant’s 
idealism has been rejected, especially in light of the fact that 
the advance of human intelligence has brought many powerful 
means to life that can end or suppress human life: from nuclear 
weapon to self-learning artificial intelligence.
In this context I find the analogy of technology as art very 
interesting if applied to Kant’s ‘philosophical chiliasm’. Can we 
think of technology as something challenging and unsettling the 
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common view, including the view on technological progress, in 
the way we expect from art? Does technology propose a differ-
ent perspective in a rather ambiguous way, as we experience 
with art, or does it rather establish, unambiguously and eventu-
ally inevitably, a new way of seeing and doing things? In my view 
there is a central difference between art and technology: while 
the message of art eventually is the difference of being, the mes-
sage of technology is “just” a different way of being – a ‘change 
of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs’ 
as McLuhan describes the ‘”message” of any medium or technol-
ogy’. This inevitable, rather than possible, change is what I have 
in mind when I asked to what extent the statistical perspectives 
Big Data mining enforces limits the freedom of being different. I 
guess we will have to wait and see how the “governmental data 
mining” and “governmental predictions”, as portrayed for exam-
ple in Tal Zarsky’s publications or in Changing Behaviours: On 
the Rise of the Psychological State (2013) by Rhys Jones, Jessic 
Pykett and Mark Whitehead, eventually affect human behavior.
EF: It’s interesting to note, since I repeatedly mentioned 
Flusser’s romanticism, that Kant’s notion of ‘natural purpose’ 
served as an inspiration for the romantic organic concept of 
nature. So Kant and the romantics are not as distant as they 
might appear initially. For Flusser, however, technology should 
offer us a bridge between the powers of reason and the capabili-
ties of imagination. We must engage with technologies that make 
us dream (about the future, for instance). He was not interested 
in a form of knowledge devoted to the regulation of life (as in pre-
dictive analytics or algorithmic regulation), but sought instead to 
promote a creative, artistic relationship to technology as a very 
peculiar form of knowledge, which approaches truth and reality 
through their opposing side (Gegenseite), as it were, via art and 
philosophical fictions. Of course, we can always ask whether this 
creative, libertarian form of relationship with technology will 
prevail over its uses as an instrument for the measurement (and 
control) of the world. Perhaps Flusser let his romantic vision of 
new media get the best of him.
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Anyway, to properly answer the initial question on Flusser’s 
optimism, unlike Agamben, for whom technology is part of the 
mechanisms that keeps us under control and incapable of achiev-
ing a more authentically human (and animal and posthuman) 
condition, Flusser believes in the libertarian potentialities of 
the technical image and the artistic and playful nature of new 
media. To be sure, Flusser’s vision is utopian (and messianic, like 
Agamben’s), but it’s a utopia we should always strive to material-
ize. In any case, I believe his optimism is better than the brand 
of technological pessimism that is characteristic, for instance, of 
much French theory produced in the last 40 years.
RS: We already discussed Flusser’s belief in the libertarian 
potentialities of new media with respect to Big Data Mining. Now 
you point out his optimism and utopianism regarding technology 
and the posthuman. Let me press you on this a bit more. In his 
book Vom Subjekt zum Projekt. Menschwerdung (From Subject to 
Project. Becoming Human, 1994), Flusser moves his idea of the 
constant reinvention of the Self and the steady departure from 
what is home and custom (in German Wohnung and Gewohnheit) 
from the context of migration to the framework of technology. 
However, one of the pejorative keywords about new media – not 
only since Eli Pariser’s Filter Bubble or Cass Sunstein’s Republic.
com but already in Andrew Shapiro’s Control Revolution (1999) 
– has been “daily me” or “you-loop” signifying the customization 
and personalization of what one encounters on the Internet. This 
personalization, which many people more or less approve of and 
even desire, has been addressed as the preclusion of the unfa-
miliar, the removal of diversity and of what we are not (yet). If 
the statistical logic of the algorithm so easily and powerful over-
rides the cultural concept of otherness, what role will technology 
play in the project of posthumanism?
EF: There are several ways of understanding the term and the 
concept of “posthumanism”. For instance, in his The Souls of 
Cyberfolk (2005), Thomas Foster discusses what he considers to 
be two radically different forms of posthumanism. On the one 
hand, there’s the brand of posthumanism that was developed in 
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cyberpunk literature, which was essentially progressive and lib-
ertarian. Cyberpunk didn’t see technology as something exter-
nal, but rather as pervasive and intimate. It also dismissed or 
at least complicated the reductionism of dualities like utopian/
dystopian and male/female. On the other hand, there’s also a 
kind of posthumanism that can serve politically conservative 
agendas. Movements like the World Transhumanist Association 
or Extropianism, according to Foster, align themselves with an 
ideal of “self-realization” that is pro-market and individualistic. 
Also, it’s always possible to discuss posthumanism in concrete, 
down to earth and shortsighted terms or choose to approach it 
in a more abstract, philosophical manner. While the first option 
treats posthumanism mostly as an effect of material technolo-
gies (particularly digital and genetic technologies) on the tradi-
tional makeup of the human body and mind, the second one takes 
a more complex instance, treating contemporary technologies as 
just one specific and visible manifestation of a much older and 
often invisible force.
The latter is Argentine philosopher Fabián Ludueña’s per-
spective in his brilliant work La Comunidad de los Espectros 
(2010). Ludueña employs the term “antropotechnics” to define 
‘all the techniques by means of which the communities of the 
human species and the individuals that compose them act upon 
their own animal nature with the intent to guide, expand, mod-
ify or domesticate their biological substrate, aiming at what 
philosophy at first and later the biological sciences have grown 
accustomed to call “man”.’ Religion is, of course, one of our 
most fundamental forms of antropotechnics, one devoted to the 
spectralization of man (what really matters is the spirit, not the 
body). In that sense, the contemporary biotechnological revolu-
tion would be nothing more than a radical secularization of the 
ancient Christian eschatology. While several thinkers now claim 
the need of a reckoning with the animality that all anthropotech-
nics tried to expel from the human sphere, Ludueña, in his book 
Para além do princípio antrópico: por uma filosofia do outside 
(2012) attempts to go even further. For him, we should get rid of 
the last anthropic principle, which is life itself. It is incumbent 
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upon us to develop a philosophy capable of thinking or specu-
lating about the objectivity of the universe without a human 
observer. Life is not necessarily the ultimate goal of a cosmos 
that is composed mostly of inorganic matter, no less than man is 
the final step in the development of life. In other words, why busy 
ourselves with a phenomenon that is so marginal and excep-
tional as life, ‘if not because man still conserves in life a desire 
to explain himself?’ Ludueña’s project is closely related to some 
other interesting contemporary philosophical enterprises that 
tackle with issues of posthumanism, such as Eugene Thacker’s In 
The Dust of this Planet (2011).
In this context, to embrace the posthuman means to develop 
new ways of philosophizing – for instance, by elaborating a ‘phi-
losophy of the outside, of death and the specter,’ as Ludueña pro-
poses. Perhaps it’s possible to reframe the question by resorting 
to three different kinds (or degrees) of posthumanism. The first 
kind corresponds roughly to the one Foster attributes to move-
ments such as Extropianism. Rather than being an authentic 
posthumanism, it’s a sort of super-humanism, since its main goal 
is to extend the dominion of the human race to the whole cosmos 
and augment certain human traits by means of technology (life-
expectancy, powers of reasoning etc.). The second kind invites us 
to reconnect with the animal and deconstruct the anthropocen-
tric principle that has guided western thought since its inception 
(but which, according to Ludueña, still clings to the “anthropic 
principle”). Finally, there is a kind of extreme or radical posthu-
manism, in which not only man, but also the very idea of life, as 
a privileged entity, needs to be overcome. All this philosophical 
preamble seemed necessary, because although posthumanism 
may strike us as a very recent problem, it can also be framed as 
a millennia-old topic that underscored the whole history of phi-
losophy and that’s still fundamental for all coming philosophy.
Now, which kind of posthumanism should we ascribe to 
Flusser? With his fascination for animals and his criticism of 
anthropocentrism, he was probably closer to the second type, 
but with the particularity of a belief in technology as the tool for 
tapping into the unrealized potentialities of the animal. In the 
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German version of the Vampyroteuthis, Flusser not only specu-
lates about how the telematic society shall be able to modify our 
psychic structure, dissolving the boundaries of the “I-capsule” 
(Ich-Kapsel), but also hints at a possible posthuman future when 
man will be able to modify his genetic composition in order to 
realize all possibilities dormant in the primordial cells. We can 
certainly question the accuracy of Flusser’s first prediction, 
since new media and social networks have not accomplished 
the desired openness to the other, the disintegration of the 
“I-capsule”, as you mentioned in the question (at least not yet…).
However, the second speculation remains open to debate. 
This speculation is further developed in “Arte Viva” (Living Art), 
an unpublished text written in Portuguese in which Flusser 
approaches what he considers to be two major concurrent and 
also converging technocultural revolutions: Telematics and 
Biotechnology. For him, the latter represents the possibility of 
recuperating the ancient notion of “ars vivendi” (the art of liv-
ing). Whereas the revolution of telematics promises the program-
mability of our lives, the other one (Biotechnology) promises the 
programmability of all life. Why should we be stuck in our cur-
rent biological configuration? Why, for instance, can’t we design 
brains that are completely spherical (like the octopus’) instead of 
semi-spherical? What kind of new thoughts and forms of action 
could emerge from such a reconfiguration of the brain and the 
body? Genetic manipulation will be the ultimate form of art, 
since it will operate on our own bodies rather than on any exter-
nal objects. In the future, if we manage to combine the organic 
with the inorganic, we will create ‘organisms that will replace 
the inanimate machines with ‘living’ artificial intelligences (no 
longer composed of silica, but rather of nerve fibers).’ In order to 
be “transcendentally creative” – in other words, in order to intro-
duce novelty and noise into a system – Biotechnology will need 
to insert new materials (like silica) in the genetic code of living 
beings. The hybrid beings originating from these processes will 
then give rise to new forms of thought that we are currently inca-
pable of contemplating. In sum, the issue of posthumanism (in 
Flusser or in general) is so complex and multifaceted that we’ve 
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just begun to scratch its surface, and the place of technology 
within this topic still needs to be more thoroughly investigated.
Media Literacy
RS: In his 1948 book Die Welt des Schweigens (The World of 
Silence), Swiss cultural philosopher Max Picard portrays silence 
not as absence of noise but as the context of consciousness. In 
the silence of nature, man is confronted with the before cre-
ation/after finitude and consequently his own mortality. Today 
with the ubiquity of mobile technology we escape silence even 
in the remotest corners of the earth. Against the background of 
Picard and others who called for moments of contemplation in a 
life increasingly accelerated by new media (think of Kracauer’s 
essays Those Who Wait and Boredom), how do you see the philo-
sophical implications of digital technology?
EF: I didn’t expect to see Max Picard’s name mentioned in an 
interview about digital media, but it’s an interesting question. 
He was a very accomplished writer in his lifetime, having been 
praised by personalities like Rainer Maria Rilke and Herman 
Hesse. Today, however, he is all but forgotten and any men-
tion of traditionalist thinkers like Picard may sound old-fash-
ioned, although I believe there are some interesting similarities 
between his philosophy of language and Walter Benjamin’s. Die 
Welt des Schweigens is a very beautiful essay on man’s origi-
nal relationship to silence, which for Picard is also the realm 
of divine transcendence. The fact that we now live in a world of 
noise and babbling is a symptom of our metaphysical and cul-
tural decay, according to Picard. Chief among the causes for 
this decay is technology, especially media technology. I think we 
need to read Picard in the context of the Kulturkritik (cultural 
critique) that was a distinctive trait, in the early and mid-20th 
century, of the literature devoted to the analysis of the social 
changes brought about by the modernization of life – mainly in 
the German-speaking world.
The main problem for Picard was the acceleration of time, 
which lead mankind to a continual state of flight, ultimately, a 
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flight from God (Die Flucht vor Gott is another essay by Picard). 
To be sure, the flight from God is not something particular to our 
age, but the problem now is that there’s no longer an objective 
world of faith. Whereas in the past man could individually make 
the decision of fleeing from the world of faith, we now experi-
ence the opposite situation: it is necessary that each individual 
continually decide to embrace the world of faith and stop fleeing. 
Therefore, this state of flight became the existential trademark 
of our times. Of course, modern media are definitely to blame 
for this change. Picard believed that cinema, for instance, was 
the perfect medium to effect the flight from God (and from our-
selves). For me, Picard is a thinker who had brilliant intuitions, 
but who must be taken with a grain of salt, to say the least. It 
must be said, however, that Picard was not in favor of a simple 
Luddite solution. Destroying the technologies that now extend 
all around the globe would only make the situation worse. 
Nonetheless, I believe that we could in fact use a little bit more of 
silence and contemplation in the midst of our always technologi-
cally agitated and busy lives.
RS: I bring up Picard because I consider his take on silence 
and God essential in order to understand certain aspects of new 
media. Let me elaborate on this. Picard notes in his book that 
there is more silence in a human being than she can spend in 
a life time. This rather poetic utterance, that Rilke certainly 
would have subscribed to, seems to conflict Blaise Pascal’s 
famous statement: ‘all the unhappiness of men arises from one 
single fact, that they cannot stay quietly in their own chamber.’ 
Alone, Pascal believes, man ‘feels his nothingness, his forlorn-
ness, his insufficiency, his dependence, his weakness, his empti-
ness.’ His being prone to death, Pascal explains, haunts every 
human, ‘so that if he be without what is called diversion, he is 
unhappy.’ However, for Pascal the solution was not escaping the 
quiet chamber, i.e. silence, but listening to God. This is the link 
to Picard: the flight from God prompts the flight from silence. 
The link to new media is what Picard calls noise (Wortgeräusch): 
the constant sound of words that do not originate from silence 
and do not return to silence but exist in their own right without 
Erick Felinto 115
the urge to mean anything. The linguistic term for this is phatic 
communication the popular definition small talk – its field of 
practice are networks and applications such as Facebook or 
WhatsApp. Despite Picard’s appeal, permanent communication 
for communication’s sake has become the ruling principle of con-
temporary culture, a kind of placebo conversation referring to 
nothing other than itself. The aim of this kind of conversation is 
to avoid the moment that, like Pascal’s quiet chamber or Picard’s 
silence, would leave one alone with oneself. What may sound like 
cultural pessimism – and certainly would to Pascal and Picard 
– can also be seen as a way to ensure the continuation of the 
project of modernity. Because the return to God – or any other 
Grand Narrative that give our life transcendental asylum – would 
only confirm what Nietzsche once suspected: that the greatness 
of our deed, to have killed God, is too great for us. Accordingly, 
Gianni Vattimo notes in his book Religion (1996), edited together 
with Jacques Derrida: ‘To react to the problematic and chaotic 
character of the late-modern world with a return to God as the 
metaphysical foundation means, in Nietzsche’s terms, to refuse 
the challenge of the over(hu)man(ity).’ In this perspective, the 
phatic communication – the noise Picard despises – prevents us 
from seceding the project of modernity by celebrating an eter-
nal recurrence of the same in the constant worship of steadfast 
presence. Hence, Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, Snapchat and 
similar places keeping the carousel of communication alive allow 
us to feel happy without the danger of silence and the answers 
silence may offer. New media is – as metaphysics of aimlessness 
– not the problem but the solution of modern life.
EF: This is a very intelligent way of framing Picard’s question 
within the context of new media. I believe we are experiencing 
a major social and cultural transformation that is intimately 
connected to the way we use communication media. Instead of 
focusing on the production of information and meaning, we’re 
moving towards a culture of entertainment. We want to experi-
ence sensations, to have fun, to be excited. If silence is becom-
ing impossible, meaning also seems to be in short supply theses 
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days. Perhaps your question can be reframed in these terms: 
small talk is an expression of our need to be continuously enter-
tained and avoid the need of serious talk. This shift can also 
be expressed, as Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht suggests in his book 
Production of Presence (2004), in the transition from a “culture 
of meaning” to a “culture of presence”. In other words, the cul-
tural practices connected with the body, materiality and sensa-
tion are given precedence over the ones connected with (imma-
terial) meaning and interpretation. Of course, from the point 
of view of a cultural pessimist, this is certainly disastrous. The 
Frankfurtian philosopher Cristoph Türcke, for example, defines 
our contemporary need for excitation as an addiction in his book 
The Excited Society (Erregte Gesellschaft, 2002). Evidently, since 
God is no longer a viable intellectual solution, we need to replace 
him with something else. Türcke incites us to step on the break 
and fight the endless procession of audiovisual excitation with 
a focus on moments of sedimentation and tranquility. We have 
to create social “islands” of concentration and art should be our 
most important weapon in this battle. But I don’t think we need 
to isolate ourselves from the surrounding media environment in 
order to do that. Sometimes, as Gumbrecht argues, this is pos-
sible precisely through media (a film, for instance). In this sense, 
Gumbrecht’s idea of being “quiet for a moment” amidst the noise 
of our technological engagements sounds very compelling to me.
RS: Interesting that you bring in Gumbrecht’s “culture of pres-
ence” that indeed can be understood as the philosophical supple-
ment or rather precursor of the technological development we 
are experiencing. In my interview with David Golumbia I con-
sidered Gumbrecht’s aesthetics of presence as an affirmation of 
the “That” without the question for the “Why”. His desire to be 
in sync with the “things of the world” also relieves us from the 
obligation to better ourselves and the world around us – which 
Gumbrecht considers the obsession of the Frankfurt School and 
the Kulturkritik it represents. It is obvious how far this perspec-
tive has moved art from its role as estrangement and negation 
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of the status quo as Adorno, Türcke’s reference point, concep-
tualized art.
EF: My problem with the present situation is not so much the 
rise of entertainment or the decay of meaning. After all, we have 
been interpreting phenomena for at least the last two millennia. 
It’s about time we started experiencing more intense relation-
ships with our bodies and the materiality of our surroundings. 
The problem is the colonization of all domains of life by enter-
tainment. It’s almost like we had the obligation to be entertained 
(and worse, to be “happy”). Well, I want the right to be sad, I 
want to be able to find more spaces of silence within the tor-
rent of images and excitation the media continually offers. In 
his study on Picard, Christian Fink asks whether thinkers like 
him can still be relevant, especially in the context of the so-
called “medial turn” and new paradigms of research such as the 
“materialities of communication”, which compels us to focus on 
the non-significant and material aspects of the communication 
processes rather than on its meaningful contents. I’d say “yes”, 
I believe that Kulturkritik can still play an important role in the 
current situation. If nothing else, at least to keep at bay the 
sometimes excessive hype surrounding new media.
On the other hand, I understand how Gumbrecht’s idea of 
being in sync with the things of the world might be read as an 
abandonment of the critical enterprise (as it traditionally implies 
a form of distancing towards the world). However, one must not 
forget that Gumbrecht’s goal was never simply to dismiss the 
importance of the hermeneutic tradition and its achievements. 
He makes it clear, time and again, that his project runs paral-
lel to this enterprise and strives to counterbalance the overpow-
ering force of interpretation in the Humanities. Additionally, 
although I still find valuable lessons in the tradition of critical 
thinking, I agree with Gumbrecht’s diagnostic about the loss of 
belief in a “world-reference” and the epistemic crisis we’ve been 
facing since the nineteenth century. This crisis makes the tra-
ditional position of the critic as a distanced observer untenable 
nowadays. My interest in recent philosophical movements like 
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“Object-Oriented Philosophy” or theoretical paradigms such as 
the “New Materialisms” comes from a belief that they reflect a 
certain Zeitgeist that is proper of our current experience of the 
world. Yes, after having said so much about the world – to the 
point that no linguistic reference to reality still seems viable – 
we need to go back to the things themselves (but certainly not in 
the Husserlian sense of this expression!).
Gumbrecht himself acknowledges the possible accusations 
directed at a theoretical program that has no ‘immediate ethical 
or even “political” orientation,’ but he remains convinced that the 
main task of theory and teaching today is to point to instances of 
complexity rather than prescribing how they should be under-
stood. By means of this attitude, he also notes how close some of 
our academic endeavors can be to actual artistic practices – and 
I like this idea very much. I still believe in the powers of criti-
cism, but we’ve been doing it for a long time and there seems to 
be a sense of exhaustion in the Humanities regarding interpreta-
tive practices. Art is another way of bettering ourselves and the 
world around us (or so I believe it). Being in sync with the world 
– which can’t, by no means, be a permanent situation – doesn’t 
mean necessarily to be in harmony with it and doesn’t preclude 
me from engaging with critical activity from time to time.
RS: I am on Gumbrecht’s side to the extent that the hermeneu-
tic approach to art or any artifact of culture should not impov-
erish and deplete what we experience ‘in order to set up a 
shadow world of “meanings”’, as Susan Sontag notes in her essay 
Against Interpretation to which Gumbrecht alludes in his essay A 
Farewell to Interpretation. Sontag’s essay addresses the ‘hyper-
trophy of the intellect at the expense of energy and sensual capa-
bility’ as an escape from the challenging and unsettling nature 
of art we discussed above. She famously ends her essay with the 
notion: ‘In place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art.’ 
Gumbrecht’s embrace of reality seems to be the realisation of 
such erotics. However, in the afterword Thirty Years Later to the 
anniversary issue of her essay collection Against Interpretation 
(2001), Sontag distances herself from her original attack on 
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interpretation given the ongoing shift from symbolic concerns 
to intensities of direct sensual stimulation in contemporary cul-
ture. At the end of the century, giving up the search for meaning 
has turned out to be a much more efficient and popular strat-
egy for escaping the experience of crisis – that she expects art 
to present – than the fixation of meaning. This is especially the 
case if interpretation does not aim at stabilizing meaning but is 
attributed with the ‘nihilistic vocation’ to ‘reveal the world as a 
conflict of interpretations’ as Gianni Vattimo states in Beyond 
Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy 
(1994). Contemporary theory conceptualizes the hermeneutic 
endeavour as conveying complexity and different, conflicting 
perspectives rather than a prescription of how to understand 
things. I wonder how practical Gumbrecht’s “culture of pres-
ence” is to archive this aim, if the encounter of different per-
spectives onto the things of the world is replaces by the idea of 
being in sync with them. This may reflects a certain Zeitgeist – 
as does the intention of Object-Oriented Philosophy to overcome 
the Kantian and postmodern ‘correlationism’ – but this Zeitgeist 
strikes me as an escape from the epistemic aporia that (post)
modernity has passed on to us. Hence, I agree that the ‘epistemic 
crisis,’ as you put, makes ‘the traditional position of the critic as 
a distanced observer untenable,’ however, I hold that it makes 
the position of a critical critic even more indispensable. And I 
agree with Gumbrecht to the extent that his project of a “culture 
of presence” is indeed meant as a supplement but not replace-
ment of the “culture of meaning”.
To come back to the first part of your statement, I also agree 
that the problem is not the occasional shift from the paradigm 
of meaning to the intensity of the moment but the ideal of idle 
hyperactivity. In this respect, Sherrry Turkle, in her book Alone 
Together (2012), regrets that we flee from every possible “down-
time” into the business of our “can’t wait” online conversations 
and states: ‘But if we are always on, we may deny ourselves 
the rewards of solitude.’ Such sentence hardly makes sense to 
younger people today if William Deresiewicz is right with his 
observation in his Chronicle of Higher Education essay The End 
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of Solitude (2009): ‘Young people today seem to have no desire 
for solitude, have never heard of it, can’t imagine why it would be 
worth having.’ Deresiewicz conclusion is alarming: ‘But no real 
excellence, personal or social, artistic, philosophical, scientific 
or moral, can arise without solitude.’ In the same tone of culture 
pessimism Nicholas Carr, in his 2008 article Is Google making 
us stupid? and later in his 2011 book The Shallows – What the 
Internet is Doing to Our Brains, discusses the consequences of 
online media for literacy. From Carr’s perspective, multitasking 
and power browsing make people unlearn deep reading and con-
sequently deep thinking. The shift from deep attention to hyper 
attention has been announced and bemoaned by many intellec-
tuals of whom Cristoph Türcke with his Erregte Gesellschaft is 
one example of them in the tradition of the Frankfurt School. 
Another is the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler who speaks 
of a threat to social and cultural development caused by the 
destruction of young people’s ability to develop deep and critical 
attention to the world around them. Is there a real threat or is 
this just another reiteration of a well-known lamentation about 
the terrifying ramifications of all new media?
EF: I try to steer clear of this kind of assessment, because even 
the titles of these books operate according to the same logic 
they supposedly criticize. Is Google making us stupid? or Andrew 
Keen’s The Cult of the Amateur: How Today’s Internet is Killing 
our Culture (2007) sound to me like rather sensational and biased 
titles. It’s precisely the kind of titles that are fashioned in order 
to sell books and generate hype. The analyses are often simplis-
tic and one-sided. Stiegler is, of course, much more sophisticated, 
but I think we have to read him with a caveat. With works such 
as his or philosopher Barbara Cassin’s book Google-moi (2007), 
we usually have the impression of hearing, over and over, the tra-
ditional complaints of the old European intellectuals against the 
ill effects of the (mainly US-dominated) media culture. Perhaps 
the main problem is the historical tendency to the monopoliza-
tion of the human senses by one particular form of media in det-
riment of others. The insistent myth of progress sees history as 
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a linear development, in which new media are destined to inevi-
tably replace and banish old technologies. In the current mar-
ket-driven system, the past is a place we never should wish to 
return to. In other words, why can’t we play with the possibilities 
of new media, while at the same time navigating through sev-
eral other (more traditional) forms of cultural experience, such 
as literature, for instance? That’s why Siegfried Zielinki’s plea 
for the heterogeneity of the arts and media sounds so relevant 
nowadays. We need to keep moving forward, but always with an 
eye in the past, in order to escape the historical prison of techno-
logical progress.
RS: Change of subject to a somehow related issue: Digital 
Humanities seem to be the new buzzword in the Humanities. 
What do you think about it and how do you see its relationship to 
Digital Media Studies?
EF: I’m all for the development of new investigative strategies in 
the Humanities, as well as for the promotion of productive dia-
logues between hard and soft sciences. However (and perhaps 
because I don’t like buzzwords), I’m not so enthusiastic about 
Digital Humanities. It’s not that I see anything intrinsically wrong 
about it. It’s rather a question of taste and affinity. It’s just some-
thing I am not so interested in pursuing, specially when there 
are so many other interesting things going on in the Humanities 
right now. My only fear regarding Digital Humanities is that it 
becomes a new form of methodological totalitarianism. I’m a 
little concerned with the grandiose rhetoric that can be found 
in some books on Digital Humanities. It’s surprising that only a 
handful of people in Brazil have heard about Digital Humanities, 
because it perfectly fits the philosophy and guiding principles 
of the governmental agencies that fund research. It’s supposed 
to be collaborative and it apparently can give the Humanities 
a more scientific outlook. A few years ago I remember hearing 
the constant criticism from funding agencies that researchers 
were writing too many “essays” in Brazil. What they meant is 
that we needed to do more grounded research and incorporate 
more empirical data in our assessments. Although I acknowledge 
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the importance of all these precepts, including the notion of col-
laborative research, I fear they might become the only socially 
sanctioned guidelines for research in the Humanities. If we man-
age to avoid privileging research paradigms and methods on the 
basis of how scientific they look, then there’s nothing to fear. On 
the contrary, Digital Humanities can become a valuable asset in 
the theoretical toolbox of the Human Sciences, although some 
concern has been raised, for example, about its disregard for 
issues of race and gender.
As for its relationship to Digital Media Studies, I like the idea 
of inclusive and diverse fields of research – and that’s why I pre-
fer the term “media studies” over “digital media studies”, like I 
stated in a previous answer. Depending on how we use Digital 
Humanities it can even help bridging the gap between the ana-
logical and the digital worlds. What we need is the multiplica-
tion of possibilities, not their reduction to one or two dominating 
paradigms. I think that the best works in Digital Humanities are 
aware of the dangers I mentioned here and are ready to react to 
them. A good example would be the volume Digital_Humanities 
by Anne Burdick, Johanna Drucker, Peter Lunenfeld, Todd 
Presner, and Jeffrey Schnapp (2012), which acknowledges the 
need of diversity by stating from the start that this new research 
program should be ‘an extension of traditional knowledge skills 
and methods, not a replacement for them.’
InteRvIew 4
Computerization always promotes 
centralization even as it promotes 
decentralization
David Golumbia
David Golumbia teaches in the English Department 
and the Media, Art, and Text PhD program at Virginia 
Commonwealth University. He is the author of The 
Cultural Logic of Computation (2009) and many arti-
cles on digital culture, language, and literary stud-
ies and theory. He maintains the digital studies blog 
uncomputing.org and edits The b2 Review: Digital 
Studies magazine for the boundary 2 editorial col-
lective. His The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-
Wing Extremism is forthcoming in 2016 from the 
University of Minnesota Press, and he is currently 
working on the book Cyberlibertarianism: The False 
Promise of Digital Freedom.
David Golumbia presents four reasons why he considers “hacker” 
groups such as Anonymous right-wing activism, states that in 
the regime of computation today the mathematical rationalism 
of Leibnitz has prevailed Voltaire’s critical rationalism, and pro-
poses a FDA for computer technology. He doesn’t see the Internet 
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as Habermasian “public sphere,” considers Digital Humanities a 
‘perfect cyberlibertarian construct,’ bemoans the capitulation 
of universities to new media corporations, and calls for a bal-
ance of both modes of thinking, the hedgehog and the fox, in the 
digital age.
Prelude
Roberto Simanowski: What is your favored neologism of digital 
media culture and why?
David Golumbia: My least favorite digital neologism is “hacker.” 
The word has so many meanings, and yet it is routinely used as 
if its meaning was unambiguous. Wikipedia has dozens of pages 
devoted to the word, and yet many authors, including scholars 
of the topic, write as if these ambiguities are epiphenomenal or 
unimportant. Thus the two most common meanings of the word—
“someone who breaks into computer systems,” on the one hand, 
is by far the most widely-understood across society, and “skilled, 
possibly self-taught, computer user” on the other, is favored to 
some extent within digital circles—are in certain ways in conflict 
with each other and in certain ways overlap. They do not need to 
be seen as “the same word.” Yet so much writing about “hack-
ers” somehow assumes that these meanings (and others) must be 
examined together because they have been lumped by someone 
or other under a single label. Today, “hackers” are bizarrely cel-
ebrated as both libertarian and leftist political agitators, “outsid-
ers” who “get the system” better than the rest of us do, and con-
summate insiders. My view is that this terminological blurring 
has served to destabilize Left politics, by assimilating a great 
deal of what would otherwise be resistant political energy to the 
supposedly “political” cause of hackers, whose politics are at the 
same time beyond specification and “beyond” Left-Right politics.
RS: Could we then, in allusion to Geert Lovink’s book title and 
complaint Networks Without a Cause, speak of hacktivism or 
rather hackerism without a cause?
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DG: In my mind, much of what is celebrated as “political activ-
ism” by “hacker” groups such as Anonymous is more easily 
parsed as right-wing than as left-wing activism, but because it 
gets labeled “hacker” people are hesitant to read the actual poli-
tics for what they are.
RS: Why do you see this as right-wing activism?
DG: I consider it right-wing for four reasons: first, because the 
issues on which it focuses are usually ones on the agenda of the 
far right (the dissolution of the state, the celebration of individ-
ual freedoms over social equality, and a diminished focus on the 
dangers of concentrated capital); second, because to the degree 
that hackers declare overt politics, they are usually those of 
right libertarianism; third, because its culture is so retrograde 
with respect to Left issues, such as gender and racial equality; 
fourth, because it celebrates power, both at the individual and 
personal level, and often celebrates its exercise without any dis-
cussion of how power functions in our society. These last two 
both mitigate, for me, the partially leftist appearance of the 
anti-rape and anti-pedophilia campaigns sometimes engaged 
in by Anonymous and others. This is made more bizarre by the 
fact that the term “hacker” was first popularized in the “skilled 
computer user” meaning and that among the most famous hack-
ers were Bill Gates, Paul Allen, Steve Jobs, and Steve Wozniak. 
“Hacking” is supposed to be counter-cultural and resistant to 
capital, say some on the Left, but many tech business leaders 
today call themselves hackers; not only does Mark Zuckerberg 
call himself a hacker, but Facebook makes “hacking” a prime 
skill for its job candidates, and all its technical employees are 
encouraged to think of themselves as “hackers.”
I have begun some work in which I try to disambiguate the 
“technical” definitions of “hacker” from its actual deployment 
in social discourse, and my tentative conclusion is that “hacker” 
means something like ‘identified with and desirous of power, and 
eager to see oneself and have others see oneself as possessing 
more power than others do.’ That isn’t what I see as a welcome 
political formation. I don’t think the criticism I am making here is 
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quite the same topic about which Lovink is writing in Networks 
Without a Cause, as his subject there is what Evgeny Morozov 
and others have called “slacktivism,” or the belief that one is 
causing or contributing significantly to political change by com-
municating over social media. At least in those cases, the causes 
to which one is committed are often clear, even if the results of 
one’s actions are not always clear at all. With “hacking,” I am 
concerned about something closer to effective action that takes 
on a cloak of Left-oriented social justice and equity concerns, but 
in fact tends much more clearly to serve Right-oriented inter-
ests; I see this concern as the reason Barbrook and Cameron, 
Borsook, and Winner identified the notion of “cyberlibertarian-
ism,” about which I’ve written a fair amount recently in terms of 
its impact on Left political goals.
RS: If you could go back in history of new media and digital cul-
ture in order to prevent something from happening or somebody 
from doing something, what or who would it be?
DG: I can’t help but find it very interesting to imagine what 
the Internet would be like today if in 1991 the Commercial 
Internet Exchange (CIX) had not been established and the High 
Performance Computing Act had not been passed, and the 
Internet remained generally off-limits for commercial usage. I 
think we would today have a wonderfully useful set of tools some 
of whose problems would not exist or would be substantially miti-
gated, and I think we would have much less techno-utopianism: 
especially the suggestion that if we just let capital do what it 
wants and get out of the way, all of our problems will be solved.
Politics and Government
RS: Speaking of the internet’s commercialization, while in the 
1990s Internet pioneers such as John Perry Barlow declared the 
independence of Cyberspace from the governments of the old 
world, now it seems people hope for governments to intervene 
in the taking-over of the Internet by huge corporations such as 
Google and Facebook.
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DG: I always saw the rejection of government as unwelcome and 
part of a general pro-corporate and often explicitly libertarian 
rejection of core values of democratic governance. Government 
is and has been the only effective guarantor of egalitarian values 
that I know of in our world. Libertarians attack this principle 
specifically; their pro-business philosophy targets places where 
democratic processes, up to and including rulings of the US 
Supreme Court, suggest that Constitutional principles require 
regulatory and statutory guarantees of equality. I am not sure 
I see yet a robust enough recognition that a rejection of govern-
ment is itself a rejection of almost the entirety of democracy in 
any coherent form in which it’s been articulated, and that the 
result of rejecting it can only be massive concentrations of power 
and capital.
RS: Given the different perspective on the role of the government 
in society in the US and in, say, Germany one wonders how the 
Internet would have developed if it had been invented in Europe.
DG:  I know much more about the US than about the European 
context, but my impression is that Europe would have been much 
more cautious about the commercialization of the Internet, 
which I think would have been a much better way to run the 
experiment. Some European countries often have robust rules 
about the “right to representation” or the notion that individu-
als “own” any or all data about themselves, and having built out 
the Internet with that as a foundation would, to my mind, have 
been preferable.
RS: While for some time and to some people its gift economy 
imperative let the Internet appear as the last resort of commu-
nism, it meanwhile has become a playground of neo-liberalism 
even centralizing an important public good such as knowledge 
in the hands of a private company such as Google. In his book 
The Googlization of Everything (And Why We Should Worry), Siva 
Vaidhyanathan speaks of Google’s “infrastructural imperial-
ism” and calls for the public initiative of a “Human Knowledge 
Project” as “global information ecosystem“. Aware of the utopian 
nature of his vision, Vaidhyanathan adds that Google has been 
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crowding out any imagination of alternatives, and achieving this 
not least—and ironically—by virtue of its reputation for building 
systems that are open and customizable -- so far. Should we mis-
trust the positive record and worry? Would the US government 
or the European Union ever have been able to carry out some-
thing like Google’s book project? Should –and could– they run a 
search engine free of advertisement and with an algorithm vis-
ible to all who care?
DG: We should worry, and though I agree with Vaidhyanathan 
in many ways, there are some ways in which I think the critique 
needs to go deeper. The Internet was never a bastion of commu-
nism, not without a kind of thoroughgoing establishment of foun-
dations which it never had, and certainly not once the restric-
tions on commercial use were lifted. At some level I think some 
kind of public accountability for central mechanisms like search 
is absolutely imperative, though what forms these can take are 
not at all clear to me, since exposing parts of the search algo-
rithm almost necessarily makes gaming search engines that 
much easier, and gaming seems to me a significant problem 
already. Computerization is always going to promote centraliza-
tion even as it promotes decentralization—often in one and the 
same motion. Advocates of decentralization are often almost 
completely blind to this, directly suggesting that single cen-
tral platforms such as Facebook, Wikipedia, Twitter and Google 
“decentralize” as if this somehow disables the centralization 
they so obviously entail.
This is therefore a set of problems created in no small part 
by the promulgation of ubiquitous computing itself. At this 
level I am not sure that having Google search be “owned” by 
the public or a private corporation makes that much of a differ-
ence, although the arguments for it being a public resources (as 
advanced by legal scholars such as Frank Pasquale and others) 
I find persuasive, and the existence of governmental communi-
cations systems in the past, despite right-wing attacks on them, 
is compelling evidence that governments can run such systems 
not just efficiently but also with respect for the equality interests 
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inherent in such systems (that is, the US Postal Service, under 
constant attack from Republicans, not only works well, but pro-
vides services at low cost to populations to whom the provision of 
services is not economically advantageous).
Centralization is one problem, and I believe we need a much 
more robust and thoughtful critique of the tendency toward 
centralization itself: that regardless of its benefits, its draw-
backs are more serious than most commentators want to admit. 
Wikipedia, in my opinion, which in many ways resembles the 
Human Knowledge Project, is of great concern to me precisely 
because it intends to be and has partly succeeded at being the 
single site for the totality of human knowledge, and I think there 
are compelling reasons to suggest that the very idea of a single 
site for the totality of human knowledge is itself politically sus-
pect, despite its benefits. This is an abstract-level concern, like 
my concern with Google, that does not have much to do with the 
actual character of particular Wikipedia pages or the results of 
particular Google searches, but with a question more like that 
of monopolies and antitrust. In the heyday of antitrust jurispru-
dence in the US, it was widely-acknowledged that monopolies of 
various sorts over any part of the market were inherently unwel-
come. Today, under the influence of highly interested parties 
who themselves want the advantages of concentrated economic 
power, that thinking has been almost entirely cast aside, and I 
think it is today needed more than ever, or at least as much as it 
was in the days of Standard Oil.
Algorithm and Censorship
RS: The numbers of views, likes, comments and the Klout 
Score –as measure of one’s influence in social media– indicate 
the social extension of the technical paradigm of digital media: 
counting. The quantification of evaluation only seems to fulfill 
the “cultural logic of computation” as the title of your 2009 book 
reads that addresses the aspiration in politics and economics to 
organize human and social experience via computational pro-
cesses. The desired effect of counting is comparison and ranking 
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which allows for determining normality and detecting deviance 
with the effect of predicting, controlling and disciplining human 
action. However, the effort to measure and classify dates back to 
at least the Enlightenment and is part of a modern understand-
ing of nature and society. Is computationalism hence nothing 
more than the continuation of the epistemic logic of modernity 
by new means after the intermission of postmodern ambiguity 
and relativism? Where do you see the problem of this concept?
DG: You write: ‘the effort to measure and classify dates back to 
at least the Enlightenment.’ That’s true. The point of my book is 
not to deny the effectiveness or importance of quantification; it is 
to dispute the view that its methods are the only ones that apply 
to the human sphere. As I briefly discuss at one point in the book, 
with the Enlightenment comes both the view, most usefully and 
tellingly associated with Leibniz, that human reason is entirely 
a function of what we call in a narrow sense rationality—that is, 
the view that everything in the mind, or everything important 
in society, can be reduced to mathematical formulae and logical 
syllogisms. Against this, we have what is sometimes thought of 
as the “critical rationalism” of Voltaire, a more expansive version 
of rationalism that recognizes that there are aspects to reason 
outside of calculation, which in Voltaire’s case might include phe-
nomena like irony, skepticism, and a certain humility about the 
potential of human beings to grasp the totality of experience.
More recently, Derrida encourages us to use the term “rea-
son” in place of this more expansive notion of “rationality,” 
pointing out how frequently in contemporary discourse and 
across many languages we use the word “reasonable” to mean 
something different from “rational.” I argue in my book that the 
regime of computation today encourages the narrow view of 
rationality—that human reason is all calculation—and that is dis-
courages the broader view, that reason includes other principles 
and practices in addition to calculation and logic. I believe some 
versions of “modernity” tilt toward one, and some tilt toward the 
other. Projects to quantify the social—including Klout scores, the 
quantified self, and many other aspects of social and predictive 
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media—advertise the notion that calculation is everything. I 
think we have very serious reasons, even from Enlightenment 
and modernist thinkers, to believe this is wrong, and that his-
torically, regimes that have bought into this view have typically 
not been favorable to a politics of egalitarianism and concerns 
with broad issues of social equality. My hope is that the pendu-
lum is swinging very far toward the calculation pole, but that 
eventually it will swing back toward the broader view of rational-
ity, recognizing that there are dangers and fallacies inherent in 
any attempt to thoroughly quantify the social.
RS: The notion that quantification undermines egalitarianism 
seems paradoxical, since one could argue numbers, by nature, 
symbolize equality. Think, for example, of the one head-one vote 
rule today in contrast to previous restrictions on the base of cer-
tain qualities: possession, education, gender, ethnos. What is 
your concern?
DG: I just don’t agree that ‘numbers by nature symbolize equal-
ity’ and I’m not sure how or why one would assert that. Numbers 
are abstract objects that can symbolize and enforce inequality 
every bit as much as equality. The one person-one vote rule is 
a numerical system designed to ensure equality; the one-prop-
erty owner-one vote rule that the US had in its early days was a 
numerical system that ensured inequality (as was the “3/5 com-
promise” under which slaves counted as less than other mem-
bers of the population for purposes of democratic representa-
tion). Further, the reduction to calculation, which is what I talk 
about—the view that everything can and should be reduced to 
numbers, particularly when it comes to the social world—has his-
torically been associated much more with Right than with Left 
political systems, as I discuss at length in my book.
RS: Your book seems to confirm the technological determin-
ism explored, for example, in Alexander Galloway’s Protocol. 
How Control Exists after Decentralization (2006) and shares 
his call for resistance which itself is repeating the call to resist 
the tyranny of transparency by fog and interference proposed 
in Tiqqun’s “The Cybernetic Hypothesis” (2001) and before by 
132 Interview 4
Deleuze in his discussion with Antonio Negri „Control and 
Becoming“. How do you see today the option to undermine com-
putation and cybernetics as the central means of unlimited ratio-
nalization of all human activity in contemporary society?
DG: I take “technological determinism” to be the view that the 
form of a given technology inherently, and to a large extent 
regardless of human intervention, shapes society. Using that 
definition, I would disagree strongly that my book, Galloway’s, 
and the other works you mention endorse technological deter-
minism—quite the opposite in fact. While I think Galloway 
and I would agree that certain technologies tend to come with 
implicit politics, these have often been formed by the developers 
of the technology, and are always or almost always subject to 
the social matrices in which those technologies are embedded, 
and the technologies themselves are largely shaped by those 
social matrices. I agree with Galloway’s suggestions about the 
“tyranny of transparency.” To me the way to resist that is to put 
politics and social good above other values, and then to test via 
democratic means whether technological systems themselves 
conform to those values. When they don’t, even if they are fun, 
attractive, addictive, or even very useful, it seems to me we have 
an obligation as a society to consider limiting or even rejecting 
those technologies. Otherwise the deterministic factors become 
all about the market—what can be sold to us, using the most 
advanced technical means possible to determine what we are 
least able to resist. That is a tyranny of the market that is anti-
thetical to democracy. I believe we have built a technical system 
that solicits and captures far too much information about us, and 
that the only solutions to the enormous problems that it causes 
are to scale the system itself back, however contrary to received 
wisdom that may sound. Further, the fact that we are gener-
ally prohibited even from considering any such scaling-back of 
technology as long as a small enough group of people wish to 
purchase it—witness here the controversy over attempts to reg-
ulate or perhaps prevent the distribution of Google Glass, and 
the extremely arrogant insistence on the part of Google itself 
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and many early adopters that only they have the right to decide 
whether the technology is acceptable, even if it has detrimental 
effects on many other people.
RS: Google Glass may be a good example of what I mean by 
technological determinism and why I am skeptical regarding 
the prospect of human interventions. You are completely right, 
Google Glass, as much as Facebook and other new communica-
tion technologies, has been formed by developers who more or 
less represent certain social practices or desires. Given the age 
of many programmers and their longing to be the next teenage 
millionaire by coming up with the right app, one wonders to what 
extent they fulfill social desire and to what extent they produce 
it. However, my notion of technological determinism alludes to 
McLuhan’s notion that first we shape technology and then tech-
nology shapes us. Hans Jonas, in his book The Imperative of 
Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, 
basically repeats this assumption, stating that human power 
over nature has become self-acting and has turned man into a 
“compulsive executer of his capacity”. Isn’t the development of 
Facebook (its imperative of radical transparency) and the inven-
tion of Google Glass (its aim to have the computer and Internet 
as handy as possible) the inevitable expansion and consequence 
of what has been created before? To put it this way: When does 
the cultural logic of computation turn into the logic of technol-
ogy itself with the result that technology is no longer caused by 
culture but rather determines it?
DG: Technologies, especially once they are released, absolutely 
do exert shaping powers on society. Where I part ways is on the 
question of “inevitability.” It is not inevitable that the democratic 
citizenry should or will accept Google Glass; it was not inevitable 
that we accepted nuclear power (and we could have accepted it 
much more than we have); it was not inevitable that the Internet 
would be commercialized; it is not inevitable that Facebook (at 
least in something like its current form) is legal, not least for the 
reasons you mentioned earlier regarding European law, which 
differs from US law in some important respects regarding the 
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kinds of representations found on Facebook. Television itself was 
structured by a range of legal and engineering decisions which 
could have been handled differently. McLuhan is an extremely 
gnomic thinker, as he not just admits but openly embraces, and 
it’s not always clear how to take some of his statements—even 
in “the medium is the message,” it’s not clear which aspects of 
“the medium” count as “the medium” and which don’t. One of 
the main targets of libertarians in the US is the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), which they believe “impedes innovation.” 
I think the history of the FDA is very clear, and that we have 
been well-served by having a democratically-empowered body of 
experts and citizens determine whether or not a particular drug 
is more harmful than beneficial. Computer technologies are now 
openly advertised as having life-altering effects as extreme as, or 
even more extreme than, some drugs.  The notion that such pow-
erful technologies must be allowed to proliferate subject only to 
the “regulation” of the market only fits into libertarian ideas of 
democracy, and I think and hope that we will reach a point where 
we understand that democratic constraints on technology are not 
merely welcome but necessary. Another area where this exact 
issue is raised is drones. Right now, in the US, FAA and other 
regulations prohibit most kinds of drone use (other than in mili-
tary operation). There is nothing inevitable about the question of 
whether these laws change, and if they don’t change, the future 
will be very different than if, as techno-libertarians demand, the 
laws are removed and drone operators are just allowed to do as 
they like.1 And I do think, following the FDA model, that it is criti-
cally important to have democratic regulation of at least some 
technologies prior to their release, as well as some kind of demo-
cratic review of technologies after they have been released. I do 
not think it is out of the question, for example, that the EU and/or 
the US will, eventually, prohibit certain parts of the functionality 
today associated with Facebook.
RS: A FDA for digital media seems to be as reasonable as the 
FDA is. In Germany there is discussion whether one should cre-
ate a ministry of the Internet. Of course, there would, especially 
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in the US, be much objection against any regulations. And sure 
enough there would be references to John Stuart Mill’s Essay On 
Liberty and warnings against any kind of ‘nanny statecraft’ that 
claims to know better what is good for its citizens – who them-
selves may find Google Glass just cool and convenient but a bit 
pricey. However, another ‘message of the medium’ – and request 
for the digital media FDA – is customization which causes the 
loss of chance encounters, the preclusion of the unfamiliar, the 
removal of diversity and of what we are not (yet). This becomes 
problematic once people are addressed not as consumers but as 
citizens expected to be open to others instead of cocooning in 
their bubble. Hence, personalization, driven by economic force, 
is political. Are the actual policy makers in the digital media age 
those who program ego-loops, inadvertently undermining the 
foundation of a democratic society?
DG: My short answer to your question is a resounding yes. This 
is a major concern of mine and other critical thinkers about the 
Internet. Rather than looking at the machine (at websites, Twitter 
streams, Facebook chats, etc.) to see evidence of “democratiza-
tion,” we should be looking at society itself to see the direction in 
which it is moving. There is some to my mind highly tendentious 
research suggesting that certain kinds of anti-authoritarian pro-
test movements may be fueled by the introduction of Internet and 
mobile telephone communication (mostly in the “Arab Spring”), 
but this is very different from the question of how such technolo-
gies impact existing and deeply embedded democracies. If we 
look at the period from the early 1990s to the present day in the 
US, for example, this coincides with one of the most dramatic 
shifts to the political Right in our history. To be sure this shift 
started in the 1980s and included many forms of media such as 
television and radio, but it is absolutely clear that the introduc-
tion of the Internet did very little to stop that shift.
Further, it is startling how much the organizational materials 
of the political Right worldwide sound almost identical to that of 
the Left, in praising digital and mobile technology as enabling 
the realization of its political goals. This to me embodies one of 
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the deep paradoxes in Internet evangelism: on the one hand, it 
says, print and other forms of information technology enabled or 
even created democracy; on the other, it says, these technologies 
were insufficient, and something new is needed that jettisons 
many of the affordances those older technologies had. At worst, 
one can imagine folks like Jeff Jarvis and Clay Shirky in 1776 
saying to Benjamin Franklin, “if only you had the Internet, you’d 
be able to really have a democracy.” This seems like a willful 
misreading of history to me, one that happens to converge with 
some very powerful commercial interests.
As your question suggests and as the work of scholars like 
Matthew Hindman implies, for many different reasons the 
Internet does not “force” individuals to engage with a wider 
array of political opinions and in many cases makes it very easy 
for individuals to do the opposite. Thus we have a new kind of 
centralization that is not itself regulated in the way that the pub-
lic service provision of news by the much-derided “big three” 
television networks in the US of the 1960s and 70s were. There, 
the centralization was acknowledged and a variety of voluntary 
and legislative measures were taken to ensure these centralized 
services fed the public interest—and at that time we had a very 
robust and very interactive political dialogue in the US. Today, 
we have unacknowledged and entirely unregulated centraliza-
tion, and among the most partisan, divisive, and uninformed 
political discourse in the US that we have ever seen, in part due 
to the utopian rhetoric that says Internet media is democratizing 
in a way no other media has been before.
RS: From a German point of view, I can confirm your perspec-
tives with regard to Jürgen Habermas, whose 1962 book The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society is often mistaken as a blueprint 
for the democratic sphere of the Internet. However, in his essay 
“Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy still 
have an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory 
on Empirical Research” (in his 2008 book Europe: The Faltering 
Project), Habermas himself considers the asymmetric system 
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of traditional mass media the better foundation for a delibera-
tive, participatory democracy than the bidirectional Internet. 
The Internet, he concedes, undermines the old gate-keeping and 
allows everybody to participate in the discussion. However, the 
fragmented public sphere online obstructs an inclusive and rig-
orous debate of the cons and pros of a specific issue and thus 
does not foster a well informed political engagement.
DG: I agree with this very much. There is a great deal in 
Habermas that calls into question the easy adoption of his work 
to the Internet as if it is a realization of his “public sphere.” 
Further, while I am no huge supporter of network television, I 
find the cribbed accounts of political discourse under the “big 
three” to be highly contrary to history, both in terms of individ-
ual behavior and overall politics. People in general were more 
informed in the 1960s and 1970s than they are today; they were 
less tolerant of absolutely crazy, fact-resistant political inter-
ventions; politics was more productive. I’m not saying this was 
caused by the networks (although having 3 sites of informa-
tion about which everyone conversed excitedly may not have 
been such a bad thing, and is “participatory” and “interactive” 
in many important senses that Jarvis, Shirky, Jenkins and oth-
ers dismiss far too quickly), but that the idea that the Internet 
“democratizes” political discourse seems contravened by the fact 
that political discourse has become notably less rich, less inter-
active, more divided, and less productive than it was under ear-
lier media regimes.
RS: Early 2016 one may even ask to what extent it is the distrac-
tion and dispersion of the audience on the Internet that allows a 
person with the discourse quality of Donald Trump to become a 
presidential candidate.
Art and Aesthetics
RS: People have said that art in or of digital media must be 
political even if its intentions are to be utterly formalistic. If 
art is based on technology the focus on form draws attention to 
how technology works and this is already an act of reflection or 
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education. From this perspective, one would assume that digital 
art and literature are art and literature that address the politics 
of digital technology. What is your experience in this regard?
DG: I would never say art “must” be anything. “Art,” whatever 
that is, serves many different purposes, including frequently, no 
particular purpose at all, other than “being.” Art may be used or 
not used for any number of purposes, intended or not intended 
by its creators. What resonates for me in this question is the 
huge amount of digital art that takes as its subject the operation 
of digital technology itself. I think art can be successful if and 
when it addresses politics, though it certainly does not need to. 
Art that addresses digital politics, which at this point includes 
many ordinary novels and short stories as well as more overtly 
digital forms, can be as successful as any other art, however we 
define “success.” But there is absolutely a considerable amount 
of digital art whose purpose appears to be mainly or entirely the 
demonstration of the capabilities of digital tools. This art strikes 
me as completely formalist, devoid of any overt politics, and usu-
ally lacking any emotional or aesthetic content with which audi-
ences can connect. The inherent politics of such work seems to 
be to exalt the wonders of the digital world, and for the most 
part I don’t find that a particularly promising direction for the 
arts to take—it almost functions as a kind of advertisement for 
Photoshop or for HTML 5 or whatever technology the work is 
created in, and it is rare that technology demos work, at least 
for me, in the same register that functions for me as aesthetic, 
no matter how broadly conceived. It is certainly the case that 
some of the best digital art (Jodi, Shulgin, Mark Napier, Pall 
Thayer, Rafael Rozendaal) reflects in various ways on the condi-
tion of the digital, but that rarely if ever appears to be its over-
riding concern.
RS: To take your skepticism on just flexing the technical ‘mus-
cles’ even further, one could say this kind of digital art carries 
out the shift from the culture of meaning to the culture of pres-
ence promoted, for example, in Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s 2004 
book Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey. 
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Though, Gumbrecht does not discuss new media, he considers 
the ‘”special effects” produced today by the most advanced com-
munication technologies’ as possibly ‘instrumental in reawaken-
ing a desire for presence.’ In this aesthetic theory for the 21st 
century desire for presence favors materiality and intensive 
moments over interpretation. The agreeable argument may be 
that one should not resist the physical and aesthetic pleasure of 
an artwork by reducing its energy, vitality, and expressiveness 
to a particular proposition, as Susan Sontag famously stated 
in her essay “Against Interpretation” in 1964. The problematic 
consequence, however, is the sheer affirmation of the That with-
out the question for the Why let alone questioning the That. As 
Gumbrecht puts it fairly clearly, being in sync with the ‘things of 
the world’ relieves us of the obligation to better ourselves and the 
world around us. It is obvious how far this aesthetics has moved 
from Adorno’s notion of art as estrangement and of thinking as 
negation of the status quo. I wonder to what extent the formal-
ist version of digital art and the contemporary aesthetic theory 
more or less unconsciously collaborate to step beyond the criti-
cal perspective on society you address in your answers above.
DG: I quite like this line of thinking, and it resonates to me to 
some extent with my experiences in teaching; reading the most 
breathless of techno-utopians, one might imagine that today’s 
“digital natives” would be almost uniformly enthusiastic about 
thoroughgoing computerization and the many digital gadgets 
and effects they live with. Instead—and with the notable excep-
tion of very computer-identified hacker and proto-hacker stu-
dents—I find much the opposite. I find the students, as you sug-
gest, hungry in an intuitive but often explicit sense for the kind 
of embodied, present experiences for which the digital is usu-
ally a mediation, impatient with the tools and their own absorp-
tion in them, impatient even with the emphasis on special effects 
in cinematic media. Though my students are a subset oriented 
toward literary study, there are many very digitally-fluent folks 
among them, and I am continually surprised and heartened by 
the number of them who are deeply skeptical about the wonders 
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being continually sold to them, and who seem to have a fairly 
good grasp on certain aspects of human experience (the body, 
face-to-face socialization, relationships, issues of life and death) 
that writers like Jarvis and Shirky appear to want us to think 
are vanishing entirely. This also seems to me to connect to the 
ideas of David M. Berry and Bernhard Stiegler and others, that 
the plasticity of “human nature” itself to some extent guarantees 
a building and/or rebuilding of what they (somewhat mechanis-
tically for my taste; like your other interviewee Mihai Nadin, I 
am a great admirer of the anti-mechanistic biological theories of 
Robert Rosen) call “long circuits.”
Media Literacy
RS: What comes to mind if you hear “Digital Media Studies”? or 
“Digital Studies” or “Web Studies”?
DG: These are names for existing and valuable fields of aca-
demic study. I am concerned that they don’t actually name use-
fully discrete areas of social practice, so that people who go to 
school now to do “digital media studies” may license themselves 
to omit huge amounts of cultural practice (chiefly, that which 
occurred before the mid-1990s, and that which does not occur on 
a screen), and that these omissions end up not just informing but 
even structuring the work done by such investigators. You can’t 
understand human culture well by restricting yourself to such 
a narrow time period. That has been a problem for subfields of 
Media and Communication Studies to begin with, and a narrow 
focus on “digital media” threatens to be even worse.
RS: In your book and in your answers above you argue against 
techno-utopians praising the Internet as a road to more democ-
racy and urge we need to notice and address the ethical, cultural 
and political costs of computing. What role do or should institu-
tions of elementary and higher education play in this regard? Are 
Digital Humanities of help or – if replacing interpretation by algo-
rithm, hermeneutics by statistics – rather part of the problem?
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DG: The 2013 MLA-conference contained the panel “The Dark 
Side of the Digital Humanities” which is being followed up 
with a special issue of differences called “In the Shadow of the 
Digital Humanities,” in which I have an essay called “Death of 
a Discipline.”  Part of what I argue in that essay is that Digital 
Humanities is a kind of perfect cyberlibertarian construct—on 
the one hand, it tells us, it is a method that says nothing about 
politics; on the other hand, it attracts and often promotes a very 
specific politics that is deeply at odds with other understandings 
of the humanities. One aspect of that politics is a resistance to 
teaching about the core political and politico-philosophical issue 
that ground any serious understanding of the nature of society 
and of civic organization. As such, while I am generally in favor 
of teaching about the “ethical, cultural, and political costs of 
computing,” I consider it more urgent simply to return to teach-
ing ethics, politics, and cultural politics in a much more thor-
oughgoing way. In too many ways the advent of the computer has 
enabled a turning-away from such matters throughout the educa-
tional system, in favor of a “skill-based” program that is largely 
a political front—a way of teaching one politics above all oth-
ers, one that does not even admit the possibility of dissent. Too 
often the “ethical, cultural, and political costs of computing” are 
taught from a single, packaged perspective: that “hackers” and 
“Hacktivists” like Anonymous, Barrett Brown, Jacob Appelbaum, 
Aaron Swartz, Andrew Auernheimer, Julian Assange and others 
constitute a site of meaningful resistance to the social costs of 
computing. From my perspective, they are part of the orthodox 
view, a pre-scripted site of self-described resistance that is in 
fact much more continuous with than opposed to the concen-
tration of power. Power is the topic that needs to be addressed 
throughout the educational system in a much more resistant way 
than it currently is; these hackers for the most part advocate the 
use and concentration of power (in their own persons and institu-
tions rather than those they dislike), and political theories that 
attract me are those that inspire us to resist the accumulation 
of power in the first place, and its careful, ethical, and judicious 
use when its use is required.
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RS: It has been argued – for example in Berry’s 2011 The 
Philosophy of Software – the computational turn in the 
Humanities could convert the referential totality of human life 
into a computational ‘knowing-that’ and knowing how to trans-
form subject matter through calculation and processing inter-
ventions. Does Digital Humanities foster the computationalism 
you address in your book and discussed above with respect to 
Leibnitz and Voltaire as representatives of two quite different 
views in the Enlightenment on human reason? Burdick, Drucker, 
Lunefeld, Presner, and Schnapp in their 2012 book Digital_
Humanities (which you have written about on your Uncomputing 
blog) see Digital Humanities as an ambassador of the Humanities 
bringing the ‘values, representational and interpretative prac-
tices, meaning-making strategies, complexities, and ambiguities 
of being human into every realm of experience and knowledge 
of the world.’ Does Voltaire still have a future after Leibnitz suc-
ceeded so fundamentally with his idea of algorithmic machines 
and formal logic? Or do we have to understand the computational 
turn as the rejection of Voltaire’s irony and skepticism that has 
thrived for two or three decades in the name of postmodernism?
DG: In my book and in everything I write and say, I try to make 
clear that my intent is not to eradicate the Leibniz line of think-
ing, but to suggest that its prominence today makes the Voltaire 
line extremely hard to see, and that we desperately need both. 
Not just that, but Voltaire, Swift, and others show the profound 
danger in the univocal adoption of the Leibniz line—this is some-
thing we have known for hundreds if not thousands of years, and 
it’s hard-won knowledge and wisdom, and the fact that we do 
seem on the verge of forgetting it today is part of what makes the 
digital revolution frightening. The two books you mention are 
interesting, because I see Berry as advocating a view that I can-
not discount entirely—that a new version of the Voltairian critical 
reason will emerge as a part of and reaction to widespread com-
puterization. I see this view also in the thought of Stiegler, and I 
hope it’s correct and keep looking for evidence that it may be. On 
the other hand, the Burdick et al Digital_Humanities book strikes 
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me as disheartening evidence in the other direction; I see it as 
asserting exactly that the Leibniz way of thinking overcomes 
and makes unnecessary the Voltaire line, and in this sense it 
comes close to arguing many times that the activities we associ-
ate with humanistic practice should be replaced by computation; 
one notes how rarely anything in that book can be construed as 
positive commentary on what it repeatedly slurs as “traditional” 
humanistic practice, including any kind of humanistic scholar-
ship that does not celebrate the digital as utterly transformative.
RS: Since you mention Bernard Stiegler, in his 2008 article Is 
Google making us stupid? and later in his 2011 book The Shallows 
– What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains, Nicholas Carr dis-
cusses the consequences of online media for literacy. From 
Carr’s perspective, multitasking and power browsing online 
make people unlearn deep reading with the effects being carried 
offline, and with the result that they also unlearn deep think-
ing. Stiegler certainly shares such perspective and even sees the 
destruction of young people’s ability to develop deep and critical 
attention to the world around them as a threat to social and cul-
tural development. What is your take on this?
DG: I take Carr’s concerns very seriously. I find the reaction to 
it among the digerati to be too colored by one form or another of 
a quasi-religious faith in computerization. I think there is lots of 
empirical evidence to suggest that what Carr is worried about is 
actually taking place—that certain kinds of political and cultural 
discourse are, in fact, quite a bit “shallower” than they were for 
most of the recent and even less recent past. I find Stiegler’s 
comments on Carr to be among the most important interventions 
in this discussion we have to date. In addition to discussing him 
occasionally in several recent works, Stiegler offered a seminar 
in 2012 on Plato, a fairly significant part of which was devoted to 
Carr; the first session is called “From Nicholas Carr to Plato.”2 If 
I understand correctly, in addition to and to some extent against 
Carr’s analysis, Stiegler makes two points that seem absolutely 
vital. The first is, essentially, about temporality: that the time 
of the digital is a kind of perpetual “now,” one that continually 
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suggest a break with everything that has come before, and that 
this temporality interrupts “long circuits” that are somewhat 
akin to Carr’s “deep thinking,” but gain some specificity by 
being framed in temporal rather than spatial terms. The second 
is a point that I don’t think anyone else has made, or at least 
has not made as clearly and as well: that even if we accept that 
digital media is having profoundly interruptive effects on human 
thinking (which I think Stiegler does, as does Carr, and I find it 
hard to disagree with this), we actually end up having a contra-
dictory understanding of “the human” if we suggest that human 
beings will necessarily be unable to develop new “long circuits” 
that compensate for, and perhaps even extend, the capabilities 
that may be getting pushed aside at the moment. Rather than 
having faith in a deterministic technology that will itself “liber-
ate” us from the problems it causes, and rather than dismissing 
the concerns of writers like Carr and Stiegler and Sherry Turkle 
and many others, this position allows us to imagine cultural and 
cognitive re-inscriptions of digital capabilities that recognize 
that some of what the digital currently pushes away may, in the 
longer run, be things we as a society do not want to abandon.
RS: This sounds as if the problem technology brings with it also 
containsentails the solution and will actually advance humanity 
by pushing to further advance develop its faculty of reason. To 
play the devils advocate(and to employ a different kind of dia-
lectic), wouldn’t it, rather than hoping that certain traditional 
human capabilities are not abandoned but re-inscribed, be excit-
ing to see the loss as the actual win? In 2010 Times-Columnist 
Ben Macintyre compared the hyper-attentive, power-browsing 
disposition of the digerati with the fox in Isaiah Berlin’s essay 
“The Hedgehog and The Fox” (1953) about the two modes of 
thinking. While the hedgehog, Berlin argues, ‘relates everything 
to a single central vision, one system, less or more coherent,’ the 
fox ‘pursues many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory.’ 
Berlin favors the fox, as does Macintyre who praises the Internet 
for turning all of us into foxes because to him – and to a cer-
tain extent also to Berlin – the hedgehog-thinking is totalitarian 
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and fundamentalist. Could we appreciate the loss of deep read-
ing from this perspective? As openness to different, even con-
tradictory information and standpoints and as rejection of any 
new Grand Narrative; the prevalence of the database paradigm 
over narrative.
DG: This is a complex question that I’ve addressed a bit in other 
answers; I certainly hope that something like this is the case. 
But I’m discomfited by the portrayal of “narrative” or what I’ll 
also call “interpretive” knowledge as “traditional” and there-
fore the database as forward-looking or avant-garde, among 
other things. The current “fox” forms are ones promoted by 
commercial power, as a form of political power; they are forms 
that, whatever their tremendous power today, have been present 
in human society from its earliest days. No doubt, “fox” think-
ing and “hedgehog” thinking each have their day; taken to the 
extreme, either one can and will be destructive. But in my life-
time, I cannot remember moments when it seemed so possible, or 
when we saw so many argue, that one side or the other had been 
proven essentially irrelevant to human existence. The desire to 
obliterate one side or the other is to me the mark of burgeoning 
totalitarianism. To take the example clearest to hand: reports 
by a variety of journalists and academics of working conditions 
inside of Google itself do not appear, to me, to paint a picture 
of a robust, rights-respecting, participatory culture. It is not a 
sweatshop or coal mine, and it pays very well, but in many ways 
the work culture of Google looks to me like the kind of totally-
surveilled, conformity-enforcing (in the name of “merit”) work-
place imagined in dystopian films like Gattaca, and the fact that 
many Google employees honestly think they know what is good 
for the rest of society better than society itself does is very trou-
bling. A healthy democratic society needs a variety of strong 
viewpoints in active conversation and even (political) conflict; 
too much of what happens today appears particularly directed 
toward eliminating these fundamental components of what I con-
sider freedom.
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RS: Before the Internet became available for private and com-
mercial use it was administered by the university. Today one has 
the impression the university is no longer on top of development 
in this domain. How should academic institutions have responded 
to the upheaval of new media? How should they become more 
involved today?
DG: Just as a point of fact, I believe universities were among sev-
eral kinds of institutions that administered the Internet. On the 
one hand, referring back to the kind of democratic oversight of 
technological development that I have advocated above, I think 
universities have backed away from this and could and should do 
much more, and that in general it is quite difficult to find criti-
cal questions about digital technology being raised on US uni-
versities today with the same vigor they are raised about other 
cultural practices—although this is absolutely the kind of aware-
ness and thought I try to encourage in my own teaching. On the 
other hand, that lack of criticism means that in another sense 
universities are too involved with computerization—they have, in 
many different ways, become active and often uncritical promot-
ers of the technology industries, and somewhat often even act as 
salespeople for technology products.
Political forces in the US have worked hard to diminish any 
sense of civic or public good (to the extent that this is replaced 
with a kind of “open source” commons, it has become a vitiated 
and atrophied concept, one that is all about making resources 
available to the major information profiteers, like Google). My 
belief is that the Internet should never have been commercial-
ized to the extent it has been, and this is not a matter for univer-
sities alone but for society as a whole. My view is also that higher 
education itself has been so compromised both by the attack on 
public goods and by intrusion of capital into spheres from which 
it was formally barred before, again largely without the consent 
of most of us involved in higher education, that we have been in 
many ways unable to provide the civic, intellectual, political and 
historical contexts that would have been necessary to form an 
adequate response to overwhelming technological change. Even 
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in the 1990s I don’t think most of us imagined in any serious way 
that global capital could so overwhelm nearly every important 
institution of civic and public welfare in society, and it is hard to 
be surprised that academics, who often rightly remain focused 
on their narrow areas of study, were neither prepared nor really 
even in a position to mitigate these changes.
Notes
1. Making airspace available for ‘permissionless in-
novation’, The Technology Liberation Front April 
23, 2013 - http://techliberation.com/2013/04/23/
making-airspace-available-for-permissionless-innovation
2. Terence Blake has done an admirable job translat-
ing the often dense proceedings of this seminar into 
English (http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2012/06/24/
translations-of-bernard-stieglers-seminar).
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Network Societies 2.0: The extension 
of computing into the social and human 
environment
Ulrik Ekman
Ulrik Ekman is well known in the field of digi-
tal studies as editor of the 2013 MIT Press com-
pendium Throughout: Art and Culture Emerging 
with Ubiquitous Computing and co-editor of the 
2015 Routledge anthology Ubiquitous Computing, 
Complexity and Culture. His main research inter-
ests are in the fields of cybernetics and ICT, the 
network society, new media art, critical design and 
aesthetics, as well as recent cultural theory. His 
publications include research articles and chapters 
such as ”Editorial: Interaction Designs for Ubicomp 
Cultures” (Fibreculture 19), “Design as Topology: 
U-City” (Media Art and the Urban Environment; 
Springer 2015), and “Of Transductive Speed – 
Stiegler” (Parallax 13.4). Ulrik Ekman is a trained 
computer scientist who worked for years as a sys-
tems programmer and systems planner before study-
ing in the humanities (languages, the arts, literary 
theory, philosophy, cultural studies). He works now 
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as Associate Professor at the Department of Arts and 
Cultural Studies at the University of Copenhagen.
Ulrik Ekman discusses the (assumed) democratic potential of 
digital technology and social media, the haunting of Turing’s 
ghost, the third wave of computing as its extension into the 
social and human environment and externalization of psycho-
logical individuation in techniques. He talks about the role of 
algorithms as means of personalization and foreclosure, the 
affirmative and subversive energy of surveillance art, the trans-
disciplinary call of media literacy and the ‘interpellative’ aspect 
of participatory culture.
Prelude
Roberto Simanowski: If you could go back in history of new 
media and digital culture in order to prevent something from 
happening or somebody from doing something, what or who 
would it be?
Ulrik Ekman: It would be quite interesting to have been in 
a position to insert some kind of critical wedge in a relatively 
important situation back in the 1930s when Turing came up with 
the model of the computer as a universal machine. This notion 
of a universal machine with the potential to simulate all other 
machines and their programs almost founds and certainly forms 
the context for what can be called “digital media studies” and 
“digital culture.” It has been incredibly influential, first as an 
idea, then as a model and a sort of blueprint, and then not least 
for the making of ever so many real computers. If I wanted to 
make different noise and disturbance here, this is motivated by 
the tensions in Turing’s thought, the tendential idealization of 
the modern computer, as well as by the questions raised by con-
temporary developments in the culture of ubiquitous computing. 
I continue to question the tensions between the finite and the 
infinite, the discrete and the continuous in Turing’s work. One 
cannot but note the tension: all real computers must by necessity 
remain finite and discrete, but in order to take on all computation 
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they must have infinite and continuous memory. A disturbance 
here would almost certainly have deconstructed the ideality so 
as to afford openings of different epistemologies of computation. 
These, or some of these, would be less than universal, perhaps 
general, perhaps particular, perhaps oriented towards the sin-
gularity of computation. Some of them would surely also deviate 
from ideality towards questions of various real embodiments of 
computation in machines.
RS: What would have changed through such a disturbance?
UE: In a sense, my wish to disturb stems from having just one 
apparently simple question in mind: are the computational units 
of current developments in the culture of ubiquitous computing 
still modern computers of which one could say that they are truly 
Turing heirs? If the heuristic idea of ubicomp today is supposed 
to be one of computation qua embodied virtuality in operation, 
if the diagram today is supposed to be a human-oriented, con-
text-aware, and calm computing, and if such a diagram maps out 
in practical concretizations as multitudes of wired and wireless 
computational infrastructures with decentralized distributions 
of sometimes highly specialized units demonstrating mobility 
and ad hoc networking… are we then still talking about modern 
computers? Do you still want to think of the link between a sen-
sor and an actuator in a dynamically connective and mobile net-
work dealing only with the temperatures of 200 square feet in 
a forest or a field as something involving a universal machine? 
So, my wish to make different noise with and against Turing has 
quite a bit to do with seeing a need for a revised set-up of the-
oretical ideas. I also see a need for recognizing another set of 
existing blueprints or diagrams for computation and computers. 
Not least I affirm a need to observe that saying “digital culture” 
today often implies that we are already living with an enormous 
and growing set of real computers that might be becoming dif-
ferent together and have us exist differently, too. I am still not 
done with the intricacies of Turing machines, but perhaps we can 
return to this later.
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Politics and Government
RS: From early on the Internet has been attributed with demo-
cratic value as a new public sphere of radically liberated com-
munication, an update of Habermas’ model of deliberative 
democracy. With the Web 2.0 the promise even increased with 
keywords such as participation and transparency. During the 
last years, however, a critical turn in digital media studies has 
pointed out the perils rather than the promises of the Internet, 
Web 2.0, and mobile media. How do you see this matter?
UE: How can it be that one can come across arguments during 
the 1990s that the ‘information society’ and ‘cyberspace’ are 
more or less inherently ‘democratic,’ that they in and of them-
selves offer a new kind of ‘community’ in a way that earlier social 
and cultural studies had apparently left as an unresolved mat-
ter; and that they give us the kind of ‘public sphere’ presumably 
requested in the wake of the semi-demise of much Frankfurt 
School theoretical work? I am still amazed that critical engage-
ments with these kinds of lines of argument have either tended 
to be too absent or to peter out relatively fast. One of the things 
behind my wish to have been inserted as a critical wedge at some 
relevant point in this broad discursive development is that it 
seems to repeat itself without enough of a difference that makes 
a difference. When we get to the period around 2005, we see 
much the same kind of statements being made, only now it is in 
the main a question of the positive potential versus pitfalls of 
social media, blogging, micro-blogging, and then mobile media.
Of course, it is not that critical efforts are entirely absent 
– I recall self-reflexive efforts in the media and in journalism, 
alongside research articles discussing this critically, and a 
number of reconsiderations of the work of Durkheim, Raymond 
Williams, Habermas, Giddens, Castells, and more. However, 
these efforts were inconclusive, did not lead to any consensus, 
and dwindled away within a five-year period. In the next cycle, 
from 2005 onward, the critical engagement is actually much 
weaker, smaller in scale, and even less influential. Considering 
the demise of the Left, the broad socio-historical developments 
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after 1989, and the impact of liberalisms on globalization pro-
cesses in a broad sense, this is hardly surprising. Nonetheless, 
I would still like to have disturbed this tendential silencing of 
critical or alternative or differential thoughts.
RS: Maybe it was even this, the declared end of Grand Narratives 
and of History, as competition between different socio-political 
models, that made all desire for a better world emigrate into new 
media, hoping technology would save us from post modern and 
post historical frustration.
UE: I think we agree on now being able to identify a certain 
historical and theoretical rupture here. Perhaps you are right 
that some of the perceived losses in this have fueled some of the 
remarkably strong interest in new media as well as science and 
technology studies. It might be an exaggeration, however, to say 
that all desire and all hope emigrated to these fields. Perhaps 
it would be more accurate to say that one finds here a rather 
strong tendency to idealize and emphasize rather one-sidedly 
what appeared to many as the positive potential in these devel-
opments. To my mind this still calls for different critical reevalu-
ations. Today it remains interesting and non-trivial to ask in 
what senses computers, computer science, and cybernetics as 
the discipline of steering and control could be said to afford 
media, mediations, and communicational platforms for ‘democ-
racy,’ ‘community,’ and ‘public spheres.’ Something analogous 
goes for the ethico-political potential of networks, network (dis)
organizations, and network protocols to be ‘democratic,’ ‘social,’ 
and capably open to differentiated debates with a certain rea-
sonableness and egalitarian influence. Network societies, decen-
tralized networks, and the overriding concern with security and 
control of infrastructure and information with a view to survival 
originated not least in post-WWII military-industrial complexes 
alongside a small number of university research centers in the 
Western hemisphere. The numerous ethico-political and socio-
cultural tensions and differences inherent in this have neither 
been resolved nor yet been treated thoroughly and convinc-
ingly in existing research nor in the media, in my opinion. If that 
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were the case, we could not today be witnessing in the media a 
late outcome of the post-9/11 ethico-political coupling in ‘demo-
cratic’ network societies of terror, security, and surveillance. I 
am thinking not just of the quiet acceptance or affirmation of 
the ‘need’ for surveillance by the people in many ‘democratic’ 
nations, nor just of much needed momentary alternate wake-up 
calls like Snowdon’s, but of how disturbingly exceptional it is to 
see influential prime ministers object publicly to foreign intel-
ligence services tapping their cellphones.
RS: If you allude to the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, I 
am less surprised than you that she abstained from serious 
reproaching her ally United States – in contrast for example to 
the Brazilian president Dilma Russeff who used her objection 
against the U.S. to overcome the Vemprarua-turbulence in her 
own country. While in the 1990s, regarding the Internet, the 
government in the Western World experienced itself “at war with 
our own products,” as Klaus Lenk put it in the 1997 edition The 
Governance of Cyberspace, today all governments of the world 
are certainly relieved that the anarchy of the early days has 
morphed into the regulation and control we experience now. 9/11 
is only an excuse for what was already clear after Perry Barlow’s 
1996 Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace: That the 
“Governments of the Industrial World” will not leave alone “the 
new home of mind“ as Barlow describes the cyberspace.
UE: In my earlier remarks my focus was somewhat more limited. 
My attention was on one part of the political axis, notably the 
post-9/11 developments concerning intimate linkages among 
terror, national security, and surveillance – up to and including 
the current operations of the NSA. Today some of the more criti-
cal and heated exchanges among the U.S. and several European 
nations concerning the politics of surveillance appear to have 
worrisome potential outcomes. The messages from Germany, 
France, and others make it clear that the Internet and the 
WWW as we have known them should perhaps not be taken for 
granted. We might see the reappearance of strictly regional and 
not least strictly national politics of informational security and 
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surveillance that will imply so many deconstructions of the very 
idea of a decentralized global network of networks such as the 
Internet. Of course, such politics have always been there, but 
increasingly strong general strictures of this national sort would 
still mean an incredible loss of potential for the development of 
network societies on a global and more cosmopolitan scale. The 
“new home of the mind” that you mention could very well come to 
stay much closer to your physical national territory and its politi-
cal governance.
RS: As for the “new home of mind” these 15 years later, your 
collection of essays Throughout. Art and Culture Emerging with 
Ubiquitous Computing 2013 with MIT Press presents almost 
700 pages with essays by more than 40 leading researchers on 
digital media and cultural theory from a vast array of academic 
fields with quite different perspectives on the promises and per-
ils of computing. What are the most interesting or challenging 
aspects to you about this topic?
UE: During the period we have worked on the book (it started 
in 2008 via a Danish but very internationally oriented research 
network), ubicomp, pervasive computing, ambient intelligence, 
things that think, and the Internet of Things have become much 
more of an empirical fact. Enough so that we have net addresses 
and a net protocol with the capacity to deal with the billions of 
computational units involved, enough so that these major lines 
of development are becoming solid parts of the latest editions of 
the standard textbooks in computer science, hardware engineer-
ing, software development, and HCI. And enough so that a great 
many people in the world are beginning to notice that the ground 
is shifting here and there underneath network societies that now 
begin to move from a phase one to a phase two, expanding and 
intensifying networking problematics along the way.
RS: Can you illustrate this shift to a phase two and the problems 
it contains?
UE: For example, even in a very small country like Denmark 
one finds a handful of research groups at work on ‘pervasive 
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healthcare,’ something whose massive distribution and use of 
smart computational things and wirelessness might well soon 
alter our notion of the home, healthcare, and how to address the 
elderly in nations with a demography tilting in that direction. Or 
consider the first dozen intelligent cities, smart cities, and u-cit-
ies now being built with some kinds of ubicomp capacity from the 
ground up. These are experimental projects in South-East Asia 
mostly, but also factual developments in an epoch with an inten-
sive interest in the development of edge cities, megacities, and 
new kinds of urban regions. But I should still start by stressing 
that on the other side of the initial visions from Mark Weiser and 
his Xerox Parc colleagues along with many others in Europe and 
Asia, multitudes of technical issues remain unresolved. The cul-
tural dimension remains very much more underdeveloped both 
in research and in cultural practices. This is an asymmetry that 
this book is trying to address and change a bit by focusing some-
what more on the cultural and human sides of this.
RS: Ubiquitous computing furthers the information society we 
live in by extending the presentation and processing of informa-
tion beyond computers. The new buzzwords, you already said it, 
are Internet of things or programmable world referring to objects 
that talk to each other and process information even without 
presenting themselves to us. Advocates speak of the swimming 
pool that heats up when it sees there is a Barbecue on the cal-
endar, they project the fridge that automatically restocks, and 
they hope for sensors attached to asthma inhalers mapping their 
usage to communicate areas of risk as part of that ‘pervasive 
healthcare’ you mentioned. Skeptics, on the other side, warn of 
even more loss of privacy as well as of malicious hacks into shop-
ping lists, cars, and pacemakers. How do you see this develop-
ment? Are the perils worth the benefits?
UE: Thank you for your insistence on pressing these issues of 
critical evaluation. I hear more than a faint echo of your last 
question here, so let me return to the interesting and the chal-
lenging, the benefits and the perils… Perhaps there is only one 
issue, perhaps Simondon saw this already. It might be he was 
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right that the organization of complexity is a phylogenetic aim 
which belongs to biological species but finds interesting analo-
gies in the way technical objects and systems exist. The most 
interesting and the most challenging, the benefits and the perils 
are but flip sides of this: ubicomp cultures design complexity and 
this is their frontier. Technically speaking, the passage of time 
and all the repeated design processes make ubicomp objects and 
systems pass through successive modifications. This tends to 
have them develop from more abstract and diagrammatic states 
to more concrete states, something we are approaching today in 
rudimentary ways. The benefit-peril here is that ubicomp sys-
tems are called upon to move from a more or less self-referential 
performance structure (not entirely unlike what you tend to find 
in Turing machines) to one that is hetero-referential.
RS: That means the systems are open to their environments?
UE: Ubicomp systems are precisely not to remain disconnected 
from the context but are to become gradually more contextu-
alized in a process of mutual adaptation of system and context 
or environment. This is a route that leads towards the more 
complex – the solution of complexity is a phylogenetic aim, as 
Simondon liked to say. It is interesting-challenging that adapta-
tion to context is still truly difficult for computational systems, 
and that ‘context’ here tends to mean both the real/virtual envi-
ronment and its human inhabitants. There is a reason for the 
nicknaming of these main lines of development (ubiquitous, per-
vasive, ambient, etc.): they are all taking names to suggest the 
expanded character of computation and computing. So, pressed 
by your questions I would point to these two main sources of ben-
eficial-perilous complexification: context-awareness and adapta-
tion to the anthropos, both of which will demand the production 
and recognition of meaning.
RS: As for the expanded character of computing, this reminds 
me of McLuhan’s take on media as extension of man. Since the 
computer is already such an extension, are we then talking about 
the extension of extension and should we, since McLuhan consid-
ered such an extension at the same time an amputation of human 
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capacity, also talk about the expansion of amputation? With the 
words I used before: What about malfunctions and hacks in com-
plex context-oriented computational systems?
UE: One large part of computing in the expanded field concerns 
such extensions of man. But perhaps your remarks stay a little 
too close to the anthropocentric. For approaching current devel-
opments along this path might often lead to blindness or forget-
ting of the more singularly technical relationalities, including 
those of autonomous agents communicating among themselves 
without any human interception. Naturally, this might be what 
you have in mind when referring to McLuhan’s notion of ampu-
tations of human capacity. To my mind, the use of this term 
would then tend towards a too one-sided and negatively critical 
approach. Moves towards autonomous technical individuations 
also involve inventions of the other that might be less of an ampu-
tation than an augmentation, for technical as well as human sys-
tems. So, amputation is obviously one important dimension in 
this, but only one of them. Something similar goes for malfunc-
tions and hacks. It is obvious that an increase in complexity of 
human and technical systems and their interrelations paves the 
way for what can become an exponential rise in the number of 
malfunctions and possibilities of hacking. Moreover, if the ideas 
of the invisible computer and calm or embedded computing are 
privileged in research and development, malfunctions and hacks 
can become extraordinarily difficult to recognize and counteract 
as such. Nonetheless, all malfunctions and hacks come freighted 
with potentials for invention and positive improvement.
I would like to affirm the initiatives to move towards a human-
oriented computing, and I am excited about the challenges and 
difficulties of having technical and human context-awareness 
co-develop. Still, I am deeply unsettled and disturbed by a range 
of the ethico-political implications in both the visions for this and 
in a range of the kinds of implementation we can already find 
and follow today. It should be obvious reason for concern that the 
ongoing work on new technical infrastructures with something 
like ubicomp processual capacity also means infrastructural 
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and infraprocessual acceptance on a societal level of monitor-
ing, surveillance, tracking and tracing, information gathering to 
a degree and with an intensity we have not yet known. The cul-
tural theoretical uptake and the broader social debate are lag-
ging behind or might be almost missing. But even the engineers 
and system planners know and make explicit that trust, security, 
privacy and the secret, ownership of information, and transpar-
ency remain major issues still to be dealt with. I look forward to 
seeing the development in tandem of the technical systems and 
the sociocultural dimensions to go with and against these.
RS: I completely agree with your notion about the lagging and 
lacking theoretical uptake of the technological development. Let 
me press you a bit more on the new technologies’ ambivalence 
of great opportunities and unwanted but perhaps inevitable con-
sequences in the ethico-political regard. Pervasive computing 
has found its own popular movement in what is known as Self 
Tracking, Quantified Self and Living by Numbers. Of course, the 
pervasive data aggregation in the name of self-knowledge and 
self-optimization facilitates big data mining and helps paving the 
way to pervasive control and algorithmic regulation. Here we 
encounter a problem similar to Simondon’s phylogenetic desire 
for complexity: the desire for knowledge. A major method of gain-
ing knowledge is to measure and survey, which in the age of digi-
tization and datafication leads to a boost of empirical sociology 
beyond the academic field. The flipside of conducting measuring, 
however, is taking measures. No government, no health depart-
ment, no insurance company or credit institute can afford not to 
react – or, better, take preemptive actions – if certain patterns 
and correlations of behavior are established. Knowledge obliges. 
The results are regulations justified by algorithmic analysis 
enforced by ubiquitous computing – unless society decides, for 
ethical reasons, to forbid certain knowledge or its utilization. 
But who would argue against the desire to know?
UE: It is obviously unrealistic, unnecessary, and also to a large 
extent undesirable to argue against a desire to know. Your ques-
tion appears to me to be one respecting the status of the relation 
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between current technics and the political economy of subjecti-
vation and governmentality. This appears to be a question that is 
partly motivated by recent empirical developments, but also one 
posed in a theoretical vein not all that foreign to Deleuze’s short 
text on control societies plus the last parts in his Foucault book, 
the work of the late Foucault, as well as a considerable body of 
sociological and critical theoretical work in recent surveillance 
studies picking up on this heritage. However, the empirical 
developments you mention are still far from being widespread 
and strong enough to be able to claim any kind of sociocultural 
significance. At most they are particular examples, perhaps some 
relatively weak social chains that may have generalizable poten-
tial a bit further down the road. This should itself warn against 
proceeding too fast, against drawing conclusions.
Second, I register a certain vacillation, or actually a slide in 
your question, moving from ‘ambivalence’ through ‘facilitation’ 
to ‘control,’ ‘regulation,’ as well as ‘enforcement’ by ubiquitous 
computing. It appears to me to make quite a difference whether 
you point to an undecidability, to a facilitation of actualizing a 
certain potential, to a normative mode of regulation, to a stron-
ger notion of political control, or to something like a technologi-
cal determinism. I am sure that a number of readers of Foucault 
and Foucauldian work, for example, will immediately recognize 
both the issue of how to distinguish among these and the ongo-
ing difficulty of actually doing so in practice. I think all of these 
are in play in the parts of the history of the present that have to 
do with ubicomp and its enculturation via social and personal 
individuations – except the last one. That is, I do not subscribe 
to the notion of technological determinism that seems to lurk in 
your question.
RS: Your impression is correct. My question aims at the central 
issue in media studies: whether media have their own agenda 
or whether they are just tools serving the demands of people. 
Though I do not follow technological determinism à la Friedrich 
Kittler, I do share McLuhan’s belief that the medium itself 
“shapes and controls the scale and form of human association 
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and action.” However, since we first shape technology and tech-
nology then shapes us, as McLuhan would say, I am especially 
alerted if representatives of a big technology company declare 
that technology is neutral but people are not. For example, this 
was claimed by the former Google-CEO Eric Schmidt and the 
current director of Google Ideas Jared Cohen in their 2013 book 
The New Digital Age. Reshaping the Future of People, Nations, 
and Business. I consider such an objection to technological deter-
minism less a theoretical perspective than a strategic statement, 
a self-serving denial of any responsibility for the social and cul-
tural changes that a mega player on the Internet such as Google 
no doubt brings to society. But you are right, if I slide from ‘facil-
itation’ to ‘control’ I am shifting from the message of the medium 
to the characteristic of social systems: Autopoiesis. I see the 
control and regulation I am addressing with respect to perva-
sive data aggregation as a means of the social system to regu-
late, stabilize, and reproduce itself – as discussed for example 
in Foucauld’s concept of governmentality. Can we expect admin-
istrative and intelligence apparati not to use every technology 
available to improve their work?
UE: This substantiates your question considerably and makes 
it easier to address. We agree that neither human nor technical 
systems and agents are neutral. We are misunderstanding each 
other part of the way since you point towards media and I most 
often address questions of technics prior to discussing media. 
Moreover, however, I think we disagree as regards determinism 
and causation. I do not believe that we first shape technology 
only then to have technology shape us. I think of technics and 
the sociocultural as co-existing and co-developmental, and I tend 
to press this quite far towards a relational ontology, not unlike 
what you find in Simondon and his thought of transduction. This 
means I also very often, but not always, will parenthesize anthro-
pocentrism (something at work also in Simondon’s thought of 
the mode of existence of technical objects). Sometimes I do this 
by insisting that ‘we’ are relating as technological beings and 
entities (Leroi-Gourhan comes to mind), and that distinctions or 
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binary oppositions such as human/machine, culture/technics, 
and lifeworld/system are always already off on the wrong kind of 
track. So, ubicomp is not really the technological Other (capital 
‘O’) for ‘us’ humans but rather how we currently tend to exist and 
live on with technics, how technics exists with humans, among 
other things. To put it a bit provocatively: there is always some-
thing machinic in me that could be made operational, there is 
always something preindividually human in technics that could 
be put into operation.
RS: Agreed that the (technological) Other is somewhat part of 
us, agreed that technology is also the response to and result of 
certain socio-cultural patterns of behavior. However, society is 
not a uniform factor sharing the same values and ideas. We know 
that for example ‘digital natives’ see the issue of transparency 
and privacy quite differently as compared with older genera-
tions. Given that the younger generation is driving the develop-
ment of the new technologies that sooner or later affect all of 
society, the Other may in fact less be a problem of the culture/
technology-opposition than of differences within a culture or 
between cultures within a society respectively.
UE: I think we have less than a disagreement here and more of 
a misunderstanding of terms or conceptual armature. Perhaps 
I have failed to make clear the extensional reach as well as the 
interior character of my notion of technics. The differences 
within a culture and the differences among cultures that you 
gesture towards here always already involve technics and media-
tion, as does your gesture here (and any human gesture). If there 
is not really a culture/technology opposition, in my view, this 
is because human cultures exist technologically. This goes for 
relations concerning interior as well as exterior environments, 
and these involve social and cultural others as well as otherness 
more generally. It could well be that the main part of the mis-
understanding here is due to my attempt to stick with the more 
general problematic of technics. Of course you are quite right to 
point to the need for a finely differentiated analysis of the socio-
cultural values and ideas at stake in the development of current 
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technics and I would be very interested to see this fleshed out in 
future work.
Let me try to get back to your earlier question concerning 
surveillance in an epoch with ubicomp. To my mind the techno-
cultural potential of ubicomp is still undecidable, and there is 
nothing ‘inevitable’ about actualizations of self-surveillance – or, 
for that matter, sousveillance, or inverse surveillance. I do agree 
that an immanentist and critical approach to a history of the 
present is called for, but that still permits me to be at a remove 
not only from a determinism and a control, but also from push-
ing any notion of a normative regulation in one specific and more 
and less worrisome or negative direction. Your question is highly 
relevant and points to pressing concerns. But that does not pro-
hibit me from affirming quite some faith both in a radical democ-
racy and a cosmopolitanism to come and in existing democracies, 
their laws, institutions, and populations. Subjectivation with 
ubicomp, governmentality with ubicomp, -- these are extremely 
interesting questions. Nonetheless, general second-order self-
control and massive, invisible, proactive code-regulation are 
not the only open doors here, nor even the most likely to be or 
stay actualized in the slightly longer run. Certainly they do not 
actualize the best value-systems, nor do they even pave the way 
for the stronger politics of sensation and mediaesthetics, the one 
with a better chance to survive with other means.
Algorithm and Censorship
RS: One buzzword of the present time is „smart things,“ objects 
such as my refrigerator, my coffee cup, and the windows in my 
building, that communicate among each other in order to pro-
cess information that I had to take care of myself earlier. Hence, 
computers not only do more than just computing; they also do it 
with a much wider scope and have become much smaller than 
the computers of the 20th century. How do you see the future 
of computing?
UE: What a truly impossible question! But, in a sense, the impos-
sible invention is the only one of interest, the only invention; so 
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let me try to answer… I could just say to you that smart things 
and ubicomp will largely be the same as modern computing 
because computers are still modern. Or, I could say that ubicomp 
will certainly change modern computing and this decisively 
because smart things and smart materials are smaller, mobile, 
massively distributed, materially and environmentally embed-
ded, wireless, context-aware, and ad hoc connective. But let me 
instead try to move alongside just one such formal and undecid-
able opening.
Actually, we were already moving towards something like 
this very early in our conversation when we discussed Turing’s 
work. Perhaps smart materials, smart things, and ubicomp units 
already have altered the tendency to idealize the modern com-
puter unduly. Even today, though, I am hearing Turing echoes: 
Turing machines are as powerful as real machines; they can 
execute any program that a real computer can; they can simu-
late all other computers, etc. These echoes remain – but perhaps 
they have in fact begun to die out. Smart things certainly remind 
us that real computers need electricity and run into unexpected 
conditions (just a little dust, or a user armed with a bottle of 
Coke). Smart materials have a finite number of configurations, 
have finite internal storage, and they are disturbed by input/
output. Ubicomp systems can only manipulate a finite amount of 
data, remain delimited by processing time concerns, and solicit 
algorithms that are not general and indifferent to the actual lim-
its imposed on memory… Or, inversely, ubiquitous computing 
systems do remind us of their difference from Turing machines 
because they do much more than permit of procedures: they are 
perhaps really good models of a great many important programs 
which assume continuous and unbounded input over time, and 
ongoing computation rather than halting. Perhaps the numerous 
units connecting and collaborating on and off in ubicomp envi-
ronments are different enough to remind us that Turing machines 
should be more continuous and infinite. But that this should take 
place down along the more unpredictable and often complexity-
generating axis of the context: peripherals, I/O, interfaces, and 
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interaction design, meaningful human lives and their kinds of 
context-awareness…
When you are involved in, move through and engage with 
(consciously or, more often, unconsciously) mixed realities with 
multitudes of computational units dynamically organizing and 
disorganizing context-aware and human-oriented mixed real-
ity environments around you, do you then still live with real 
computers reminiscent of Turing machines? If computation is 
increasingly embedded and increasingly becomes a question of 
microscopic MEMS, so that the very form and materiality of your 
cup, the texture of your clothing, the pigment of your wall and 
wallpaper are computational, does that bespeak a modern com-
puter heritage?
My questions are sincere: I cannot decide, you cannot decide. 
At most one can begin to trace margins, cracks, some kind of 
openings that are on the edge of what remains to come in com-
puting, if anything. I do think Turing machines are being mar-
ginally disturbed today. It is not just that they do not model 
continuous I/O and concurrency well, nor that computational 
complexity theory has begun to point out some problematic kinds 
of reductionist assumptions. Rather, new ideals, diagrams, and 
de facto implementations today disturb them. Not a little of this 
could perhaps be seen as a pull towards anthropological, biologi-
cal, chemical, and physical ‘logics’ of computation. I am still with 
Turing’s ghost: I tend to be tempted to ask Turing, not to decide, 
but how he opens up to thinking, diagramming, and living with 
human-computer emergence and the complexity of current tech-
nocultural (dis)organizations.
RS: The notion of living within a computational environment 
instead of with computers as we knew them, is not undisturbing. 
Equally alarming is that smart things may conceal the difference 
that information is said to make, if we don’t realize what infor-
mation all the smart things process, and how. Do we need a new 
theory of information and communication?
UE: The concealment and the invisibility are not in and off 
themselves new – computers are doing this all the time, as they 
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always did. The idealization of becoming more invisible, calm, 
and unobtrusive is perhaps partly new and should be scrutinized 
carefully, with ethico-political issues in mind. However, perhaps 
you are right to point towards the need for a new theory since 
the move towards a human-oriented and human-centered com-
puting might disturb the currently hegemonic theorization.
Would it not have been of interest to disturb the work and 
the outcome of Shannon and Weaver’s work on communication 
theory in the mid- to late 1940s, so that their notions of ‘com-
munication’ and ‘information’ were made to pursue and include 
a few of those dimensions, lines, and points they clearly saw 
and knew about but still bracketed quite resolutely? Material 
machines, embodiment, life, animality, humanity, context, and 
semantics… the purposeful delimitations and reductions of all 
these must necessarily be scrutinized again today, considering 
the development of the third wave of computing and cybernet-
ics. For example, can we stay with their influential work if we 
are to see a human-oriented, context-aware computing engag-
ing dynamically with the more or less meaningful intentions and 
interactions of so many humans?
Naturally, this is a question that has been asked before, by 
Katherine Hayles for example, and so we have seen recent revisi-
tations of the ghosts of Donald McKay’s and Raymond Ruyer’s 
competing theoretical work on information, communication, and 
meaning at the time.
RS: McKay and Ruyer against Shannon and Weaver? What would 
this contribute to a ‘third wave’ of computing?
UE: I am trying to point to the need in a third wave of computing 
for expanded notions of information and communication, notions 
not necessarily formalized as strictly in terms of mathematics 
and statistics as were those of Shannon and Weaver. One of the 
crucial hinges here is the approach to meaning and semantics. In 
my view, a context-aware and human-oriented third wave of com-
puting must be able to deal differently with meaningful informa-
tion and communication than did Shannon and Weaver’s theory. 
Ruyer’s work on living matter and its influence on Simondon, 
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Deleuze, and Guattari are largely forgotten today, as are his 
ideas in La cybernétique et l’origine de l’information. But here 
you actually find an attempt to think cybernetics and informa-
tion in material, biological, and machinic terms, including an 
important role for organic productions of sense or meaning. In 
McKay’s work on information, you do find a part that has to do 
with the value of the probability of its selection, but you also find 
a structural part which is to assure its correct interpretation, a 
semantic aspect to be decided via the changes effected in the 
recipient’s mind. This more subjectively oriented and clearly 
semantic notion of information stayed alive for some time in the 
British school of information theory. But it must have appeared 
too inconsistent and at any rate too difficult to measure math-
ematically, judging from the way in which American cybernetics 
moved on in the 40s.
We never had just one theory of information and communica-
tion – there were always many. There is no doubt that also today 
a large number of researchers are drawing upon notions of infor-
mation and communication that are considerably softer, looser, 
or more fuzzy than those formalized by Shannon and Weaver 
for efficient signal processing. Considering the current devel-
opments in network societies that move towards technical self-
organization, embodied virtuality, and types of systemic context-
awareness that are not just a question of GPS but must operate 
with a certain human semantic and semiotic reach, there are 
many good reasons for other notions of information as well as 
communication. These notions tend to reinscribe some kind of 
human language and cognition, but this often remains implicit or 
tacit in current research, and perhaps it is safe to say that these 
issues remain unresolved and only very partially addressed at 
this point in time.
Still, one can observe at least two common responses to this 
challenge. The first is to shy away, noting on the way that one 
of the seemingly uncircumventable facts is that Shannon and 
Weaver’s theory is the wider and actually works. It has been quite 
exorbitantly successful as regards proving its worth, and today 
it infiltrates practically all communication whose operations and 
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informational messages involve computers. One well-known fur-
ther transdisciplinary move down this axis is Kittler’s insistence, 
dehumanizing to some, that ‘there is no software’ – just the hard-
ware objectification of an informational language. Then informa-
tion works in terms of the probability of materializing certain 
numerical values of two variables: noise-free signal input and 
a separate source of noise… Just as the human subject and its 
agency are a structural function of advanced technical systems, 
one materialization of their statistics.
The second common response is to acknowledge and affirm 
the need today for another set of notions and a new mode of oper-
ation that can meet the call for a human-oriented and context-
aware (smart, intelligent, ambient, pervasive, ubiquitous) com-
puting with semantic and semiotic reach as in existing human 
languages and cognition. However, on the technical side of 
the systems involved this almost always means to go on using 
Shannon and Weaver’s work. Only now one inserts on top of that 
base a higher level theory (program or algorithm) that simulates 
the solution called for. The vast majority of work in hardware 
engineering, network organization, and software development I 
have seen so far takes that kind of layering approach for granted, 
and an abstract, universal mathematical idealism or formalism 
tends to stay intact on top of this. The search for abstract invari-
ants and the simplest, most elegant code or algorithm is still 
altogether hegemonic here.
Perhaps Herbert Simon was right when he argued that com-
plexity often takes the form of hierarchical systems and that 
often one can be quite resolutely pragmatic about reductionism 
and remain with weak notions of emergence and complexity. I 
am not yet convinced, though, that this will altogether do with 
respect to the informational, communicational, semantic and 
semiotic dimensions of context-aware and self-organizing com-
puting and their embodied virtualities of today. In addition, I find 
it interesting that important recent efforts in philosophy and sys-
tems theory can be seen to resist this kind of reductionism, quite 
insistently. Derrida’s way of making cybernetic programs sub-
servient to the trace is one such insistence – an insistence on a 
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moving internal differential complication and complexification of 
human consciousness. Luhmann’s work in social systems theory 
is another interesting example, one that actually echoes clearly 
McKay’s work on information. I am thinking of Luhmann’s argu-
ment to the effect that ‘meaning’ remains the basic concept of 
sociology. On his view, ‘meaning’ is a functional concept, one that 
must be presumed working in order for experience processing to 
be able to decide among different possible states or contents of 
consciousness. What does not get chosen here is not altogether 
eliminated but memorized and in some way kept accessible. For 
Luhmann, this made ‘meaning’ irreducible to ‘information.’ Its 
function is not to eliminate system-relative states of uncertainty 
about the world or environment. It is special and basic… It is not 
just that ‘meaning’ is a selective relationship between system 
and environment, but that it enables both reduction and preser-
vation of complexity…
RS: Let me turn the question of information, meaning, and sys-
tem to the experience of the Internet today. It is a known fact 
that Internet companies use personal data and personalizing 
algorithms to customize the websites they show us, the ads 
they send us, and the information they give us. One metaphor 
to describe the digital media age may therefore be ‘narcissism’ 
which in digital media studies translates to “daily me” (in Cass 
Sunstein’s book Republic.com) or “you-loop” (in Eli Pariser’s book 
Filter Bubble). The fate of Narcissus is well known. The per-
sonal and cultural cost of personalization in digital media is the 
loss of chance encounters, the preclusion of the unfamiliar, the 
removal of diversity and of what we are not (yet). The algorithm 
is the censor people more or less approve of and even desire. 
This becomes problematic once people are addressed not as 
consumers but as citizens expected to be open to others instead 
of cocooned in their bubble. Hence, personalization, driven by 
economic force, is political. Hence, are the actual policy makers 
in the digital media age those who program ego-loops, inadver-
tently undermining the foundation of a democratic society? Or 
is the alert regarding personalization hyperbolic and rather the 
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clandestine update and comeback of the claim of critical theory 
that the cultural industry impedes citizens’ release from their 
self-incurred tutelage?
UE: There is not all that much metaphorical about the narcis-
sistic plane in this development – it is in a sense quite literal and 
real coding, something which makes your question all the more 
relevant. But I also have to admit that I tend to find this to have a 
more double face. I agree that in certain ways the corporations, 
the programmers, and the web designers deploying codes and 
algorithms are most often asymmetrically favored in medial as 
well as politico-economic terms, at least on obviously corporate 
sites. However, even though this most often goes for blogging 
and social media as well, here such asymmetries can be reversed 
to a certain extent, mostly on the medium-specific and communi-
cational planes. Personalization becomes interactive in the other 
direction as well, and sometimes it becomes a genuinely social 
affair, so that Internet mediation also becomes socialized rather 
than just having people become ‘personalized’ and normatively 
‘socialized’ by the web medium.
Algorithms exist on many planes in this, and altogether gen-
erally speaking I still find them to carry individual and social 
affordance-potential as well as potential for what you call ‘cen-
sorship’ plus loops and foreclosure (perhaps rather strong terms 
in a great many cases and contexts). I agree that the study of the 
role and status of algorithms and code is gradually becoming a 
much more pressing concern in contemporary network societies. 
I am truly glad to have seen a first little series of initiatives dur-
ing the last five years or so to establish culture-oriented soft-
ware studies as a legitimate sub-discipline. This is far too new a 
development that one can estimate its reach or outcome, but I am 
very glad to affirm it.
Let me return to your question. I think you are, much like 
Stiegler for instance, perhaps a little too worried and too criti-
cally disposed with respect to the socio-political and personal 
implications here. The tendencies with respect to normative per-
sonalization and socialization you are diagnosing are, of course, 
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very recognizable to me and to many others. I do have critical 
questions here, but perhaps my focus tends to be on narcissistic 
processes other than the corporate normative overdetermination 
by algorithmic coding that you have singled out here.
RS: OK, let us come back to the myth of Narcissus that somehow 
also is about media literacy. The reason Narcissus dies is, accord-
ing to one of the many sources, that he does not know that still 
water functions as a mirror and that he has no concept of a mir-
ror. As a consequence, he falls in love with his own beauty after 
he just rejected the love of Echo who is doomed to only repeat 
the last words she heard, i.e. be a sonic mirror instead of a visual 
one. Thus, Narcissus’ tragedy is actually that he was not content 
with being confined to himself. He was narcissistic against his 
own will and good. How is the situation with digital media?
UE: This myth is open to a great many readings and rewritings, 
including yours, and perhaps that is why it is so insistently with 
us today still. However, the speculum and the mirror stage are 
now surely somewhat differently externalized, not least via con-
temporary technics and their digital media platforms. Here I am 
particularly interested in the more insidious movements directed 
at using available algorithmic environments as the medium for 
potential self-surveillance, self-coding, and self-control. Most 
often this happens privately or in social silence, and it is usu-
ally not articulated or conceptualized as such. But quite fre-
quently, especially the last five years in many countries, you find 
this turning into an explicit process of attempted medial self-
presentation on coded and coding planes. Let me give you just 
one rather sharply delimited example: contemporary male and 
female self-portraits in the semi-nude, captured with a cellphone 
camera in a bathroom with a mirror, subsequently uploaded to 
a social media site. These you can today find on the Web in the 
hundreds, if not thousands. They solicit mediaesthetic analysis 
because they undertake partially experimental remediations and 
re-aestheticizations of the self-portrait as painting (van Eyck, 
Dürer, Michelangelo, Rembrandt…) and as photo (Brady, Nadar, 
Rimbaud, Eakins, Muybridge… Woodman, Sherman…). They 
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typically draw upon hypermediation rather than the mirrorings 
in early painting, and they differ from photos taken in a mirror 
or taken with a camera held in front of oneself. They are rather 
to be approached as a new type of explicit staging of the cell-
phone and the mirror and the social media site as the technical 
apparati for narcissistic processes. More importantly, I find here 
an expressive explicitation of the hastily increasing import of 
technics with mobile and social media-intimacy. This is becom-
ing much more important for performative attempts at self-affec-
tive, self-sensing, and self-perceiving identity-formation.
Art and Aesthetics
RS: You give a great example of how new technology creates a 
new genre of aesthetic expression. It may be premature to call 
these bathroom-mirror-self-portraits art. However, it leads to the 
question of how technology and reflection relate to each other: 
Is art (or aesthetic expression for that matter) that is based on 
technology and draws attention to its procedures, also inevitably 
an act of reflection or education?
UE: Let me give you just one kind of example: urban software 
art involving surveillance in mixed realities. Urban software art 
most often draws upon programmers’ competencies and hence 
remains a relative rarity. However, it follows a curve not unlike 
that of digital literacy and has begun to permeate cities in net-
work societies. Like these, software art is now concerned with 
a third wave of cybernetics and its developments of ubiquitous 
or pervasive computing. Urban software art arrives in a multi-
plicity of variants. One of the more interesting is making itself 
felt at and as the critical edge of the surveillance programs and 
tracking systems already operating as augmentations of the 
public sphere.
At the Goethe Institute in Toronto you could be subjected to 
David Rokeby’s Sorting Daemon installation, along with its dis-
play of so many finely differentiated profilings of other people on 
the street. In the contemporary urban environment of a South-
East Asian megaregion, in the agglomerated global economic 
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command and control center of Tokyo, you might encounter 
Christian Moeller’s media art project Nosy. You then accompany 
its robotic surveillance camera bitmapping what it captures onto 
three nearby towers. On Trafalgquar Square in London, an old 
European cultural city center, you might engage with Rafael 
Lozano-Hemmer’s Under Scan project. You and others gather 
with its interactive video portraits and become embedded in an 
advanced tracking and projection system. In a North American 
suburban sprawl like L.A., you could step into Electroland’s 
Enteractive street level project. You move with its embedded sen-
sors and actuators, its bright LED and video displays of human 
movements. At the Barbican in London you might well engage 
in Rider Spoke, one of Blast Theory’s projects in pervasive gam-
ing. You, your bike, and your handheld computer begin to help 
co-author an urban mixed reality drama of hide and seek, invis-
ibility and visibility.
Most of the time and in most of these places you will not be 
conscious of the myriad software processes and wired or wire-
less movements of the third wave of computing. Today they 
nevertheless operate with enough complex mediatory ubiquity-
effects to subtly influence your notion of reality. Software art 
projects tend to make this influence a bit less subtle. Global 
urbanization increases its complexity, undergoing extension 
as well as intensification. In most urban situations and events 
the operations of mainframes, servers, traffic and communica-
tion systems, personal computers, tablets, smartphones, and not 
least new variants of out-of-the-box computing with networks 
of sensors and actuators remain so many infrastructural invis-
ibilities. Urban software and surveillance art projects, however, 
most often leave them less than unremarkable. They become 
more than the silently present mediaesthetic contexts of the city 
qua site, polis, and community.
RS: Tracking software art as a means of addressing the 
ongoing but hardly noticed surveillance processes? In my 2008 
book Digitale Medien in der Erlebnisgesellschaft. Kultur – Kunst 
– Utopie (Digital Media in the Society of Event: Culture, Art, 
Utopia), I devoted an extra chapter to the issue of digital art and 
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surveillance, with respect also to Rokeby’s installations Taken 
and Seen. I was not criticizing Rokeby and others (Simon Biggs, 
Scott Snibbe) for employing surveillance. However, I was won-
dering to what extent such art also serves as a kind of beautifica-
tion of and adaption to the culture of surveillance.
UE: To be sure, since they are partaking of a global market, a 
porous formation of states and regions, a set of post-industrial 
urban cultures, and not least cybernetics as a science of control 
and steering, such software art projects cannot but embrace 
surveillance. They do so as part of a spectacle of interactiv-
ity that appears organized to be superficial, distracting, entic-
ing, and deceptive. It is all too likely that such art projects will 
remain ‘merely’ playful celebrations of branded products, part 
and parcel of leisure time consumption. Only now the spectacle 
includes individual, social, and ethico-political neutralization 
via a certain second-order surveillance and a competent over-
coding of urban software code. However, perhaps this type of 
software art includes more. Dramatizing contemporary surveil-
lance complexes is already an unusual feat, as are the interactive 
movements across limits of programmed urban screening and its 
visibility. Besides, there are efforts here to deconstruct the dis-
tinction between the everyday urban culture for the coded many 
(low) and the culture of systems design and programming for the 
elect (high) at work on coding control societies. So, such soft-
ware art is on its way towards decoding 20th Century central-
ized state surveillance and its disciplinary panoptic spectacle for 
the modern city. It is decoding, coding, and recoding some parts 
of the more open system of control societies with their processes 
of free-floating soft modulations of coded dividuals on the move 
in the networks of the contemporary city.
However, it also touches upon another potential: critical 
edges immanent to software design and programming. A mixed 
reality pervasive gaming project such as Blast Theory’s I’d Hide 
You is well on its way to have tracking processes become more: 
they involve technical implementation of bio-capacities such as 
synergy and emergence. Dynamic and mutual streaming video 
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surveillance among a set of online players and a set of street 
players trying to obey an apparently simple rule: film other play-
ers without being filmed. This kind of programming with and 
for live play suffices to have inventions of the other arrive. You 
could say that this project morphogenetically and differentially 
constructs live an urban mixed reality to come and thus always 
already functions as a kind of city laboratory. It is an immanent 
urban transcendence qua a model mechanism or a set of dynami-
cally superimposed maps of relations of urban forces internal to 
the concrete aggregates that will operationalize these relations. 
Such software art projects are in contact with a virtuality con-
tinuum so as to move towards a technical and human self-orga-
nization and emergence of mixed urban realities with tracking. 
They are not just giving rise to the coding of complexes and the 
complicated in surveillance. They have produced codings, recod-
ings, and decodings of ‘live’ surveillant complexities. They are 
live and moving in the uncoded and the codable city. They are on 
the move as an entire differential series of diagrams qua embod-
ied thought-experiments in which a simile of the being of the city 
to emerge may be glimpsed.
Media Literacy
RS: I agree with your observation of insufficient public discus-
sion of the surveillance and privacy issue. I wonder, though, 
to what extent I need to understand programming in order to 
understand the “Real Privacy Problem” discussed from a cul-
tural studies perspective like Evgeny Morozov’s, to be found in 
his article of the same title in MIT Technology Review in October 
2013. Sure, a technological issue can’t be understood without 
technological insights. On the other hand, especially the mat-
ters of surveillance and privacy suggest the reason for the defi-
cient discussion is not inadequate information but poor interest. 
This poor interest, it seems, is caused not primarily by the lack 
of understanding programming but by ignorance with respect to 
the cultural and ethical ramifications of technology.
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UE: I hope that it has already become clear that I affirm, sub-
scribe to, and also practice a quite transdisciplinary mode of 
work in a broad technocultural field. This means that I value and 
find necessary the kinds of insights provided by cultural studies, 
sociology, philosophy, semiotics, and critical theory, for exam-
ple. It also means that I value and find necessary the insights 
stemming from computer science, human-computer interaction, 
interaction design, science and technology studies, media and 
communication studies. Such a transdisciplinary mode of work 
comes along with several obvious pitfalls and problems, includ-
ing the great many disciplinary incompatibilities and the impos-
sibility for any one person to master all this in any kind of real 
depth. However, it also affords a set of transversal movements, 
some of which I find to be lacking or underdeveloped in current 
research that very often pays its dues to hyper specialization in 
one or at most two fields or disciplines. I think this will simply 
not do with respect to the development we are discussing here 
– it remains a transdisciplinary project inching towards complex-
ity all along. The corporations and their senior system planners 
know this all too well, and that is why we tend to see research 
groups composed of hardware engineers, programmers, anthro-
pologists, psychologists, interaction designers, graphic design-
ers, linguists, philosophers, etc. In the universities we are almost 
always just lagging behind, but that does not really change or 
remove the call for such a mode of operation.
All this means I work with a multiplicity of approaches and so 
consider it a little difficult to say what has primacy, what is the 
originary source of the problems with seeing to a more extended, 
well-informed, and critically reflexive discussion of surveillance 
and privacy. You are right, however, that I may tend to bring into 
play some of the disciplines in which I have had the more train-
ing – in this case computer science and software development. 
Of course this is not all or enough, but I still think that quite a 
case can be made for the need to see more of this in areas such 
as cultural studies and ‘digital humanities.’ For a great many 
people ignorance, lack of information, blind trust, indifference, 
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powerlessness and more are all at play here, and this makes it 
difficult to approach.
My main reason for ongoing questioning down along the tech-
nical axis is the lack of information and the lack of rights plus 
capacity to do something about insight and ownership. This is 
very often due to the blockings of transparency via the extended 
use of hierarchies of privilege and access -- in technics generally, 
in intelligence and security, as well as in the political economy 
of information. Specifically, I find it a quite intolerable terror 
and tyranny that ubicomp projects are pursued with no or far too 
little misgivings, qualms, or scruples as to their systemic invis-
ibility, inaccessibility, and their embedded ‘surveillance’ that 
will have no problems reaching right through your home, your 
mail, your phone, your clothes, your body posture and tempera-
ture, your face and emotional expressivity, your hearing aid, and 
your pacemaker.
The lack of information can very well be addressed from sev-
eral angles. Programming is one good vantage point. Insight 
respecting hardware architectures and the cultural dimension is 
another. Treatment of interaction designs and their ramifications 
is yet another. Critical design approaches to digital media stud-
ies would be welcome. Generally, I welcome all these moves into 
deliberation, and even the overload ensuing, for this is already 
something quite different from taking for granted that informa-
tional invisibility, unawareness, inaccessibility, and expropria-
tion is our code.
RS: Let us push the “terror and tyranny” of ubicomp projects a 
bit further. In a Wired article on the Programmable World (issue 
21.06) Bill Wasik writes that once connected things become 
ubiquitous the world of everyday objects will be transformed 
“into a designable environment, a playground for coders and 
engineers.” Since in a ubiquitous programmed world if-then-rela-
tionships are the “blood” of the system, the article also foresees 
a profitable market of if-then-apps. The result may be that we 
outsource the if-then-decision of our daily lives to the cultural 
standards of programmers and the commercial considerations of 
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the app-industry. How would you approach this issue in a semi-
nar on the social and philosophical implications of technologi-
cal progress?
UE: Let me be somewhat blunt and provocative. When you press 
the light switch in your living room, the engineers, the designers, 
and the companies dealing with electrical systems have been out 
there for a long time profiting from your everyday cultural tac-
tics and all the strategies relating to the use of electricity (lights 
turned on and off in this case). Your if-then decisions and the cul-
tural standards with which you live have been technically, prac-
tically, economically, and politically pre-programmed in part by 
the strategies of industry, commerce, consensus re safety stan-
dards, political decisions as to infrastructure, etc. It is a real rar-
ity today, however, to encounter strong sociopolitical criticism of 
technological ‘progress’ qua electricity and its implications, even 
though it remains possible and is perhaps becoming gradually 
more called for in view of our need to be differently concerned 
about energy, the environment, climate, and sustainability. Since 
you most often remain happily oblivious to the great many elec-
trical strategies immanent to your everyday culture and form of 
life, why is it that a smart ubicomp environment should solicit a 
critically well-informed seminar on its social and philosophical 
implications?
RS: Maybe because in a smart ubicomp environment we even 
give up the experience of pressing the light switch which, until 
now, at least reminds us of the implicit if-then-structure of 
this device.
UE: No doubt you are right. Presumably something different 
must be at stake, something that does make such a critical sem-
inar warranted. I would certainly agree, but I would then add 
that perhaps it is not altogether easy to demonstrate that this 
is a difference in kind rather than one of degree. For instance, 
both kinds of technological ‘progress’ depend on energy qua 
electricity, and they both depend on negotiating a human cul-
tural habituation to a certain set of affordances, some kind of 
technical envelope or a curtain of technical objects (to echo 
178 Interview 5
Leroi-Gourhan for a second). Still, I think one would be right to 
stay with the question.
Generally speaking I think the insistence on sensing a dif-
ference of import here derives from the drive towards solutions 
of complexity, as we talked about earlier. You have a sense that 
somehow a smart ubicomp environment is a far more complex 
affair than a light switch and electrical wiring and therefore 
perhaps more socially worrisome or politically more difficult to 
affirm. If so, the question would become one of thinking, and 
then evaluating, what is meant by ‘more complex.’ We evidently 
have multitudes of relata and relations in both cases, and the 
interactions among the relata are not altogether trivial, so in 
both cases we have good mereological questions.  We also have 
in both cases quite some concern respecting complex topologies 
and temporalities, structural as well as functional complexity. 
However, something must be urging us to think that smart ubi-
comp environments do not permit of reductions of complexity 
as easily and do insist on further internal complication on our 
side. Is this just a matter of the fate of all inventions of the other 
(psyche and/or techné), all new phenomena to which we have not 
yet become habituated? I think you would be right to press the 
issue a bit further than that…
Actually, in order to fast-forward this some, we could note 
that we have recent and closely related precedents of this dis-
cussion. For instance, I remember being both surprised and 
interested to read a short, early text by Manovich treating of 
interactivity – in part unusual due to the explicit ethico-political 
engagement, in part due to its display of an affective plane with 
a mixture of fear, anger, and humor. I read this text on ‘totalitar-
ian interactivity’ perhaps ten years ago, I think, a bit stunned by 
his analysis of new media art installations as representatives of 
a relatively advanced form of audience manipulation. Certainly, 
my attention was caught when he claimed that the spectator-
subject-interactant is here placed in a structure reminiscent of 
a psychological laboratory or a high-tech torture chamber – the 
kind you might imagine yourself finding in the CIA or KGB.
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Perhaps it is a little too easy to shrug this off as hyperbole 
and let its apparent exaggerations reside with the author’s pro-
jections -- stemming from a certain pre-1989 period and a certain 
sociopolitical background proper to the Eastern Bloc. Perhaps 
this treatment of the interactivity of new media art actually 
deserves more and other than that, and it may well point towards 
the question of complexification we are trying to address. For 
Manovich saw in this an updated version of Althusser’s Marxist 
socio-political concept of ‘interpellation,’ or the way in which ide-
ology as embodied in major institutions and discourses always 
already constitutes subjects’ identities by ‘hailing’ them in social 
interactions. Manovich made a series of observations remark-
ably similar to your question: engaging with interactive media 
art installations we are asked to follow pre-programmed, objec-
tively existing associations – we are asked to mistake the struc-
ture of somebody else’s mind for our own. According to him, this 
could be said to form a quite fitting kind of identity-formation 
for the information age. No longer so much that of early or late 
industrial society, being asked to identify with somebody else’s 
body image (lifestyle, fashion, physical appearance). Rather that 
of a later epoch, one of cognitive labor: being asked to identify 
with somebody else’s mind.
RS: The difference, though, would be that in an interactive 
art installation you are prompted to reflect on the interaction 
imposed on you (because the grammar of interaction presented 
is offered up for negotiation), while the application in an Internet 
of things-system does not aim at discussion but pragmatism and 
rather expects you to just follow the if-then-logic proposed.
UE: I am happy to agree that some interactive art installa-
tions offer such promptings, but this is not always the case, 
and besides, human interactants’ behaviors often demonstrate 
quite some differences so that even explicit promptings may 
be ignored or turned into something else. Analogous remarks 
should be made with respect to interactive ubicomp systems 
and the Internet of Things: in some cases interactants are made 
very conscious of the implications of being in this context for 
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interactivity and may have the chance to opt out; in other cases 
the interaction design and the system remain altogether calm, 
embedded, and invisible to humans as a technocultural infra-
structure that must be taken for granted. Of course, we also 
have a whole series of shades of gray here, ranging from almost 
prompting human awareness (obtrusive ambience) to almost not 
doing so (vague ambience).
My point here, though, is that already with the Internet, mid-
90s new media, and the first set of notions of interactivity we had 
the uncanny sense of coming together with technics, software, 
and interaction designs demonstrating a certain complexity. We 
have externalized modes of psychological and social individua-
tions in technics; we are reimplanting these individually and 
socially, often (not always) without noticing this consciously or 
discussing it with others, often (not always) without making a 
difference that makes a difference ourselves.
More specifically, then, smart ubicomp environments would 
be uncannily complex in ways not entirely unlike this. Perhaps 
they are getting a good deal closer to the uncanny – insofar as 
they reach solutions of complexity qua externalizations of traits 
and processes we tend to associate with the human. The tech-
nical developers of such environments are ideally aiming at 
self-adapting and proactive systems with a context-awareness 
capable of dealing more or less intelligently with a wide range 
of human behavior, interaction, motivation, and intention. Again, 
we are extraordinarily far from seeing anything like this real-
ized. Even so, it should already today be relatively obvious to 
many of us that we have begun to engage with systems that pro-
file our identities in incredible informational detail. We are inter-
acting with systems that register our whereabouts, activities, 
and objects or property. They recognize our physical appearance 
and ways of moving, our ethnic and national belongings, our 
facial expression and gestures. They register movement, pres-
sure, wind, humidity, temperature, light, sound, radio waves, and 
they may alter our environment and its ambience or mood. And 
they may begin to make themselves felt, make themselves heard, 
display themselves, and speak to us.
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RS: The argument that we are far from seeing anything like this 
realized may not appease those old enough to have seen what 
seemed to be fiction turned into a profitable product. The fact 
that already today systems profile our identities and determine 
the patterns of our actions is not comforting either. On the 
contrary, wouldn’t it be naïve to assume that in a profitable if-
then-app-market the individual keeps a say against all the well 
thought through if-then-solutions? I guess the issue is again one 
of technical determinism and individual choice. Let me illustrate 
my concern by switching from Manovich to Morozov who, in his 
new book on Technological Solutionisms  (2013), gives the exam-
ple of a smart kitchen that scientists at Kyoto Sangyo University 
work on: “the Japanese researchers have mounted cameras 
and projectors on the kitchen’s ceiling so that they can proj-
ect instructions – in the form of arrows, geometric shapes, and 
speech bubbles guiding the cook through each step – right onto 
the ingredients. Thus, if you are about to cut a fish, the system 
will project a virtual knife and mark where exactly that it ought 
to cut into the fish’s body.“ Of course we still can neglect what 
the smart kitchen utters about cutting fish and follow the advice 
we got from our grandma. However, how much talk will there be 
with grandmas and other relatives or friends about fish and simi-
lar important things in life if well paid professionals know it all 
better and do not hesitate to tell us?
UE: I think we will have no trouble agreeing that it matters how 
our lifeworld exists technologically, how it is programmed, and 
what interaction designs are made operational in its mixed reali-
ties. We do seem to differ with respect to the priority granted in 
the relation of technics and culture, machinic and human system. 
Here I insist on mutual implication and co-development prior to 
any clear and strict asymmetries in favor of either technologi-
cal determinism or free human orchestration. Interestingly, in 
this example concerning the smart kitchen my angle of approach 
appears to permit of more of a role for human and cultural 
agency than yours, although that is only one of the stakes.
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Let me reiterate that this broad tendential development is 
happening most often in piecemeal fashion. This allows me to 
point out that my worry is partially different from yours and 
concerns the reach towards an ideal of living intelligence. We 
have yet to see more integrated systems at play in any one such 
smart environment. But the fact that things are moving in that 
direction might alert us to that goal of smart organization and 
not least smart self-organization. To the best of my knowledge no 
existing systems are self-adaptive, proactive, or genuinely self- 
and other-generative. In fact they are almost all of them annoy-
ingly stupid rather than intelligent and smart (depending on how 
you wish to define these two terms). They malfunction and crash. 
They miss the point more often than not. They have any num-
ber of unintended and not exactly felicitous side-effects. But this 
should nonetheless still be enough to suggest that the tendential 
pull in R&D is vaguely reminiscent of some of the things also 
addressed earlier in AI and AL initiatives. Here it concerns a 
specific pull towards externalization of a considerable bundle of 
‘human’ traits and processes, then a pull towards a more genu-
ine co-development of human culture and technics.
If you are facing an artifactual mixed-reality ubicomp envi-
ronment with such complexity, we should perhaps be discussing 
issues that remain different (in degree) from those associated 
with the light switch (even though this has agency too, as sci-
ence and technology studies and actor-network theory like to 
remind us). Socially you are now also interacting with systems 
qua a multitude of dynamic mixed-reality quasi-personalities 
and quasi-socialities. Technically: as both Weiser and most engi-
neers of software and hardware knew only too well, complex 
embedded systems without good interfaces are notoriously hard 
to maintain and repair – since it is hard even for the engineers 
to figure out what is wrong, what is working correctly but has 
really undesirable side-effects, etc. Ethically, definitions of 
human values plus mindbody schemes for individual and social 
identity formations are at stake, most often invisibly and tacitly, 
and most often without any right to database access, control, or 
deletion of so-called personal information. Economically, such 
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an environment is truly excellent as regards supporting fur-
ther development of experience and transformation economies. 
Technics may well help here with fine-grained registration over 
time of your profile -- on planes of affect, sensation, emotion, and 
perception – only then to engage you every so often prior to your 
conscious understanding and deliberation. Politically, individu-
als and social groupings most often remain powerless and unin-
formed about the ‘humanoid’ systems with which they interact. 
The concretization of the vision for billions and billions of compu-
tational units with mobility, context-awareness, and ad hoc net-
working connectivity on the micro- or molecular scale will have 
left modern notions of ‘privacy’ and the ‘secret’ far behind, just 
as it makes ‘surveillance’ a completely insufficient and mislead-
ing concept or term. It makes a kindergarten exercise of Huxley 
and Orwell’s fictions, and even of the technical capacity of most 
existing intelligence services as we have known them.
If you have not sensed this already, I am extending the worst-
case scenarios well into the incredible. We are very far indeed 
from seeing this happen, for any number of good reasons down 
along each one of these axes. And the complexity of the human, 
the animal, biological life forms include quite some good barri-
ers and unknown membranes still for science and technics, com-
puting included. I do have serious reservations, however, and 
these do run along lines somewhat similar to what I have just 
mentioned. At the same time, I will go on looking forward to fur-
ther work on a human-oriented ubicomp environment. In all like-
lihood it has a lot to teach us about our relation to the environ-
ment, our sense of the world, and about our relation to ourselves 
and others. Every now and then I tend to try think of technics as 
our extended immune system. With ubicomp culture in mind I am 
again reminded how aggressively mastery-minded and appropri-
ative this system is most of the time and in most of its processes. 
I am also reminded how often it displays processes that are obvi-
ously belonging to auto-immunity. I am almost always reminded 
how far our co-development with technics is from sustainability.
InteRvIew 6
Enslaved by digital technology
Mihai Nadin
Mihai Nadin is a scholar and researcher in electrical 
engineering, computer science, aesthetics, semiotics, 
human-computer interaction, computational design, 
post-industrial society, and anticipatory systems. 
He developed several computer-aided educational 
aids prior to the widespread use of the Internet and 
was one of the first proponents in the United States 
of integrating computers in education. Nadin inves-
tigates in several publications the implication of the 
digital paradigm and discusses in depth the new 
civilization resulting from it in his 1997 book, The 
Civilization of Illiteracy. Mihai Nadin holds advanced 
degrees in Electrical Engineering and Computer 
Science and a post-doctoral degree in Philosophy, 
Logic and the Theory of Science; he has served as 
Endowed Professor at the University of Texas at 
Dallas since 2004.
Mihai Nadin sees the human condition at stake in the Gold Rush 
obsession of digital technology entrepreneurs; he considers big 
data the ‘ultimate surrender to the technology of brute force’ 
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and the age of information ‘by definition an age of total transpar-
ency.’ He detects a new Faustian deal where Faust trades better 
judgment for perfect calculation; he unmasks social media as the 
‘background for conformity’ and revolutionary technology as the 
underlying foundation of the ruling economic system.
Prelude
Roberto Simanowski: What is your favored neologism of digital 
media culture and why?
Mihai Nadin: “Followed”/“Follower:” It fully expresses how the 
past overtook the present. “Crowd” anything: self-delusional slo-
gans for the daisy brain.
RS: If you could go back in the history of new media and digital 
culture in order to prevent something from happening or some-
body from doing something, what or who would it be?
MN: I would eliminate any word that starts with “hyper” and 
“super,” and every scoring facility. Alternatively, I would prevent 
Bill Gates from developing DOS, and Apple from giving up on its 
language (the IOS7 cries out as an example of failing to live up to 
the company’s foundations). Yes, I would eliminate Term Coord, 
the European Union’s attempt to standardize terminology.
More important: I would establish a framework for reciprocal 
responsibility. No company should be immunized against liabil-
ity procedures. If your product causes damage due to sloppy 
design, insufficient testing, perpetuation of known defects, 
you are liable. Forget the legal disclaimers that protect disrup-
tive technologies that disrupt our lives. And no user should be 
allowed to further the disruption. A simple analogy: Carmakers 
are liable for anything that systematically leads to accidents; 
drivers are liable for using cars irresponsibly. Does the analogy 
of the technology of the industrial age extend to that of the digi-
tal age? On an ethical level, of course. Innovation does not legiti-
mize discarding ethics.
RS: What comes to mind if you hear “Digital Media Studies”?
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MN: Opportunism. The unwillingness to think about a totally 
different age.
RS: If you were a minister of education, what would you do about 
media literacy?
MN: I would introduce “Literacies” (corresponding to all senses 
and to cognitive abilities) as the ubiquitous foundation of every-
one’s education. “Vive la différence” would be the common 
denominator.
Politics and Government
RS: While in the 1990s Internet pioneers such as John Perry 
Barlow declared the independence of Cyberspace from the gov-
ernments of the old world, now it seems people hope for govern-
ments to protect privacy online and to intervene in the taking-
over and commercialization of the Internet by huge corporations 
such as Google and Facebook?
MN: Pioneers are always mercenaries. Of course, to open a new 
path is a daring act—so much can go wrong. There is a lot of 
romanticism in what the Internet forerunners were saying. Most 
of the time, their words were far louder than their accomplish-
ments were meaningful or significant. Declaring the Internet as 
an expression of independence from the government when you 
are actually captive to DARPA is comical at best. MILNET (split 
from ARPANet), further morphed into classified and non-clas-
sified Internet Protocol Router Networks, should have warned 
us all about what we will eventually surrender. Was Minitel 
(France, 1978) better? It offered little functionality, and was not 
dependent on the private data of its users. DOS—the operating 
system that even in our days underlies the world of PCs (since 
1981)—was adopted without any consideration for the integrity 
of the individual. Apple stole from Xerox something that, even 
today, the company does not fully understand. But Xerox does 
data management in our days (it took over the tollways in Texas), 
and Apple sells music and whatnot—sometimes in collusion with 
publishers. You have to keep the competition vigilant. In the 
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early years, everybody was in a hurry. This was the second com-
ing of the California Gold Rush in which college dropouts found 
opportunity. Indeed, in no university, nobody—academic or not—
knew enough about the future that the pioneers were promising 
to turn into paradise on Earth. When the blind lead the blind, 
you will never know when you arrive, because you really don’t 
know where you are going.
RS: This is a strong, devastating statement: The pioneers of digi-
tal media and culture as mercenaries, comics, thieves, dropouts, 
and blind persons without ideas and beliefs?
MN: Without idealizing the past or demonizing the beginners, 
let’s take note of the fact that Lullus understood that with new 
means of expression we can better understand the universe. And 
we can ask more interesting questions about the human being 
and its own understanding of the world. Pascal would not miss 
the value of feelings in the human perception of reality, and in the 
attempt to subject it to calculations. Leibniz, with whose name 
computation is associated, would seek no less than a universal 
language for making possible, for example, the understanding of 
history from a perspective of accomplishments. He was not inter-
ested in translating Chinese philosophy word-by-word. He was 
interested in ideas. (If you want to ask “What’s that?”—i.e., what 
are “ideas”—this interview is not for you!)
College dropouts should not be vilified, but also not idealized. 
It helps to start something free of the constraints of cultural con-
ventions. It does not help to realize that what is at stake is not a 
circuit board, a communication protocol, or a new piece of soft-
ware, but the human condition. The spectacular success of those 
whom we associate with the beginnings lies in monetizing oppor-
tunities. They found gold! The spectacular failure lies in the 
emergence of individuals who accept a level of dependence on 
technology that is pitiful. This dependence explains why, instead 
of liberating the human being, digital technology has enslaved 
everyone—including those who might never touch a keyboard or 
look at a monitor. To complain about the lack of privacy is at best 
disingenuous. Those who rushed into the digital age gave it up! 
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In Web 2.0, profits were made not by producing anything, but in 
profiling everyone. The nouvelle vague activism of our days is a 
mantra for legitimizing new profitable transactions, not a form 
of resistance. If everyone really cared for their rights, we would 
have them back. All that everyone really wants is a bigger piece 
of the pie (while starting the nth diet).
RS: I am not sure about the diet but I completely agree that the 
implications of digital culture also affect those staying away 
from digital media, if such staying away is possible at all. But 
how guilty are those giving up privacy, their own and as a con-
cept in general, by rushing into the digital age? Considering 
the conviction from the McLuhan camp that first we shape our 
tools and afterwards our tools shape us and that any medium 
has the power to impose its own assumptions on the unwary, 
I wonder how deliberate the acceptance of the new media’s 
assumptions are. Hand in hand with the human being’s unwari-
ness goes triumph as homo faber, which Hans Jonas, in his book 
The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the 
Technological Age, calls the human fatality. We are entrapped by 
our success, Jonas states, in respect to the human’s belief in tech-
nology. Our power over nature has become self-acting and made 
man into a “compulsive executer of his capacity.” What would be 
required now is a power over that power. Did we really expect 
Gold Rush entrepreneurs to develop this kind of self-discipline?
MN: The echo chamber metaphor was used so far mainly to 
describe politics. It simply says that feedback of a narcissistic 
nature reinforces prejudices. Under Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and cur-
rent Islamic extremism, masses tend towards hysterics. Self-
induced delusions and political idolatry are twins. Does it look 
any different within the objective, rational domain of science 
and technology?
The expectation of objectivity is sometimes rewarded: there 
are scientific and technological developments of authentic nov-
elty. But let’s be clear: revolution means to turn things around, 
full circle, and in this respect, the information age is such a 
development. Technologically, this is a time of amazement. 
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Conceptually, it is rather the reinvention of the wheel in digital 
format. For a long time, no new idea has percolated. The inno-
vators aligned themselves with those in power and those with 
money. When the profit potential of the typewriter—the front 
end of IBM computers in the attempt to be free of perforated 
cards—was exhausted, word processing emerged. The X-acto 
knife gave way to the cut-and-paste procedure. It was not a new 
way of thinking, but rather a continuation of old patterns.
I am deeply convinced that computation (not only in its digi-
tal format) will eventually open up new opportunities and break 
from the past. The self-discipline in your question—how to keep 
a lid on the obsession with profit at any price—should actually 
become the determination to give free rein to creativity. Under 
the pressure of profit-making, there is no authentic freedom. In 
the echo chamber of science, celebration of one adopted perspec-
tive—the deterministic machine—leads to the automatic rejec-
tion of any alternative.
RS: Big Data is the buzzword of our time and the title of many 
articles and books, such as Big Data: A Revolution That Will 
Transform How We Live by Viktor Meyer-Schönberger and 
Kenneth Cukler (2013). The embracing response to the digitiza-
tion and datafication of everything is Data Love, as the 2011 title 
of the conference series NEXT reads, which informs the business 
world about ‘how the consumer on the Internet will be evolving.’ 
It is a well-known fact that big data mining undermines privacy. 
Is, however, that love mutual, given the acceptance and even 
cooperation of most of the people?
MN: Big data represents the ultimate surrender to the technol-
ogy of brute force. Wars are big data endeavors, so are the eco-
nomic wars, not to mention the obsession with power and total 
control of the so-called “free individual.” Whether we like it or 
not, “information society” remains the closest description of the 
age of computers, networks, smartphones, sensors, and every-
thing else that shapes life and work today. We are leaving behind 
huge amounts of data—some significant, some insignificant. 
Babbage’s machine, like the first recording devices, like the 
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abacus and so many pneumatic and hydraulic contraptions, are 
of documentary importance. I am sure that if entrepreneurs of 
our days could find any value in them, they would not hesitate 
to make them their own and add them to the IP portfolio of their 
new ventures. What cannot be monetized is the human condition 
expressed in such previous accomplishments. You cannot resus-
citate Babbage or Peirce, except maybe for some Hollywood pro-
duction or some new game.
Data becomes information only when it is associated with 
meaning. However, our age is one of unreflected data genera-
tion, not one of quest for meaning. Data production (“Give me 
the numbers!”) is the new religion. Politics, economics, and 
science are all reduced to data production. Ownership of data 
replaced ownership of land, tools, and machines. Human interac-
tion is also reduced to data production: what we buy, where we 
buy, whom we talk to, for how long, how often, etc. The Internet 
as the conduit for data is boring and deceiving. This is not what 
Vinton Cerf, to whose name the global transmission protocol 
TCP/IP is attached, had in mind. Instead of becoming a medium 
for interaction, the Internet got stuck in the model of pipes (sew-
age pipes, oil pipes, water pipes, and gas distribution pipes) and 
pumps (servers being engines that pump data from one place to 
another). Berners-Lee’s world-wide web made it easier to become 
part of the network: the browser is the peephole through which 
anyone can peek and everyone’s eyeballs become a commodity. 
Great pronouncements will not change this reality more than 
radical criticism (sometimes, I confess, a bit exaggerated). But 
we should at least know what we are referring to.
By the way: creative work—of artists, scientists, craftsmen 
(and women)—takes place on account of sparse data. Survival is 
a matter of minimal data, but of relevant information.
RS: Again, your account is quite radical and disillusioning, 
though not unjustified. In response, let me ask to what extent 
the browser reduces people to commodified eyeballs. Hasn’t the 
Internet (or the Web 2.0) rather turned every viewer and listener 
into a potential sender thus weaving a network of “wreaders,” 
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as George P. Landow termed the reader-authors in hypertext 
in 1994, or “prosumers,” as the corresponding Web 2.0 con-
cept reads? Isn’t this the spread of the microphone, to allude to 
Bertolt Brecht’s demand in his radio essays 85 years ago? Isn’t 
this dogma of interaction the actual problem?
MN: In the evolution from centralized computing (the “big iron” 
of the not so remote past) to workstations, to client server archi-
tecture, to the Cloud (real-time) re-centralization, we have not 
come close to establishing the premise for a human knowledge 
project. “The knowledge economy” is a slogan more than any-
thing else. Computation made possible the replacement of living 
knowledge by automated procedures. However, most of the time, 
computation has remained in its syntax-dominated infancy. On a 
few occasions, it started to expand into the semantic space: con-
sider the diligent work of the ontology engineers. The time for 
reaching the pragmatic level of authentic interactions has not yet 
come. The ontology engineers do not even realize that there is 
such a dimension. If and when it comes, we will end the infancy 
stage of computation. “Eyeballs” are not for interaction in mean-
ingful activities, but rather for enticing consumers. Interaction 
engages more than what we see.
RS: One basic tool of data accumulation and mining is Google, 
which through every search query not only learns more about 
what people want and how society works, but also centralizes 
and controls knowledge through projects such as Google Books. 
How do you see this development?
MN: There is no tragedy in digitizing all the world’s books, or 
making a library of all music, all movies, etc. After all, we want 
to gain access to them. This is their reason for being: to be read, 
listened to, experienced. The tragedy begins when the only rea-
son for doing so is to monetize our desire to know and to do some-
thing with that knowledge. I remember shaking hands with that 
young fellow to whom Terry Winograd introduced me (May 1999). 
Larry Page was totally enthusiastic upon hearing from me about 
something called “semiotics.” At that time (let me repeat, 1999) 
none of my friends knew what Google was, and even less how it 
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worked. They knew of Mosaic (later Netscape Navigator), of the 
browser wars, even of AltaVista, Gopher, and Lycos (some sur-
vived until recently). Today, none can avoid “Googling.” (Lucky 
us, we don’t have to “Yahoo!”) The act of searching is the begin-
ning of pragmatics. Yes, we search in the first place because 
we want to do something (not only find quotes). Pragmatics is 
“doing” something, and in the process recruiting resources 
related to the purpose pursued. Larry Page is one of the many 
billionaires who deserve to be celebrated for opening new ave-
nues through searches that are based on the intuitive notion that 
convergence (of interest) can be used in order to find out what is 
relevant.  But nobody will tell him—as no one will tell Raymond 
Kurzweil—that the real challenge has yet to be addressed: to 
provide the pragmatic dimension.
The fact that Google “knows” when the flu season starts 
(check out searches related to flu) is good. But if you used this 
knowledge only for selling ads, you miss the opportunity to trig-
ger meaningful activities. Seeking life everlasting is not really 
a Google endeavor. It is a passion for which many people (some 
smart, some half-witted) are willing to spend part of their for-
tunes. They can do what they want with their money. Period! 
But maybe somebody should tell them that it makes more sense 
to initiate a course of action focused on the betterment of the 
human condition. Or at least (if betterment sounds too socialist) 
for more awareness, for a higher sense of responsibility. Properly 
conceived, Facebook (or any of the many similar attempts) 
could have been one possible learning environment, way better 
adapted to education than the new fashionable MOOCs [mas-
sive open online courses]. Instead, it is an agent of a new form of 
addiction and human debasement.
Algorithms and Censorship
RS: Speaking of Facebook, here and in any social network where 
the amount of views, likes, and comments is counted the cul-
tural consequence of computation seems to be comparison and 
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ranking. Has communication shifted from ambiguous words to 
the excitement of who or what wins the competition?
MN: “Scoring” is the American obsession of the rather insecure 
beginnings projected upon the whole world. In the meaningless 
universe of scoring, your phone call with a provider is followed 
by the automatic message eliciting a score: “How did we do?” 
Less than 2% of users fall into the trap. The vast majority scores 
only when the experience was extremely bad—and way too often, 
it is bad. This is one example of how, in the age of communica-
tion (telling someone how to improve, for example), there is no 
communication: the score data is machine processed. The best 
we can do when we want to achieve something is to talk to a 
machine. The one-way only channels have replaced the two-way 
dialog that was meant to be the great opportunity of the digi-
tal age. We don’t want to pay for talking with a human being. In 
reality, we don’t want to pay for anything. As the scale expands, 
everything becomes cheap, but nothing has become really bet-
ter. To speak about influence in social media, for example, is to 
be self-delusional. Scoring is not only inconsequential, but also 
meaningless.
Indeed, in this broad context, the human condition changes 
to the extent that the notion of responsibility vanishes. 
Consequences associated with our direct acts and decisions are 
by now projected at the end of a long chain of subsequent steps. 
At best, we only trigger processes: “Let’s warm up a frozen 
pizza.” You press a button; the rest is no longer your doing in any 
form or shape. More than ever before has the human being been 
rendered a captive receiver under the promise of being empow-
ered. The variety of offerings has expanded to the extent that, 
instead of informed choices, we are left with the randomness 
of the instant. As a matter of fact, the “living” in the living is 
neutralized. The age of machines is making us behave more like 
machines than machines themselves. The excitement and energy 
of anticipation are replaced by quasi-instinctual reactions. By no 
means do I like to suggest an image of the end of humanity, or 
of humanness. There is so much to this age of information that 
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one can only expect and predict the better. For the better to hap-
pen, we should realize that dependence on technology is not the 
same as empowerment through technology. The secular “Church 
of Computation” (as yet another Church of Machines) is at best 
an expression of ignorance. If you experience quantum compu-
tation, genetic computation, intelligent agents, or massive neu-
ral networks, you realize how limiting the deterministic view of 
the Turing machine is. And you learn something else: There is a 
price to everything we want or feel entitled to.
RS: During the debate of the NSA scandal in summer 2013, 
Evgeny Morozov titled an essay in the German newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung The Price of Hypocrisy, holding 
that not only the secret service or the government undermines 
the privacy of the citizen, but the citizens themselves by par-
ticipating in information consumerism. Morozov points to the 
Internet of things that will require even more private informa-
tion in order to work, i.e., to facilitate and automate processes in 
everyday life that until now we had to take upon ourselves. The 
price for this kind of extension of man’s brain is its deteriora-
tion through the loss of use. On the other hand, some claim that 
if the swimming pool heats up automatically after discovering a 
BBQ scheduled in our calendar, our brains are freed up for more 
important things.
MN: Yes, we want to automate everything—under the illusion 
that this will free us from being responsible for our own lives. 
For those shocked by the revelation that there is no privacy on 
the Internet of data, I can only say: This is a good measure of 
your level of ignorance, and acceptance of a condition in which 
we surrender to the system. Walk into Taste Tea in San Francisco, 
where the credit card app “Square” registers your iPhone pres-
ence and logs into your account. This is not government intru-
sion, but the convenience of automated payment. We cannot have 
it both ways—privacy and no privacy at all. Fundamentally, the 
age of information is by definition an age of total transparency. 
That Internet imaginaire that some pioneers crowed about—it 
will make us all more creative, freer than ever, more concerned 
Mihai Nadin 195
about each other—was only in their heads. And not even there. 
The “innocents” were already in bed with the government—and 
with the big money.
It is not the government that betrayed the Internet. The “inno-
cents” volunteered back doors as they became the world’s larg-
est contracting workforce for spy agencies. The hotness IQ rank-
ing for university studies in our days (cybersecurity, anyone? 
data-mining?) reflects the situation described above: “Follow the 
money!” Total transparency is difficult. A new human condition 
that accepts total transparency will not miraculously emerge, 
neither in San Francisco, nor in India, China, or Singapore. 
Government will have to be transparent. Who is prepared for 
this giant step? The government could make it clear: We observe 
you all (and they do, regardless of whether they make it known 
or not). Those hiding something will try to outsmart the system. 
The rest will probably be entitled to ask the Government: Since 
you are keeping track of everything, why not provide a service? 
My files are lost, you have them, provide help when I need it. We 
pay for being observed, why not get something in return?
RS: Lets talk more about automated decisions and vanishing 
responsibility that is a central topic of your work during the last 
decade. In your article “Antecapere ergo sum: what price knowl-
edge” you foresee a rather bleak future in which responsibility 
is transferred from humans to machines by calculation and algo-
rithmic datamining. You also speak of a new Faustian deal where 
Faust conjures the Universal Computer: “I am willing to give up 
better Judgment for the Calculation that will make the future the 
present of all my wishes and desires fulfilled.” How do anticipa-
tion, computation, Goethe’s Faust and Descartes’ ergo sum relate 
to each other?
MN: In order to understand the profound consequences of the 
Information Revolution, one has to juxtapose the characteris-
tics of previous pragmatic frameworks. I did this in my book, 
The Civilization of Illiteracy (a work begun in 1981 and published 
in 1997), available for free download on the Internet. There are 
books that age fast (almost before publication); others that age 
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well, and others waiting for reality to catch up. Look at the cover 
of my book. I conceived that image as part of the book in 1996/97: 
something that might remind you of Google books and of what 
many years later became the iPad. The image from the Vatican 
Library is indicative of what my book describes in detail: that is, 
make available the libraries of the world to everyone.
This book is more than ever the book of our time. I don’t 
want to rehash ideas from the book, but I’d like to make as many 
people as possible aware of the fact that we are transitioning 
from a pragmatics of centralism, hierarchy, sequentiality, and 
linearity to a framework in which configuration, distribution, 
parallelism, and non-linearity become necessary. The theocracy 
of determinism (cause¬effect) gives way to non-determinism 
(cause¬effect¬cause). It is not an easy process because, for a 
long time we (in western civilization, at least) have been shaped 
by views of a deterministic nature.
To understand the transition, we must get our hands dirty in 
pulling things apart—pretty much like children trying to figure 
out how toys work. Well, some of those toys are no longer the 
cars and trains that my generation broke to pieces, convinced 
that what made them run was hidden down there, in the screws 
and gears forming part of their physical makeup. Search engines, 
algorithms, and rankings—the new toys of our time—are only 
epiphenomenal aspects. At this moment, nobody can stop people 
from Googling (or from tearing apart the code behind Google), 
and even less from believing that what the search comes up with 
is what they are looking for.
We rarely, if ever, learn from the success of a bigger machine, 
a larger database, a more functional robot, or a more engaging 
game. We usually learn from breakdowns. It is in this respect 
that any medium becomes social to the extent that it is “social-
ized.” The so-called “social media” are top-down phenomena. 
None is the outcome of social phenomena characteristic of what 
we know as “revolutions” (scientific, technological, political, 
economic, etc.). They are the victory of “We can” over “What do 
we want?” or “Why?” And as usual, I go for questions instead of 
appropriating the slogans of others.
Mihai Nadin 197
RS: As a remark on how we capitulate to our capabilities: During 
the anti-NSA protests in summer 2013, somebody presented 
a poster stating “Yes we scan.” This of course alluded to the 
famous slogan in Obama’s election campaign, articulating dis-
appointment in the new president and perhaps also calling for a 
new movement. Read together, both slogans symbolize the deter-
minism at least of this technological part of society: We scan 
because we can.
MN: Without accepting even a hint of a dark plot, we need to 
understand what is called “social media” as an outcome of the 
transaction economy. It was embodied in, among other things, 
new businesses. Uber and Lyft disrupt taxi services; airbnb and 
HomeAway disrupt the hotel business. The disruption had many 
dimensions, for instance, efficiency but also ethics. In the trans-
action economy ethics is most of the time compromised. The 
transaction economy replaces the industrial model, even the 
post-industrial model. To stick to the toy metaphor: Someone 
decided that we are all entitled to our little cars, fire engines, 
and trucks. We get them because they are deemed good for us. 
And before we even start being curious, the next batch replaces 
what we just started to examine. It is no longer our time, as 
inquisitive children, that counts. Others prescribe the rhythm for 
our inquisitive instincts. And for this they redistribute wealth. 
In rich and poor countries, phones are given away. You need to 
keep the automated machines busy. Money is not made on the 
phones but on the transmission of data. This is a new age in the 
evolution of humankind. Its definitory entity is the transaction, 
carried out with the expectation of faster cycles of change, but 
not because we are smarter and less inert; rather because our 
existence depends on consuming more of everything, even if that 
means sacrificing integrity.
The faster things move around, the faster the cycle of pro-
ducing for the sake of consumption. Each cycle is motivated by 
profit-making. The huge server farms—the toys of those con-
trolling our economic or political identity—are really not at all 
different from the financial transaction engines. Nothing is 
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produced. A continuous wager on the most primitive instincts is 
all that happens. Thousands of followers post sexually explicit 
messages and invitations to mob activity; they trade in gossip 
and selling illusions. Ignorance sells better and more easily than 
anything else. Not only copper bracelets, cheap Viagra, diet pills, 
and everything else that succeeds in a large-scale market. If you 
Google, you first get what those who have paid for it want you to 
see, sometimes to the detriment of other (maybe better) options. 
Fake crowds are engineered for those living in the delusion of 
crowd sourcing.
The transaction economy, with all its high-risk speculation, 
is the brain-child of Silicon Valley. San Francisco is far more 
powerful than Washington DC, New York, and even Hollywood. 
Chamat Palihapitiya put it bluntly: We’re in this really interest-
ing shift. The center of power is here, make no mistake. I think 
we’ve known it now for probably four or five years. But it’s 
becoming excruciatingly, obviously clear to everyone else that 
where value is created is no longer in New York, it’s no longer 
in Washington, it’s no longer in LA. It’s in San Francisco and the 
Bay Area. (Palihapitiya is one among many bigwigs going public 
on such a subject.)
RS: Speaking of the replacement of Hollywood by Silicon Valley, 
Adorno once accused the culture industry of liberating people 
from thinking as negation, as addressing the status quo. Being 
busy learning the status quo, i.e., finding out how all the new 
toys work—politically upgraded and camouflaged by euphemis-
tic concepts such as “social” and “interactive”—seems to be a 
clever strategy to achieve the same result. Your new book, Are 
You Stupid? describes stupidity as the outcome of a system fak-
ing change because it is afraid of it. Who rules that system? Who 
is behind that strategy?
MN: Let us be very clear: the revolutionary technology that was 
seen as liberating in so many ways actually became the underly-
ing foundation of the transaction economy. Never before has the 
public been forced into the rental economy model as much as the 
digital revolution has done. You no longer own what you buy, but 
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rent the usage, to be screwed by the “landlord” (who makes more 
money by selling your identity than by providing you with a via-
ble product). And even that is not straightforward. It has become 
impossible to connect to the Internet without being forced into 
a new version or a new patch. It has all gone so far that to buy a 
cell phone means to become captive to a provider. In the USA, a 
law had to be promulgated in order to allow a person to unlock 
“your” phone! (Remember: this is the age of the rent economy, of 
transactions not production.) Profits have grown exponentially; 
service never lives up to promises made and to the shamelessly 
high prices charged. In this context, social media has become 
not an opportunity for diversity and resistance, but rather a 
background for conformity. Once upon a time, within the office 
model, it was not unusual that women working together noticed 
that their menstrual periods synchronized. Check out the 
“Friends” on various social media: They now all “think” the same 
way, or have the same opinion. That is, they align to fashion and 
trends, they have their “period” synchronized. All at the lowest 
common denominator.
In making reference to such aspects of the “social” media, 
I might sound more critical than their investors would prefer. 
But as long as we continue to idealize a technology of disen-
franchisement and impotence, we will not overcome the limita-
tions of obsession with data to the detriment of information. The 
toy train reduced to meaningless pieces entirely lost its mean-
ing. Remember trying to make it move as it did before curiosity 
took the better of it? Information eventually grew from playing 
with toys: the realization that things belong together, that the 
wheel has a special function, etc. Given the fact that in the digi-
tal embodiment knowledge is actually hidden, replaced by data, 
the human condition that results is one of dependence. There is 
no citizenry in the obsession with the newest gadget, bought on 
credit and discarded as soon as the next version makes the head-
lines. The Netizen that we dreamed of is more a sucker than an 
agent of change.
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RS: The discussion of stupidity in the light of new technology 
associates Nicholas Carr’s 2008 article Is Google making us stu-
pid? and brings up the question to what extent a search engine 
leaves the time to inquiring and acquire (or take apart and play 
with) knowledge. How do you see the role that search engines 
such as Google play in society?
MN: In everything individuals do, they influence the world—and 
are influenced by the world. Within an authentic democracy, this 
is an authentic two-way street: you elect and you can be elected. 
Google, or any other search engine for that matter, reflects the 
skewed relation between individuals and reality. Some own more 
than the other(s). This ownership is not just economic. It can 
take many other forms. If you search for the same word on vari-
ous sites and at various times, the return will be different. In the 
naïve phase of data searching, way back in the 90s of the last 
century, relevance counted most. In the transaction economy, 
search itself is monetized: many businesses offer SEO [search 
engine optimization] functions. It pays to “find” data associated 
with higher rewards. Such rewards are advertisement, political 
recognition, technical ability, etc. In other words, through the 
search, a cognitive economic, political, etc. reality is engineered 
as the “engine” forces the searcher to receive it.
Of course, social media relies on search engines, because 
instead of empowering participants, it engineers the nature of 
their relations. This remark is not meant to demonize anyone. 
Rather, it is to establish the fact that in post-industrial capital-
ism, profit-making is accelerated as a condition for economic 
success. Those who do not keep up with the speed of fast trans-
actions turn into the stories of wasted venture capital and failed 
start-ups. The cemetery of failed attempts to work for the com-
mon good is rarely visited. America, but to a certain extent 
Germany, England, and France, sucks up talent from the rest of 
the world, instead of rethinking education for the new context of 
life and work in the information society. When the world learned 
about the worrisome depth at which privacy was emptied of any 
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meaning, by government and business, it was difficult to distin-
guish between admiration and uproar.
The fascinating Silicon Valley ecology deserves better than 
unreserved admiration. It is time to debunk the mythology of 
self-made millionaires and billionaires—and even more the aura 
of foundations à la Gates, which are mostly self-serving. America 
has encouraged the rush to the new gold not because it loves 
the new science and technology, but rather because it recog-
nized new forms of profit-making. Unfortunately, the human con-
dition associated with the information society continues to be 
ignored. At the scale at which profits are multiplying, crime is 
also multiplying.
The more recent wars that the USA has carried on are not pos-
sible without computers and the technology developed for wag-
ing them. Moreover, the profoundly dangerous undermining of 
democracy through vast surveillance of citizens is also the prod-
uct of digital know-how bordering on the infamous. Computer 
science programs in many universities are nothing but training 
facilities for businesses at taxpayer expense. Research is very 
often a service to the military and the intelligence community, 
not an avenue towards new science, and even less an expression 
of ethical responsibility for the long-term consequences of new 
technologies. We teach the young and less young of our nation 
(and of other nations) the violence of games, and then wonder 
why America is the world champion in crime.
Media Literacy
RS: Let me come back to your book The Civilization of Illiteracy 
where you depict a civilization unfolding in which media comple-
ment literacy, and literacy—the way it is conceptualized in the 
Gutenberg Galaxy—is undermined by new literacies demanded 
and developed by digital technology. The general tone of the 
book is one of excitement and the invitation to be ready for the 
new challenges. Your answers in this interview so far indicate 
that this has changed.
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MN: Fifteen years after The Civilization of Illiteracy was pub-
lished (and almost 30 years since I started writing it), I can-
not be more optimistic than I was at the time it was published. 
I already mentioned that I am convinced that it is the book of 
our time: new developments are still catching up with some of 
its predictions. It is an 890-page book, which I thought would be 
the last book of the civilization of literacy. I do not see anything 
terrifying in the reality that the human condition changes. It is 
not a curse, but a blessing. Corresponding to the new pragmatic 
framework, we are all experiencing the need to adapt more rap-
idly, and sometimes to trade depth for breadth. We do not have 
enough courage to discard everything that is still based on the 
structure of the previous pragmatic framework. The program 
in which I teach just built a new arts and technology teaching 
and learning facility: the same factory model; the same central-
ized, hierarchic structure. In reality, such a building should 
not have been erected. On the one hand, there are the big pro-
nouncements regarding the state of science and technology; on 
the other, captivity to the past. Conflict does not scare me. I see 
in conflict the possibility of an authentic revolution in educa-
tion and in many other societal activities. What scares me is the 
deeply ingrained conformity to the medieval model of teaching 
and learning. And the demagoguery associated with monetizing 
all there is. The Faustian trade-off is skewed: I will give you the 
illusion of eternity in exchange for your abdicating your desire to 
discover what it means to live.
RS: How do you see this Faustian trade-off (coming) in place? 
Are you talking about the computational, digital turn in 
the Humanities?
MN: A recent book on Digital Humanities (Anne Burdick, Johann 
Drucker, Peter Lunenfeld, Todd Presner, Jeffrey Schnapp, MIT 
Press 2012) claims that ‘Digital Humanities is born of the encoun-
ter between traditional humanities and computational methods.’ 
Of course ‘recent’ does not qualify as ‘significant.’ We learn from 
the text (and the comments it triggered) that ‘Digital Humanities 
is a generative practice,’ and that it ‘contributes to the “screen 
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culture”’ of the 21st century. But we do not gain access to the 
questions of the human condition. We learn about design, but not 
from an informed perspective of the activity, rather on account 
of a reactive process of design that lacks a visionary dimension. 
McLuhan is quoted (again, the echo chamber metaphor is quite 
well illustrated in the tone of the writing); so are John Berger, 
Scott McCloud (on comics), and even Charles and Ray Eames. In 
respect to computation, the discourse is even more muddled. The 
words are often right; missing is the deeper understanding of the 
dynamics of human existence and activity. The applied aspect 
made the book a good candidate for adoption—and explains why 
it was funded: it promotes a notion of humanity congruent with 
that of technology.
In reality, “Humanities” is the expression of resistance. Those 
involved in humanities probe the science and technology instead 
of automatically accepting them. These remarks should not be 
construed as a book review. I use the book as an opportunity to 
recognize those honestly interested in understanding what is 
happening in our days, but also to point out that the endeavor is 
complicated by the fact that we are part of the process. You don’t 
have insight into the earthquake that reshapes the landscape. 
The hype over big data is of the same nature as the hype over the 
digital (sic!) humanities. Humanities—i.e., the many disciplines 
that fit under this heading—is rushing into a territory of meth-
ods and perspectives defined for purposes different from those 
of the humanities. To give up the long view for the immediacy 
of results is not a good trade-off. I am amused by those great 
“humanists” who seek out programmers for testing their own 
ideas. Smiling, we bid farewell to the past (some might recognize 
behind this formulation an author who saw part of this coming).
RS: Let me bring in another aspect of this. Computation—or 
algorithmic reading—has been a tool of research in the humani-
ties for some time. Digital Humanities aims at the application 
of digital processes and resources for text and image analy-
sis, large data mining, and data visualization. The rationale 
behind it: Machines are better in processing data than humans. 
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However, the reading that algorithms carry out is “distant” in 
contrast to the close reading by humans. Your comment to Digital 
Humanities above is quite straight and critical. In the same 
spirit you state in your article “Reassessing the Foundations of 
Semiotics:” Quantity does not automatically lead to improved 
comprehension. The challenging semiotic project is, as you con-
tinue, not only to find information in big data, but also meaning 
in information. What do you expect from Digital Humanities in 
terms of reassessed semiotics?
MN: The great assumption is that there is a universal machine: 
the Turing machine. This assumption has led to the spread of the 
most insidious forms of determinism. Algorithmic computation 
became the magic formula for fighting disease, making art, and 
building rockets. It is forgotten that Turing defined only a spe-
cific form of automated mathematics. Universities, as centers of 
inquiry, were only too happy to replace the thinking of previous 
ages with the inquiry associated with virtual machines. They 
housed the big mainframe machines. Everything became Turing 
computational, and at the same time, as circular as the under-
lying premise. If you can describe an activity—that is, if you 
have an algorithm—algorithmic computation would perform that 
particular operation as many times as you wished, and in every 
place where that operation is involved. As long as the focus is on 
algorithmic descriptions, computation is assumed to be univer-
sal. Indeed, the arithmetic behind selling tomatoes in a market 
or exploring the moon became the same.
It turns out that quite a number of problems—the most inter-
esting ones, actually—are not algorithmic. Protein folding, 
essential in living processes, is one example. So is computer 
graphics, involving interactive elements. Furthermore, adap-
tive processes can not be described through algorithmic rules. 
More important, anticipatory processes refuse to fit into neat 
algorithmic schemes. At the time when I advanced the notion 
that the computer is a semiotic engine, my enthusiasm was way 
ahead of my ability to understand that the so-called universal 
machine is actually one of many others. Today we know of DNA 
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programming, neural network computation, machine learning 
(including deep learning), and membrane computation, some 
equivalent to a Turing machine, some not.
We are not yet fully aware that the knowledge domain cov-
ered by the universal computation model (the Turing machine) is 
relatively small. We are less aware of the fact that specific forms 
of computation are at work in the expression of the complexity 
characteristic of the living. The university is still “married” to 
the deterministic model of computation because that’s where the 
money is. If you want to control individuals, determinism is what 
you want to instill in everything: machines, people, groups. Once 
upon a time, the university contributed to a good understand-
ing of the networks. Today, it only delivers the trades-people for 
all those start-ups that shape the human condition through their 
disruptive technologies way more than universities do. Working 
on a new foundation for semiotics, I am inclined to see semiot-
ics as foundational for the information age. But that is a differ-
ent subject. If and when my work is done, I would gladly con-
tinue the dialog.
InteRvIew 7
Self-monitoring and corporate interests
Nick Montfort
Nick Montfort develops computational poetry and 
art, is a frequent collaborator at the intersection of 
digital media and literature and associate profes-
sor of digital media at MIT, where he has served 
as faculty adviser for the Electronic Literature 
Organization. He is the coeditor of The New Media 
Reader (2003) and The Electronic Literature 
Collection 1 (2006) as well as the author of Twisty 
Little Passages: An Approach to Interactive Fiction 
(2003) and Exploratory Programming for the Arts and 
Humanities (2016).
Nick Montfort ponders about the fate of buzzwords in the his-
tory of digital media, praises the Internet for supporting intellec-
tual advancement, and does not expect a for-profit organization 
such as Google to serve the intellectual community or nonprofit 
organization. He addresses self-monitoring systems as corporate 
monitoring systems, he assumes authorship over a text resulting 
from a program he wrote including legal responsibility in case 
this text incited a riot, and he doesn’t fear the quantitative turn 
of Digital Humanities but hopes for a “digital media DH”.
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Prelude
Roberto Simanowski: What is your favored neologism of digital 
media culture and why?
Nick Montfort: “Blog” is a pretty good one that works well as a 
noun and verb and describes a non-proprietary, user-controlled, 
system for a new sort of writing. Remember blogs? But I think 
one of the most telling neologisms is “ghay” (or “ghey”), which is 
an intentional misspelling of the word “gay” originally developed 
to circumvent lexical filters and allow people (boys and young 
men) to insult one another in a homophobic manner. This term’s 
existence shows how negativity, including that based on identity, 
persists in online cultures, even if ‘on the Internet, no one knows 
you’re a dog,’ even though new groups of people are connected 
by computing, and even though we built systems to try to block 
disparaging forms of speech. It appears not only because people 
want to use a particular slur, but also because a silly, ineffective 
way of preventing that slur from being used was put in place. 
And usage has evolved: Some people now use the term in the 
sense of “I wish to insult you, but don’t worry, even though I am 
using a slur of this sort I don’t mean to say that homosexuality is 
bad.” What progress.
RS: Interesting to see how the arrival of effective search and 
filter engines have impeded free speech and how people found 
their way to work around it. Which leads to the next question: If 
you could go back in history of new media and digital culture in 
order to prevent something from happening or somebody from 
doing something, what or who would it be?
NM: I don’t think free speech online has been impeded very 
directly, at least from my perspective in the United States. One 
might have a different idea in considering China, of course, 
and there are chilling effects and other indirect means of sup-
pressing expression. But I find that many of the speech-related 
problems that I see are from trolls, spammers, haters, and other 
people who speak freely and in anti-social ways. We don’t need 
to make all such speech illegal. We would, however, like to 
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have a world in which those who want to communicate with one 
another can do so.
With regard to your question about what to prevent, the easy 
choices here would be ones that keep bad things from happen-
ing (for instance, the release of Spore or Duke Nukem Forever, 
games that were much better when we were imagining them) 
or ones that keep good things from ending (for instance, clas-
sic games are revived in new editions). To look on the positive 
side, I’d be interested in keeping the Digital Arts and Culture 
conference series going past its final 2009 conference. I wish 
there were some conference series of this sort today, spanning 
the arts, including theory and practice, and allowing for human-
istic work that is technically serious.
RS: We will come back to the issue of humanistic work and digi-
tal technology. First this question:  If you were a minister of edu-
cation, what would you do about media literacy?
NM: When it comes to media literacy in general as well as pro-
gramming, students should be invited to be creative and to learn 
by doing. I’d work, and would continue to work as I do in my role 
as a teacher (rather than government official), to allow more 
media practice and media making. This is a major aspect of my 
next book, Exploratory Programming for the Arts and Humanities, 
but is also part of all the classes I teach at MIT. I’m not saying 
that practice and media-making is the only way to learn, but I do 
find it to be an essential way to learn.
Politics and Government
RS: Some of the buzzwords of critical as well as euphoric discus-
sions of the current and future state of digital media are “big 
data”, “Internet of things”, “algorithmic regulation”. How would 
you discuss those words in a class on the cultural implications of 
digital media?
NM: Terms like these do represent underlying ideas and con-
cepts, and they are worth discussing. But the ascendancy of 
the term “big data” doesn’t mean it is truly a more effective and 
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powerful idea than is “distant reading” or “cultural analytics.” 
I think it’s useful to discuss today’s popular terms in the con-
text of other famous terms from the past such as “push media” 
and “cyberspace.” Obviously these are terms that sound very 
outmoded now, but I don’t mean to be dismissive when I refer 
to them; some of those underlying ideas have been important 
and remain so, and yet, obviously, everything promised by such 
terms did not persist (or never came to be in the first place). How 
do terms such as these represent hopes, imaginations, fascina-
tion, and also misconceptions?
RS: If we ask Google Ngram, we learn that the term “big data”, 
of which “distant reading” can be seen as an offspring, occupies 
discussions much more than “push media”. We will come back 
to big data and distant reading later. For now it may be good to 
remind of this other term famous in the past and somehow for-
gotten in present time. Why do you think “push media” and its 
antipode “pull media” did not persist?
NM: Without looking at the relevant big data, I am sure that 
“push media” is a term strongly associated with the Web boom 
of around 1996 and 1997. PointCast was a company, founded in 
1996, that garnered a huge amount of buzz for “pushing” infor-
mation to client computers, reversing the way the Web works. 
Practically everybody had the Pointcast screensaver, which 
displayed news headlines and such. In March 1997 the cover of 
Wired featured a hand and the word “PUSH!” and instructed 
readers to “kiss your browser goodbye.” Why did PointCast 
go out of business and why did talk of “push media” subside? 
Because the concept, as exciting as it was, was almost totally 
wrong. People did not want to turn their computers into print 
newspapers or TV sets, at least on these terms, even though they 
would later gladly use services like YouTube to access video. 
They wanted to post their own content, search and surf in differ-
ent ways, and write comments (even if the comments on YouTube 
do not seem highly meaningful). Sure, there are types of infor-
mation that people want “pushed” to their computers and devices 
– weather information, software updates, posts and tweets from 
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feeds/accounts that they’ve subscribed to. But putting those in 
place didn’t fundamentally reverse the Web. We didn’t kiss our 
browsers goodbye.
The reason I bring up this term is simple. In late 1996, “push 
media” was the next big thing, generating tremendous excite-
ment. Except, like “Infobahn,” it wasn’t the right concept or a 
truly relevant term. In 2014, “big data” is obviously a hot topic, 
the next big thing. Except maybe it isn’t. Maybe by 2020 it will 
sound about as relevant as the Infobahn does today. In the case 
of big data, I think the reasons for the obsolescence of the term 
(and I am sure it will become obsolete) will be quite different. We 
really are facing what seems to us today like massive amounts 
of data related to communication, writing, media – and we have 
data from a huge number of sensors as well. We don’t yet have 
the methods to analyze this data as we would like, and we cer-
tainly lack the means to contextualize it within our cultures, 
societies, and economies. But this data isn’t inherently “big.” It 
only seems big because we have been focused on much smaller 
data sets. Our discussion of “big data” does not pertain to how 
much data there is, but rather what our traditional means of data 
collection and analysis have led us to expect. When those expec-
tations change, what seems like “big data” now will no longer 
seem big. It will just be data.
RS: Web 2.0 culture seems to have tamed and commodified the 
wild, anarchistic Internet of the 1990s when people played with 
identity in IRCs and MUDs and built their own websites in idio-
syncratic ways. Remember John Perry Barlow’s declaration of 
the independence of Cyberspace from the governments of the old 
world? Today, it seems people hope for governments to intervene 
in the taking-over and commercialization of the Internet by huge 
corporations such as Google and Facebook.
NM: Government has always played a huge role in online com-
munications. Even before there was much popular access to 
the Internet, when people used BBSs run on individual’s home 
computers and phone lines, the technical development of both 
the computer and the phone system was strongly supported by 
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the government. Obviously the US government had a lot to do 
with the development of the Internet, too. The problem now is 
that corporations have found a way to profitably insinuate them-
selves into personal publishing, communication, and information 
exchange, to make themselves essential to the communications 
we used to manage ourselves. As individuals we used to run 
BBSs, websites, blogs, forums, archives of material for people to 
download, and so on. Now, partly for certain technical reasons 
and partly because we’ve just capitulated, most people rely on 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Google, and so on.
RS: Capitulation is a strong word; stronger than technical or 
cultural reason. It associates the claims of activists to stand up 
against the danger of surveillance and commercialization for a 
”free, open and truly global Internet” as, for example, expressed 
in Tim Berners-Lee’s campaign The Web We Want. Such claim 
certainly deserves consent. However, the notion the Internet has 
gone the wrong way reminds us of philosophers such as Adorno 
who considered, against the perspective of the majority of the 
people, the social system we live in as wrong. Isn’t the claim of 
a better Internet similar to the utopian notion of a better soci-
ety? To rephrase my earlier question: What would have been the 
alternative to the actual development of the Internet? And how 
do you see the interdependence of technological agenda and cul-
tural demand in this regard?
NM: This is an extremely interesting and important issue. Often, 
we act as if we want the Internet to live up to the positive nature 
of our society. Consistent with the various media panics we have 
undergone, we assume that new technologies will be threats to 
the social order. Because of this, we want our familiar society 
to win out over these new threats. But in fact, while new tech-
nologies certainly have their relationships to communication and 
creativity, being influenced by the past and influencing what will 
come, they are part of society. As you’ve said, our current social 
norms are not always correct or ideal. We shouldn’t just be hop-
ing to uphold them, but to improve our societies, whether one 
wants to call that impulse progressive, utopian, or whatever else. 
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Of course our current social system is wrong, or, to be a bit more 
gentle, not optimal. Should we try to “fix” the Internet or digital 
media more generally so that it better replicates the dominant 
social treatment of immigrants, trans people, youth, and other 
disadvantaged and oppressed groups? Of course not! We should 
be working to improve social justice, and we should certainly use 
and shape our technologies to help us accomplish that.
You’ve asked for an alternative to the Internet, so let me 
provide an alternative that would be worse than what we have: 
An oligopoly of hegemonic corporate services that replicate the 
mainstream values seen in classic network television and the 
policies of retail stores. You can only hang around if you might 
buy something. You need a credit card (so you can’t be a young 
person) and/or documentation that is effectively proof of citizen-
ship. Don’t expect alternative gender identities or other means of 
self-representation to even be discussed, much less implemented. 
Even cumbersome and seldom-adopted means of enhancing pri-
vacy (PGP, Tor) are absent, as of course are practical tools for ad 
blocking and spam filtering.
Access to digital information and conversation via the 
Internet isn’t perfect, but it is better than this nightmare. Today, 
there are people who work on alternative DNS servers and other 
infrastructural improvements to the core technologies of the 
Internet. But from your and my standpoint, and the standpoint 
of most of our readers, I think that trying out practical ways of 
collaborating, sharing information, and fostering access and 
conversation can offer tremendous benefits. You could have 
started a conventional, closed-access journal 1999, but instead 
you created Dichtung Digital, a bilingual publication, which you 
made available online for free and later developed into a peer-
reviewed journal. I have been blogging for many years and have 
used Web systems to collaborate on and publish freely-available 
work, working with people of different sorts internationally. 
These are the things we need to do to provide an alternative to 
monolithic discourse, whether corporate, retail, or institutional 
in some other ways. We need to build the structures that will 
support positive conversations, intellectual advancement, and 
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empowerment. And we need to continually be part of these 
conversations.
RS: In his book The Googlization of Everything (And Why We 
Should Worry), Siva Vaidhyanathan speaks of Google’s “infra-
structural imperialism” and notes that Google has been crowd-
ing out imagination of alternatives, not the least of which by its 
reputation for building systems that are open and customizable 
-- so far. Should we mistrust the positive record and worry? 
Should –and could– the US government or the European Union 
carry out something like Google’s book project and run a search 
engine free of advertisement?
NM: Siva is absolutely right. Just hoping that Google will provide 
flexible, general-purpose search, search that does exactly what 
everyone in the world wants and needs, as a public service, is not 
a sound idea. While the government can lead the way in infor-
mation access (for instance, the Library of Congress is a pretty 
good institution that does this, as is the British Library) I also 
don’t expect new Web systems such as search engines to be gov-
ernment initiatives. Let me be more explicit about those institu-
tions I mentioned, though: The Library of Congress, in addition 
to being a major library in the US, developed a non-proprietary 
classification system that is used throughout the US and in some 
other countries. The British Library has also made many general 
contributions and has more items in its holdings than any other 
library in the world. So some of our large governmental institu-
tions that deal with information are very influential, and in very 
positive ways.
Building a large search engine is a hard task that few under-
take. Currently, in English, I understand that there are only two 
sizable indexes of the Web; Google’s and the one used by both 
Bing and Yahoo. It’s Coke and Pepsi, but for our access to the 
universe of inscribed knowledge. The search capability we have 
is pretty good for commerce and for just “surfing” for entertain-
ment; for doing scholarly research or getting medical informa-
tion it is atrocious – sometimes it seems that you might as well 
simply go to Wal-Mart and try to find what you need there. But 
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it is considered a hilarious idea to try to build a new index of the 
Web. We think that only Google can do it for us.
There probably are suitable uses of government regulation 
and suitable new government projects in this area, but the main 
response here should be to expand our imagination and under-
take new efforts to build alternative systems. For instance, why 
are we waiting for Google to give us an excellent search facil-
ity for scholarly works? Google is not involved in the intellectual 
community of scholars, academic conferences, teaching, advis-
ing students, and so on. The research they are conducting is, by 
the very nature of their organization as a corporation, for the 
purpose of enriching their shareholders. That by itself doesn’t 
make Google “evil,” but the company is simply not going to solve 
the scholarly community’s problems, or anyone else’s problems, 
unless it results in profit for them. A regulation won’t fix this; 
we, as scholars, should take responsibility and address the issue. 
To see a case where a nonprofit organization has done a better 
service than any company has, by the way, consider the Internet 
Archive. Obviously there is Wikipedia, too. Neither is perfect; 
they’re just the best systems of their sort in the world.
Algorithm and Censorship
RS: As I learnt in the interview with Erick Felinto, Brazilian’s 
most progressive former minister of culture, Gilberto Gil, once 
said: “I’m a hacker, a minister-hacker”. Felinto continues, in a 
time when big corporations are increasingly colonizing cyber-
space, we need to imbue people with the hacker ethics of free-
dom, creativity and experimentation. David Golumbia, on the 
other hand, holds that “hackers” are bizarrely celebrated as both 
libertarian and leftist political agitators. To Golumbia, “political 
activism” by “hacker” groups such as Anonymous is more easily 
parsed as right-wing than as left-wing activism, for their issues 
are usually ones on the agenda of the far right: the dissolution 
of the state, the celebration of individual freedoms over social 
equality, and a diminished focus on the dangers of concentrated 
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capital. How do you see the role of hackers and hacktivism in the 
cultural and political environment of digital media?
NM: “Hacker” is a very loaded term, to leave aside “hacktiv-
ism,” which is loaded in other ways. To some it means breaking 
into other people’s systems, to some it means working to protect 
those systems, and to some it means building those systems. I 
think the political valence of destruction is different than that 
of construction, and that working for organized crime to infil-
trate other people’s computers and build botnets is also signifi-
cantly different than opposing Scientology or (to get old school) 
the Communications Decency Act. It’s certainly different than 
creating and maintaining Python, a Linux distribution, the Linux 
kernel, or other systems. To consider hacking in the sense of pro-
gramming and in the constructive system-building sense, partic-
ularly in free software, I see that there is a liberal aspect to the 
activity, even if undertaken by political conservatives. (Perhaps 
like George W. Bush’s artistic practice as a painter, which allows 
him to sensitively and strikingly portray Putin?) “Hacking” in 
this way involves adding code, and the concepts that code embod-
ies, to the world, allowing others to use these additions they like, 
fork them if they like, or forget them if they like. I’m not saying 
hackers (specifically, free software hackers) are always virtuous 
in every way or that they are exactly what we expect them to be 
politically. For that matter, I don’t mean to suggest that doing 
destructive things isn’t appropriate and useful at times. Still, the 
basic activity of hackers (as I think of them) is constructive and 
the outcomes are offered to the world to improve the way compu-
tational systems work and the way we think about information.
RS: Since Internet companies use data and algorithms to cus-
tomize the website they show us, the ads they send us, and the 
information they give us, one metaphor to describe the digital 
media age may be narcissism. In digital media studies the term 
translates to “daily me” (in Cass Sunstein’s book Republic.com) 
or “you-loop” (in Eli Pariser’s book Filter Bubble). To Sunstein, 
Pariser and others alike, the personal and cultural cost of per-
sonalization in digital media is the loss of chance encounters, the 
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preclusion of the unfamiliar, the removal of diversity and of what 
we are not (yet). A valid concern or a hyperbolic alarmism?
NM: There are a lot of dimensions to personalization and self-
monitoring beyond the narcissistic ones. You could use infor-
mation about yourself to better contextualize what you read, to 
relate news in other parts of the world to your own city or experi-
ences, or to get recommendations that broaden your perspective. 
I don’t think that I would call a person with diabetes, monitoring 
his or her blood sugar levels, a narcissist simply because more 
information about the self is being observed in this case and this 
person is concerned with that information. When unseen algo-
rithms isolate people by their purported world-views, of course, 
that is problematic. But let’s not flatten every use of personal 
data to that.
RS: I agree. So lets take self-monitoring: What is your per-
spective here?
NM: I do admit that there are dangers in taking a Fordist/
Taylorist perspective on oneself (and one’s productivity). But I 
think individuals in culture today can work through the prob-
lems associated with self-monitoring. I’m more concerned that 
what we call self-monitoring is almost always mediated by cor-
porations. The types of monitoring we can do are dictated by 
corporate, for-profit interests, just as the interfaces we use are 
developed by corporations. And of course the data we accumu-
late about ourselves, even if we look at it only on our phone or 
only on our local computer where it is captured, is almost always 
transmitted to corporations that are obliged to use it in any way 
that can increase their profits. It doesn’t have to be this way, but 
we need to change things if it is to be otherwise.
Fitness monitoring is an interesting case. Fitbit’s monitoring 
devices are popular ones, providing information about how the 
wearer’s body vibrates throughout the day, an extraordinarily 
detailed sequence of sensor data that pertains not just to gen-
eral activity level but to all physical activities being undertaken. 
Fitbit’s system is not a self-monitoring system. It is a corporate 
monitoring system: the data is sent to Fitbit. The corporation 
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then shares the data it obtains from a particular user with that 
user, via its website. Other users get some information, too. 
Years ago, it was noted that the sexual activity of some users was 
visible in their posted data. Fitbit responded by making certain 
data private by default. “Private” of course just means that the 
data is not posted on the Web for all users to see. The company 
Fitbit, based in San Francisco and founded by James Park and 
Eric Friedman, can still tell when its users are engaging in sex-
ual activity. Fitbit has been taking on other companies as clients 
and is monitoring the activities of those companies’ employees. I 
don’t know whether your HR department gets to track how much 
sex you’re having, but there is no technical barrier to this.
My point is that if you want to know how many steps you’re 
taking each day, you can just get a pedometer. There’s no need 
to get a corporation (or several) involved. If you want to plot the 
data and have it look pretty, there’s no technical barrier to doing 
that on a computer or mobile phone without sending the data to 
anyone else. Why wait until people start getting fired for their 
tracked activities outside of work: walking too little, for instance, 
or having too much sex on their own time?
RS: I absolutely agree, if I want to track myself why do the data 
have to be on a corporate website. Your explanation suggests 
that it is actually laziness and incompetence (to go the extra mile 
and find ways to collect, analyze and visualize data without fall-
ing for the convenient app of a corporation) that eventually will 
allow employers to control their employees. However, we should 
not forget that the new cultural technique of self-tracking is 
intertwined with the meanwhile quite established cultural tech-
nique of sharing. It is not inevitable but very much suggested 
that my running becomes a ‘social running’ by sharing the data 
of my activities online. Plus, in this case the sharing has even 
more reason than the infamous sharing of what I am doing right 
now or what kind of food I ordered. According to the Hawthorne 
effect people work harder – and run faster – if monitored by oth-
ers. Transparency boosts motivation and will push a lazy person 
into action. Jawbone’s VP of product development once phrased 
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it this way: ‘The number one correlate with your weight is what 
your friends are doing.’ Hence, it is very unlikely that self-track-
ing works the way it does without a social-networking feature.
NM: Actually, the 2007 Journal of the American Medical 
Association article “Using Pedometers to Increase Physical 
Activity and Improve Health,” which considered pedometer use 
without data sharing, reported ‘The results suggest that the use 
of a pedometer is associated with significant increases in physi-
cal activity and significant decreases in body mass index and 
blood pressure. Whether these changes are durable over the 
long term is undetermined.’ So there is peer-reviewed medical 
research that people having their own (not shared) pedometer 
data is beneficial. Of course, for medical advice and informa-
tion, I would go to the top American medical journal before an 
offhand statement from an executive of an interested company. 
Beyond that, I’ll note that if you want to get into a sharing situa-
tion where social pressure helps you enhance your fitness, there 
are other ways to do it – join a gym, for instance.
Although I don’t see it as critical to fitness success, I do 
understand why people wish to share exercise data with others. 
It may be, for instance, to try to connect to other people via data 
instead of via conversation. Is it really very socially significant 
that I walked 16,396 steps on Saturday? It’s more than usual, 
and I suppose it could possibly prompt a conversation or make 
some of my friends more socially aware of me in some ways. But 
if the goal is social sharing, wouldn’t it be much more signifi-
cant to write something on my blog, or even briefly tweet, about 
where I walked, why, with whom, and what the weather was like? 
For some people, sharing raw data may indeed serve this social 
purpose, so I don’t mean to suggest that data sharing is wrong. 
But it seems that it could just as easily substitute for deeper 
social interaction, rather than enhancing it.
RS: This brings us closer to the actual issue here: The increas-
ing public sharing of personal data may in fact represent the 
decrease of social interactions. Could it be that people have 
become too lazy to write about their life and prefer outsourcing 
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the task to technology which automatically both turns the report 
from words to numbers (or images if we include Snapchat and 
other social media of self presentation) and distributes it to as 
many people as wanted at once. This of course raises the inevi-
table question why people follow Facebook’s imperative to share 
as much personal information as possible and why younger gen-
erations don’t seem to care about privacy.
NM: I don’t buy either the stereotypical privacy concerns that 
people have about, for instance, teens (refuted in danah boyd’s 
book It’s Complicated) or the “digital native” concept (with odd 
colonial valences among many other problems). Essentially, I 
would say that young people, as with any group of people, are 
neither fully aware of technology and complete masters of it in 
every way, nor are they rubes who fail to think about their own 
interests and who don’t understand the social implications of 
technology. Young people do not need to learn the social norms 
of the use of technology from their elders. But they are also not 
total experts who are ready to chart the future of the Internet 
for everyone in the world. We should be respectful of the per-
spective and values that youth have; we should also respect the 
fact that their expertise and vision is not the only expertise and 
vision, nor is it the best in every way.
I have to point out that Facebook is not in favor of ‘the shar-
ing of as much personal information as possible.’ Facebook is 
in favor of having as much personal information as possible fed 
into their own corporate systems, for others to see, certainly, 
but ultimately for their own use. In fact if all the information on 
Facebook were available in some other system that was at least 
equally convenient to use, the company would have a severe 
problem. So trustworthy branding, a trendy company, buying 
other prominent and successful startups, and so on is also criti-
cal from Facebook’s standpoint. What Facebook really wants is 
for your social life to be impossible without them.
Finally, I don’t think people are just being too lazy generally. 
They’re inventing new forms and genres online, communicating 
and creating in radical new ways. It’s just that there are a lot of 
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complexities to the social, cultural, and political dimensions of 
digital media and the specific systems (often corporate ones) that 
are arising. In fact the problem is probably not laziness at all, but 
that people are moving too fast and are overlooking things that, 
with a better understanding of history and more time to contem-
plate them, they would be able to deal with in much better ways.
RS: This is exactly what should alarm us. More so since Facebook 
is so successful in accomplishing its goal. If boyd’s message is 
that the kids are all right, we may add that  – and some would 
say, for this reason – the society is not. Younger generations have 
basically adapted to the regime of sharing and look forward with 
excitement rather than discomfort to the Internet of smart things 
that will know everything about us and may pass it on to others 
who also like to know. I wonder how much they understand the 
social implications of technology if even people with more educa-
tion and experience don’t really know where this road of shar-
ing will lead us. Not only Facebook but almost every app today 
wants to have as much personal information as possible. As we 
know, personal information sum up to societal information which 
is wanted by the intelligence apparatus and governments as well 
as by scientists and companies. Isn’t the actual problem of big 
data mining rather than the more or less conscious compromise 
of privacy the looming of algorithmic analytics and regulation?
NM: I don’t think these can be easily separated. There are some 
types of big data work that are hard to see as a threat to pri-
vacy: astronomical data and data from monitoring air quality, for 
instance. But much of the excitement about big data has been 
regarding data about people – cultural, economic, medical, and 
so on. Or of course reading people’s email (or whatever Google 
wants to call its algorithmic analysis), initially to serve up ads 
but perhaps for many other interesting reasons. I say these are 
difficult to separate because there is no reason to amass huge 
amounts of data, which classically would be private, unless this 
data can eventually be analyzed, either by the collector or by a 
company to which it is sold, or can be used to regulate human 
or machine behavior in profitable ways. So I wouldn’t locate the 
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problem in the analytic stage. The collection stage very strongly 
prompts analysis and use.
Two analogies: In a criminal trial in the US, the judge works 
to avoid inadmissible evidence being shown to the jury in the 
first place. That evidence isn’t shown at first and then retracted 
later. Also, in a hiring process, if you’re not legally allowed to 
discriminate based on age, it works well if you don’t ask appli-
cants to provide their age. So instead of trying to block analysis, 
I’d suggest that we only give data to companies if, at the very 
least, there is actually some benefit to us. But really, the benefit 
should be worth the cost of giving up that data – it should pay us 
appropriately for how much the data is worth. And of course we 
don’t know how much the data is worth.
RS: Indeed, we don’t know and even if we knew that it is worth 
a lot it shouldn’t be up to us to sell it because not only do per-
sonal information sum up to societal information, the personal 
approach to information can also produce societal pressure. 
Imagine fifty percent of the applicants in a hiring process volun-
teering their age, their ethnicity, and their Facebook password 
assuming that it is beneficial to them. What chances do you think 
the other fifty percent will have of getting hired if there is only 
one job for ten applicants? We have to be stricter: It should not 
only not be up to companies alone what kind of data they can col-
lect and analyze but also not to the individuals alone what data 
they can share and provide. The decision should be in the hands 
of the society as a whole after it has discussed the possible impli-
cations of certain data sharing and reviewed the acceptabil-
ity of such implications. In this context it is remarkable that in 
December 2015 the European Parliament agreed on a proposed 
Data Protection Reform that foresees the appointment of ‘data 
protection officers’ in order to ‘help the competent authorities 
to ensure compliance with the data protection rules’ as well 
as the adoption of ‘impact assessment’ carried out by the com-
petent authorities with respect to certain uncertain data pro-
cessing. Hence, maybe we have to think much bigger about the 
privacy issue, as an issue that, similar to that of social welfare 
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and medical benefits, requires public debate and governmen-
tal regulation.
Art and Aesthetics
RS: In the 1990s there was a lot of talk about the “death of 
authors” and the empowerment of the reader in hypertext. 
Although in the discussion of hypertext today the role of the 
author is understood in a way that is much more complex, the 
death of the author remains an issue with respect to text auto-
matically created by a computer program. Ironically, in contrast 
to the author’s hasty discharge in the early hypertext debate, the 
trope of the death or disempowerment of the author is now not at 
all played out in the way one would have expected. Rather than 
considering the author as being replaced by software, a number 
of theorists and practitioners regard the author as present in the 
software. You have experimented a lot with computer-generated 
text and “poetic computing” as one of your lectures is entitled 
and discuss this issue in your book Exploratory Programming 
for the Arts and Humanities that will be published in 2016 with 
MIT Press. How much authorship do you claim in a text resulting 
from a program?
NM: When I write a text-generating program – and let me 
restrict myself right now to the “self-contained” kind that doesn’t 
accept seed or source texts – I consider myself to be the author of 
the program and therefore implicated in the output the program 
produces. I wouldn’t say, and I don’t say, that I wrote the output. 
It was produced by the program, which I wrote. I make my pro-
grams available under free software licenses as free/libre/open 
source software, so anyone can run them and generate texts with 
them. I don’t claim ownership of the texts that result when other 
people run the program. It is perfectly legal for someone to go 
and publish such outputs, and the system itself, without my per-
mission, although it’s nice for people to let me know when that 
happens. Now, I think it very likely that if one of my programs 
generated some text that, for instance, advocated the overthrow 
of the government and incited a riot, I could be found to be 
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legally responsible for this. And, in the sense of moral author-
ship, I certainly get some credit (or blame) for the poems others 
generate with my programs.
RS: Given that you don’t claim ownership of the text resulting 
from somebody using your program, would then, if the text turns 
out to be lawless, the other guy be jailed? To hold you responsible 
in court or build you a memorial for the overthrow, wouldn’t the 
idea then have to be communicated within the code itself, i.e. 
before the outcome of any text? As I understand it, you program 
a system with certain rules of communication while the concrete 
application of the rules, the communicated, is not in your control. 
Like langue and parol in linguistics, or the camera and the pho-
tograph in media studies.
NM: Analogies to better-known domains may be helpful. IBM’s 
chess computer Deep Blue defeated Gary Kasparov in a water-
shed moment for human-computer relations. One can imagine 
the team of programmers saying “We beat Kasparov!” after this 
happened. This is an instance of metonymy, however; it isn’t 
literally true. Kasparov could easily defeat any or all members 
of this team, playing in any configuration, if the game were 
between people. The programmers didn’t beat him; they wrote 
a computer program that beat him. Sergy Brin and Larry Page 
don’t find people’s search results for them; the search engine 
they developed (and that many others contributed to) does. When 
you typed “I hate Jaws” into the Google search engine several 
years ago, the system would helpfully suggest: “Did you mean: I 
hate Jews?” Brin and Page didn’t create this result, of course, but 
they and their company developed the system that produced this 
result. Just as the Deep Blue programmers can take credit for 
Kasparov’s defeat, although they didn’t personally defeat him, 
Brin, Page, and Google would have to be the ones blamed for that 
suggestion that the search engine made – and also the ones who 
get credit when the system works well.
RS: I agree with your conclusion but wonder about the premise. 
Deep Blue won because of the computing power, and only after 
it was upgraded to Deeper Blue so it could base its moves on the 
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analysis of thousands of master games and the evaluating of 200 
million positions per second. Google acts on the base of prob-
ability. These are qualities of the computer humans deliberately 
make use of. Their good making use of it certainly deserves them 
authorship. But of course, Brin and Page are not the authors of 
the line I hate Jews; only of the mechanism of autocompletion.
NM:  That’s a good point, and I think it does inflect mine in an 
important way. In both of these cases the system (Deep Blue, 
Google search) works not only because of smart programmers 
but because of well-curated data that is used to train the sys-
tem. Even when there’s not a mass of data to train on, those who 
develop such systems draw on experience “manually” to devise 
rules. In any case we have to look beyond the developers/pro-
grammers to, in many cases, data, and, in all cases, the culture 
and contexts in which these systems are developed.
RS: You also wrote a book about interactive fiction (Twisty Little 
Passages of 2003) describing the development of an online inter-
active fiction community in the 1990s and examining the concept 
of the “active reader” in contrast to the passive reader in tradi-
tional text from gaming and literary perspectives. What are your 
main points in the book? What would you rewrite more than a 
dozen years later?
NM: A significant change is the increasing amount of work that 
isn’t “parser-based.” When I looked at IF critically, and when I 
thought about it myself as an IF author, I considered that nat-
ural-language input (in the form of short commands: get lamp, 
ask the librarian about the freeway, take inventory) was very 
important. It was giving the player a chance to be a maker of 
language and to respond, even if in a limited way, in the same 
medium that the game was using to present the simulated, fic-
tional world. Recently, there has been a great deal of interest-
ing work in hypertext (mainly using the system Twine) and in 
“choice-based” games where one selects from a short menu of 
options. Meanwhile the visual novel, a form much beloved in 
Japan, is also gaining some ground in the US. These interfaces 
still don’t appeal to me as much as that of parser-based IF does, 
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but there is some very intriguing writing, including radical and 
experimental writing that goes in some very compelling new 
directions, that is happening in these forms. I’ve also written 
my own interactive fiction system, used these days for research 
purposes rather than widespread creation of IF, since writing 
Twisty Little Passages. I wouldn’t try to document this system in 
an updated edition, but I would try to enrich the discussion of 
IF platforms and their influence on and relationship to creative 
work. That’s of course also a topic that grows out of my work as a 
series editor of the MIT Press Platform Studies series.
Media Literacy
RS: In 2003 you edited, together with Noah Wardrip-Fruin, The 
New Media Reader collecting important texts about and projects 
of the than still emerging field of new media. If you look back at 
this book and forward to the probable future of new media (i.e. 
smart objects, big data, self tracking), what subjects have proved 
essential, what subjects need revision, what subjects would you 
add to the New Media Reader 2?
NM: Actually there is essentially nothing I would change about 
the texts we selected in The New Media Reader. We tried to 
determine the readings that would explain the history of the 
field, from World War II to the World Wide Web, and with the 
input of our many advisors I think we did that well. We could 
certainly substitute a reading here or there, but I think it would 
be a detail and not indicative of a need for a major revision. We 
could update the introductions, too, if that seemed valuable to 
readers. If there were any change I would strongly advocate for 
a new edition of The New Media Reader, it would be to eliminate 
the CD-ROM. Certainly not because I dislike the contents of the 
CD, which I think are rather important and which I worked to 
assemble very earnestly, but because in practical terms there 
are few people who even have CD drives in their computers and 
who make use of the CD. For practical use in classes, we should 
get as much as possible online (some of it already is) and allow 
people to access these resources over the network. I guess it’s 
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typical that the major changes needed are not in the book’s con-
tent but are due to changes in platforms and storage media (or 
network access to resources).
RS: Digital Humanities seem to be the new buzzword in the 
Humanities. Some fear with Digital Humanities the quantita-
tive turn taking place in contemporary society finally infects 
even the disciplines supposed to reflect and interpret society’s 
development and turns it into a branch of the science depart-
ment. Others hold that “algorithmic criticism” doesn’t aim at 
verifying and stabilizing meaning through replacing interpre-
tation by counting. On the contrary, “algorithmic criticism” and 
“distant reading” offer new insights in the way knowledge or 
data respectively is organized and opens up new opportunities 
for close reading and interpretation. What do you fear or hope 
from Digital Humanities and how do you see their relationship to 
Digital Media Studies?
NM: Fear of quantitative study by a computer is about as silly as 
fearing writing as a humanistic method – because writing turns 
the humanities into a branch of rhetoric, or because writing is 
about stabilizing meaning, or whatever. Valuable insights from 
computational humanistic study have already been reached, and 
these should be displayed in response to such talk. I’m actually 
worried about a different type of intellectual limitation when it 
comes to the Digital Humanities. Many people think that DH can 
only be done on our venerable cultural heritage. We can study 
literary history from centuries past, the development of cities, 
older examples of art, music, and so on, but we can’t study digi-
tal media using DH, because, I suppose, that’s too many digitals 
at once. It’s bizarre, because that part of our culture which is 
digital is particularly amenable to analysis using DH techniques: 
you don’t have to digitize it, because it’s already digital. And, 
those working with DH clearly don’t find computers entirely dis-
dainful; they can be used for analytical and critical purposes. 
Why not consider the cultural production that is being done 
with them, too?
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I see a connection between the study of 17th, 18th, and 19th 
century art, literature, and culture and the study of what is hap-
pening today with digital art, electronic literature, and online 
culture and communication. So I’m certainly in favor of having 
“digital media DH” along with other kinds of DH. Such work, just 
like any other DH endeavor, could provide new insights into its 
objects of study while also offering general benefits to the digital 
humanities. In case this sounds like a minor concern in light of 
some of the more overtly political and urgent issues that we dis-
cussed earlier, let me state: Understanding that we, today, are 
part of history, and understanding how we are part of history, is 
not an irrelevant detail!
InteRvIew 8
The age of print literacy and ‘deep 
critical attention’ is filled with 
war, genocide and environmental 
devastation
Rodney Jones
Rodney Jones is an applied linguist investigating 
computer mediated communication. He is particu-
larly interested in how digital media affect the way 
people conduct social interactions and manage social 
identities from surveillance and self-representation 
on social network sites to crowd wisdom, self-track-
ing and algorithmic analysis. He is the co-author of 
the 2011 textbook Understanding Digital Literacies: 
A Practical Introduction which not only teaches how 
new media work but also how they affect social prac-
tices. Rodney is Professor of Sociolinguistics and 
Head of the Department of English Language and 
Applied Linguistics at the University of Reading.
Rodney Jones points out the collusion of governments and corpo-
rations in an unregulated internet, as well as the potential of par-
ticipatory media for grassroots movements and surveillance. He 
examines the discursive economies of social network sites and 
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their algorithms, the (partially justified) replacement of experts 
by crowd wisdom, the (historical) dialectic of quantification and 
narrativisation (especially in clinical medicine), the self-tracking 
movement, the self-presentation on Facebook, and the the cur-
rent role of (media) literacy in the educational environment.
Prelude
Roberto Simanowski: What is your favorite neologism of digi-
tal media culture and why?
Rodney Jones: I love the term ‘datasexual’, the new brand of 
‘metrosexual’ for whom the collection and display of personal 
data has become a new form of grooming and cultural capital. 
The term is both funny and scary, and perfectly fits the aesthetic 
of many quantified selfers: young, urban, hip, educated, geeky 
and slightly arrogant. Part of me sees some kind of poetic justice 
in this, having grown up at a time when being geeky was cer-
tainly not sexy — so the rise of the datasexual is kind of like ‘the 
revenge of the nerds’. I’m also fascinated with the new ways data 
has become mixed up with sex and sexuality. This is of course 
not entirely new. Back in the 1990’s I did research on personal 
ads, and a key ingredient was always one’s ‘stats’ (age, height, 
weight, etc.). Digital technology, of course, has brought the dat-
ification of the sexual marketplace to a new level. We are in a 
state of constantly grooming our virtual selves in order to attract 
friends, mates, employers, etc.
RS: Datasexual is a quite productive neologism indeed. I can 
think of at least two more layers: 1. The data scientist is “The 
Sexiest Job of the 21st Century” as Thomas H. Davenport and D.J. 
Patil wrote in the October 2012 issue of the Harvard Business 
Review. 2. The obsession with data regarding diet and physical 
activity replaces the cliché of the overweight nerd getting up 
only to get pizza and coca cola by guys excited about quantify-
ing self apps which inevitably provides them with a sexy body. 
The revenge of the nerd comes in two steps: First, they provide 
the technology for a wide-ranging datafication turning numbers 
into the central criterion of communication – at the expense of 
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words with which they have never felt very comfortable to begin 
with. Secondly, they produce the apps and social network set-
tings that provide the necessary motivation to get their own 
stats ‘in shape.’
RJ: Yes, it’s also interesting to see this in the context of the devel-
opment of food and health culture in Silicon Valley, and the wider 
context of ‘Californian’ culture. So there’s an interesting mixture 
of spiritualism and empiricism – I meditate, and then quantify 
how much I have done it for example with the Meditation Time 
& Tracker-App by Robin Barooah. In this regard I highly recom-
mend a book by Anthropologist J. English Lueck called Being and 
Well-Being: Health and the Working Bodies of Silicon Valley. At 
the same time, before we get too worked up about this ‘contra-
diction’ it’s good to remember that lots of ancient spiritual sys-
tems rely heavily on quantification. Tibetan Buddhists, for exam-
ple, use beads to count how many times they have prostrated or 
said different mantras, and the texts are quite explicit about the 
numbers that need to be reached before the practitioner can go 
on to the next step. The most obsessive self-trackers I’ve ever 
met are Tibetan lamas.
RS: I would never have guessed that: Numbers at the basis of 
mediation. We will come back to the issue of quantification. 
Before a rather speculative question: If you could go back in his-
tory of new media and digital culture in order to prevent some-
thing from happening or somebody from doing something, what 
or who would it be?
RJ: I wouldn’t dare. I’ve seen too many movies about people 
going back in time to change things and ending up suffering 
unintended consequences. I think the idea that history moves in 
a simple linear fashion and that discrete events can be blamed 
for discrete outcomes is probably wrong. The causes and con-
sequences of events are usually very complex, and often hidden 
from us, especially in the realm of media which involve not just 
all sorts of complex, inter-related economic and political deci-
sions, but also the aggregation of countless personal decisions of 
users (the ‘market’). I don’t think it’s as easy as identifying where 
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we have taken a ‘wrong turn’. I also think this smacks slightly of 
technological determinism — if only this or that technology or 
this or that media policy had developed differently, everything 
would be all right.
RS: Your feeling is probably right. I in fact do believe that media 
have the power to change the situation of men and that without 
certain media the world would be different. I suspect without 
the smartphone most people would still watch their environment 
rather than escaping into another world as I always did with a 
book. But this is a question for further studies of media or digital 
media respectively. Which brings us to the next question: What 
comes to mind if you hear “Digital Media Studies”?
RJ: It’s always difficult to name what we do, and no term is really 
ideal. The real purpose of these disciplinary names is to make 
our activities comprehensible to university administrations, gov-
ernment funding bodies and prospective students, but when you 
start interrogating the labels they are all deeply problematic. 
Are we studying media, or are we studying human behavior? 
What is the utility of separating ‘digital media’ from other kinds 
of media (the term already promotes a kind of ‘discourse of dis-
ruption’ that is often hyped by media companies)? People who 
identify with the label may come from wildly different intellec-
tual traditions: anthropology, communication studies, cultural 
studies, literary studies, psychology, sociology, etc., and often 
what one ‘digital media scholar’ is doing may have no resem-
blance at all to what another is doing— they may not even speak 
the same language.
For my work I use the term ‘digital literacies studies’ (though 
I should probably say I’m just an applied linguist interested in 
things people are doing with digital technology). The problem 
with my label is that most people don’t understand what I mean 
by ‘literacies’ (or even think its a typo), because they may not be 
familiar with developments in the ‘new literacy studies’ over the 
past fifty years. They may think ‘literacy’ is simply the ability 
to read and write, whereas when I use the term ‘literacies’ I am 
referring to all social practices associated with the deployment 
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of semiotic systems, practices that are not just about encoding 
and decoding information, but also about negotiating relation-
ships, distributing material and symbolic resources, and con-
structing social identities.
Politics and Government
RS: While in the 1990s Internet pioneers such as John Perry 
Barlow declared the independence of Cyberspace from the gov-
ernments of the old world, now it seems people hope for govern-
ments to intervene in the taking-over and commercialization of 
the Internet by huge corporations such as Google and Facebook. 
Thus, web activists calling for the government to pass laws to 
protect privacy online, and politicians suggesting expiration 
dates for data on social networks appear to be activists in a bat-
tle for the rights of the individual. Have tables turned to that 
extent? Are we, once rejecting old government, now appealing to 
it for help?
RJ: I think the tables have turned, but this is not just true in the 
realm of media, but also in the realm of things like healthcare, 
transportation, environmental protection, advertising, etc. The 
shift happened with the rise of neo-liberalism in the 1980’s, and 
the ‘unregulated’ internet proved fertile ground for it. Freedom 
from government intrusion means freedom for ‘markets’— pow-
erful corporations inevitably fill the power void and are much 
more difficult to challenge since their CEOs and directors are 
not elected. Meanwhile, elected officials, at least in the United 
States, are increasingly servants of these corporations which 
fund their campaigns. It’s a horrible dilemma, especially since 
citizens who rail against big government and those who rail 
against big corporations often seem to want the same thing, but 
are pitted against each other (while the governments and cor-
porations are actually colluding). Unfortunately, too much of 
the infrastructure of our daily existence (including the infor-
mation infrastructure) is in the hands of forces that are beyond 
our control.
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The big question for media scholars is the degree to which par-
ticipatory media provides the tools for grassroots movements 
to challenge this hegemonic marriage of government and cor-
porations. On a good day, I think it does, because I think any 
increased opportunities to communicate laterally and quickly 
mobilise social networks can be very powerful (I’m thinking, for 
example, of the recent protests in Hong Kong). I’m also optimis-
tic because lots of young people are one step ahead of the tech-
nology companies (especially when it comes to things like digital 
piracy). I think that the persistence of torrents is a good sign 
that the ‘machine’ has an achilles heel. On a bad day, I’m pessi-
mistic as I see that the very tools that facilitate the formation of 
grassroots social movements are also tools that facilitate unbe-
lievable capacities for governments and corporations to exercise 
surveillance of private citizens and to manipulate their experi-
ences of reality.
RS: Speaking of governments, corporations and the control of 
the internet: Google has become one of the symbols for the cen-
tralization of an important public good such as knowledge in the 
hands of a private company. It is not only the most effective and 
popular search engine, it also gave us an enormous pool of dig-
itized books, which we like to consult whenever we need from 
wherever we are. Would the US government or the European 
Union ever have been able to carry out something like Google’s 
book project? Should –and could– they run a search engine free 
of advertisement and with an algorithm visible to all who care?
RJ: This relates to the last question. Would any government nec-
essarily be a better steward of such information than a private 
company? That would really depend on the resilience of demo-
cratic institutions in a society, and my experience is that they 
are rarely as resilient as we think. Another aspect of this ques-
tion has to do with the resource implications. Information is not 
really free. It involves an enormous amount of labor to produce 
and distribute. Unfortunately, with the way the internet works 
now, the ‘value’ of information is hidden from us, because we are 
being ‘charged’ for it in ways that are not always apparent (by 
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giving our own information in return). This, of course, is a point 
that Jaron Lanier makes very persuasively. Would we be comfort-
able with a government using the same model to fund it’s ‘human 
knowledge project’? If not, what other ways could they fund it? 
What’s scary to me about Google is not its size or reach but the 
economic model that makes that size and reach possible in the 
first place.
RS: An important aspect of the Internet with respect to politics 
and government is the subversive role it plays towards what 
Foucault called the ‘order of discourse’. With the opportunity 
to express oneself online and with easy access to a plethora of 
divergent utterances on everything, the old ‘disciplinary appa-
ratus’ has lost its base and impact. The situation is sometimes 
celebrated as shift from expertocracy towards swarm intelli-
gence, sometimes bemoaned as cult of the amateur. How does an 
applied linguist look at this matter?
RJ: I think that what we have here is a shift from Foucaultian 
‘orders of discourse’ to Deleuzian ‘societies of control’. 
Opportunities to ‘express oneself’ are just as constrained 
as before, only now by the discursive economies of sites like 
Facebook and YouTube. People have ‘access’ to divergent utter-
ances, but the algorithms channel us into the same old discursive 
traps. People who get their news from the internet in 2014 are 
in some ways less likely to be exposed to divergent views than 
those who got their news from TV in the 1960’s because of the 
‘filter bubble’. At the same time, I think you are right — the new 
ways information circulates has brought on a crisis of expertise. 
But part of this crisis also comes from the fact that many people 
feel that experts have failed us: doctors can’t cure us, bankers 
destroy the economy, priests have sex with children, athletes 
take drugs, politicians are corrupt, and corporations cheat us 
and pollute the environment. Ironically, now people seem to put 
more trust in algorithms (which aggregate and interpret crowd 
sourced data) than they do in people. They seem to think that 
what they are getting is actually the ‘wisdom of crowds’, when 
what they are really getting is the interoperation of aggregated 
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data by algorithms which were created by the very experts that 
they distrust and often reinforce the very same agendas.
What is interesting to me as an applied linguist is how peo-
ple negotiate this new economy of knowledge. I don’t think it’s 
as simple as the ‘wisdom of crowds’. We need more empirical 
research on how people search for and evaluate information 
online (when, for example, they are suffering from a health prob-
lem), how knowledge is collaboratively constructed and con-
tested in social networks, how ‘laypeople’ work together to pool 
knowledge and challenge experts. For me, the power of applied 
linguistics is that it gives us a way to operationalise theories. 
So applied linguists in the 1990s (especially critical discourse 
analysts) operationalised the idea of ‘orders of discourse’ by dis-
covering ways discourses are instantiated in things like gram-
matical structures and genres. Now applied linguists need to 
operationalise the idea of ‘societies of control’, to understand 
how discourse circulates in networks, how selves (as discur-
sive constructions) become instantiated in webs, how the nodes 
and ties of networks are created and strengthened through the 
moment by moment conduct of social interaction, and how people 
‘talk’ with algorithms.
Algorithm and Censorship
RS: One could argue that the order of discourse has been 
inverted: not simply to the extent that laypeople now replace 
experts, but also in a general dwindling willingness to engage 
with counter arguments or with anything that is difficult and 
demanding such as a complex consideration instead of a straight 
statement. What we may also lose when we dismiss experts are 
people who, because of their expertise and experience, know bet-
ter than we what is good for us and (because of their ethos) force 
us to avoid the easier way: the journalist or editor of news on TV 
and of a newspaper who offers a complex analysis of a political 
issue, the curator who decides what art work the public should 
be exposed to, the teacher who makes students read what she 
thinks they should know. One result of such development is the 
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trust in numbers as we can see with social media and other plat-
forms online that focus on the counting of views and likes. At the 
same time, algorithmic analysis of big data seems to verify Lev 
Manovich’s claim from more than a decade ago: the database as 
one model to make meaning out of the world (by representing the 
world as a list of items) is overcoming the narrative as another 
model (representing the world as a cause-and-effect trajectory 
of items). In your 2013 book Health and Risk Communication you 
mention the ‘discursive turn’ in social science and investigate 
how people reflect and communicate health and disease. How do 
you see the relation of numerical and narrative elements in this 
communication? What role does the quantified self-movement, 
whose slogan is “self knowledge through numbers,” play in this 
new scenario?
RJ: The story of clinical medicine in the past 100 years or so has 
been the story of the tension between quantification and narrati-
visation. In the 19th century and before, narrative played a cen-
tral role in diagnosis, with the doctor’s main job being the elic-
itation of a comprehensible narrative from the patient and the 
interpretation of that narrative. With the development of clinical 
trials in the 20th century, along with all sorts of technologies 
for the measurement of bodily functions, diagnosis increasingly 
became a matter of interpreting numbers rather than stories. 
The patient’s narrative and the doctor’s intuition both came to 
be seen as unreliable. This reached it’s height in the 1990s with 
the rise of ‘evidence based medicine’. A lot of this shift was mar-
ket driven— increasing quantification gave health care systems, 
insurance companies and pharmaceutical companies more effi-
cient ways of rationalising resources, billing for services and 
marketing drugs. At the beginning of this century there was a 
backlash against this focus on ‘treating the numbers’. With the 
rise of ‘narrative based medicine’ (as well as the focus on nar-
rative in alternative therapies), over-quantification came to be 
seen as suspect. So where does the quantified self movement fit 
in with this? Does it mean a shift back towards quantification?
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Ironically, I think the opposite is true. What practices of self 
quantification actually give to many patients are better resources 
for them to tell stories to doctors. In fact, there has always been 
a dialectical relationship between narrativisation and quantifica-
tion in medicine. Clinical practice has always been about turning 
narratives into numbers (doctors turn patient’s stories into diag-
noses, drug dosages and treatment regimens), and about turning 
numbers into narratives (doctors need to explain the results of 
medical test or risk scenarios in terms that patients understand). 
In the past, this process was completely in the hands of doctors. 
Patients only had their narratives. Doctors had the power to turn 
them into numbers and then to make new narratives out of the 
numbers. Self-quantification, at its best, puts some of this power 
in the hands of patients and gives patients a role in generating 
and interpreting data about their health.
RS: This sounds like a twofold happy end: The cooperation of 
numbers and narratives, or, as Katherine Hayles puts is, data-
base and narrative as “natural symbionts“, as well as the collab-
oration of doctors and patients. Doesn’t the obsession with num-
bers and this kind of self-applied ‘dataveillance’ also bring new 
problems with it?
RJ: In terms of actual health outcomes, I am still very optimis-
tic about what this development means for patients and their 
relationship with physicians. There are, however, a lot of poten-
tial dangers to this. One is the danger that self-monitoring can 
give rise to new regimens of governmentality and surveillance. 
Another is that the rise of self-tracking allows governments and 
health care systems to devolve responsibility for health onto 
individuals.
RS: This would be the dark side of this ongoing trend to self-
optimization. It is certainly not wrong if people are more aware 
about their physical activities and eating habits. However, if the 
resulting data determines peoples’ entitlement to health care 
benefits then the self-applied, quantified ‘bioveillance’ would 
turn into a means of further expanding the neo-liberal perspec-
tive on society. A case in point of the prevalence of numbers 
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over narratives is Google’s PageRank which is based on statisti-
cal concerns beyond any hierarchical taxonomies and ontology 
based interpretation.
RJ: The biggest problem with self quantification is that, like any 
form of entextualization, the ‘insights’ we can get from it are 
determined by the semiotic categories that it is able to repre-
sent. So quantification translates everything into numbers, and 
numbers have the power to help us see these things in new ways, 
but at the same time, they limit our way of seeing things. But this 
is true of any semiotic mode or genre (what I call in my book, 
technologies of entextualization). So all modes of representation 
(numbers, words, pictures) are biased, ideological.
As for Google, of course it manipulates Page Rank and cen-
sors all sorts of things, but that’s not the real problem. The 
real problem lies in the uninterrogated ideological assump-
tions behind Page Rank to begin with — the ideological assump-
tions supported by this ‘technology of entextualization’—which 
includes the idea that ‘value’ and ‘relevance’ are determined by 
popularity and association. As academics we are all too familiar 
with the consequences of this way of valuing knowledge. Does 
the number of citations really measure the ‘impact’ of an article?
RS: We academics of course assume that it doesn’t. Different 
to the senior management, we presuppose that popularity is a 
problematic criterion for evaluation as long as we value com-
plexity and intellectual challenge. However, we all know from 
Facebook that a thoroughly crafted post is not likely to receive 
more likes than a cute picture. On the other hand, isn’t the 
regime of numbers – which gives everybody an equal say regard-
less of her intellectual or political resources – the inevitable des-
tiny of democracy? Put differently: Does the quantitative turn 
digital media and especially social bookmarking bring to society 
prompt us to reconsider our concepts of power, participation and 
public voice? Discuss
RJ: This is a complicated question, with lots of parts to it. I 
think if you speak to many users of Facebook (and especially 
Instagram) they’ll tell you that they spend a lot of time crafting 
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their status updates in order to maximize likes, and even pay 
attention to when they post them, knowing that people are more 
likely to look at their newsfeeds at certain times during the day. 
I’m not sure that ‘cute’ is enough to get likes anymore. People try 
to be clever. I admit to doing it myself. I sometimes use Facebook 
status updates as examples when I discuss multimodal discourse 
with my students, because they are often very carefully  com-
posed, with their ‘success’ depending on how the poster is able 
to create particular relationship between elements in the image, 
between the image and the words, and between themselves and 
the different (usually multiple) audience that they are targeting. 
I’m not saying this is high culture. It’s popular culture, but popu-
lar culture can also have an artfulness. At the same time, we 
need to be careful about expecting any more from Facebook than 
we do from other forms of popular culture. Sometimes, though, 
you do get a serious and thoughtful post that will attract a lot of 
attention. It depends upon the sociohistorical context. I found for 
example during the Umbrella Revolution that my Facebook news-
feed became a site of rather sophisticated debates about consti-
tutional reform.
But the question of power and participation is more compli-
cated. My suspicion is that political ideas that are packaged in 
ways that appeal to people’s prejudices and fears tend to get the 
most traction (‘likes’), and this was certainly true before social 
media: so you get great populist leaders like Huey Long and Joe 
McCarthy and Adolph Hitler (and now, perhaps, Donald Trump). 
I think the difference is the network effect: that these ideas get 
spread much more quickly, and they are amplified within echo 
chambers (that are partly created by algorithms like Google’s). 
Likes attract likes. The ‘popular’ posts or ‘bookmarked’ articles 
appear at the top of the list and are more likely to become more 
popular. More worrying is the way people’s ideas get reinforced 
rather than challenged. So if someone types ‘Is Obama a Muslim’ 
into Google, and then clicks on pages that assert that he is, then 
the next time he types Obama into the search engine, he will 
likely receive results asserting that Obama is a Muslim, and so 
start to think that this is a ‘fact’ or at least mainstream opinion.
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RS: Another question I have about Facebook concerns its 
contribution to a better world by way of the so-called transpar-
ency culture and sharing imperative. While the economic inter-
ests behind this data worship are undoubted and certainly need 
to be addressed, the question remains as to why younger gen-
erations don’t seem to care about privacy but establish, using 
Facebook millionfold day-to-day, radical transparency as the new 
foundation of our culture. Critics of digital culture such as Siva 
Vaidhyanathans have called for a “dignity movement” that needs 
to address that having a certain level of anonymity and “breath-
ing room” is part of both being human and being social.
RJ: There’s, of course, another way to look at this. That is, to 
remember that much of what we think about as ‘privacy’ and 
‘dignity’ are really Western bourgeois notions that have actually 
developed quite recently, and that these ideas also have certain 
consequences, notably the privatisation of the public sphere and 
the concentration of wealth into very few hands. It is also impor-
tant to remember that, as danah boyd points out, young people 
have their own norms and literate practices for sharing and con-
cealing information and manipulating their self-presentations 
online. In fact, most of my conversations with my own students 
reveal a host of very sophisticated techniques for determining 
who gets to see what about them. It’s also naive to think that 
what people post online is really ‘true’. Often status updates 
are very deliberate artifices designed as parts of carefully con-
structed public narratives that are intended for particular audi-
ences. Too much thought goes into this to characterise it as a 
kind of ‘information promiscuity’.
RS: I have no doubt that young people don’t want everybody to 
read everything they share in social networks. They are, as dana 
boyd points out, especially concerned about ‘surveillance from 
parents, teachers, and other immediate authority figures in their 
lives’ rather than the possible access of governments and corpo-
rations to their data).1 However, I am not sure I would agree with 
boyd that teens’ engagement with social media is just a differ-
ent interplay between privacy and publicity ‘instead of signaling 
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the end of privacy as we know it.’ In particular, the shift from a 
‘private by default’ to a ‘public-by-default framework,’ that boyd 
notes, indicates that we are experiencing a tremendous change 
in the traditional concept of privacy. As for the fact that privacy 
as we know it is a rather recent feature of Western civilization 
is often used to pave the way for the post-privacy stage our civi-
lization is entering; most prevalent maybe by moral philosopher 
Peter Singer in his 2011 essay Visible Man. Ethics in a world with-
out secret. However, if recency is an argument what about other 
constructs and concepts that materialized in Western civilization 
not long ago such as equal rights for women and equal opportu-
nity stipulations for religious, ethnic, or sexual minorities? I see 
an interesting historic-philosophical shift applied here: Since 
enlightenment man considered history, including technologi-
cal development, as progress to the better and expected ‘non-
enlighted’ cultures to eventually catch up. Now it seems privacy 
as one of the results of the historical process – the German soci-
ologist Georg Simmel once considered the secret one of man’s 
greatest achievements – is devalued as something we also could 
and actually should do without.
RJ: Yes, I suppose it depends on privacy from whom. Kids are very 
good at being private from their parents and teachers, but not 
very good at being private from advertisers and the government, 
but they don’t see advertisers or the government as threats (yet) 
the way they do their parents (who have immediate power over 
their lives). Interestingly, I think if you talk to kids about privacy 
(from their parents) they will likely frame it in political terms—
it’s about ‘dignity’, ‘rights’, ‘autonomy’, so I think Simmel’s ideas 
are still pretty strong. I’m not arguing that privacy should be 
devalued because it’s new. I’m arguing that it’s still valued (or at 
least the ideas of autonomy and dignity behind it are). Finally, I 
think it’s important to remember, as I said above, that, especially 
in this age of micro-celebrity, there is a big difference between 
the person and the persona. I don’t think a lot of people regard 
the ‘self’ that they are constructing on Facebook to be their ‘real 
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self’ (any more than they think Lady Gaga acts the same way in 
private as she does in public or on Facebook).
The relationship between the Western enlightenment and privacy 
is an interesting one, for the more privacy is valued, the more 
disclosure is also valued. So in Western countries a gay man 
must come out if he is to be regarded as ‘authentic’ and ‘free’. In 
China, where there is little regard for privacy, one is expected to 
keep this a secret (even if other people implicitly know). The idea 
of privacy can’t be separated from the development of western 
capitalism/individualism. Privacy creates democracy and ‘free-
dom’ (whatever that means), but that’s not why it is so important 
in our societies. The important thing, from a capitalist perspec-
tive is that privacy creates value.
RS: Let me relate the issue at hand with the question of techni-
cal determinism we touched on before. One of the classes you 
teach is called “Digital literacies in the era of surveillance”. It 
explores the kinds of choices people have in utilizing digital 
technologies in societies in which nearly every action they take 
with digital media is being recorded, logged, aggregated and 
analyzed. Those media theorists who subscribe to McLuhan’s 
notion of the medium as the message are rather skeptical as to 
the extent to which humans are able to understand and reject 
the postulates media impose onto them. The hate-love relation-
ship of many people with Facebook may be one example: despite 
the complaints about the burdens inflicted by this communica-
tion and self-manifestation ‘machine,’ one still isn’t able to quit. 
Are we prisoners of our own devices, who can checkout any time, 
but never leave?
RJ: As for social media, what traps us is not the media part, 
but the social part. The media becomes the place where all our 
friends gather, and so we can’t socialise unless we go there (not 
so different from the church and the public square in the past— 
in fact, the church is a good analogy for social media since it also 
imposes a kind of regime of confessional sociality). Sherry Turkle 
worries that media have become the architectures of our intima-
cies, but I don’t think this is at all new. Technologies (and the 
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social institutions they support) have always been the architec-
tures of our intimacies. Architecture itself (the walls of private 
homes, churches, schools, shops) have been the architectures of 
our intimacies.
Media Literacy
RS: In 2011 you published the book Understanding Digital 
Literacies: A Practical Introduction, co-written with Christoph A. 
Hafner.  The topics range from hypertextual organization over 
blogging and games to social networks. In contrast to other text-
books about new media literacy, you don’t limit your explanations 
to how these new tools of communication work and can be used 
effectively but inquire how they affect cultural behavior and val-
ues. Given your perspective as a researcher and your experience 
as a teacher, what role should literacy about the cultural impli-
cations of new technologies play in the educational environment 
and what roles does it play today?
RJ: This gets back to a point I made in my earlier answer. The 
question is not just how media literacy should be taught, but 
about how all literacy should be taught. The problem with most 
approaches to literacy is that they focus on ‘how things work’ 
(whether they be written texts or websites or mobile devices) and 
teach literacy as something like the skill of a machine operator 
(encoding and decoding). Real literacy is more about “how peo-
ple work” — how they use texts and media and semiotic systems 
to engage in situated social practices and enact situated social 
identities. So whether we are teaching students how to write 
essays or blog posts, the most important question we should 
have for them is — what are you doing when you use this media 
or this genre or this language, and, even more important, who 
are you being?
RS: There are many concerns inside and outside academia about 
what people do with new media and what new media do to people. 
One example is Nicholas Carr who in his 2008 article Is Google 
making us stupid? and later in his 2011 book The Shallows – What 
the Internet is Doing to Our Brains, discusses the consequences 
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of online media for literacy. From Carr’s perspective, multitask-
ing and power browsing online make people unlearn deep read-
ing with the effects being carried offline, and with the result that 
they also unlearn deep thinking. The shift from deep attention 
to hyper attention has also been announced and bemoaned by 
French philosopher Bernard Stiegler who even speaks of a threat 
to social and cultural development caused by the destruction of 
young people’s ability to develop deep and critical attention to 
the world around them. Is this academic nightmare justified? Or 
is this just another reiteration of a well-known lamentation about 
the terrifying ramifications of all new media?
RJ: I don’t think it is justified, for several reasons. There is no 
doubt that new media are giving rise to new kinds of ‘attention 
structures’ just as writing did in the past, as well as radio and 
television. In environments dominated by digital media people 
will definitely distribute their attention differently, but I don’t 
think there is any evidence that this will result in less ‘critical’ 
thinking. The problem with most of these discussions is that they 
get stuck in simplistic metaphors about the mind (e.g. deep—
shallow) that I don’t think do justice to the complexity of embod-
ied situated cognition. Second, there is the question of what it 
means to be ‘critical’. In some ways, being able to successfully 
traverse multiple texts also requires considerable critical think-
ing, just of a different sort. Third, the assumption that we are 
losing our ability to ‘read deeply’ confers value on a particular 
type of text and a particular type of writing— writing that fol-
lows linear forms of argumentation. Texts that people write in 
the future will be less linear and more hypertexual, and more 
algorithmic, and demand different kinds of reading skills, and 
different forms of criticality (forms that we desperately need to 
learn how to teach).
Finally, I don’t think shallow reading is replacing ‘deep read-
ing’. What it’s mostly replacing is television. There is absolutely 
no evidence that young people today are reading less than they 
were in the 1960s when I grew up. In fact most of the evidence 
(e.g. from PISA surveys, from book sales) indicates that young 
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people are reading more than before, more than adults, and, that 
they are reading longer texts. As for the claim that people are 
becoming more ‘stupid’, I can just imagine my students rolling 
their eyes at being called stupid by a generation that has created 
the economic, political, social and environmental catastrophe we 
now find ourselves in. The ‘social and cultural development’ and 
‘deep critical attention’ of print literacy has brought us centuries 
of war, genocide and environmental devastation. New forms of 
literacy may not solve these problems, but the ‘good old days’ 
when everybody read deeply, pondered critically, and acted 
wisely simply never existed.
RS: In 2010 The Time’s columnist Ben Macintyre compared the 
rapid and restless information gathering of the Web 2.0-gener-
ation with the fox who jumps from one idea to the next draw-
ing inspiration from many sources while the hedgehog sees the 
world through the prism of a single overriding idea. Macintyre 
takes this analogy from Isaiah Berlin’s 1953 essay The Hedgehog 
and The Fox and clearly favors the fox model, since to him it also 
opposes ideological fixation. What Carr, Stiegler and others per-
ceive from a quite culture pessimistic perspective – power brows-
ing, short attention span – is for Macintyre almost the promise of 
a better future. Should we, rather than bemoaning or doubting 
the waning of ‘critical’ print literature, more actively emphasize 
and discuss the hidden promises of the ongoing cultural change?
RJ: As long as we don’t work ourselves up into an optimism that 
becomes just as constraining as Carr’s pessimism. I do think 
that what is often happening is not just jumping from idea to idea 
to get inspiration, but making connections between disparate 
ideas, which can be very useful. But any mode of thinking is only 
as good as its execution. A person can read Georg Simmel and 
miss the connections between the ideas, even when the author 
makes them quite explicit. And one can similarly surf across the 
surface of the web, but not engage in creating any connections 
between one thing and another.
RS: Before the Internet became available for private and com-
mercial use it was administered by the university. Today one has 
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the impression the university is no longer on top of development 
in this domain. How should academic institutions have responded 
to the upheaval of new media? How should they become more 
involved today?
RJ: It depresses me sometimes to see how the universities are 
responding to new media, mostly as platforms to deliver old 
media genres like lectures. The problem is trying to fit old peda-
gogies into the new kinds of participation frameworks made pos-
sible by new media.
RS: Another problem may be to upgrade old research disciplines 
by new technologies as it is happening under the umbrella term 
of Digital Humanities. This could turn the Humanities into a 
branch of the science department or, via quantitative analysis 
open up new opportunities for close reading and interpretation. 
What do you fear or hope from Digital Humanities for your field 
of research?
RJ: I’m not a literary critic, but my view of the humanities is that 
their goal should be to help us understand what it means to be 
human in the face of any technology we interact with — to shed 
light on how we live in whatever kinds of buildings, societies, and 
virtual worlds we have built for ourselves. The bifurcation of the 
human and the technological is entirely artificial. The techno-
logical is the human—its what we’ve built for ourselves. The goal 
of the hsumanities is to make us critical and reflective about all 
the technologies we use, whether they be sonnets or iPhones.
Notes
1. Dana Boyd: It’s Complicated. The social lives of networked 
teens, New Haven, London 2014: 56. The following quotes 
pp. 57 and 61f.
InteRvIew 9
Surfing the web, algorithmic criticism and 
Digital Humanities
Diane Favro, Kathleen Komar, Todd Presner, Willeke Wendrich
The participants of this interview are colleagues 
at the Humanities at UCLA and members of its 
Digital Humanities group. They apply the tools and 
methods of Digital Humanities in their research 
and teaching, write about Digital Humanities or 
study subjects of Digital Media Studies such as lit-
erature in and with new media. Diane Favro is 
professor at the Architecture and Urban Design 
department and Director of the UCLA Experiential 
Technologies Center; Kathleen Komar is professor at 
the Department of Comparative Literature, former 
President of the American Comparative Literature 
Association and Acting Co-Director of the Office of 
Instructional Development at UCLA; Todd Presner 
is Professor of Germanic Languages, Comparative 
Literature, and Jewish Studies and Chair of the 
Digital Humanities Program; Willeke Wendrich 
is Professor of Egyptian Archaeology and Digital 
Humanities, Editorial Director of the Cotsen Institute 
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of Archaeology Press and director of the Center for 
Digital Humanities at UCLA.
The interviewees address the fear of ‘derailment’ on the digital 
highway, the ‘lack of deep thinking’ among their students and the 
worry of humanists (and especially the ‘old folks’) to be deval-
ued as thinkers by technological advances. They speak about 
the pluriformism of the Digital Humanities movement, about 
visualized thinking and collaborative theorization, about the 
connection between cultural criticism and Digital Humanities, 
they share their mixed experiences with the Digital Humanities 
program at UCLA, explain why most innovative work is done 
by tenured faculty and muse about the ideal representative of 
Digital Humanities.
Prelude
Roberto Simanowski: What is your favored neologism of digital 
media culture and why?
Diane Favro: Hackathon:  beyond the obvious associations with 
marathon [the long race] and telethon [crowd sourcing], etc., 
such events capture key characteristics of digital humanities 
work: collaborative, adventurous, nimble, and productive.
Willeke Wendrich: Twitter feed. It is supposed to mean access 
to the output of Twitter, but it evokes images of sparrows focus-
ing on the seeds directly in front of their beaks, and to me sym-
bolizes how many tweeters react instantly on other tweets, 
rather than the world at large.
Kathleen Komar: I am taken with the phrases “digital immi-
grant” and “digital native” because they make so painfully clear 
the difference between my use and understanding of technology 
and that of my students. Students are so comfortable multitask-
ing and web surfing. I still process information vertically while 
they do it horizontally.
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RS: If you could go back in history of new media and digital cul-
ture in order to prevent something from happening or somebody 
from doing something, what or who would it be?
WW: Google Earth for updating their API without allowing back-
ward compatibility.
KK: I would stop pop-ups and ads. They succeed in distracting 
me much too often!
RS: If you were a minister of education, what would you do about 
media literacy?
DF: Literacy is essential, but involves more than texts. I would 
advocate students become adept at critically reading a range 
of information-conveying sources including words/languages, 
spaces, colors, movement, and people/cultures, and that they 
become adept at using the appropriate tools to do so.
WW: Involve students in an exciting project to produce a high 
quality work and see their name in “print”/on the screen while 
having learned everything from metadata, to mark up and copy 
rights with preferably a bit of programming as well.
KK: Make sure that technology is available to every child. The 
rest they will figure out for themselves. And institute a course 
on web ethics.
Todd Presner: I consider digital literacy to be a grand chal-
lenge of the 21st century. This involves understanding, among 
other things, how information is structured, presented, stored, 
and accessed; how computational processes create and organize 
data; how interfaces structure user experiences; how platforms 
embody certain world-views and encode culture more generally. 
Digital literacy is both critical and creative.
Digital Media
RS: With the critical turn in Digital Media Studies in the last 
10 years, the notion of the Internet as an ‘identity workshop,’ 
as Sherry Turkle described it, or the new public sphere for free 
political discourse has widely been abandoned (cf. Golumbia’s 
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Cultural Logic of Computation, Morosov’s Net Dellusion, Turkle’s 
Alone Together, Carr’s The Shallows, Lovink’s Networks Without 
a Cause, Pariser’s Filter Bubble, Vaidhyanathan’s Googlization 
of Everything etc.). Meanwhile there is also worry and warn-
ing outside the academic field regarding the spoiling of the 
Internet by commerce and surveillance, i.e. Tim Berners-Lee’s 
The Web We Want-Campaign, Edward Snowden’s appeal to res-
cue the Internet, to name only two popular figures in the Anglo-
American discourse. How do you see the development of the 
Internet over the last 20 years? Which worries and warnings do 
you share, which do you find ill-founded?
DF: My greatest fear centers on derailment. We were given 
the keys to the car with very little driver’s education. Able to 
go down too many different roads on the Internet at any given 
moment, users easily forget their targeted original destination. 
While undirected touring can be wonderful, it has overwhelmed 
other types of investigations and minimized deep, slow thinking. 
Without critical, serious training on how to use the Internet we 
are weakening our criticality. The fact that users are insulted by 
the notion of needing Internet training is indicative of the prob-
lem. The un-ending attempt to be technologically current (Do 
I have the fastest connection? Last upgrade? Newest browser? 
Best smart phone/computer with all the latest bells and whis-
tles?) further derails us, consuming time and redirecting efforts 
to the tools rather than the substance of inquiry.
WW: The internet has, on the one hand, democratized and 
become available to many, which is a positive development. On 
the other hand, it has a strong focus on consuming, rather than 
producing, and an expectation that the information found online 
can be trusted. 
KK: It might be the case that the early days of any field are filled 
with heady idealism. Early on we may have felt that the inter-
net would make us free and allow us to communicate globally 
and instantly. Our assumption (on the optimistic side) was that 
that would be liberating. In some ways it has been. The func-
tion of social media in fueling revolutionary movements is a case 
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in point. But we have also been contained in many ways by our 
technology. I see my students much less in a face-to-face set-
ting now than I did before the digital revolution. They email and 
want instant and brief responses to very complex questions. I 
fear that they think too broadly and quickly and do not do the 
work of thinking deeply or in any sustained way. I also fear that 
we will become so digitalized that our “personal” existence will 
become public data to be consumed and used but not to get to 
understand us as individuals. Distance reading might become an 
analogy for distance relationships. No need to read the primary 
text—no need to know the actual person at all.
TP: Like all networking technologies that preceded the internet 
(from postal systems to railways and telephones), we see a per-
sistent dialectic: technology enables certain things and prevents 
other things; technology is hailed as salvific and simultaneously 
apocalyptic; it can democratize and also be used to advance 
authoritarianism; it can be used to facilitate participation, and 
it can be used to control and monitor populations. No big sur-
prise here! Technology always has a dialectical underbelly, as 
these authors have identified, and it can also be used in surpris-
ing, unanticipated, and creative ways that have the potential to 
advance democratic values. We need to move beyond the either/
or binary, and consider both the risks and possibilities embodied 
in any technology. We must not give up on the weakly utopian 
possibilities (to rework Walter Benjamin’s phrase) since without 
them, it becomes very hard to imagine alternatives, build better 
worlds, and foster ethical communities.
RS: According to Maryanne Wolf, Director of the Center 
for Reading and Language Research and Professor of Child 
Development at Tufts University, Somerville, Massachusetts, and 
her doctoral candidate Mirit Barzillai, ‘an early immersion in 
reading that is largely online tends to reward certain cognitive 
skills, such as multitasking, and habituate the learner to immedi-
ate information gathering and quick attention shifts, rather than 
to deep reflection and original thought.’ (http://204.200.153.100/
ebeling/Deep_Reading.pdf) The shift from deep attention to 
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hyper attention and the results of multitasking and power brows-
ing have been announced and bemoaned by many intellectuals, 
and I hear similar comments here. Nicholas Carr made the loss 
of deep thinking (or: derailment) popular in his 2011 book The 
Shallows – What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains. Bernard 
Stiegler speaks of a threat to social and cultural development 
caused by the destruction of young people’s ability to develop 
deep and critical attention to the world around them. Your work 
as an academic teacher is closely connected to the ability of 
deep reading. Kathleen already voiced her concern that the mes-
sage of digital media – instant and brief responses to complex 
questions – does not foster deep thinking. To press you all on 
this issue: Do you share the worries listed above? How do you 
experience the relationship to reading in the younger generation 
of students?
DF: Students today do seem to have differently-wired brains than 
those of the previous generation. Rapid assimilation and highly 
developed curiosity are positive results of “distracted learn-
ing;” lack of sustained inquiry and deep thinking are among the 
negative.  “Free” and easy access is resulting in a rise in col-
lage scholarship as well as plagiarism.  Particularly of concern 
is the shift away from sustained writing and reading. Students 
moan loudly if asked to do a 10-page paper, while in the past the 
moan-threshold was at 20 pages. Deep reading is increasingly 
viewed as an educational necessity, not something done outside 
the classroom, for pleasure or personal learning. In response to 
this changing reality I now develop projects (rather than assign-
ments) that are more oriented toward hypothesis testing, object 
creation (digital model, thick map, etc.) involving multi-media, 
interdisciplinarity, and peer learning through collaboration. 
Students respond well to the competition presented by working 
in groups, in contrast to the results they produce from isolated 
researching on the Internet.
WW: What I have found is that students not only have a shorter 
concentration span, but also appreciate audio-visual information 
over reading. They would rather have something explained to 
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them in short videos than by reading an article (which is some-
thing I cannot identify with at all. I’m usually bored to irrita-
tion with video explanations because they are slow and not very 
information dense). I do, however, not tend to worry about such 
changes, although I will not cater to them. There is not much 
point to try to hold back societal developments. My hope is that 
we will end up with a pluriformity of media, although with the 
increased commercialization of the internet that might not actu-
ally happen. Now THAT is a true cause for worry.
KK: Yes, I share this concern. My students are great at surf-
ing the web to find the information they seek; but when con-
fronted with a poem by Emily Dickinson or Wallace Stevens, they 
are confused by the need to read deeply and to consider each 
word in its poetic context. They are less attuned to unreliable 
narrators in novels as well. I think that the need to mull over 
a word or phrase—and to be able to argue a particular mean-
ing among other possible meanings is increasingly difficult for 
them. They are also less aware of the history of literature or cul-
ture that informs a particular work of art or literature.  They are 
not any less bright than earlier students; they have been condi-
tioned to think differently. That gives them some advantages in 
this new world—but I would hate to see them lose other capaci-
ties of thought.
TP: I think the era of deep attention is largely a fantasy that has 
been projected backwards to romanticize a world that never 
existed. We’ve conjured up an image of a past world in which 
people could concentrate on a single task (like reading a Tolstoy 
novel from start to finish) in order to elevate certain cultural ide-
als, behaviors, and artifacts. But this binary makes little sense: 
first of all, film theorists in the early 20th century complained 
about film causing a “cult of distraction” among the masses 
and before that, critics complained about the genre of the novel 
being subversive (largely because it helped bring literacy to a 
much wider public). In both cases, prior media revolutions elic-
ited the same critiques. Hyper-attention has probably always 
been around, just like deep attention still persists today: If 
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you’ve ever watched teenagers play videogames, you would note 
their rapt attention, complex strategy making, and formidable 
attention to detail.
RS: There is a series of neologisms around of the basic elements 
of digital media: algorithmic criticism, algorithmic design, ethics 
of the algorithm, algorithmic analytics, algorithmic regulation. 
This abundance of new technical terms around the algorithm 
evidences its central role in coding and computing. The implica-
tions this role will have on culture and society in the age of digi-
tization is still to be seen. Some welcome the algorithm as a tool 
of knowledge production by big data mining and distant reading. 
Others, however, see the algorithm as Pandora’s box since it fos-
ters a way of thinking and acting based on stiff if-then-rationales 
and on statistics and it outsources human agency. How do you 
look at algorithms?
DF: I personally like the rigor imposed by rule-based (algorith-
mic) thinking, in part because the approach parallels my own 
field of study. The meaning of the term, however, has become 
equated with “computing.” As a result, I tend to use other 
descriptors.
WW: They certainly have their uses, and we should not do away 
with them. Big data analysis, however, is of a completely differ-
ent use than detailed qualitative analysis or thick descriptions of 
phenomena. Algorithms actually are not really stiff if-then-ratio-
nales. Mostly what happens in big data analysis is the descrip-
tion of trends, without any attempt to explain these. They are 
mostly descriptive, rather than analytical or interpretational.
KK: If we see algorithms as a formal set of instructions to carry 
out a specific function, then I like the clarity of the operation. 
This might be couched in numbers or words (e.g., if you see an 
oncoming plane, veer right). So it isn’t the formal process that is 
a problem for me; it is the assumption that this is always numeri-
cal and that it can provide ultimate answers to complex ques-
tions. Complexity and ambiguity are not always bad; they induce 
us to imagine other answers. I would hate to see this human 
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capacity devalued in favor of illusory certainty. A single answer 
is not always the best way to go.
TP: I’ve used the phrase “the ethics of the algorithm” in a recent 
study of the Shoah Foundation’s Visual History Archive, a digital 
archive of 52,000+ Holocaust testimonies, to describe the ways 
in which computational processing of data is hardly a neutral 
enterprise and, in fact, requires an attention to ethical issues 
at every stage. Other authors, like Stephen Ramsay, have begun 
developing the critical field of “algorithmic criticism,” examining 
not only the ways in which code needs to be analyzed and inter-
preted for its assumptions and structures, but also how code can 
be used to engage in cultural critique.  The code and database 
might, for example, be reordered, disassembled, and reassem-
bled according to the constraints and possibilities of computa-
tional logic. This is the essence of algorithmic criticism.
RS: Let me just pick the two key phrases in Todd’s answer to 
readdress the problems I see when it comes to the advance of the 
algorithm. The “ethics of the algorithm” can also be seen in terms 
of the famous article by computer scientist Robert Kowalski in 
1979 Algorithm = Logic + Control. In my interview with David 
Golumbia, the author of The Cultural Logic of Computation, he 
differentiates between two philosophical approaches to life: 
Leibniz to whom everything in the mind and in society can be 
reduced to mathematical formulae and logical syllogisms and 
Voltaire whose “critical rationalism” includes phenomena like 
irony and skepticism. In light of increasing algorithmic reading 
and regulation of society I wonder how much room the future will 
offer Voltaire if the future – including the Internet of things – is 
densely populated by computers as Leibniz’ ‘children’. My other 
question aims at Ramsay’s concept of “algorithmic criticism.” I 
absolutely support Ramsay in that computer-assisted text analy-
sis should not be employed in the service of a heightened criti-
cal objectivity but deepened subjectivity. However, when Ramsey 
looks forward to the day “alogithmic criticism” is, as a practice, 
so firmly established that the term itself may seem as odd as 
“library based criticism”. I am concerned about the insensibility 
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towards the underlying media. While the library offers a specific 
collection of texts to a reader, the algorithm offers its reading of 
a (specific collection of) text(s) to the reader. The algorithm as a 
medium does not equal the library, nor does it substitute it, but 
complements it and establishes (by stepping between the given 
text and the reader) a very different pre-condition of criticism.
TP: I don’t think we are in disagreement here. I would love to 
imagine and advance a kind of algorithmic criticism in which 
Voltaire’s irony and skepticism unfolds in profound and even 
unpredictable ways, but I certainly recognize the lure and the 
dangers of the Leibnitz model. Again, we have both existing 
simultaneously, pulling us between logic and control, on the 
one hand, and artful subversion, on the other. The notion of an 
ethics of the algorithm is an attempt to inject ethical thought 
and humanistic values into computational processes at all lev-
els, from the broader information architectures to the design 
of structured data and databases to the processes of capturing, 
analyzing, and interpreting that data.
Digital Humanities
RS: One neologism of the development of digital media is Digital 
Humanities, which meanwhile has been become the most impor-
tant keyword in the Humanities. The debate on DH has itself 
coined a series of neologisms such as “fluid textuality,” “ubiq-
uitous scholarship,” “animated archive,” and “distributed knowl-
edge production”. What do those terms mean and what do they 
mean to you?
DF: I don’t use the first terms, but would equate “ubiquitous 
scholarship” with pervasive access to scholarship that in turn 
promotes learning at many levels, including by citizen learn-
ers outside academia. I participate in a number of “distributed 
knowledge production” projects in which scholars in distant loca-
tions all work together in a truly interactive way.  Such collabo-
ration is dynamic and stimulating, as well as expedient.
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WW: These terms are keyed by a specific section of DH prac-
titioners. The interesting thing about DH is that it is very plu-
riform, with multiple disciplines working together, critiquing 
and using DH methods and tools. Often these critiques bridge 
the method and theory of DH as well as the practitioner’s other 
scholarly backgrounds. In the case of archaeology and DH there 
is, for instance, a strong emphasis on theories of chronology and 
spatiality, critiquing how space and time are represented. Issues 
are, for instance, that chronologies differ depending on the geo-
graphical and archaeological context, a situation which does not 
lend itself easily to representation in standard western calen-
dar structures.
KK: “Ubiquitous scholarship” and “distributed knowledge pro-
duction” indicate a movement toward more collaborative work 
and towards more openly sharing research findings. I think 
these are good things in the Humanities—where we have been 
in the habit of going off to our own cubby holes and doing our 
own individual work. “Fluid textuality” implies a different area 
to me—one that involves electronic literature (on which I am 
currently doing research). It indicates the capacity of creating 
texts that are not fixed artifacts (like a book) but rather can be 
recombined or are interactive or may be authored by several 
individuals. So still collaboration of some kind. But also a fleet-
ing characteristic.  Texts can disappear or change rapidly in an 
electronic environment (websites or posts, for example).
TP: Together with my co-authors (Anne Burdick, Johanna 
Drucker, Peter Lunenfeld, and Jeffrey Schnapp), we introduced 
each of those terms in Digital_Humanities. They are not terms 
that people necessarily use in everyday discourse, even about 
the Digital Humanities, but are meant to conceptualize certain 
shifts in cultural production and humanistic inquiry enabled 
by the digital. In brief: fluid textuality refers to the malleable, 
fungible, and extensible environment for digital artifacts; ani-
mated archives are just that: archives that are no longer a bunch 
of “dead” and forgotten objects but ones that have been given 
a new lease on life in digital worlds, often through strategic 
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curatorship and blended environments; distributed knowledge 
production refers to the world we work in, where collaborative 
research is prized and knowledge is spread across many locales, 
including academic and non-academic ones, not to mention slices 
of the broader public; and finally, ubiquitous scholarship refers 
to a future to come, in which the pervasive infrastructure of 
computing has also transformed the scholarly enterprise in a 
way that greatly enlarges its domain, reach, and impact.
RS: Besides new words, another contribution of this 2012 book 
to the discussion in the humanities is a different perspective 
on its present and future. Against the ‘default position that the 
humanities are in “crisis”,’ the authors portray the computa-
tional turn in Humanities as a chance of bringing the ‘values, 
representational and interpretative practices, meaning-making 
strategies, complexities, and ambiguities of being human into 
every realm of experience and knowledge of the world.’ What 
would be an example for this extension of the values and strate-
gies of the Humanities into other fields? How, on the other hand, 
do you see the ‘dark side of the Digital Humanities’ and ‘where 
is cultural criticism in the Digital Humanities’ (to allude to two 
popular and rather critical debates on DH at the MLA-convention 
2011 and 2013)?
DF: At UCLA, the new Urban Humanities Initiative aims to inte-
grate the criticality and values of humanists into the design and 
theorization of architecture and urban design and planning. 
At the same time, the UHI provokes humanists to experiment 
with the approaches of architects and urban designers, includ-
ing hypothesis testing, visualized and spatial thinking, and col-
laborative theorization. In identifying a “dark side” for DH, we 
often forget that all fields have their own negative aspects since 
those of traditional fields have become masked by familiarity. 
Humans synthesize a myriad of actions, emphases, contradic-
tions, and interpretive practices, yet these are often isolated in 
academia. By embracing ambiguity, simultaneity, fuzzy thinking, 
and interdisciplinary collaboration, DH is a positive provocation 
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to the field compartmentalization that has increasingly hobbled 
academics pursuing new knowledge.
WW: Perhaps the most important contribution of DH is that it 
brings the understanding to computational approaches that 
data are not objective, often ambiguous, and context dependent. 
These are insights from the humanities that are seldom consid-
ered, let alone valued in the sciences, including computer sci-
ence. I, therefore, don’t think that there is a lack of cultural criti-
cism in DH, although there are undoubtedly practitioners who 
use DH methods and tools uncritically (but then they would also 
write uncritical articles or books). In other words culture criti-
cism, critical thinking, and social awareness are not inherently 
part of, nor inherently lacking in DH.
KK: The “humanities” began as those areas of study in which 
we examine achievements designed and executed by human 
beings—as opposed to natural phenomena. It is a study of human 
culture—which, at earlier moments in our history, would have 
included mathematics and engineering. So I see no inherent 
need to separate (or protect) the Humanities from other humanly 
generated systems of meaning such as mathematics. I think we 
should be chipping away at these separations rather than but-
tressing them. I believe it profits scientists to see their own 
work as a kind of narrative. However, I do not believe we should 
cede the arena of important intellectual achievements to the sci-
ences—as many of our campuses have done recently. The specu-
lative and critical thinking skills remain crucial in our society. 
Students (and colleagues) need to be able to examine cultural 
and political claims critically. This is the point of my undergradu-
ate course on Kafka.  Literature makes us think and rethink cul-
tural currencies.
TP: The issue for me concerns the importance of the values, 
perspectives, methods, and content of the humanities at a time 
in which the humanities are under fire for their supposed irrel-
evance or secondary status. The humanities provides historical 
and comparative perspectives; it shows how knowledge is always 
“situated” in specific cultural, social, and economic contexts; it 
260 Interview 9
provides an ethical orientation and methods that seek to com-
prehend – not overcome – ambiguity, difference, uncertainty, and 
fuzziness. As I’ve written elsewhere, the connection between 
cultural criticism (Kulturkritik) and DH is crucial in this respect.
RS: I assume it is easy to agree that all fields have their “dark 
side” and that, though there is no shortage of cultural criticism 
in DH, DH can also be practiced uncritically. It is also absolutely 
understandable how DH can and should be critical regarding the 
‘givenness’ of data and the structure of knowledge production 
and representation. Todd’s discussion on DH as a kind of heir of 
cultural criticism and Critical Theory illustrates very well how 
“cultural-critical archive projects and platforms” undermine and 
overcome what Foucault defined as rules of exclusion by means 
of “citizen-scholars” and “participation without condition”. The 
aim of such “historical documentation” or “database documenta-
ries” seems to be the improvement of knowledge rather than its 
subversion. From a certain philosophical point of view, however, 
it is the subversion of knowledge that renders most the “ambi-
guities of being human”. An example for this perspective is the 
German philosopher Odo Marquard who, in a 1986 essay on the 
inevitability of the Humanities (“Über die Unvermeidlichkeit der 
Geisteswissenschaften”), considers the function of Humanities 
in society to create a rhetoric of resistance not (only or first of 
all) towards institutions but (also and moreover) to signification 
and Truth. To Marquard the characteristic – and mission – of the 
Humanities is to irritate the business of understanding, to coun-
terbalance the notion of reliable, objective knowledge in the nat-
ural sciences. The political importance of such deconstructive 
work becomes clear, as Marquard holds, with respect to confes-
sional civil wars, which he terms ‘hermeneutic civil wars’: People 
killed each other over the right interpretation of a book. Such 
political view of the relationship of the Humanities to interpreta-
tion and knowledge may be surprising and foreign. However, it is 
mirrored by others if for example the Italian philosopher Gianni 
Vattimo, in his 1997 book Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning 
of Hermeneutics for Philosophy, speaks of a ‘nihilistic vocation 
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of hermeneutics’ and welcomes it as ‘the dissolution of funda-
mentalism of every kind.’ Here the aim of interpretation is not 
the better, more complete, less manipulated understanding of 
reality but rather the understanding that the comprehension of 
reality is inevitably grounded in difference and irreconcilability. 
The vocation of DH may not be to present the Truth. But it also 
seems to be far from the nihilistic epistemology of postmodern 
perspectives.
Digital Literacy
RS: It is obvious that the humanities scholar of the future needs 
skills that exceed the traditional requests. Computational skills 
and statistical methods come to mind, as well as new ways of 
undertaking research and presenting the results. How does the 
ideal representative of Digital Humanities look like? What are 
the main obstacles you see in this regard?
DF: I would argue that there is no “ideal representative” of DH, 
as it is by nature interdisciplinary in approaches and practitio-
ners. I believe that we are in a transitional phase of evolution 
in which new tools are stimulating dynamic methodologies 
that will gradually become the mainstream. Twenty years ago 
we had a separate academic program in my department called 
Architectural Computing; today computing is so pervasive in all 
aspects of teaching and research that program has been elimi-
nated. I would imagine that likewise in the future the majority of 
humanistic inquiries will deploy the tools, theories, collaborative 
strategies, and interpretive practices of today’s DHers and we 
will move on to other provocations.
WW: The ideal future humanities scholar will not necessarily 
need computational skills or a fluency in statistical methods. The 
training preparation and set of skills really depend on her partic-
ular research interest. Knowledge of relevant languages and dis-
ciplinary theories and methods will remain of great importance. 
Some of those languages could be, but don’t necessarily have to 
be, computer languages. More important is the will and talent to 
work in interdisciplinary teams, take time and have the openness 
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of mind to familiarize oneself in the background and methods of 
other team members, and have an appreciation of all team con-
tributions. Developments are following each other in rapid order 
and rather than everybody in the academic organization trying 
to keep up with everything, we will have to divide tasks and play 
on our own and each other’s strengths. Having said that, in gen-
eral it works best if humanities scholars do try to familiarize 
themselves with a core suite of tools and programs, so that they 
are at least intelligent conversation partners. Similarly, the best 
designers and programmers have at least some understanding 
of what scholarly work is concerned with: the main questions, 
approaches and critiques.
KK: The main obstacle I see is fear. Humanists (myself included) 
fear being devalued as thinkers by the technological advances 
that seem to leave us behind. But every new app or piece of tech-
nology grows out of a narrative that can imagine a new way of 
doing things.  Even pop culture such as science fiction and Star 
Trek have contributed to our technological developments. Many 
of us “old folks” fear that we cannot attain the necessary compu-
tational skills this late in our careers—and perhaps this is true. 
But the future generations may not see any problem. They are 
techno-savvy and unafraid of the challenges. My undergrads 
are excited about using computers to do their literary research. 
They are the future. But they still need the understanding of 
other cultures and languages and the critical-thinking skills to 
explore research outside of their immediate contexts.  Working 
in collaborative teams (as many of the sciences have done for 
some time) is probably a strong need for future scholars.
RS: UCLA offers a graduate certificate in Digital Humanities 
Program which, as it reads at the website, ‘prepares students to 
work in this new environment by providing them with knowledge 
about the tools, methods, and theoretical issues central to the 
emerging field and enabling them to ask specific research ques-
tions that harness new technologies.’ What are the details of this 
program? What kinds of students enroll? What are the (adminis-
trative) obstacles you encounter?
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TP: The graduate students come from a multiplicity of back-
grounds across the humanities, social sciences, and arts, rang-
ing from fields such as history, English and foreign literatures, 
comparative literature, art history, information studies, architec-
ture, urban planning, archaeology, design media arts, and more. 
They are interested in how digital tools, methods, and technolo-
gies are transforming knowledge investigation, knowledge mak-
ing, and knowledge dissemination in the 21st century as well 
as the ways in which their own fields can be drivers of these 
transformations. The DH certificate functions like a “minor” for 
graduate students and requires five courses, including an intro-
ductory seminar on DH and a capstone research experience in 
DH. The latter embeds graduate students in faculty-led team 
projects, often drawing on library and technical staff, under-
graduates and other faculty members. Graduate students also 
produce a web portfolio of their research and present it publicly 
at the end of the program. More details about the program can 
be found online at: http://digitalhumanities.ucla.edu
WW: The students enroll in a core class, which has a focus on the 
theoretical aspects of DH, illustrated by looking at and analyz-
ing existing projects. Practical work is an integrated part of the 
certificate, learning particular tools and basic programming, but 
with a focus on those approaches that might be of direct use to 
the type of research that they are doing. This can be database 
programming, three dimensional Virtual Reality reconstruc-
tion of ancient buildings, Geographic Information Systems to 
analyze spatial data, text analysis, gaming, statistical analysis, 
or big data. Rarely do students specialize in more than one or 
two of these large fields of interest. Students who enroll usually 
already have a strong interest in computer based research and 
they typically choose to do the certificate because they want 
to learn more in order to facilitate their own research, but also 
to give themselves an edge when applying for jobs. There don’t 
seem to be major administrative hurdles to initiate and teach 
the program. It remains to be seen how well-accepted PhD the-
ses will be that have a non-traditional structure or are strongly 
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collaborative. In general advisors, even those who are DH pro-
ponents, will advise their students to err on the side of the tra-
ditional. The same is true for Assistant Professors who have a 
great interest in DH, but still feel they should produce a book 
with a respected publisher to safeguard tenure. Therefore for 
the coming decade or so, at least until DH work is more widely 
accepted by Academia, most innovative work is done by tenured 
faculty who can afford to take risks.
DF: The UCLA administration supports inter- or trans-discipli-
narity, especially inquiries which have the potential to be trans-
formative academically and in the world at large (this is specifi-
cally the aim of our new Urban Humanities Initiative). However, 
the barriers to working across fields, departments, and divisions 
within a rule-heavy, tradition-bound state institution remain sig-
nificant. In addition to the administrative challenges presented 
(In what department does the program reside? Who pays for 
what? How can other divisions get “credit” for something named 
“Humanities”?), are the practical needs for digital access, stor-
age, archiving, and space. The UCLA administration involves DH 
faculty and staff in committees dealing with digital infrastruc-
tural needs, but actual realization remains painfully slow. On the 
bright side, the UCLA library is a major partner in DH, providing 
expertise as well as space.
InteRvIew 10
Opening the depths, not sliding on 
surfaces
N. Katherine Hayles
N. Katherine Hayles is a pioneer in the field of digi-
tal media and digital literature studies and the 
author various milestone studies. With books such 
as How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in 
Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (1999) and 
My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and 
Literary Texts (2005) she explores the liberal human-
ist concept of the “natural self” in the age of intelli-
gent machines; with books such as Writing Machines 
(2002) and Electronic Literature: New Horizons for 
the Literary (2008) she draws attention to various 
forms of digital literature and offerey examples of its 
close reading; with her book How We Think. Digital 
Media and Contemporary Technogenesis (2012) and 
the co-edited collection Comparative Textual Media. 
Transforming the Humanities in the Postprint Era 
(2013) she discusses the issues of contemporary tech-
nogenesis and the future of Digital Humanities. N. 
Katherine Hayles is the James B. Duke Professor of 
Literature at Duke University.
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N. Katherine Hayles discusses the advantages of social and algo-
rithmic reading and reaffirms the value of deep reading; she 
doubts media literacy requires media abstinence; she underlines 
the importance of the Humanities for ‘understanding and inter-
vening’ in society but questions the idolized ‘rhetoric of “resis-
tance”’ and she weights the real problems facing the Digital 
Humanities against unfounded fears.
Roberto Simanowski:  You have been writing extensively and 
from early on about digital or electronic literature combin-
ing a theoretical discussion with case studies. In addition you 
are the co-editor of Electronic Literature Collection 1 published 
in 2006. How would you sum up the history of digital or elec-
tronic literature?
N. Katherine Hayles: Since I first became engaged with elec-
tronic literature in the early 1990’s, the predominant tendency 
I have seen is its continuing diversity. As digital platforms and 
softwares have diversified and proliferated into cell phones, tab-
lets, iPods, etc., so have the forms and content of digital litera-
tures. The hybrid productions of Jason Nelson combining liter-
ary and game forms, the short fictions of M. A. Coverley written 
for the Excel format, the combination of real-world and fictional 
content by Shelley Jackson in Skin and by Scott Rettberg and 
Nick Montfort in Implementation, and many other experimental 
ventures indicate how robust and exciting digital literature has 
become, especially compared to its relative modest beginnings 
as Storyspace hypertexts. Social networks have provided other 
opportunities for experimentation, for example Twitter fictions 
that stretch over many tweets, functioning like electronic ver-
sions of the old BurmaShave signs along country roads.
RS: Since multi-linear writing within Storyspace in the early 
1990s, the Internet and mobile media have further changed the 
way we read. Apps such as readmill, for example, allow immedi-
ate dialogue about a text amongst its readers; electronic books 
facilitate the analysis of how a reader reacts to a text: i.e. where 
she stops, what passages she skips, what notes she makes. How 
will social reading change the way we perceive literature in 
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electronic media? How will the algorithmic reading of such read-
ing affect the writing of literature?
NKH: Social reading expands and facilitates reading practices 
that have been going on for some time, in classrooms, book 
clubs, blogs and elsewhere. I think it is an exciting develop-
ment, as one can now share one’s impressions of a text in close 
to real time with colleagues across the world. Algorithmic read-
ing is also exciting, since it allows us to ask questions impossi-
ble before, especially queries concerning large corpora of texts. 
Nevertheless, we should not interpret algorithmic reading as 
the death of interpretation. How one designs the software, and 
even more, how one interprets and understands the patterns 
that are revealed, remain very much interpretive activities. 
Moreover, many algorithmic readings are carried out in tan-
dem with hermeneutic interpretation in the traditional sense. An 
example is the close reading that Allen Riddell and I give of Mark 
Danielewski’s Only Revolutions in my book How We Think.
RS: In his 2008 article ‘Is Google making us stupid?’ and later 
in his 2011 book The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to 
Our Brains, Nicholas Carr discusses the consequences of online 
media for literacy. From Carr’s perspective, multitasking and 
power browsing online make people unlearn deep reading with 
the effects being carried offline, with the result that they also 
unlearn deep thinking. The shift from deep attention to hyper 
attention has been announced and bemoaned by many intellectu-
als. The French philosopher Bernard Stiegler even speaks of a 
threat to social and cultural development caused by the destruc-
tion of young people’s ability to develop deep and critical atten-
tion to the world around them. You take issue with Carr’s conclu-
sions in your book How We Think. On the other hand Stiegler, in 
his 2010 book Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, refers 
to your report that students are no longer able to engage in deep 
reading. What role is the cultural technique of reading going 
to play if power browsing, multitasking, and permanent online 
connectivity make the long-established contemplative reading 
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session increasingly obsolete? How will and how should litera-
ture and literary studies react to this process?
NKH: As Carr acknowledges, the web brings powerful advan-
tages, including to scholarship. I am old enough to remember 
what it was like to do research when one had to rely on type-
writers and card catalogues; not for a minute would I want to 
return to those methods! Even Stiegler, who in Taking Care of 
Youth and the Generations has mostly a denunciatory tone, in his 
newer A New Critique of Political Economy sees hyper attention 
as a Derridean pharmakon, poison and cure together.  Clearly 
the problem here is how to maximize the web’s potential for seri-
ous intellectual work and minimize its potential for superficial-
ity and distraction.  Stiegler’s position, as stated in a lecture he 
gave at the SLSA conference in 2011, is that we should focus on 
“adoption, not adaptation”—in other words, we should wherever 
possible limit access to the “entertainment complex,” including 
the web, to prevent the kind of technogenetic changes I describe 
in How We Think, especially for young people and children where 
neural plasticity is the greatest.
RS: Media abstinence as part of media literacy in an Adornian 
like way? Stiegler’s proposal seems unlikely given the ubiquity 
of digital media and entertainment. At least it appeals to parents 
and teachers to oversee the younger generations’s media use.
NKH: While Stiegler’s approach of “adoption—no!” may be fea-
sible for very young pre-schoolers, it becomes ineffective, and 
probably impossible, for children older than five as they become 
exposed to school, classmates, and other influences outside of 
the home. Moreover, it assumes that media immersion is entirely 
negative, and many researchers (Steven Johnson, James Paul 
Gee) make persuasive cases for some good effects, from acquir-
ing hand-eye coordination to gaining a more sophisticated sense 
of strategy and planning. If we now turn to deep attention, we 
can see that from the beginning, the tradition of deep attention 
required the support and nurturing of institutions—intellectual 
discourse and an educated elite in classical Greece, monasteries 
in the Middle Ages, debate and writing in the Renaissance, etc. 
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So it is in the contemporary period as well. The role of educa-
tors at every level, from kindergarten through graduate school, 
should be to make connections between contemporary practices, 
for example browsing and surfing the web, and the disciplined 
acquisition of knowledge. The difference is having an intellec-
tual context for questions and seeking for all the rich resources 
that can contribute to understanding those questions more 
deeply, seeing their implications more fully, and moving tenta-
tively toward answers adequate to these complexities. Instead 
of “adoption, not adaption,” my slogan would be “opening the 
depths, not sliding on surfaces.”
RS: In your book How We Think you discuss the future of the 
Humanities with respect to digital media. Your conclusion is that 
Traditional Humanities ‘are at risk of becoming marginal to the 
main business of the contemporary academy and society.’ Digital 
Humanities, on the other hand, you add ‘are at risk of becoming 
a trade practice held captive by the interest of corporate capital-
ism.’ This prospect about the future of Humanities sounds like a 
choice between Charybdis and Scylla.  How can the Humanities 
survive the digital turn without dying?
NKH: The Humanities, as I understand them, are above all 
about understanding and intervening in the cultural, social, 
technological and intellectual contexts throughout history that 
have shaped what people want, what they consider important, 
and what moves them to action. These questions are as vitally 
necessary now as they have ever been. For the past few decades, 
as we know, the Humanities have been immersed in the critique 
of dominant institutions. While this has lead to important intel-
lectual developments such as deconstruction, postmodernism, 
and posthumanism, it has also had deleterious effects as well, 
tending to isolate the Humanities from the wider culture and 
tending toward a rhetoric of “resistance” so widely accepted that 
the mere idea of “resistance” is idolized without thinking seri-
ously about consequences and the assumptions undergirding it, 
including the ways in which humanists are complicit in the very 
practices they criticize.
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One of the sites where these forces are currently in play is in 
the Digital Humanities. There are plenty of problems facing the 
Digital Humanities: technical (e.g., distinguishing patterns from 
chimeras in data analysis); cultural (e.g., defining significant 
problems rather than ones tailored to chasing grants); economic 
(being coopted by corporate funding to the extent that pedagogi-
cal and educational priorities are undercut); and ethical (e.g., 
power relations between professors and graduate students). 
However, when people talk about the “Dark Side of the Digital 
Humanities” (the subject of an MLA panel 2013), these kinds of 
problems are often not what they mean. Rather, what they more 
likely have in mind are the disparity in funding between the 
Traditional and Digital Humanities; the fear that data analysis 
may displace traditional criticism; and (as I heard Stanley Fish 
assert on a panel we shared) analysis without interpretation, as 
if data and text mining were simply machine functions without 
human understanding. In my view, these fears either reflect a 
misunderstanding of algorithmic methods (in Stanley Fish’s 
case) or envy about the relatively abundant funding streams 
that the Digital Humanities enjoy, neither of which is a well-
founded critique.
RS: The opposition of algorithmic analysis and interpretation 
may be shortsighted as is the competition between database 
and narrative for the ‘exclusive right to make meaning out of 
the world’ that Lev Manovich announced more than a decade 
ago. As you point out in your book, database and narrative are 
natural symbionts rather than natural enemies considering nar-
ratives ‘the necessary others to database’s ontology.’ However, 
if Stephen Ramsay calls for “algorithmic criticism” as a way to 
supplement and balance algorithmic processing by hermeneu-
tic activity, he also responds to Franco Moretti’s provocative 
request to replace interpretation by data mining, i.e. close by 
distant reading. Also, there is a call for „engaged humanities” 
making a contribution to the quality of human life through pro-
ductive knowledge (as for example in Cathy N. Davidson’s and 
David Theo Goldberg’s 2004 essay Engaging the Humanities). 
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This seems to counter the concept of humanities as a necessary 
correction of the positivistic paradigm of the natural and engi-
neering sciences in society with the principle of ambiguity (as 
advocated for example by German philosopher Odo Marquard 
in his 1986 essay On the inevitability of the humanities). In 
Marquard’s perspective the function of Humanities in society is 
a rhetoric of resistance not (only or first of all) towards institu-
tions but (also and moreover) to signification and Truth. In this 
light, interpretation after data mining is mandatory not to verify 
meaning but rather to destabilize it. How valid, do you think, is 
this concept of the humanities still with respect to the ongoing 
quantitative turn in the Humanties?
NKH: I think the opposition between interpretation and data 
mining is somewhat misguided. Data mining is not devoid of 
interpretive decisions; how one designs the software has every-
thing to do with underlying assumptions and presuppositions, 
which are forms of interpretive activity. Moreover, one should 
also not assume that data mining and text mining bear a simple 
relation to signification and truth. Often results are ambiguous, 
and judgment is needed to distinguish genuine patterns from chi-
mera and other artifacts of the way the analysis was carried out. 
As for meaning, isn’t it destabilized every time someone offers a 
new reading of a canonized text, or insists on the importance of 
a non-canonical one? I don’t see meaning as an accomplishment 
over and done once and for all, but rather a continuing search 
that contains moments of meta-stability as well as moments of 
destabilizations. This kind of ferment is what keeps the humani-
ties relevant and constantly renewing themselves.  Would it even 
be possible constantly to destabilize, without ever positing or 
hoping for or arguing for some kind of stabilization? Even if one 
thinks destabilizations should be constant, isn’t this a kind of sta-
bilization in itself? In my view, we should think carefully about 
the kinds of problems mentioned above and their implications for 
pedagogy, for example, the necessity for a deeper understanding 
of statistical methods and their relation to the results of data and 
text mining. As the Humanities move into “Big Data,” they might 
272 Interview 10
usefully engage with scientific disciplines that have been dealing 
with these problems for some time.
RS: So you rather see a bright side of the Digital Humanities?
NKH: As mentioned above, I find the prospects for asking new 
kinds of questions using data and text mining techniques excit-
ing, and I am fascinated by what Jeffrey Schnapp and Todd 
Presner have called Digital Humanities 2.0, in which they call for 
a shift from analytical methods to an experiential focus. I can 
see their point, but in my view, the two approaches (analytical 
vs. experiential) are complementary to one another rather than 
antagonistic. I find the antagonism between the Traditional and 
Digital Humanities, understandable as it may be, also misplaced. 
In a collection of essays that I co-edited with Jessica Pressman, 
entitled Comparative Textual Media: Transforming the Humanities 
in the Postprint Era (2013), we suggest that a better way forward 
is to embrace a media framework as the basis for teaching and 
research rather than now-obsolete and cumbersome categories 
such as centuries, genres, and national languages. Such a trans-
formation, focusing on the specificities of media and practice-
based research combining hands-on experience with theoretical 
work, would re-energize traditional research as well as provid-
ing a basis on which scholars specializing in print, manuscript 
and orality could engage fruitfully with those specializing in 
digital methods.
InteRvIew 11
From writing space to designing 
mirrors
Jay David Bolter
Jay David Bolter is well known as the author and co-
author of important books on the subject of digital 
technology, culture and aesthetics: Turing’s Man: 
Western Culture in the Computer Age (1984); Writing 
Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of 
Writing (1991); Remediation: Understanding New 
Media (1999, with Richard Grusin); Windows and 
Mirrors (2003, with Diane Gromala). In addition to 
writing about new media, Bolter collaborates in the 
construction of new digital media forms and created, 
for example, together with Michael Joyce Storyspace, 
a pre WWW hypertext authoring system. Bolter is the 
Wesley Chair of New Media at the Georgia Institute 
of Technology and a co-Director of the Augmented 
Environments Lab. He works closely with Prof. Blair 
MacIntyre, Prof. Maria Engberg, and other AEL 
researchers on the design of augmented and mixed 
reality experiences for cultural heritage, informal 
education, and expression and entertainment.
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Jay David Bolter talks about the (missing) embrace of digital 
media by the literary and academic community, about hypertext 
as a (failing) promise of a new kind of reflective praxis, about 
transparent (immediate) and reflected (hypermediate) technol-
ogy. He compares the aesthetics of information with the aesthet-
ics of spectacle in social media and notes the collapse of hierar-
chy and centrality in culture in the context of digital media.
Prelude
Roberto Simanowski: What is your favored neologism of digital 
media culture and why?
Jay David Bolter: I am not sure that I have a favorite neither in a 
positive or negative sense. Such neologisms as hacktivism, slack-
tivism and crowdsourcing are all in current circulation; they all 
represent contemporary views of our media culture.  Insofar that 
is the case, we have to accept them (not necessarily of course 
to use them ourselves).  Rather then selecting favorites, a more 
appropriate task would be to understand the underlying reasons 
why culture seems to need to create new vocabulary. One such 
term that I would nominate for study is “collective intelligence.” 
It captures a major preoccupation today, the notion that as a net-
worked digital culture we can achieve a level of knowledge pro-
duction that is not possible for an individual and indeed is of a 
different order from the kind of knowledge that was produced in 
earlier media era.
RS: If you could go back in history of new media and digital cul-
ture in order to prevent something from happening or somebody 
from doing something, what or who would it be?
JDB: I am really not keen to rewrite the history of digital culture. 
I don’t trust my own hindsight much more than I do my ability to 
anticipate future developments. When I think of the history of 
my own engagement with digital culture, however, it is clear that 
I often failed to grasp the importance of two key developments 
in digital media. The first was the advent of networked hyper-
text and the WWW, whose significance I didn’t appreciate until 
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it was well underway in the 1990s.  The second was the advent of 
social media, where I was again late to the party. Both Web 1.0 
and Web 2.0 were phenomena that I did not anticipate. My only 
consolation here is that many others failed to appreciate the sig-
nificance of the digital even longer than I. For example, the liter-
ary community failed utterly to engage with digital media in the 
1990s (despite the increasingly importance of the WWW). Indeed 
even today the literary community remains reluctant to explore 
the possibilities that digital media offer.
RS: This failure was indeed surprising given the fact that with 
its hypertextual and multimedial techniques digital media 
offered very interesting forms of experimental writing. But the 
new literary genre that was announced quite early in academic 
journals (I remember Richard Ziegfeld’s essay Interactive Fiction 
in New Literary History in 1989) never really took off. You were 
one of the earliest academics to write about new technologies of 
reading and writing. In your 1991 book Writing Space you dis-
cuss hypertext as “both a visual and a verbal representation”, 
not writing of a place, “but rather a writing with places“ and you 
reveal the link between hypertext and the literary movement of 
concrete poetry, a kind of poetry in space („Poesie der Fläche“) 
as its German proponent Franz Mon once called it. I remember 
how in the late 1990s at conferences people were convinced of 
a bright future of hyperfictions as a literary genre once it grew 
in popularity. However, soon academics – such as Marie-Laure 
Ryan in her 2001 book Narrative as Virtual Reality. Immersion 
and Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media – addressed 
the internal aesthetic problem of multi-linear writing and recom-
mended to “tame” hyperfiction by offering a more simple struc-
ture with more self-contained lexias, i.e. narrative episodes. The 
subversion of the cohesive structure of the text and the lack of 
authorial control over the readers’ navigation was obviously too 
different from the thoroughly choreographed non-linear nar-
ration and unreliable narrators that the postmodern poetics at 
that time proposed. I remember how we both, over a drink at the 
Electronic Poetry Festival in Paris 2007, expected much more 
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openness for experiments with digital technology from artists 
than from the literary community. Was it wrong to suppose the 
literary community to be more embracing towards digital media?
JDB: I think that even in the 1980s and 1990s the literary com-
munity was predisposed to be more aesthetically conservative 
than the art community. Look at the rather radical broadening of 
the definition of art in the decades since the 1960s: performance 
art, installation art, media art. The experiments of the historical 
avant-garde of the 1910s and 1920s and the neo-avant-garde in 
the 1950s and 1960s had eventually affected the community as 
a whole. In the case of literature, postmodern writers were sel-
dom as radical in their aesthetic revolt from modernism as were 
the visual artists. There were of course the concrete poets, lan-
guage poets, Oulipo, and so on. But such groups were never more 
than small avant-gardes. Postmodern writers such as Thomas 
Pynchon were after all quite traditional in comparison with per-
formance artists such as Carolee Schneemann. Thus, even in the 
1990s “serious” writers could not imagine rethinking the (print-
based) assumptions that lay behind their work. Those assump-
tions included the fixity of the text and authorial control over the 
text, both of which hypertext challenged.
RS: In Writing Space you discuss the relationship between the 
new form of nonlinear writing and the theory of interpretation 
promoted by Wolfgang Iser and Stanley Fish in the 1960s and 
also point out a philosophical correlation: namely that between 
hypertext and postmodern theory, which your colleague George 
P. Landow from Brown University at the same time proclaimed 
in the subtitle of his book on hypertext as Convergence of 
Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology. A quarter of a 
century later postmodern theory has lost its appeal, its relativ-
isms and transcendental homelessness are hard to endure, peo-
ple yearn for reliable values and even Grand Narratives again. 
However, the ‘postmodern technology’ has remained and has 
fundamental effects on our individual and social life. How do 
you see the situation today with respect of your observations and 
expectations of 25 years ago?
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JDB: When I look back at Writing Space and my work from that 
period I think I would have to characterize my position as inno-
cent opportunistic. I was attempting to read the new possibilities 
of the digital technology into the framework of contemporary lit-
erary and critical analysis. I was doing this in an effort to talk 
to an academic community for whom that kind of analysis was 
the common currency. So it was natural enough to look at these 
new forms of non-linear writing that seemed to be promoted by 
digital hypertext in terms of reader response theory by Wolfgang 
Iser and Stanley Fish, in terms of even deconstruction or other 
forms of post-structuralist interpretation. Like George Landow 
in his book on hypertext I too felt that this was a legitimate way 
of understanding what hypertext was doing, because I myself 
was immersed in that same critical theoretical framework.
But that strategy didn’t work very well at the time because 
the community was not really ready to accept the notion that dig-
ital technology could be a new medium of literary expression and 
academic analysis, that it could in some sense take a position 
aside the printed book. And therefore they saw the attempt to 
appropriate the reader response theory, deconstruction and so 
on a kind of misguided or even reductive understanding of what 
post-structuralist theory was trying to do. Ultimately they were 
right in a certain sense, because post-structuralism too was con-
ditioned by the contemporary, still print-based media culture. 
The notions of  the indeterminacy of the text, the death of the 
author, intertextuality and so on— all these notions depended for 
their ironic effect on the fact that text were fixed in print and 
did have identifiable authors and the authority of the publication 
system. In any case, and for whatever reason, the community 
refused to listen. Neither the academic community of literary 
scholars nor the community of writers found digital technology 
interesting. And neither of them saw that hypertext in particular 
could be a new communicative and expressive form they needed 
to engage with. So given that they weren’t prepared to engage 
with the technology it was futile to try to provide a critical, theo-
retical basis for that engagement. The think that strikes me is 
278 Interview 11
that the literary community has still today refused to engage 
with the digital.
The whole line of argument that I was making in that period 
about hypertext has been superseded in a variety of ways by mul-
tiple forms of media that digital technology has developed into, 
by new modes of interaction and by the advent of a huge com-
munity of participants in media culture that didn’t exist in the 
early 1990s. So with all those changes, looking back it doesn’t 
seem as if there is much left of the notion that hypertext could 
be a new form of writing. To put it another way: The kind of liter-
ary hypertext culture we were envisioning never happened. On 
the other hand the popularization of hypertext in the form of the 
WWW and all the technologies that developed out of the WWW 
have been proven to be a tremendous success and have really 
changed our media culture in significant ways. That’s a triumph 
of hypertext, but it is a triumph of hypertext not limited to or 
even addressed by the academic community.
Media Literacy
RS: An unexpected triumph and maybe an unwelcomed one. 
This at least is the question if one considers the contemporary 
concerns about hyper-reading which popular writers – such as 
Nicholas Carr in his 2011 book The Shallows – What the Internet 
is Doing to Our Brains – but also academics – for example 
Katherine N. Hayles in her 2007 article in Profession “Hyper and 
Deep Attention: The Generational Divide in Cognitive Modes” – 
address as a potential threat to deep reading. Doesn’t the hyper-
textual technique – of multiple offers to leave the text at hand 
for another one – practice a form of nervous, inpatient reading 
unable to engage in one particular issue? Doesn’t hyper-reading 
– if it discourages a sustained engagement with the text – ulti-
mately also hinder deep thinking? This grim picture is quite the 
opposite of what was expected from hypertext technology in the 
1990s when the structure of the variable cross-linkages not only 
was celebrated as liberation from the ‘tyranny of the author’ but 
also welcomed as destabilization of the signifier and as emphasis 
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on the ambivalence and relativity of propositions. Hypertext was 
seen as an ally in the efforts to promote and practice reflection. 
Today hypertext technology and its cultural equivalent hyper-
reading are rather seen – for instance by the French philoso-
pher Bernard Stiegler – as collaborators of the culture industry. 
Did this promising technology betray us? Is Hypertext a Trojan 
Horse appearing as a tool of critical thinking while actually 
undermining it?
JDB: My view of this issue is more fatalistic or more accepting of 
the inevitability of certain kinds of cultural change. First of all, 
yes, the predictions hat we were making for hypertext as a new 
kind of reflective praxis didn’t come true. Literary hypertext 
never became a generalized cultural form of expression. What 
we did get was the WWW, where linking was unidirectional and 
for many of the first generation hypertext writers a simplifica-
tion and reduction that in fact didn’t foster reflective practice. 
But it was tremendously successful incorporating visual and 
audio forms into writing as never before creating a much larger 
set of communities of writers and that was true even in the 
1990s when writing on the web meant designing your own web-
site and became exponentially more the case in the 2000s with 
the advent of social media.
So that is the fact of contemporary media culture. In response 
to this fact of extraordinary broadening of participation but also 
the changing of writing forms that constitute that participation 
we have a set of academics and popular writers who are deeply 
critical to what happened like Nicholas Carr’s popularization 
of this point of view that writing and reading are changing our 
brains to make it less reflective. The academic community has 
agreed in its own way with this judgment, at least the older, more 
traditional academics, for example Stanley Fish, Jonathan Culler 
and many others have written negatively about the new form of 
reading that seems to be practiced in the digital realm nowadays.
I would say that the criticism is both right and wrong. Right in 
the sense that it certainly does seem to be the case that the kind 
of writing and reading that was highly valued in the age of print 
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were different and there was a kind of valorization of reflec-
tive or deep or close reading. That is clearly not being practiced 
by the huge community of readers and writers on social media 
today. But does this mean that close or reflective reading has 
disappeared? No, there is still a community that practices that 
form of writing and reading. It is still welcomed, indeed required 
as a kind of ticket of entry into the literary academic commu-
nity. But what happened is that this form of reflective reading 
and writing no longer has the status and claim to centrality that 
it had in the 20th century. So instead of a single community of 
readers and writers we have an interlocking set of communities 
of readers and writers, some much larger than others none of 
which can claim a kind of centrality or importance that eclipses 
the other. So what the critics really are complaining about is the 
loss of centrality of certain ways of reading and writing.
RS: Your account of the situation may be fatalistic, as you said, 
but doesn’t strike me as very pessimistic. Rather you address the 
claim of centrality and invite us to be open to several forms of 
practices of reading and writing. However, if one formerly dom-
inant mode becomes decentralized it is not certain that after-
wards importance is equally distributed among more candidates 
or cultural techniques. More often in history – of social move-
ments as well as media development – we see a recentralization 
of power and importance. Of course, for the issue at hand, even 
this must not be bad. In fact, one could argue that a non-linear 
reading which is more attuned to multi-tasking and serendipity 
allows easier for productive (mis)understandings and intuitive 
intelligence.
However, I have the feeling you are more concerned about the 
loss of reflection in the culture of the 21st century than you are 
willing to admit. This is at least my impression when looking at 
your 2003 book Windows and Mirrors: Interaction Design, Digital 
Art, and the Myth of Transparency, which you co-author with 
your colleague at in the School of Literature, Communication, 
and Culture at Georgia Tech University Diane Gromala. In this 
book you describe the positions of the two professions of graphic 
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designers and HCI professionals with the metaphors window 
and mirror: the transparent versus the reflected technology. 
This extends the distinction between immediacy and hyperme-
diacy from Remediation. Understanding New Media (1999), the 
book you co-wrote with Richard Grusin. Like Grusin, who since 
then has become increasingly critical towards the significance 
of digital technology to our culture (he speaks of a “dark side” 
of the Digital Humanities) you are equally skeptical of the pos-
sible pitfalls of digital media in Windows and Mirrors request-
ing an approach to design that turns digital media into an object 
of reflection rather than making them transparent. To play the 
ignorant: Why should we be afraid of the disappearance of the 
computer through transparent interfaces? Don’t we also want 
letters to be invisible so we can reflect on what the text says 
rather than on how it looks like?
JDB: First let me say that I don’t think there is any danger of the 
disappearance of the computer. The notion of the transparent 
interface and the disappearing computer is one that we can see 
most prevalent in interface design in the 1990s and indeed still 
today. But in fact what is happening belies the notion that our 
digital technologies are burying themselves into the world. The 
internet of things, ubiquitous computing, these are technological 
and cultural manifestations that are growing in importance. But 
the computer as a platform for media is in fact not disappearing 
at all. If we look around we see the last thing that people want 
to do is their technology to disappear. They want it to be seen. 
People buy the iPhone because it’s a beautiful object which then 
can also be a status symbol that they can proudly present to oth-
ers. We see these media devices everywhere and not at all bury-
ing themselves.
Secondly there has always been a dichotomy between visibil-
ity or invisibility, or what Richard and I called between hyper-
mediacy and immediacy in the history of media culture. Even 
in the age of print after all we saw both manifestations. Indeed 
when the typography makes the medium as transparent as pos-
sible at the same time we have the tradition of the artist book, 
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advertising, graphic design in which the way that a text looks is 
what the text says.
RS: Combining your first and second notion I would say: Yes, 
people also used (and some maybe still do) books as a status sym-
bol furnishing their home with them but still preferring the book 
itself to be transparent so they have direct access to the world 
behind the interface. Art books are the exception in the world of 
books. Why should this be different in the realm of digital media?
JDB: Digital transmission and presentation is indeed used for 
all sorts of communication. Often the user does simply want to 
get the gist of the text or view an image. But a number of fac-
tors contribute to a stronger emphasis, at least at present, on 
hypermediacy in the digital realm. One of the most important 
(and most remarked) factors, is the tendency to process multiple 
channels at the same time. A typical user may be moving back 
and forth among open windows or multiple apps on her phone. 
While she is reading or interacting with one window or app, she 
may focus on the context displayed. But each time she moves 
from one to another, she becomes aware again of the multiplic-
ity that her media environment offers her. The multitasking is of 
course exactly what traditionalists such as Nicholas Carr criti-
cize about our use of computers, claiming that it destroys our 
ability to concentrate. Whether that is true or not, the critics are 
right in suggesting that this mode of consumption diverges from 
the traditional practice of reading in the age of print. In the age 
of print one did tend to read only one book, magazine, or news-
paper at a time.
Art and Aesthetics
RS: Windows and Mirrors considers digital art as the corrective 
to the assumption that the computer should disappear. Hence, 
art seems to be an inevitable part of any media literacy precisely 
because, by its very nature, art draws attention to the language 
system it employs. Digital art thus makes us aware of how digital 
technology works on a semiotic as well as cultural level. Would 
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you then, if you were a minister of education, make art to the 
center of any courses on media literacy?
JDB: Given the position that I take in my new book concerning 
the current state of media culture, it would be hypocritical of me 
as a minister of education to try to dictate anything about art 
and media literacy. I don’t think there can be a coherent policy 
because such a policy would be predicated on an ultimate goal 
or standard to which our community as a whole could subscribe. 
There is no universal agreement on a standard.  In the case of 
art, the term has become so vague as to be almost meaningless: 
it is now applied to most any activity of making. The kind of criti-
cal art that I discussed in Windows and Mirrors has significance 
only for a particular community.
RS: “The internet once belonged exclusively to the 
Structuralists”, you write in Windows and Mirrors, describing 
this community as composed mostly of graduate students and 
professors in computer science with a culture “highly developed 
in mathematics but not in art”. Many people may of course not 
see the lack of art as deficit. However, as somebody who, after 
the tenth grade, decided to let his mathematical skills die and 
rather pursued his interest in literature and art I am prone to 
agree with your perspective. Nevertheless, or rather for that rea-
son, I want to play the devil’s advocate by considering the opposi-
tion of structuralists and designers as one between information 
and spectacle. Let me explain what I mean by this and mention 
some sources that make me think this way.
My reference are three texts from the 1990 about the “break-
out of the visual” in the digital world, as you – this is my first text 
– write in your 1996 essay “Ekphrasis, Virtual Reality, and the 
Future of Writing.” In multimedia, you observe, the relationship 
between word and image is becoming as unstable as it is in the 
popular press, where images are no longer subordinate to the 
word and “we are no longer certain that words deserve the cul-
tural authority they have been given”. Three years later, Robert 
Coover, also a very early advocate of hypertext and hyperfiction, 
declared the passing of its golden age. The constant threat of 
284 Interview 11
hypermedia, Coover wrote, is “to suck the substance out of a 
work of lettered art, reduce it to surface spectacle.” One element 
of this aesthetics of the spectacle is the “post-alphabetic text”, 
a term which Matthew Kirschenbaum 1999 in a paper entitled 
The Other End of Print: David Carson, Graphic Design, and the 
Aesthetics of Media used to describe David Carson’s design style 
that “refashions information as an aesthetic event.” Carson rep-
resents the shift from the reader to the sensualist even before 
the takeoff of digital media in design and typography between 
the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. His counterpart in the digital 
world may be Macromedia’s Flash, the opposition to any icono-
clastic position and the enemy of all hardcore structuralists.
The arrival of Flash may – despite Lev Manovich’s descrip-
tion of the Generation Flash as neo-minimalists – be seen as the 
return of the baroque logic of mannerism, spectacle and sen-
sory experiences also into the digital world, which had been 
announced by some scholars in the early 2000s, i.e. Andrew 
Darley (Visual Digital Culture: Surface Play and Spectacle in 
New Media Genres, 2000) or Angela Ndalianis (Neo-Baroque 
Aesthetics and Contemporary Entertainment, 2004). As Windows 
and Mirrors notes, in June 2002 even Nielsen declared his collab-
oration with Macromedia Flash and Norman muses about emo-
tional design. Is this the overcoming of an unproductive oppo-
sition or rather the surrendering of text-purists to the power 
of the visual? You note in Windows and Mirrors that the goal is 
“to establish an appropriate rhythm between being transparent 
and reflective” and write: “No matter how flashy, every digital 
design must convey a message to its viewer and user.” And to 
be sure, your book advertises the reflective rather than the sen-
sory. How do you see the situation today? Did more Flash bring 
more mirrors?
JDB: Like all analytic dichotomies (since Hegel?), my dichotomy 
between structuralists and designers can at best serve to indi-
cate the ends of more nuanced spectrum. What we see today in 
our media economy, and even on the Web and other Internet-
media services is a range of relationships between information 
Jay David Bolter 285
and spectacle. As we noted above, web-based practices have not 
rendered obsolete the desire for the transparency of information. 
If the spectrum of possible practices extends from pure informa-
tion (whatever that might be) at one end to pure surface spec-
tacle (again if that is possible) on the other, then we see an enor-
mous range in the middle. Highly designed web sites still exist, 
but the templates of social networking sites such as Facebook 
constitute a messy compromise between information and spec-
tacle. Even Nielsen was not entirely wrong when he predicted 
the return of textual interfaces. After all, text messages and 
Twitter are among the most popular digital practices today, and 
they consist of nothing but alphabetic symbols and links. The 
baroque impulse toward spectacle and sensory experience today 
seems to be in a state of permanent but productive tension with 
the impulse for structured representation and communication.
RS: Messy compromise between information and spectacle is a 
great description for what is going on on Facebook. I would even 
go further and consider most of the updates – even if textual – in 
the light of spectacle rather than information or “phatic commu-
nication” as the linguistic term reads communication for commu-
nication’s sake. The deeper meaning of the shallow sharing, how-
ever, may be the desire to hand over the burden of experience to 
others to whom our experience naturally is no trouble at all but 
an information which can easily be ‘processed’ via likes, shares 
and one word comments. The psychological explanation for this 
outsourcing of experience is, I would argue, that we can’t endure 
the present time because we can no longer anchor it within a 
timeline that connects our past and our future in a meaningful 
way – which in a way resembles the baroque experience of being 
out of center brought by the Copernican system. But this per-
spective is my own idiosyncratic approach which needs to be jus-
tified at length elsewhere. For our conversation at hand I want 
to move to your next book, The Digital Plenitude, planned for 
2016 with MIT Press. This book discusses the status of art and 
culture in an era of digital media. What will be the main thesis 
of your book?
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JDB: The goal of my book is to examine two developments in the 
second half of the 20th century that I think have helped to define 
our media culture in the 21st century. One of them is the advent 
of digital media, websites, video games, social media, mobile 
media and all the remediation of so called traditional media like 
film and print that now appear in digital form. Digital media are 
everywhere and they provoke our constant interest and atten-
tion. The other development is the end of our collective belief 
in Culture with a capital c. The collapse of the agreed on hier-
archy in the visual arts, music, literature and scholarship and 
even politics. This collapse is a sort of open secret in the sense 
that we all know implicitly that it is happening. But many of us 
are unwilling to acknowledge the consequences of it. Many of 
us write about media culture today in a way that seems to be 
determined to ignore that history, taking extreme positions see-
ing digital media either as utopia or dystopia and utopias and 
dystopias are always measured in terms of implicit cultural stan-
dards. So when we examine the period that with digital culture 
has arisen we see that this change in our attitude towards cul-
ture interacts in very interesting ways with digital media. I think 
we can see the breakdown of hierarchy and centrality in culture 
is happening throughout the 20th century, accelerating after the 
Second World War. At the same time that the computer is being 
invented but prior to the advent of digital media, in the 1950 and 
1960s, we see strong forces to promote what was called popular 
culture. Not only the rise of the economic status of rock music, 
popular films, comic books, television shows but also an increas-
ing sense that these media and cultural forms are legitimately 
important in ways that we used to accord only to high literary 
and high artistic forms.
These two important streams or phenomena – the rise of pop 
culture and the development of digital media – interact in all 
sorts of interesting ways today so that digital media become a 
matrix for this cultural condition that we have today in which 
instead of a center we have a plentitude of cultural communities 
each with their own sets of standards and practices, interlock-
ing, overlapping, conflicting, competing in various ways. What 
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I want to do in this book is to explore some of the ramifications 
what it means to live in the age of such plentitude in which we 
can no longer say this is the right form of reading, this is the 
most important form of music, this is the function of art. All 
these kinds of assertions have moved from a discussion of our 
culture as a whole to a discussion within the communities.
RS: A very postmodern perspective, I think, that applies the 
insights of postmodern philosophy that there is not the one right 
way to see or do things to aesthetic taste and cultural techniques.
JDB: I think we can now see looking back that those were right 
who saw postmodernism as the continuation of modernism in 
other terms. The concerns that postmodernism had, even when 
postmodernists pretended to be incorporating popular culture 
into their analysis, it was still the case that postmodernism was 
really exploring the final gasp of elite modernist culture. And 
right now we see that that expiration has come to its conclusion, 
that we really are at the end of modernism. And this is what that 
end looks like, not the triumph of a new ism but a multiplicity – or 
cacophony from a modernist perspective – of different forms and 
aesthetics and assumptions about the function of art and cul-
tural expressions that are not reconciled or reconcilable.
RS: I like your notion of the contamination of postmodernism 
with modernism. Even though the postmodern attitude – as 
Frederic Jameson holds in his 1988 essay Postmodernism and 
Consumer Society – replaced parody (which always implies to 
know it better) with irony and pastiche (as the helpless approval 
of “anything goes”), Lyotard’s aesthetics of the sublime certainly 
still contains the idea of emancipation – and if only by stop-
ping the consumption of meaning. Your answer makes me won-
der whether if not hypertext has been the practical equivalent 
to postmodern theory, digital media at least turns out to be the 
fulfillment of the postmodern impulse? But let me come back to 
your notion of a plentitude of cultural communities each with 
their own sets of standards and practices. You say these com-
munities overlap, conflict, and compete in various ways. There 
are academics who are concerned that digital media is shifting 
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society more to the situation of closed communities that – as 
“echo chamber” and “daily we” – don’t overlap and conflict with 
each other anymore but rather simply end the discussion about 
the right set of cultural values and practice that exist in modern-
ism and even in postmodernism. Is the era of digital plenitude 
an era where “anything goes” consequently means “mind your 
own business”?
JDB: Let me say that this collapse of the center doesn’t look the 
same to all communities. In fact for many communities the cen-
ter is still there it happens to be co-extensive with the center of 
their own community. And if they look out at that confused media 
world they see chaos; they see the breakdown of culture as they 
understand it. That’s exactly what people like Nicholas Carr on 
the popular level or some conservative academics on the schol-
arly level are concerned about when they complain about the loss 
of reflective reading or the ability to think and make arguments. 
So I don’t believe that there is a future policy that can be pur-
sued to direct or guide the development of this interplay of media 
and culture that we see today. I think we just have to understand 
that within our own communities we can still act coherently with 
assumption about what kind of standards we have to pursue. 
But we have to understand that outside our community this dis-
course isn’t necessarily going to make much sense.
RS: I conclude that your book about digital plentitude is not a 
book about the abundance of data – or “big data” as the buzz-
word nowadays reads. I hence assume you see your work closer 
to “Digital Media Studies” than to “Digital Humanities”; pro-
vided you see a difference between both concepts.
JDB: For me the two terms denote different, though overlapping, 
fields and practices. DMS is connected with the longer tradition 
of media studies, as it was practiced by scholars such as Innis 
and McLuhan. That generation of writers and scholars educated 
the next generation, who explore the relationships among vari-
ous technologies and forms in our complex media economy today, 
including but not limited to digital media.  Media archeology is 
a branch of media studies. DH is a term that I associate with 
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a longstanding project of employing the computer to facilitate 
humanistic research: literary studies, text traditions, lexicog-
raphy, other kinds of archival work that had been done previ-
ously by hand. I realize that now DH has become a broad term 
for a whole range of different kinds of theoretical and practical 
engagements by humanists with digital media and digital cul-
ture activities.
InteRvIew 12
Digital knowledge, obsessive 
computing, short-termism and need for 
a negentropic Web
Bernard Stiegler
Bernard Stiegler is one of the most inspiring and 
important continental thinkers of today, an heir to 
Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida, 
but also to Simondon and Adorno. He is best known 
for his three volume Technics and Time on technol-
ogy and memory (in English 1998, 2009, 2010) but 
also for his other philosophical and political inter-
ventions in contemporary culture such as States of 
Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century 
(Engl.2015), What Makes Life Worth Living: On 
Pharmacology (Engl. 2013), For a New Critique of 
Political Economy (Engl. 2010). With his new series 
Automatic Society (the English edition of part 1 The 
Future of Work will be released in the Summer of 
2016) Stiegler systematically explores the social 
implications of digital technologies. Stiegler is the 
Director of the Department of Cultural Development 
at the Centre Georges-Pompidou and the founder 
of Ars Industrialis, a political and cultural group 
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advocating an “industrial economy of spirit” against 
the short-termism of capitalist consumer culture. 
In 2010 he started his own philosophy school in the 
small French town of Épineuil-le-Fleuriel open for 
lycée students in the region and doctoral students 
from all over France.
Bernard speaks about digital tertiary retention and the need for 
an epistemological revolution as well as new forms of doctoral 
studies and discusses the practice of ‘contributive categoriza-
tion,’ the ‘organology of transindividuation,’ ‘transindividuation 
of knowledge’ and individuation as negentropic activity. He calls 
for an ‘economy of de-proletarianization’ as an economy of care, 
compares the impact of the digital on the brain with heroin and 
expects the reorganization of the digital from the long-term civi-
lization in the East.
Media Literacy
Roberto Simanowski: In his pageant play The Rock (1934) T.S. 
Eliot writes: “Where is the Life we have lost in living? / Where is 
the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? / Where is the knowledge 
we have lost in information?” These critical questions resonate 
with a common thread in many of your texts regarding the evac-
uation of knowledge (connaissance) and know-how (savoir-faire), 
and the substitution of savoir vivre by ability to consume. Eliot’s 
complaint is informed by what Nietzsche called the death of God 
and Weber termed the disenchantment of the world. The next 
lines in the Eliot passage read: “The cycles of Heaven in twenty 
centuries / Bring us farther from God and nearer to the Dust.“ 
God is no criterion in your writing, dust somehow is. Rather 
than a return to religion you advertise a return to the critique 
of political economy and a re-reading of poststructuralism and 
its sources, Hegel and Marx. Schools and universities as institu-
tions where knowledge is taught and reason is formed play an 
important role in this regard. However, these institutions are at 
war with old and new media for attention as you discuss in your 
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new English book States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 
21st Century. Lets start with a very simple question: If you were 
the minister of education, what would be your first instruction?
Bernard Stiegler: First I would say, I need to become also 
the minister of science and research. Because first you have to 
change the way in which science is produced and the objects of 
science themselves. The problem is what I call tertiary retention 
and especially its new form: digital tertiary retention. Digital 
tertiary retention is transforming the conditions not only of the 
transmission of knowledge, but also of its elaboration and the 
tradition of scientific objects. All knowledge, including everyday 
life knowledge, what in French is called savoir vivre, as well as 
practical knowledge, savoir-faire, is now transformed by digitali-
zation. I think that this is an enormous transformation for which 
a new organization of academic knowledge is needed. More prac-
tically, more precisely, it necessitates the creation of new forms 
of doctoral schools, new forms of high-level research.
RS: Tertiary retention is your term to describe exteriorization of 
long-term memory in mnemo-technical systems such as archives, 
libraries or even oral lore. How do you apply this to the digital?
BS: The way in which we create new theories and theoretical 
objects is conditioned by our instruments. Knowledge, par-
ticularly academic knowledge, is always conditioned by what I 
call the literal tertiary retention in the case of the knowledge 
of the West, for example the alphabet and writing as the con-
dition of the possibility of apodictic geometry in the sense of 
Husserl. Today we have objects, biological, mathematical, physi-
cal, nanotechno-physical objects. Actually, every kind of object is 
produced by digital means that are not means in reality but are 
in fact the element of knowledge in the sense of Hegel: its new 
milieu. Therefore it is absolutely necessary to develop new forms 
of doctoral studies, which will not only produce new objects of 
knowledge but new instruments for producing rational objects.
RS: Given the agenda of your book Digital Studies: Organologie 
des savoirs et technologies de la connaissance of 2014 I take it that 
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you are not talking about digital technologies as new instruments 
of knowledge production in the sense of Digital Humanities.
BS: What I mean is not Digital Humanities which considers digi-
tal instruments in a classical way. What I mean is digital studies 
which is very different. The question for people who use digital 
means for analyzing archives for history for example or archeol-
ogy does not really changes their views on what is death, what is 
the role of linguistics etc. For me, to study digital text is to nec-
essarily completely reconsider what language is - once digitized. 
It is also questioning what is the relationship between language 
and writing, how writing modified the evolution of language, 
made possible linguistics for example etc. What we need is an 
epistemological revolution.
RS: What does such an epistemological revolution look like?
BS: A laptop, a computer, is a device, an apparatus to produce 
categories or categorization through algorithms. The basis of the 
theory of knowledge for Aristotle is the question of categoriza-
tion. What is happening with digitization is an enormous trans-
formation of the basis of knowledge. And I think this needs a 
complete reconsideration of what is knowledge as such. I myself 
practice with my students what I call contributive categorization 
exploring what is the process of categorization for Aristotle but 
also by practicing the process of categorization with data.
The other important aspect is destruction: Innovation goes 
much more quickly now and knowledge arrives always too late. 
Not only in the sense of Hegel saying that Minerva is flying in the 
evening and that philosophy is always too late. We have today a 
transformation of technical milieu that goes extremely quickly 
and we need to practice the transindividuation of knowledge in a 
new way. To that end, we have to develop a contributive research 
that is based on the use of those processes of contributive cat-
egorization but that are also processes of contributive certi-
fication based on hermeneutic communities, realizing in such 
a way the method of what Kurt Lewin called “action research” 
where you can involve many people in a team who are not nec-
essary academics but interested in the team’s object: your own 
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students but also, in PHD programs based on such a contributive 
research, forming communities of hermeneutic and networked 
action research
RS: Transindividuation is a central concept in your writing, one 
that is inspired by the philosopher Gilbert Simondon and aims at 
co-individuation within a preindividuated milieu. Individuation 
itself is an omnipresent and continuous transformation of the 
individual by information, knowledge, and tertiary retention, 
which is often carried out through the encounter with books, and 
nowadays increasingly through engagement with digital media. 
Transindividuation is the basis for all kinds of social transfor-
mation and is certainly vital to “action research” and “herme-
neutic communities”. Your notion of hermeneutic communities 
and the transindividuation of knowledge reminds me of Pierre 
Lévy’s 1994 book L’intelligence collective: Pour une anthropolo-
gie du cyberspace and other concepts of knowledge production 
from below on the Internet as a kind of democratization of knowl-
edge. Wikipedia is one example, the quantified self movement is 
another one. I also think of your discussion of the transindividu-
ation of memory as a way to overcome the global and quotidian 
“mercantile production of memory”. What role do you think the 
Internet and especially Web 2.0 can play in terms of the tran-
sindividuation of memory and knowledge?
BS: Knowledge itself is a process of transindividuation as it is 
based on controversy, on conflicts of interpretation, on processes 
of certification by critical means, by peer to peer critique. This 
was the basis for the Web in the beginning. At the beginning the 
Web was based on the process of transindividuation. But the Web 
was so successful immediately that the question was how shall 
we create data centers for being able to satisfy this traffic. This 
became a problem of investment, an industrial question in the 
sense of economics, industrial economy. This deeply modified the 
functioning of the Web itself. I know this also because I worked 
with the WWW Consortium. There was an enormous lobby by 
Silicon Valley for completely transforming the data format into 
computable formats dedicated to data economy, dedicated to 
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computation. Today the platforms, the social networks and ser-
vices like Amazon, Google or Facebook are only dedicated to the 
computation of and on data. This was not the role of the Web at 
the beginning. At the beginning the role of the Web was to track 
and trace and to make formalized, searchable  and then compa-
rable the singularities of the people producing webpages etc. So 
I think we need a reinvention of the Web.
RS: On the reinvention of the Web I would like to hear more in 
a moment. First I want to put knowledge, tertiary retention, and 
transindividuation into a broader political context. In your book 
For a New Critique of Political Economy you write: „The consum-
erist model has reached its limits because it has become systemi-
cally short-termist, because it has given rise to a systemic stu-
pidity that structurally prevents the reconstitution of a long-term 
horizon.“ Stupidity and the lack of courage or desire to use ones 
own understanding have been addressed in the Enlightenment 
and later by Critical Theory. Famous in this regard is Adorno’s 
claim that amusement promises a liberation from thinking as 
negation. Your critique of the commodification of culture seems 
to return to both Adorno’s severe critique of distraction and 
the Enlightenment’s call to emergence from one‘s self-incurred 
immaturity. What has changed — since Adorno and after the Web 
2.0 seems to have fulfilled Brecht’s famous media utopia (with 
regard to radio) of putting a microphone in each listener’s hand?
BS: The question is the pharmacology of the Web. I work a lot 
with Adorno and particularly on this question. But my prob-
lem with Adorno is that he couldn’t understand that if he was 
to address these questions with reference to the Enlightenment 
he must transform the Kantian heritage concerning what Kant 
calls schematism and transcendental imagination. I have tried to 
show in Technique and Time 3 that it is impossible to continue to 
follow Immanuel Kant on this question of precisely the process 
of categorization of the concepts of the understanding as a tran-
scendental grip. It is not at all a transcendental grip but is pro-
duced by tertiary retentions. And this is the reason why we need 
to completely redefine the theory of categorization for today. 
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Not only with Aristotle but also with Kant. Moreover we have to 
pass through the theories of symbolic time by Ernst Cassirer and 
also by Durkheim explaining that categorization is produced for 
example in shamanic society through the totem.
This is the first question. The second question is how to deal 
with the pharmakon. If you don’t use the pharmakon to produce 
therapies it will necessarily be a poison. To say we have com-
pletely to redefine education and put students not into the gram-
mar school but in front of a computer, is wrong. I am absolutely 
opposed to the notion that the digital must become the first pri-
ority of education. Children should first be absolutely versed in 
grammar and orthography before they deal with computation. 
Education in school should follow the historical order of altera-
tion of media, i.e. you begin with drawing, continue with writing, 
you go on to photography, for example, and then you use the com-
puter which would not be before students are 15 or 16.
So the point is not to make all children use a computer but to 
make them understand what a computer is, which is completely 
different. If we don’t create a new education the practice of the 
market will rule like the practices of a dealer. In a way the digi-
tal is as strong as heroin is for the brain. It has exactly the same 
effect on society as heroin has on the brain. When you use her-
oin or opium the capacity of your brain to produce endorphins 
decreases and there is a moment when you become completely 
dependent on its intoxication, and have no other way than using 
heroin. Now we are in such a situation with the digital tertiary 
retention. The reason is we don’t know how to cap it, this phar-
makon. It is prescribed by sellers of services, the dealers of digi-
tal technology. I don’t mean to be providing a moral judgment 
here, but a purely pharmacological analysis. The problem is not 
that Google or other big Internet-companies have bad intentions 
but that we, the academics, don’t make it our job to produce a 
digital pharmacology and organology.
RS: Your call to produce a digital organology reminds me of your 
notions on how music apparatuses such as the phonograph or 
radio have created a short-circuit in musical skills. Being able 
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to play music should be a precondition for significant skill when 
listening to music. The obvious link to the digital would be that 
we don’t understand the digital if we don’t understand its appa-
ratuses, i.e. operating systems, programs, applications. As you 
point out, before we acquire such understanding we have to be 
able to master reading and writing. This, however, seems to be 
jeopardized by the digital apparatuses which undermine the 
organology of transindividuation within book culture by compro-
mising lasting attention, deep reading and complex thinking. In 
your book Taking Care of Youth and the Generations you refer to 
the neuroscientist Maryanne Wolf who holds that we are not born 
to read but have to undergo a cerebral rearrangement in order to 
achieve the skills of reading and writing, a cerebral rearrange-
ment which is, as Wolf and others hold, nowadays jeopardized by 
digital media. In a later text, on Web-Philosophy, you cite Wolf’s 
concern as a mother asking herself how the digital brain will be 
able to grow and withstand digital technologies without nega-
tive effects. You conclude: “If bodies like the World Wide Web 
Consortium do not take on this kind of question, these organiza-
tions cannot reach very far.” What is it such institutional bodies 
could do but don’t? And how can they help to reinvent the Web?
BS: I think they should produce negentropy. Now, the problem 
of negentropy is always the production of singularity. If you are 
to manage a huge flux of data through algorithms, that are auto-
matic computations, you need to process a comparison between 
singularities to make them analyzable and understandable, and 
you transform this singularities into particularities. A singular-
ity is self defined, and a particularity is defined by a set of which 
it is a part. Computation necessarily transforms singularities 
into particularities of such a set. Using digital technologies, you 
have to deal between negentropy and entropy or, to say it with 
Saussure and structuralism, between diachrony and synchrony. 
In the theory of systems, diachrony is the dynamic tendency that 
makes dynamic the system, and synchrony is another tendency 
that maintains the system meta-stable. I believe that it is today 
absolutely possible and necessary to redefine the architecture of 
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the networks creating algorithms and big data dedicated to the 
traceability of singularities and to put these singularities into 
hermeneutic communities for creating dynamic communities of 
knowledge -with technologies for annotation, new types of data 
analysis algorithms and new kinds of social networks.
RS: Negentropy, i.e. negative entropy, can be understood as the 
export of entropy by a system in order to keep its own entropy 
low. You consider individuation as a negentropic activity. How 
would the Web achieve this?
BS: The Web is producing entropy not only in the sense of ther-
modynamics, but in the sense of information theory, cybernetics, 
theory of complex systems and what I call now neguanthropol-
ogy. The Web is completely subject to computation and automa-
tion based only on computation. Now, through interactions with 
the practitioners of the web, helped by algorithms like bots on 
Wikipedia, these practitioners created negentropy - that I call 
also noodiversity. This is what is destroyed by the data economy, 
only based on computation. The question for the future, not only 
for the Web, but for human kind is to produce negentropy. The 
problem of climate change for example is a problem of increasing 
entropy. It is possible to create new systems dedicated to reduce 
the automata of algorithms for giving people the possibilities to 
trace, confront and co-individuate their differences, their singu-
larities. I am working on a new theory of social networking not 
based on the network effect but based on the theory of collective 
individuation. The problem is not dedicated to a short-termist 
market but based on a long-term economy capable of producing 
a new type of development based on an economy of negentropy.
Politics and Government
RS: Let me respond to the issue of long-term economy and 
negentropy and the overdue transition from the Anthropocene or 
Entropocene, as you put it, into a new “general ecology” or, as you 
call it, Neganthropocene. In many of your texts you underline the 
destructive nature of the globalized industrial system, warning, 
as in your book What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology 
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(2013, French 2010), that “it is the future of terrestrial life that is 
at stake with unprecedented urgency” and calling for a “peaceful 
growth and development”. Degrowth – which was first discussed 
in the 1979 book Demain la Décroissance: Entropie-écologie-
économie by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Jacques Grinevald, 
and Ivo Rens – is an imperative in many alternative, ecological 
economies today as for example the title of Serge Latouche’s 
2009 book Farewell to Growth indicates. However, when the 
German philosopher Hans Jonas, in his 1979 book The Imperative 
of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age 
entertains the same idea, he assumes that the rather unpopular 
concept of non-growth can only be implemented by a government 
that does not rely on its constituencies’ approval. Ironically, this 
would, as Jonas notes, turn all the hope to totalitarian countries 
such as China or even Russia who today, however, are far away 
from compromising economic growth on behalf of ecological con-
cerns. In this context it is remarkable that today governments 
in democratic countries such as Germany give themselves what 
they call a Digital Agenda in order to govern the development of 
digital media and its ramifications in society. This Agenda also 
addresses the risks and threats associated with the process of 
digitization such as privacy, dataveillance, as well as pattern rec-
ognition and prediction (and hence manipulation) of individual 
behavior through big data mining. It may come as little surprise 
that businessmen, such as the chairman of the German Federal 
Association for Information Technology, Telecommunications 
and New Media, criticize the high data protection regulations 
set by the government as a hindrance for new business models 
and Germany’s success in the digital revolution and warn that 
we must not apply the rules of the analog world one to one in the 
digital economy but should review the concept of data thriftiness 
and become more daring. With respect to growth concerning 
industry 4.0 and with respect to what has been called data pol-
lution one could say, while the government implements negentro-
pic regulations, the business world rejects any interventions and 
calls for entropic freedom.
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BS: Let me first answer the question about growth and de-
growth. I disagree with the concept of de-growth. The problem 
is not growth as entropy. It is not possible to de-growth. What do 
we mean by growth? The definition of growth by Keynes is abso-
lutely partial and insufficient if not contradictory - particularly 
with respect to his essay Economic possibilities for our grand-
children of 1931. This is also the reason for which I follow today 
Amartya Sen and his new type of indicators for what growth is. 
He doesn’t call this growth, he calls it human development. The 
problem is the development of what he calls “capacitation” and 
what I call myself knowledge. The problem is proletarianization. 
We need an economy of de-proletarianization which is also an 
economy of care. Because knowledge is a type of care. When 
you know how to do something you have knowledge for taking 
care for something. Knowledge was destroyed twice by a first 
and a second industrial revolution as prolerianization of manual 
workers loosing their knowing-how during the 19th century, and 
prolerianization of customers loosing their savoir vivre during 
the 20th century. And the digital revolution is now prolarianiz-
ing academic knowledge and sciences - with big data etc. Now 
I think we have to deproletarianise economy, and to put knowl-
edge at the core of new modes of production and ways of life 
being the beginning of the real growth … In the current situa-
tion, we are decreasing the capability of people to growth, that is 
to know how to live by taking care of life. We become more and 
more dependent on technology. The point is not to de-growth but 
to develop a new economy that is really producing a new type of 
investment. This new economy is what I call a growth of negent-
ropy. But the problems for the current economy is that it is only 
capable to make money with what is purely computable, that is 
purely entropic. Negentropy is produced by bifurcations. The 
market is only based on computation, and the systemic bifurca-
tions are never produced by computation. This is the problem.
As for Hans Jonas’ considerations, yes, you are right, it is 
surprising to see that it is possible to discuss such questions in 
China. But it is not completely surprising. When I was in Nanjing 
the chancellor of the university told me: The West said it is 
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impossible to have a Marxist revolution in China because it was 
not an industrial but a rural society. And you were right, we were 
not an industrial society. But now we are and now that transfor-
mation will happen. Of course, we have to be careful interpret-
ing such discourse. But I think the statement is interesting and 
relevant because today there is a very critical situation on the 
geopolitical level in which you have a society, the United States 
of America, that is capable of controlling everything with a tech-
nology that is in itself entropic, which means: condemned to 
insolvency. Because entropy is creating an enormous insolvency. 
On the other side you have a country like China with enormous 
quantity of disposable money and capacity for investment, who is 
the main shareholder and banker of the United States. So I think 
there is a very interesting techno geopolitical question: How to 
find here the possibility of creating a new stage of the digital. 
We will not find such a possibility in the United States, even if I 
know many people in the U.S. who would be very positive about 
such a change and who believe in its necessity. But in the U.S. it 
is now too late. Because you have stakeholders who have a com-
petitive advantage they don’t want to lose. They cannot work this 
new type of business, the negentropic model, I believe, because 
behind them are shareholders who then won’t make money. The 
transformation of Google to Alphabet is a symptom of this. The 
American economy has very big constraints. I don’t believe that 
they are really capable of producing the new stage of the digital.
The digital is reaching a limit. This limit is expressed and 
reached by the big data as they increase the level of entropy into 
noetic life and systems, such as for example language, as shown 
by Frederic Kaplan [“Linguistic Capitalism and Algorithmic 
Mediation”, Representations 27 (2014), 57–63] regarding the 
linguistic capitalism of Google, that eliminates exceptions that 
are the origin of evolutions of language. This is what Chris 
Anderson’s “The end of theory” is incapable to understand. The 
computational conception of cognition is a new metaphysics of 
capitalism. In the United States you have very important eco-
nomic and political agencies that have enormous possibilities for 
intervention but they don’t have the technological perspectives 
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in order to act properly. I believe it is possible to do things with 
China on this question. But I work also with other people — 
English, Italian, German — and try to create a world-wide con-
sortium about this through the digital studies network. There is 
a new dynamic for addressing the question of the anthropocene, 
which is the actual topic we are discussing here.
RS: The belief in computation as a new metaphysics of capital-
ism! One may also call it – especially the theory of singularity 
as made fashionable by Ray Kurzweil – a new grand narrative 
in a paradoxical, non- or post-human Hegelian sense: The Spirit 
becomes self-aware in the form of artificial intelligence, the jour-
ney of human consciousness is fulfilled once it is given, passed 
on to machines. Would such extension of intelligence be the “pur-
pose in nature” that Kant assumes behind the seemingly non-
rational, aimless purpose and actions of men? And would this be 
— in case this development leads to mankind’s extinction or sup-
pression — the final destiny and inevitable providence of reason 
behind a seemingly unreasonable advancement? However, the 
question at hand is the relationship of such a technological telos 
to political or cultural systems. You seem to link the obsession 
with computation to Western capitalism and expect an alterna-
tive approach from the East. I assume that, when the chancellor 
of the University of Nanjing stated that now that China is indus-
trialized transformation will happen, he didn’t mean a Marxist 
revolution or at least socialist reformations. This assumption 
raises a question: The short-termism, that you claim needs 
to be overcome, is not only a phenomenon of the economy but 
also of contemporary culture as Douglas Rushkoff’s 2013 book 
Present Shock demonstrates, and as Zygmunt Baumann pointed 
out already back in the late 20th century when he described the 
episodic rather than narrative identity of the modern individual 
who is wary of long-term commitments and “abolishes time in 
any other form but a flat collection or an arbitrary sequence of 
present moments; a continuous present.” The ontogenetic short-
termism somehow mirrors the end of grand narratives on the 
phylogenetic level: The Western world lacks the teleological 
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notion (or: grand narrative) to be on its way to a better society (if 
we ignore the mantra from Silicon Valley Start Ups and their like 
that their apps, platforms, and services constantly create a bet-
ter world). In your book Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected 
Individuals: Disbelief and Discredit (2012, French 2006) you 
describe the “spiritual misery” that capitalism generates as 
“disappearance of every horizon of expectation and of all belief, 
whether religious, political, or libidinal”. One may think: to the 
extent that contemporary China holds on to such a teleological 
notion or grand narrative it may be able to orient peoples’ lives 
in longer terms. But is modern China still committed to such a 
cause? Is it able to produce, with its communist underpinnings, 
the “new spirit of capitalism” that you hope for in your book 
The Re-enchantment of the World: The Value of Spirit Against 
Industrial Populism (2014, French 2006)? Or is it, with its aggres-
sively growing economy and reckless culture of consumption, yet 
another form of short-termist, runaway capitalism or, as you call 
it, a “drive-based organization of capitalism”?
BS: I don’t think I am equipped to interpret the relationship 
between industrialisation and Marxism in China. Personally I 
don’t believe the question is a Marxist revolution. I don’t agree 
with what is called Marxism even in the sense of Marx himself. 
But I believe that in Marx, for example in the Grundrisse, you can 
find something else extremely important concerning automation 
and mechanical knowledge etc. I believe that the future belongs 
to those who are capable of producing a new theory of becoming 
and of creation of bifurcations into becoming creating futures, 
and I believe that new theory will not come from neo-liberalism. 
Because the reality of those theories is to ensure the efficiency 
of computation and the overcome of computation is bifurcation. I 
believe those theories will especially come out of Asia – but also 
of other countries everywhere in the world. Because Asia is, pre-
cisely, a long-term civilization. Of course, you are right, if you 
go to Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, or Hong Kong, it is absolutely con-
sumerist behavior that you will see. But I don’t think at all that 
the change comes from the masses. I think the change comes 
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from contradictions in the system. I also believe, the change in 
the Web that I referred to before is precisely based on the re-
functionalisation of the digital differed time with the real time. It 
is a question today precisely of the reorganization of the digital. 
And it is in the interest of Asia and Europe to part ways with 
the Californian model of networking. And I think this is possible. 
There are very good thinkers and engineers in Europe. Europe 
and Asia will have to find a kind of agreement. Maybe they will 
not find it. I would even say, probably they will not find it. But if 
they don’t, it will be a catastrophe. It will be a military and eco-
logical catastrophe. We have no chance. My job is to create this 
opportunity, not against the United States of course, but from 
the point of view of China, Japan, Russia etc. it is a question not 
only of competition but opposition to the U.S. This is for Europe 
another question. We have to find rational ways to avoid these 
conflicts. I think this is possible. It is improbable, extremely 
improbable. But it is not absolutely impossible.
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